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iPreface,
This thesis is substantially an account of the general 
election of 1890, based on reports in the newspapers of 
that time. By this method, it did not prove too difficult 
to get a reasonably full and accurate picture of events as 
they occurred. In other words, I have found myself able 
to give fairly confident answers to the two questions:
’what happened at the election?’ and ’why did it happen?’ - 
within the rather restricted framework of the election 
period itself. Moreover, since to the best of my knowledge 
this material has not been worked over before, I have tried 
to let the facts speak for themselves as far as possible; 
and, with one exception (the last section of Chapter Two), 
have purposely refrained from blending my own long term 
interpretations with more concrete reportage on the election. 
I hope that others will thus feel free to use the substance 
of what I have to say on the election for their own ends, 
even if their ideas on the subject do not agree in every 
respect with mine.
For it is these wider problems of interpretation that 
remain the most baffling. Why was the election ever held 
at all? What, if any, axioms of Japanese constitutional 
development and political behaviour can we deduce from a 
study of the election? I have my own opinions on these 
important and controversial topics; and the Introduction 
and Conclusions have been written partly with a view to 
expressing some of them. One short, general observation may not be out of place here. A good many books seem to 
have been written with the theme of the breakdown of 
parliamentary institutions in Japan in their authors’ minds. 
Perhaps, I began by wondering why the Japanese parliamentary 
system has worked.
All place names given in the text have been checked for 
their readings in Yoshida Togo’s Dai Nihon Chimei Jisho 
(Dictionary of Japanese Place Names, Tokyo, 1938-40) - a 
most useful and fascinating work, personal names were much 
more of a trouble; often for these too. however, I was able 
to find somewhere or other a phonetic (i.e. kana) reading.
The sources for such readings may not have been authoritative 
in every case; but, on the whole, I consider them reliable.
In an effort to reduce to the minimum possible errors or 
doubt arising from my renderings of personal names, I have 
included at the back of this work a list (Appx. XIII) of 
the names in Chinese script of all those elected to the House
ii
o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  J u l y  1890,  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  Appendix  XIV 
i s  a  ^ a r d - c o r e 1 l i s t  o f  t h e  names o f  p e r s o n s  n o t  e l e c t e d  
to  the  D i e t ,  f o r  which I  have  n o t  so f a r  d i s c o v e r e d  
p h o n e t i c  r e a d i n g s .  T h is  a p p e n d ix  g i v e s  my r e n d e r i n g s  s i d e  
by s i d e  w i t h  t h e  C h inese  c h a r a c t e r s .  These a r e  names o f  
p eo p le  m e n t io n e d  i n  th e  m ain  body o f  t h e  t e x t ,  and have 
b een  u n d e r l i n e d  t h e r e .
F i n a l l y ,  some ack n o w led g em en ts • The A u s t r a l i a n  N a t i o n a l  
U n i v e r s i t y  i n  i t s  c o r p o r a t e  c a p a c i t y  made t h i s  p i e c e  o f  
r e s e a r c h  p o s s i b l e  by award ing  me a t h r e e - y e a r  S c h o l a r s h i p ,  
and by p a y in g  my f a r e s  t o  and from J a p a n .  On a more 
p e r s o n a l  l e v e l ,  I  w ish  t o  e x p r e s s  my deep  a p p r e c i a t i o n  t o  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  members o r  ex-members o f  th e  s t a f f  o f  t h e  
A.N.U. f o r  t h e  s u p e r v i s i o n ,  a d v i c e ,  and  encouragem ent  t h e y  
have k i n d l y  g i v e n  me from t im e  t o  t im e :  A s s o c i a t e - P r o f e s s o r
J . I .  Ackroyd ,  Dr G. B o l to n ,  Dr E .S .  C rawcour ,  and  P r o f e s s o r  
C.P .  F i t z g e r a l d .  While  I  was s t u d y i n g  a t  Tokyo U n i v e r s i t y ,
I  was p r i v i l e g e d  i n  h a v in g  P r o f e s s o r  Ooka Y o s h i t a k e  a s  my 
s u p e r v i s o r  and  s p o n s o r ;  and  r e c e i v e d  f r i e n d s h i p ,  a s  v /e l l  
a s  much v a l u a b l e  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  h u n t i n g  o u t  and p h o t o g r a p h i n g  
m a t e r i a l ,  f rom Mr S a to  S e i z a b u r o .  I n d i v i d u a l  members o f  
t h e  s t a f f s  o f  a r c h i v e s  and l i b r a r i e s ,  b o t h  i n  Tokyo and 
i n  C a n b e r r a ,  who have  a lw ays  been  r e a d y  t o  h e l p  me, a r e  
t o o  numerous t o  m e n t io n  by name; so I  hope t h e y  w i l l  e x c u s e  
me i f  I  g i v e  them a g e n e r a l  b u t  v e r y  s i n c e r e  word o f  
t h a n k s .  I  s h o u l d  l i k e  a l s o  t o  t a k e  t h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  
t h a n k  f o r m a l l y  Mrs M. Cameron f o r  a l l  t h e  h a r d  work she  
h a s  done w i t h  h e r  t y p e w r i t e r .
INTRODUCTION
Japan’s first general election took place as a result
1of the promulgation of the Meiji constitution on 11 February 
1889. This constitution allowed for a bi-cameral Imperial 
Diet. The Upper House (Kizoku-in = House of Peers) of the 
new Diet originally had 252 members. The majority of 
these belonged to a hereditary peerage set up a few years 
before; but this House also contained a considerable 
number of commoners. The Emperor had the power to nominate 
distinguished citizens to the Upper House; and the fifteen 
most wealthy tax-payers in each of the three fu (metropolitan 
districts) and forty-two ken (prefectures) had the right 
to elect one of their number to the House of Peers. The 
Lower House (Shugi-in = House of Representatives) had a 
total of 300 seats, all of which were to be filled by direct 
election from among the people.
Under the terms of the constitution, fomal sovereignty 
resided in the Emperor alone; but actual authority was 
divided between the Diet and a Cabinet of officials. The 
Diet possessed certain important rights, which apart from 
one very minor exception were shared by both Houses in
I
For a translation of the text of the constitution, see 
ItO, Commentaries; or McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., pp. 136-44*
1
r
common. The most notable of these rights was the provision 
that Bills had to have the assent of a majority of members 
in both Houses before they could become law. The annual 
Budget, too, was subject to this veto. Moreover, the 
Government had to assemble the Diet at least once every 
year. The franchise for the House of Representatives was 
at first a very restricted one; but, since it was regulated 
by a separate Law of Election promulgated together with 
the constitution, increasing the number of voters was to 
prove a comparatively easy matter.
On the other hand, the statesmen who had been in 
office since the beginning of the era in 1868 did their 
best to ensure that the innovations of 1889 would not 
deprive them of their control of the executive power. The 
Government was expressly authorized to carry on with the 
previous year’s Budget, in the event of the current estimates 
being rejected by the Diet. Of even more significance was 
the fact that the Meiji constitution was clearly written 
with the idea of ’transcendental’ or non-party Cabinets 
in mind, even though the wording did not rule out the 
possibility of party Cabinets in the future. The ministers 
of state were theoretically appointed and dismissed by the 
Sovereign; and for the first decade or so of constitutional 
rule, they were most reluctant to acknowledge that they
2
3were also responsible for their actions to the Diet, and 
so to the people. We shall find the opening stages of 
this dispute over ministerial responsibility, between 
bureaucrats entrenched in the Cabinet and politicians 
elected to the House of Representatives, already much in 
evidence at the time of the first general election*
The Meiji constitution, as first operated, embodied 
what was essentially a family conception of the state*
The Emperor was an august but somewhat remote Head of the 
Household. The ’elder brothers’ in the Cabinet were 
empowered to carry on His government under what was hoped 
would be the friendly scrutiny of the ’younger brothers’ 
in the Diet. This view of affairs was in many ways the one 
best suited to the political traditions of the nation, and 
actual domestic and international circumstances in the 
1880s; but, in the nature of things, it was bound also to 
come under increasingly severe pressure from the large body 
of ’progressive’ and Liberal-minded opinion represented 
in the Lower House.
In the context of overall political development, the 
constitution of 1889 is perhaps best seen as a conservative 
but sincere attempt to arrive at a lasting modus vivendi 
between these two important groups: the bureaucrats in 
office, and the Liberals in opposition. The latter had
4been pressing their demand for a constitution and a 
representative national assembly since 1874; and their 
campaign has come to be known as the Jiyu Minken Undo 
(Liberty and Popular Rights Movement). Thus, the political 
history of Japan for the sixteen or so years before the 
election of 1890 had been marked by much tension and 
conflict; with the advocates of popular rights continually 
urging the bureaucrats to move more quickly than they 
wished in the direction of administrative reform, and 
with the bureaucrats having to use all their skill to 
avoid the twin dangers of isolation and complete defeat.
Liberal demands were not met in full, but by a policy 
of piecemeal concessions. Often these concessions were 
made to appear more substantial than they really were, and 
the bureaucrats in their pronouncements from the throne 
always laid great stress on the underlying principle of 
gradual advance. Nevertheless there was not much doubt 
from 1875 at the latest - and I personally think from a 
time several years before this date - that a constitution 
entailing representative institutions would be inaugurated 
eventually. Prom then on, the disputes were mainly over 
questions of the timing, theory, and provisions of the 
proposed new system. Therefore though the period from 
1874 to I889 was one of tension and conflict, it was a
5s p e c i a l  s o r t  o f  t e n s io n  and  a s p e c i a l  s o r t  o f  c o n f l i c t .
The p re d o m in a n t p a t t e r n  was n o t one o f  h e a d -o n  c o l l i s i o n  
b e tw ee n  two w h o lly  a n t a g o n i s t i c  and  r e s o l u t e l y  u n y ie ld in g  
s e t s  o f  f o r c e s .  R a th e r ,  t h e r e  was a lo n g  draw n o u t 
p r o c e s s  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  b e tw ee n  two m u tu a l ly  o p p o sed , 
c e r t a i n l y ,  b u t  i n  some ways com plem en tary  and n o t p e rm a n e n tly  
i r r e c o n c i l a b l e ,  pow er g ro u p s .
An u n d e r s ta n d in g  o f  th e  e x a c t  n a tu r e  o f  t h i s  i n t e r a c t i o n  
i s  e s s e n t i a l  f o r  a p ro p e r  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  M e ij i  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p ro b lem s and  h i s t o r y  a s  a  w h o le . At i t s  h ig h e s t  l e v e l ,  i t  
to o k  p la c e  w i t h in  th e  s i n g l e  g ro u p  o f  sh iz o k u  ( i . e .  ex ­
sa m u ra i)  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  and  i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  t h a t  h a d  come to  
pow er a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  de f a c to  s o v e r e ig n ty  
to  th e  th ro n e  i n  1868 . T hese  men h a d  as  t h e i r  g ra n d  aim  th e  
th o ro u g h  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  th e  s t a t e  a lo n g  W e ste rn  l i n e s .  
P ro m in en t among them  w ere: K ido K o in , Okubo T o s h im ic h i, 
Y araagata A rito m o , I t o  H iro b u ra i, Okuma S h ig e n o b u , In o u e  
K ao ru , K uroda K iy o ta k a , I t a g a k i  T a is u k e , M a tsu k a ta  M asa y o sh i, 
and  G oto S h o j i r o .  The members o f  t h i s  l i t t l e  g ro u p  o f  
t a l e n t e d  n a t i o n - b u i l d e r s  w ere o f t e n  b i t t e r l y  d iv id e d  among 
th e m s e lv e s .  Y et m ost o f  them  w ere e x tre m e ly  i n f l u e n t i a l  
i n  one c a p a c i ty  o r  a n o th e r  f o r  an  i n t e r v a l  o f  f o r t y  y e a r s  
o r  m ore; and  i t  i s  my o p in io n  t h a t ,  on b a la n c e ,  th e y  had  
more t o  u n i t e  th a n  d iv id e  them .
6Divisions arose from clan rivalries, personal ambitions, 
and differences of temperament as well as from open 
disagreements on matters strictly political. Yet, at the 
same time, there were other, unifying factors also at work. 
Nearly all the Meiji statesmen had known in their youth the 
frustrations and hardships of the life of a provincial 
and minor samurai under Tokugawa feudalism. As former 
samurai, they retained much of their sense of themselves 
as a governing elite. As former dissatisfied samurai, 
they were only too ready to initiate a policy of wholesale 
reform once they got the chance. Despite a number of 
relatively minor upsets and failures, therefore, peaceful 
and successful change from above was the dominant theme of 
the Meiji era. It passed quickly from restoration to 
renovation, and ended up with having accomplished what 
amounted to a revolution.
There was another youthful experience which the Meiji 
leaders had in common:- the bitterness of knowing that 
their country, under the Tokugawa Shögunate, had been 
helpless against Commodore Perry and his warships in 1853 
and 1854. This meant that they desired to reconstruct the 
state not only for its internal good, but also for its 
external safety. Patriotic indignation was married to a 
concern for personal advancement. Everything pointed to
7the need to strengthen the Empire against the West by- 
making it as like the West as possible.
Identical class background, patriotism, and a strong 
interest in Western civilization - there were other elements, 
too, in their emotional and political situation to keep the 
Meiji administrators and leaders of public opinion in 
fundamental sympathy with one another. The national ideal 
of service to the throne, to which they ostensibly owed 
their initial success and which they themselves sedulously 
fostered, was even for them something more than an obligatory 
public attitude; and, with it, went a genuine, if not 
entirely disinterested, sense of responsibility for the 
welfare and progress of their fellow-subjects and compatriots.
Furthermore, empiricism was a notable trait of the 
political behaviour of this group as a whole. Both for 
the bureaucrats who were permanently in office and for the 
Liberal leaders who several times resigned from the Government 
only to re-enter it again, politics was pre-eminently the 
art of the possible. This meant that while the Meiji leader« 
kept to the end their capacity for quarreling among 
themselves, each successive dispute usually resulted in 
some sort of compromise rather than a lasting rupture. To 
repeat:- the pattern of constitutional development from 
1874 onwards is one of intense but localized conflict within
8an overall framework of interaction. Behind all this 
lay the collapse of the Baku-han system (Baku =
Bakufu or Shogunate; han = autonomous fief or Daimiate), 
and the urgent need to put something in its place. The 
constitution of 1889 was, in a sense, the delayed but 
logical response to the restoration of 1868, the 
achievement of which had not been crowned by any 
comprehensive or durable settlement. The entire period 
1868-1889 has the flavour of an interregnum.
The visible start of the Jiyu Mihken Undo was in 
October 1873, when the Great Council of State (Dajokan) 
was divided on the question of whether or not to go to 
war with Korea, and the minority in favour of war resigned
en masse in protest against the majority decision for
2 —peace. The Dajokan was an ancient Court institution which 
had been revived in 1868 as the supreme governing body of 
the Empire. It continued in this role, acting also as a 
Regency Council, until it was replaced by a modern Cabinet 
system in 1885. By 1873» the Dajokan was in the hands of 
the real makers of the restoration - a handful of the more 
talented Court nobles, and the group of young but extremely 
able minor samurai already mentioned. These latter were
2
For an account of this dispute, see Ike, Triumph of the 
Peace Party in Japan in 1873# Far Eastern Quarterly, vol.2, 
May 1942.
9all from the four great f restoration* clans in the south­
western parts of the Empire:- Satsuma in the extreme south
/
of Kyushu; Choshu in the most westerly part of Honshu;
Tosa on the Pacific coast of Shikoku; and Hizen in the north­
western region of Kyushu behind Nagasaki. This Satcho- 
Tohi coalition had been formed in the preliminary stages 
of the restoration, and had lasted more or less intact 
until the great split of October 1873. After that date, 
we tend to find To-Hi 1 renegades* in the van of opposition 
to their former Sat-Cho colleagues in the Government.
The councillors who had advocated hostilities with 
Korea were: Saigo Takamori (Satsuma), Eto Shimpei (Hizen), 
Soejima Taneomi (Hizen), Itagaki Taisuke (Tosa), Goto Shojiro 
(Tosa), Furusawa Shigeru (Tosa). Saigo, an outstanding 
figure in the War of the Restoration, returned home to 
Kagoshima to prepare for a feudal and militarist reaction 
against the new regime. His course of action led eventually 
to the Satsuma rebellion of 1877, in the final battle of 
which he lost his life. Eto died as the defeated leader of 
a much smaller rising in Hizen in 1874. It was the Tosa 
(modern Kochi prefecture) group of statesmen, headed by 
Itagaki, that turned to the far less traditional, and 
ultimately far more successful, method of peaceful, political 
agitation as a means of prosecuting their case against
10
the Government* Between them, Tosa and Itagaki gave 
birth to Japanese Liberalism*
In its origins, then, the Jiyu Minken Undo was a 
Tosa-regional movement. It was also a samurai-class 
movement. By 1873> many samurai in all districts were 
keenly dissatisfied with the Government. Xenophobic 
and haughty, impoverished and largely ignorant of the 
real state of the nation and its relations with the 
outside world - these men had been won over by the 
restoration cry of ’Revere the Emperor; expel the 
barbarian!f, and had looked forward to seeing the new 
rulers do just that. Instead, they found the Dajokan 
determined to introduce Western ways into the country, as 
the basis and goal for its programme of complete 
reconstruction at home. The replacement of independent 
fiefs (han) by prefectures (ken) in 1871 had been followed 
by the steady whittling away of the hereditary stipends and 
special privileges of the samurai class as a whole. No 
wonder they were discontented, though in the circumstances 
no special blame can be attached to the Government for 
what was taking place. It was on these feelings of wrathful 
disappointment among the members of the only politically 
conscious class in the nation that Saigo and Eto relied
11
for their policy of armed force against the Dajokan, 
and Itagaki and his colleagues for their policy of Liberal 
propaganda against the Dajokan.
Against this background, it was only natural that the 
earliest Liberal organizations should have been confined 
in their membership and sphere of action to the Tosa samurai. 
The first of these organizations was the Aikoku-koto 
(Public Party of Patriots), set up by Itagaki and a small 
group of sympathizers in Tokyo in January 1874. The 
Aikoku-koto was never anything more than a discussion club 
and is unimportant in itself; however on 17 January 1874, 
it sent a memorial to the Dajokan, asking for the establishment 
of an elected national assembly. This was the first public 
statement of the aims of the new Liberal movement. Two 
months later, Itagaki was back in Kochi city and busy 
founding the Tosa Risshi-sha (Society For Establishing One’s 
Aim In Life). This Risshi-sha, though it remained a purely 
local association, was in many ways the parent-body of the 
Liberal movement. It had two distinct functions. One was 
to assist the economic rehabilitation of former samurai of 
the Tosa clan; the other was to strive for the attainment 
of the political ideas of the Aikoku-koto. Itagaki had 
formed the Risshi-sha by merging the Aikoku-koto with a 
Tosa patriotic club (the Kainan Gisha).
12
The next step was the founding of the Aikoku-sha 
(Patriotic Society) at Osaka in February 1875» The 
founders of this new society were the leaders of the Risshi- 
sha. They hoped by transferring the centre of their 
political activities to Osaka, by tradition the most 
’cosmopolitan’ and least feudal part of the Empire, to 
free them from the local ties and economic sectionalism 
of the parent-body. With this in mind, Itagaki and his 
adherents sent out invitations to other progressive but 
regional and samurai-centred clubs in different parts of 
the country, asking them to send delegates to a meeting to 
be held in Osaka. A number of them did, and it was from 
this meeting that the Patriotic Society was born, without 
in any way disrupting the existence of such groups as the 
Risshi-sha in Kochi and elsewhere.
Within three weeks of its founding, however, the 
Aikoku-sha was dissolved. This sudden dissolution came 
about partly as a result of insolvency; but the main cause 
was Itagaki*s decision to re-enter the Government. 
Concurrently with the parleys that had been going on among 
the leaders of the Risshi-sha and kindred organizations, 
a completely different set of talks had been in progress 
between Itagaki and Kido Koin, on the one hand, and senior 
ministers still in the Government, on the other hand. This
13
second set of talks is known as the Osaka Conference;
and they resulted in a general agreement between the
parties concerned on the desirability of a definite but
3gradual transition to constitutional rule* It was on 
the basis of this compromise that Itagaki rejoined the 
Dajökan, and by doing so left the Aikoku-sha, of which 
he was the chief architect and chosen leader, with little 
option but to disband*
This setback to the growth of the popular rights 
movement, severe though it was at the time, was not a 
lasting one. In October I876, Itagaki again resigned from 
the Dajokan, this time on the grounds that his Sat-Cho 
colleagues were not keeping good faith with regard to the 
decisions made at the Osaka Conference, and resumed his 
stance of Liberal opposition. Then, in the summer of 
I878, the Aikoku-sha was revived. Prom the time of its 
re-establishment, the Aikoku-sha, with Osaka still as its 
headquarters, quickly grew into what its founders had 
originally meant it to be. That is to say, it became the 
controlling body of a national movement for popular rights, 
embracing all sections of the population and super-imposing 
itself on the old provincial allegiances.
3 The fruits of the Osaka Conference were made public in the 
Imperial rescript of 14 April 1875» setting up a Senate 
(Genrö-in) and a Supreme Court (Daishin-in). Power of 
appointment to both these bodies was in the hands of the 
Emperor. This rescript also announced that a constitutional 
system would be introduced gradually. See Appx. I below.
14
The next few years produced a spate of political clubs 
and discussion groups throughout the land, and many of 
them were affiliated to the Aikoku-sha. The latter, for 
its part, embarked on a campaign of radical propaganda 
with the intention of forcing the Government to give way 
tö its demand for a parliament, and held regular conventions 
in Osaka for delegates from its affiliated clubs. Closely 
linked with these developments was the fact that the Liberal 
movement was tending to draw more and more of its support 
from the urban middle classes and the rural gentry of the 
villages, and, conversely, was less and less just a mouthpiece 
for samurai discontents.
At the fourth of the Aikoku-shafs Osaka conventions, 
which opened in March 1880, the name of the Society was 
changed to The Union For The Establishment Of A Parliament 
(Kokkai Kisei Domei Kai). In November of the same year, the 
title of this - the most prominent still of all the popular 
rights associations - was altered again to The Great Japan 
Parliament Supporters Association (Dai Nihon Kokkai Kisei 
Yushi Kai). At the same time, it was decided to found * a 
party with fixed principles and based upon the idea of 
f r e e d o m . T h i s  resolution bore fruit on 29 October 1881, 
when the Jiyu-to (Liberty Party) was formed in Tokyo,
4"
Lay, Rise of Political Parties in Japan, TASJ, vol.30,Pt. iii, 1902, p.384.
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w i t h i n  t h r e e  weeks o f  th e  p r o m u lg a t io n  o f  th e  I m p e r i a l  
r e s c r i p t  t h a t  p ro m is e d  a n  e l e c t e d  p a r l i a m e n t  w i t h i n  a 
g i v e n  tim e$  The f i r s t  p r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  J i y u - t ö  was I t a g a k i  
T a is u k e  h i m s e l f .  I t s  v i c e - p r e s i d e n t  was N akajiraa  N obuyuki, 
l a t e r  f i r s t  S p e a k e r  o f  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  The 
Dai N ihon  Kokkai K i s e i  Y ü sh i  K ai was am algam ated  w i th  t h e  
new o r g a n i z a t i o n .
The c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  J i y u - t o  was t h e  c u lm i n a t io n  o f  a l l  
t h a t  h ad  gone b e f o r e .  I t  m arked  th e  f i n a l  s t a g e  o f  t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  from  r e g i o n a l  sa m u ra i  c lu b s  t o  a  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t y  w i th  no r e s t r i c t i o n s  on m em bership , c l e a r l y  e n u n c i a t e d  
p r i n c i p l e s ,  a p r o p e r l y  o r g a n iz e d  s t r u c t u r e ,  and  a g r e a t  
d e a l  o f  s u p p o r t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  c o u n t r y .  I t a g a k i  h a d  r e a l i z e d  
h i s  a m b i t io n  o f  e l e v a t i n g  th e  m ass o f  th e  p e o p le  t o  a 
p o s i t i o n  from  w hich  t h e y  c o u ld  r e a s o n a b ly  lo o k  fo rw a rd  t o  
p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  o f  t h e i r  n a t i o n .  T h i r t y  
y e a r s  e a r l i e r ,  few , i f  a n y ,  J a p a n e s e  had  even  begun  t o  
t h i n k  i n  such  t e r n s ;  and  h i s  p i l g r i m a g e  o f  o p p o s i t i o n  had  
l e d  him from  Tokyo t o  K o c h i ,  th e n c e  t o  O saka , and f i n a l l y  
back  t o  Tokyo a g a i n .  The d i s s i d e n t  c o u n c i l l o r  had  r e t u r n e d  
t o  h i s  n a t i v e  p r o v i n c e ,  t o g e t h e r  w i th  h i s  c l o s e s t  a s s o c i a t e s
5
See Appx. I I  b e lo w .
6
See Appx. I l l  be low
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in the central Government, early in 1874, There, he had 
set about repairing his political fortunes with the aid 
of regional loyalism and shizoku hostility towards the 
Government. Then had come the vital move to Osaka, 
heralding the Liberal appeal to the wealthier elements 
in the nation at large. This had led at last to the setting 
up of the Jiyu-to, Japan’s first political party proper, 
in what seemed like an hour of triumph, in the capital of 
of the Empire and in preparation for a parliament to be 
summoned in 1890.
The Liberty and Popular Rights Movement had started 
as a development of localist feeling and the dissatisfaction 
of the former samurai with the waning of their class. If 
it had never moved out of the context of its origins, it 
would have been capable of producing a vigorous expression 
of particular grievances, but it would have been without 
either permanent or national significance. It was the 
signal achievement of Itagaki Taisuke, and to a lesser extent 
of Goto Shojiro, that they were able out of such relatively 
unpromising material, and in a remarkably short time, to 
inspire associations of a less restricted and more durable 
type. These associations subsisted in the main on an 
essentially theoretical notion of Liberty, which could be 
forsaken for collusion with the Government as readily as it
17
was substantiated by violence against it, and on a natural
/
proneness to make common but ephemeral cause on controversial 
topics of the day. Moreover, they retained all the stresses 
of individual temperament and regional affinities that had 
marked their antecedents. Yet, in spite of this, these 
groupings were recognizable political parties. They 
represented, in a general and reasonably unified way, some 
national or class interest that was itself of importance 
to the Empire as it was becoming, and was not merely a 
decayed vestige of what it had been.
Two other important political parties were established 
in Tokyo within a few months of the founding of the Jiyu-to. 
The Rikken Teisei-to (Constitutional Imperial Party), a 
Government sponsored body, was launched in March 1882; and 
Okuma Shigenobu, having recently resigned from the Dajokan, 
started the Rikken Kaishin-to (Constitutional Progressive 
Party) in April 1882.
Okuma*s resignation had taken place in October 1881, 
amidst conditions of great popular excitement, and in 
conjunction with the promulgation of the rescript of 12 
October 1881, referred to above. In this rescript, one 
of the most momentous ever issued, the Emperor Meiji declared:
We shall, in the twenty-third year of Meiji H 1890_7
establish a Parliament....... and We charge Our
faithful subjects bearing Our commissions to make, 
in the meantime, all necessary preparations to that 
end.
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The departure of Okuma, perhaps the most influential figure 
in the Dajokan after the death of Okubo Toshimichi in 
I878, had come about ostensibly because of differences of 
opinion with his colleagues - notably Iwakura Tomomi,
Ito Hirobumi, and Kuroda Kiyotaka - over the pace of 
constitutional development, and the sale of certain 
Government properties in Hokkaido. The real situation may 
have been that Okuma felt himself in danger of political 
eclipse, as he was by 1881 the only representative of the 
former fief of Hizen left in the senior councils of what 
was a predominantly Sat-Cho Government. Moreover, he and 
Ito were the two obvious contenders for the authority of 
Iwakura Tomomi, an elderly and failing Court noble, who had 
played a major part in the restoration coup and subsequent 
decisions. Therefore Okuma might have been feeling tempted 
to try and secure his own position by riding the new wave 
of a parliament, when he submitted a memorial in March 
1881 advocating the summoning of an elected parliament 
within two years, and the transfer of control of the 
administration to the leader of the party with the largest 
number of seats in the chamber.
Whatever the case, Okuma*s views on the constitutional 
issue, and his protests against the Dajokan!s willingness
7
Miyakoshi, Nihon Kensei Kiso Shiryo, p.311. Trans. Beckmann, Making, Appx. VI.
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to let Kuroda have the Hokkaido properties at a ’give-away* 
price, were made known in the press. Naturally, they 
earned him an immense amount of popularity with the growing 
body of petitioners for a parliament and with the general 
public. The attitude of the other members of the Dajokan 
soon ceased to be a matter just for editorial censure, and 
became the subject of indignation meetings up and down the 
land. In Tokyo and Osaka, the political temperature ran 
dangerously high, Okuma* s colleagues on the Dajokan, 
badly shaken, regarded him as little better than a traitor; 
and eventually Ito took the lead in forcing his resignation. 
At the same time, Ito prevailed upon the Council to reverse 
its previous decision with regard to the Hokkaido sale, 
and to mollify public opinion still further by announcing 
a firm date for the opening of a parliament, Okuma had 
lost a war for himself, but had won an important battle for 
his country. The whole affair had been one of the most 
spectacular manifestations of the sustained, but usually 
muted, clan and personal rivalries that went on within the 
higher circles of the Meiji leadership.
The Kaishin-to, then, when it was formed in the March 
and April of the following year, was pre-eminently Okuma's 
party; and the fallen giant was henceforth to devote some 
of his abundant energies to retrieving his power by means
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of party politics. His principal helpers in his new venture 
were a group of well-educated and talented young bureaucrats, 
who had resigned from office in sympathy with him. Among 
them were Shimada Saburo, Ozaki Yukio, Inukai Tsuyoshi, 
and Ono Azusa. Okuma could also count on a great deal of 
support from the Tokyo intelligentsia in general, chiefly 
because of his life-long friendship with that renowned 
scholar and Westernizer, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the president 
of Keio University. In the sphere of commerce and industry, 
the new party had the even more influential favour of 
Iwasaki Yataro and his Mitsubishi Company.
The separate worlds of learning and big business were 
the mainstays of the Kaishin-to, in its initial stages at 
any rate. Thanks to its good inner organization and 
conspicuously able leadership, however, the party also 
attracted all those, in the country districts as well as 
the towns, of substantial means and moderate views who were 
unnerved by the extremism of the Left wing of the Jiyu-to.
In this manner, it gradually grew into the party of the 
educated and well-heeled middle classes everywhere, 
professional as well as business and academic.
As a party of fairly wide appeal and a cautious butg
sincerely held reformist outlook, the Constitutional
For its original manifesto, see Appx. IV below.
7!
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Progressive Party was destined to play a vital and, 
generally speaking, worthy role in the future scheme of 
Japanese politics. Its underlying spirit is best 
expressed in some words used by its founder in his inaugural 
address:-
While I am emphatic in my rejection of 
precipitous change, I feel that it is important 
to distinguish our party from those which mask 
their real conservativism by pretending to stand 
for gradual progress, 9
The Jiyu-to and Itagaki*s earlier associations had explained 
John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of Liberalism to the people, 
in terms of Rousseau*s doctrine of General Will, and with 
a fervour that had a revolutionary and unitary side to it. 
The Kaishin-to, on the other hand, was much less doctrinaire
i
and, because of its relatively late appearance, had nothing 
of the Jiyu-to tradition of protest. The Progressives 
based themselves firmly on the English model of the 
sovereignty of king-in-parliament on the one hand, and 
offered the public a programme of gradual reform on the 
other. Furthermore, they were openly pluralist, unanimously 
non-violent, and undeniably plutocratic in outlook.
9 Tsunoda etc., Sources, p,694. For the original, see 
Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., pp. 411-412,
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These differences are partly accounted for by the 
fact that the great industrialists of the cities, who were 
the most powerful financial supporters of the Progressives, 
had little cause to grumble at the Government’s policy of 
subsidies for heavy industry. The rural entrepreneurs 
and landowners, on the other hand, who paid the land-tax 
that provided the Government with the greater part of its 
revenues, were prompted by their pockets to make common 
cause with the Liberal intellectuals who declared:-
The people whose duty it is to pay taxes 
to the government possesses the right of 
sharing in their government’s affairs and of 
approving and condemning. 10
The Kaishin-to, then, was from the first an organization 
of political moderates. Nevertheless there can be no 
doubt that it desired a speedy transition to a parliamentary 
form of government just as much as the Liberals did. It 
may seem odd, not to say wasteful of democratic enthusiasm 
and political talent, that long before the actual 
inauguration of the representative system, there should 
have been two separate and often mutually hostile parties 
in the field, both of which were ’popular’ in the sense of 
standing up for the common people, or sections thereof,
To
McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., p.428.
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against the Government. Personal ambition and cleavages 
of material interests, together with innate differences 
of fRight wing* and 'Left wing* political temperament 
such as are found in every country, were clearly responsible 
to some extent for this state of affairs.
Apart from factors of this sort, the early formation 
of both a Jiyü-to and a Kaishin-to was a reflection of 
the Japanese political situation at the beginning of the 
1880s, and, what is more, an augury of its further 
development down to the present day. For, given that power 
is vested in a well-trained bureaucracy seemingly aloof 
from public opinion, the rise of an organization like the 
Jiyü-to, laying great stress on intangible and inviolable 
rights in theory and sometimes rebellious in practice, is 
not so surprising. And it can only be termed felicitous 
that this confrontation of an entrenched officialdom with 
an opposition of demagogy should have been resolved, 
potentially at any rate, by the emergence of another, more 
moderate, parliamentary group. This second group, striving 
to consolidate the gains made by the first one, acted as 
a central and beneficial catalyst - working to make the 
bureaucrats more receptive to democracy on the one hand, 
and the Liberals more mindful of the necessities of power 
and the niceties of parliamentary rule on the other.
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Thus, there was already in 1882 a fore-glimpse of 
the dominant pattern of Japanese political strife since 
then - strife, that is, between a power-holding public 
service and an opposition divided into a headstrong 
radical element on the Left and a party of conservative 
reform in the Centre. In so far as parliamentary democracy 
has made advances in Japan, its progress has chiefly 
resided in the fusion of the bureaucracy with the forces 
of a proclaimed but restrained Liberalism. These forces 
were first represented by the Kaishin-to.
The third national party, the Teisei-to, was never 
remotely comparable with the other two, either from the 
point of view of size of membership, or in terms of 
crusading vigour. Its leaders were Fukuchi Genichiro, 
Mizuno Torajiro, Maruyama Sakura, Misaki Kamenosuke, Seki 
Naohiko, and Watanabe Asaka. The first three were all 
owners of prominent newspapers, which usually supported the 
Government. The Imperial Party did not make a great 
impression on the general public. Nevertheless it did have 
a number of affiliated societies in the provinces, and a 
sprinkling of sympathizers coming, in the main, from the 
lower echelons of the prefectural administrations, and 
the ranks of primary school-teachers,"^ village priests,
Tl
Beckmann, Making, p.63.
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and businessmen with an interest in official contracts.
. 12The Imperial Party's programme is worth having a 
look at on two counts. The first of them is the unexpectedly 
subdued nature of its conservativism. Here, it is perhaps 
as well to remember that this party, too, had used the word 
’constitutional* in its title. The manifesto was unequivocal 
in its assertions that the Emperor alone had the power to 
issue the constitution and decide on its terms. Nevertheless, 
having made this typically statist pronouncement, it 
envisaged a bi-cameral assembly, of which at least one 
House would be elected, and even went so far as to say that 
this parliament should be able to exercise the legislative 
power - admittedly, under the necessity of having to 
secure the Imperial assent to any Bills it might choose to 
pass. Also, of the three major party programmes, that of 
the Teisei-to was the only one to make specific reference 
to the need to safeguard freedoms of speech, association, 
and publication.
All this may be taken as a true reflection of main­
stream conservative opinion, emanating from key figures 
like Ito Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, Kuroda Kiyotaka, and Yamagata 
Aritomo. It must be stressed that this main-stream current
12
Appx. V below
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of opinion in the bureaucracy, which waa to prevail for 
the next twenty years or so, was conservative but not ultra­
conservative • It accepted the need for a constitution and 
a national assembly, and was prepared to carry on the 
business of government within the limits imposed by them. 
These limits the ruling bureaucrats hoped, of course, to 
be able to set themselves as far as possible, and they 
looked with extreme disfavour on the idea of party Cabinets. 
Yet for all that, they had in the Teisei-to manifesto and 
elsewhere signified their willingness to govern under 
the terms of a constitution, and in accordance with the 
personal freedoms and parliamentary forms it would guarantee. 
Therefore, properly speaking, their attitude was conservative 
but not reactionary; and it should be clearly differentiated 
from that of the Ultra-Conservatives, to whom any kind of 
constitutionalism was really anathema, and who wished to 
halt the process of Westernization over very wide areas 
of national life. The Ultra-Conservatives were not organized 
in a party at that time.
The second great point of interest in the Imperial 
Party declaration was a certain degree of similarity between 
it and the Kaishin-to platform. The Teisei-to, too, was in 
favour of a restricted electorate and a hard currency. Both 
manifestos made explicit reference to the throne, in sharp
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contrast to the silence of the Liberals on this point.
The Progressives declared that they intended to uphold 
the dignity of the Imperial dynasty; the Imperialists 
adhered to the doctrine that the Imperial prerogative was 
the source of all sovereignty. Moreover, in advocating 
the sovereign claims of the Emperor and the institution 
of a bi-cameral legislature, the views of the Teisei-to 
were somewhat closer to those of the Kaishin-to, which 
favoured a two-chamber system and the sovereignty of the 
Emperor-in-parliament, than to the ideas of the Jiyü-to. 
All of the Liberals wished to see the people alone made 
sovereign, and a section of them was uni-cameralist in 
sympathy. These traits of identity between the two 
platforms of the Teisei-tö and the Kaishin-to portend the 
eventual coming together of the moderate bureaucrats 
and the Progressive interests, mentioned earlier.
Finally, even though the Teisei-tö was a failure in 
so far as it did not go down at all well with the public, 
it to some extent made up for its lack of popular support 
by its influence in the field of journalism. Even after 
the collapse of the party, its former leaders continued 
to make use of the columns of their newspapers for a 
generally able exposition of the Government’s point of 
view.
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The years 1881-1882 saw a striking efflorescence of 
political parties in the warm sun of constitutional promise. 
Apart from the three major national parties already 
described, there were numerous local political associations. 
Many of these regional clubs were affiliated to one or 
other of the big parties; others were not. However, before 
long, a certain chill bleakness had set in on the political 
landscape. Widespread agricultural distress, caused by a 
series of bad seasons from 1881-5 and a deflationary policy 
enforced by the Government, led to general unrest and a 
number of small uprisings, planned or actually carried out. 
The extremist section of the Jiyu-to was deeply implicated 
in these erneutes. The revolts themselves were quelled 
without any trouble; but they stirred the authorities into 
enacting stringent legislation aimed at the growing influence 
of political parties. At the same time, there was also 
a parting of the ways within the Jiyü-to itself between 
Itagaki and the moderate officials of the party on the 
one hand, and the more radical members on the other. Further 
quarrels broke out within the Liberty Party on the wisdom 
of Itagaki and Goto Shojirofs plan to tour Europe in the 
early months of 1883» They went; but it was alleged in 
the Kaishin-to papers and elsewhere that the Government had 
secretly given them the funds for their jaunt. The Liberal
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press replied with counter-charges that an improper 
financial connection bound the Kaishin-to to the Mitsubishi 
Company.
In this atmosphere of violence, repression, and 
recrimination, the decision to disband the parties was both 
wise and timely. The precedent was set by the Teisei-to 
which voluntarily went out of existence on 24 September 
1883# This was supposedly done at the behest of Ito 
Hirobumi, who had returned from Germany in a mood of 
hostility towards political parties. On 29 October 1884, 
the Liberty Party decided that a temporary dissolution 
was the best means of avoiding the odium of seeming to be 
responsible for the scattered outbreaks of rebellion and 
the hardships of Government vigilance. Finally, though the 
Kaishin-to never got to the point of formally disbanding 
itself, it contained a faction which strongly favoured this 
course. Moreover, it was seriously disabled as an effective 
political force by the resignations of its president (Okuma 
Shigenobu) and vice-president (Kono Binken) in December 1884»
Thus, by the end of 1884, party activity, which had 
been so much in evidence two or three years before, was 
moribund. However, it took on a new lease of life before 
the end of the decade, when both the Jiyu-to and the Kaishin-to 
were revived and other parties formed. As these second
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generation parties of the closing years of the 1880s were 
those that actually took part in the election of 1890, 
they will be discussed in a later chapter* Here it will 
suffice to note that the agricultural depression, and the 
fear of agrarian revolution in the years 1881-5» bad 
increased the power of the conservative and richer village 
capitalists in the rank and file of the Jiyu-to, though 
the leadership of the party kept alive memories of its 
samurai and radical origins for a decade or so after 1885*
In the meantime, while their Liberal and Progressive 
opponents were taking shelter from the storms, the 
bureaucrats spent the years from 1881 to I889 preparing 
for constitutional government under the aegis of Ito Hirobumi. 
The whole relationship of the entrenched bureaucracy to 
the embryonic forms of parliamentary government is a most 
interesting one; but, unfortunately, it is not possible 
to say much about it here. The Meiji bureaucrats, though 
revolutionary in many ways, were also, as heirs to the 
Tokugawa Shogunate, the guardians of a tradition of effective 
bureaucratic control that went back to 1600. In Japan, 
a fully developed bureaucracy preceded the creation of 
representative institutions by several hundreds of years. 
Therefore, not unnaturally, the bureaucrats felt that they 
had a more vital and venerable raison d’etre than the
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new-fangled parliamentary institutions and the politicians 
who sought power through them. After all, the very Diet 
itself was in a sense a bureaucratic innovation; so, too, 
were the administrative reforms leading up to the 
promulgation of the constitution. The bureaucrats represented 
the established order of things; Liberalism was a new, and 
possibly disruptive force. This was the exact opposite to 
the position in Britain, where the older institution, 
Parliament, has always ranked far higher in terras of power 
and general esteem than the Civil Service,
Again, I think that it is important to realize that 
the Meiji bureaucracy was essentially a managerial class.
This, too, stemmed directly from changes in the social 
function and attitudes of the samurai under the Tokugawa 
regime. During the two hundred and fifty years' peace of 
the Edo period, the fighting retainers of the late middle 
ages had become, as a class, a literate and salaried 
administrative elite. This means that the senior Meiji 
statesmen were not a landed, or otherwise economically 
independent, established upper class; and, in my opinion, 
the term 'oligarchs' which is so often used to describe 
them is dangerously misleading. These men were either 
administrators in office or comparative fnobodies*; and 
they had nothing else to fall back on, in the event of 
failure in their public careers. It follows, then, that
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they were more ready than other powerful ruling groups - 
than the French or Russian aristocracies for example - 
to make concessions to their political opponents. This 
was one of the reasons for the empirical attitude already 
noted.
The bureaucrats were also pre-disposed by the Tokugawa 
past to think in terms of the Confucian ideal of the 
welfare of the nation as a whole. Of course, the notion 
that government should be basically for the people does 
not necessarily mean that it should also be by the people; 
and the Meiji bureaucrats often took the Cromwellian view 
that their duty was to do what was good for the people, 
and not what the people wanted. Yet, on balance, Meiji 
statism was Confucian benevolence brought up to date; and 
certain clear-sighted and influential persons, such as 
Okubo and Kido, understood, before the Jiyu Minken Undo 
began, that the state would function better as a 
constitutional monarchy under which the subjects would be 
allowed some say in the handling of affairs.
This appreciation of the situation was deepened by 
the dangers inherent in the post-revolutionary situation 
immediately after 1868, and also by a general sense of 
bewilderment at the disappearance of the familiar regulative 
machinery of the Baku-han system. The restoration at
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f i r s t  h ad  b e en  n o th in g  more t h a n  a s u c c e s s f u l  coup
/
d ’e t a t ;  and  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  decade  o f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e ,  was 
t h r e a t e n e d  by t h e  same t i d e s  o f  f r u s t r a t i o n  and i n t r i g u e  
t h a t  had  o c c a s io n e d  i t .  T here  was a  need  f o r  t h e  new 
Government t o  e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  more f i r m l y  by g e t t i n g  th e  
n a t i o n  b e h in d  i t .  At th e  same t im e ,  t h e  p r o s p e c t  o f  
i n d e f i n i t e  a r b i t r a r y  r u l e  by t h e  D a jo k an , a  body i t s e l f  
u n s y s te m a t i c  and d i f f i c u l t  t o  manage a t  th e  b e s t  o f  t i m e s ,  
was d i s p l e a s i n g  t o  members o f  th e  i n n e r  c i r c l e  o f  S a t-C ho  
b u r e a u c r a t s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t o  t h e  l i t t l e  g ro u p  o f  e n l i g h t e n e d  
and h i g h l y - p l a c e d  L i b e r a l  c r i t i c s  and  t h e  n a t i o n  a t  l a r g e .
A p re d o m in a n t ly  a g r a r i a n  s o c i e t y ,  j u s t  r o u s e d  from  two 
h u n d re d  y e a r s  o f  s e c l u s i o n  and  u s e d  t o  h av in g  i t s  l i f e  
d e te rm in e d  i n  a l l  p a r t i c u l a r s  by a  m ix tu r e  o f  w r i t t e n  la w , 
p r e c e d e n t ,  and cu s to m , fo und  i t  h a r d  t o  a d j u s t  t o  a s i t u a t i o n  
o f  r a p i d  and r e v o l u t i o n a r y  change im posed by d e c r e e .  T h is  
was a s  much th e  c a s e  f o r  t h e  r u l e r s  a s  i t  was f o r  t h e  r u l e d .  
T hus, we f i n d  Kido a t  one p o i n t  s a y in g  f r a n k l y  t h a t  men 
w ould  l i v e  t o  r e g r e t  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n ,  i f  t h e  o n ly  a l t e r n a t i v e  
was chaos  c h eck ed  by t y r a n n y .  Ke f u r t h e r  s t a t e d  t h a t  he 
had  found  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  sy s tem s o f  E urope  ’v e ry  
a d m i r a b l e ’ J and t h a t  ’ th e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  i s  th e  mind o f  t h e  
S t a t e ;  t h e  o f f i c i a l s  a r e  i t s  m e m b e rs .’ ^  About th e  same
13
M cLaren, J a p .  G o v t.  D o c s . ,  p .5 7 2 .
14
M iy a k o sh i ,  N .K .K .S . , p .1 0 1 .
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t im e  ( 1 8 7 3 ) ,  we f i n d  Okubo w r i t i n g  t h a t  i t  was b e t t e r  t o  
r e t a i n  t h e  sy s te m  o f  a b s o l u t e  m onarchy ( i . e .  D a jokan  v e s t e d  
w i th  f u l l  pow ers o f  s o v e r e i g n t y )  f o r  th e  t im e  b e in g ;  b u t  
t h a t  * i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  we w i l l  n o t  be a b le  t o  keep  th e  same 
k in d  o f  g o v e r n m e n t .1 15
P a r a l l e l  w i th  t h i s  d e s i r e  f o r  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  and 
l e g i t i m i z a t i o n ,  and o f t e n  opposed  t o  i t ,  was th e  r e g im e ’ s 
aim  o f  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  th e  Em pire by m o d e rn iz in g  i t  th ro u g h  
a p o l i c y  o f  b u r e a u c r a t i c  c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .  I n  t h e  lo n g  r u n ,  
t h e s e  two p u rp o se s  were n o t  so in c o m p a t ib le ;  i n  t h e  s h o r t  
r u n ,  i t  was v a s t l y  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  combine them . Yet 
t h e  a t t e m p t  had  t o  be made. B e fo re  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  c o u ld  be e x p e c te d  t o  work w e l l  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
l e v e l ,  i t  was n e c e s s a r y  f i r s t  t o  do some n a t i o n  b u i l d i n g .
On th e  o t h e r  han d , i t  was im p o s s ib le  f o r  t h e  Government t o  
s t a r t  on i t s  work o f  n a t i o n  b u i l d i n g ,  i f  a l l  s e c t i o n s  o f  
p u b l i c  o p in io n  were im p la c a b ly  h o s t i l e  t o  i t .  I t  l a c k e d  
t h e  m i l i t a r y  and  f i n a n c i a l  means t o  go ah ea d  on i t s  own 
f o r  v e r y  lo n g .  Prom t h i s  u n d e r ly in g  dilemma flow  many o f  
t h e  s h i f t s  and  c h a n g e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  much o f  t h e  f a s c i n a t i o n ,  
o f  e a r l y  M e i j i  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  h i s t o r y .  Prom i t ,  t o o ,  came 
th e  b u r e a u c r a t s *  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  l i k i n g  f o r  ’g r a d u a l i s m * .
So t h e r e  was much i n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  Empire a s  
c r y s t a l l i z e d  u n d e r  th e  S h ö g u n a te ,  i n  i t s  p o s t - r e s t o r a t i o n
15 ~
P o r  a t r a n s .  o f  Okubo* s memorandum, see  Appx. I I  t o  
Beckmann, M aking. P o r  t h e  o r i g i n a l ,  see  M iy a k o sh i ,
N .K .K .S . ,  p p .  1 0 6 -1 2 2 .
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difficulties, and in its hopes for the future, as well 
as in the special class background of the shizoku-bureaucrats, 
to persuade them to follow that path which, as Ito Hirobumi 
once said, fslowly but steadily constitutionalized the 
monarchy.*^  The process was perhaps accelerated, rather 
than initiated, by clan rivalries and personal enmities 
within the Government, and by the rise of the Liberty and 
Popular Rights Movement. We may see these bureaucratic 
turnings towards constitutionalism quite clearly in two 
important aspects of early Meiji political history. One 
was the attitude of the Dajokan to the throne. The other 
is the history of experiments and reforms in the 
constitutional field before 1889; these latter were 
introduced by the bureaucrats partly of their own initiative, 
partly in response to the challenge of the Liberals1 
agitation and Okuma’s defection.
With only rare exceptions, autocracy had not been 
practical politics in Japan for the previous thousand years; 
and the Meiji statesmen, though they elevated the throne, 
did so as bureaucrats and not as courtiers. They were 
never lacking in the outward deference they felt was due to 
the Sovereign and frequently hid themselves behind his 
formal omnipotence in times of trouble; but, at the same 
time, they knew, and acted as if, their real work lay with
1^Okuma (ed.), Fifty Years of New Japan, vol.l, p.126.
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the State and people as a whole. Thus, the constitution, 
when it was promulgated in 1889, was ostensibly a gift 
from the Emperor to his subjects. In reality, it was some 
kind of statutory compact between the governing bureaucrats 
and the newly remodelled nation they had called into being. 
They had moved from the steps of the throne to the rostrum 
of a parliament. In doing so, they had led their 
compatriots from the gloomy caverns of feudal disintegration 
and aristocratic reaction to the light of bureaucratic 
modernism.
As for the record of constitutional experiment and 
reform before 1889, two of its most important items were 
touched on when outlining the growth of political parties; 
the Osaka Conference of February 1875 led to the rescript 
of 14 April 1875J and. the events culminating in Okuma’s 
fall from power were inseparably linked with the rescript 
of 12 October 1881. In the first of these rescripts, the 
Government made known for the first time, in clear and 
definite terms, its intention to introduce a constitutional 
system fby degrees*. In the second, it committed itself 
to summoning a parliament in 1890. These were milestones 
along the route that had begun with the Charter Oath, sworn 
by the Emperor in April 1868, and the promulgation of Japan’s
first written constitution, the Seitaisho, in June 1868.
—
McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., pp. 7-15. See also Wilson, 
Seitaisho, Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 11, 1952.
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The Charter Oath was an epoch-making document, in 
which the new Government pledged itself to have matters 
decided by public opinion as expressed in assemblies 
’widely convoked’; to abolish the Tokugawa class distinctions 
of samurai, farmer, artisan, and merchant; and to seek 
knowledge throughout the world. All these promises were 
eventually made good; some sooner than others. The 
Seitaisho was a rather crude and contradictory scheme of 
government, which gave consultative powers to a feudal, 
bi-cameral assembly. The members of the Lower House of 
this assembly (Kogisho or Shugi-in) were nominated by their 
respective clans. These feudal parliaments proved worse 
than useless, and were soon abolished. The Government 
found it impossible to get help with its plans for 
modernization - these involved, among other things, the 
destruction of the fiefs and the special status of the 
samurai class - from the representatives of a milieu of 
insular and ignorant reaction. The Charter Oath did not go 
into abeyance, however. It retained its significance as 
a kind of Declaration of Progressive Intent or Charter of 
Promised Liberties, to which both sides made trenchant and 
frequent appeals in the ensuing years of constitutional 
conflict,
TS
For the full text of the Oath, see Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S. , 
P*33* For a rather different assessment of its historical significance, see Uyehara, Political Development, pp. 63-70*
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Mention has been made also of the recommendations on
constitutional policy submitted by Okubo and Kido in 1873*
Between them, these two statesmen initiated the basic
Government policy of a gradual introduction of constitutional
forms, starting with local government institutions. In
1874, a year before the Osaka Conference, the Emperor
announced that he would summon a Conference of Prefectural
Governors (Chihokan-kaigi), in partial fulfilment of
19the promise made in the Charter Oath. This was strictly
in keeping with one of Kidofs suggestions, and the latter 
regarded the Conference as a sort of prototype parliament.
The Chihokan-kaigi met for the first time in I875, and 
again in I878. Its debates were animated and its trappings 
dignified; but its occasional nature and the quickening 
pace of political developments robbed it of any chance it 
might have had of growing into a proper national assembly.
A more important innovation was the setting up of 
elected consultative assemblies in the prefectures (ken) 
and metropolitan districts (fu) in I878. This was 
followed by a similar measure for the towns and villages 
in 1880. These assemblies though restricted in their 
powers, performed several useful functions - apart, that 
is, from improving the day to day administration of the
McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., p.506.
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provinces, and their role as a vital but preliminary 
stage in the administration’s long term plans. For one 
thing, they were an embodiment of those feelings of 
localism which, as we shall find, were such a widespread 
and powerful influence at the time of the election of 1890 
For another thing, the local assemblies were invaluable 
as training - grounds for future candidates for the Diet. 
As first set up, the assemblies were found to be not 
entirely satisfactory in practice, and the whole system 
of local government was overhauled by Yamagata in 1888.
In 1879» the Emperor asked each of the principal 
ministers for his written opinion on the constitutional 
problem. The answers were unanimous in their desire to 
keep moving forward, slowly but surely, in the direction 
of an elected parliament. In other words, the Government 
was prepared to come to terms with the Jiyu Minken Undo; 
but in its own way, and in its own time. Yamagata wrote:- 
fWe need not be wise men to know that it will have to be 
done sooner or later. ’ in the same vein, Ito declared:
20
Beckmann, Making, p.129. For the original, see Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.274.
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At present, it is the responsibility of 
the government to follow a conciliatory policy.••• 
so that we may control but not intensify the 
situation, and relax our hold over government 
but not yield it. 21
It was on this still somewhat fluid stage of planning that 
the Okuma ’bombshell1 of March 1881 acted as a 
crystallizing agent, making concrete a decision that had 
already been taken in principle.
Before October 1881, the bureaucrats had managed to 
retain the initiative only by making concessions; after 
October 1881, they enjoyed the initiative because they 
had made concessions. That the influence of these men on 
the making of the constitution was the predominant one 
is shown by the finished product. This in many ways was 
more bureaucratic than democratic. As has been noted, it 
embodied ideas about the nature of sovereignty and 
ministerial responsibility that were of direct profit to 
the official class. Less obvious, but just as important 
and well documented, is the fact that this same group of 
main-stream bureaucrats was not really forced at the last 
minute into the decision to grant a constitution and 
establish a parliament, but arrived at it as a result of 
their own reading of the situation in which they had found 
themselves from 1868 onwards.
21
Beckmann, Making, p.132. For the original, see Miyakoshi, 
N.K.K.S., p.296.
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Nevertheless the significance of the contribution of 
the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement to constitutional 
progress should not be under-estimated. It had served 
to create a public opinion about politics where none had 
previously existed. By advocating natural rights with 
their concomitant doctrine of popular sovereignty, by 
making open opposition to the legally constituted authorities 
a matter of legitimate convention, and by giving birth 
to modern political parties, it laid several of the 
foundations on which a fully representative system could 
be built in Japan. All this was in addition to its more 
immediate achievements of advancing the date, and doubtless 
broadening the scope, of the constitution. In this fashion, 
the Meiji constitution, in its timing as in its provisions, 
was more than anything else the product of the interaction 
of a Government of progressive but prudent intent with an 
opposition of radical but in some ways opportunist and 
often irresponsible persuasion.
By no means all the driving force for this movement 
towards a constitution came from the domestic conditions 
of uncertainty following on the disappearance of the old 
order. Western pressures and example will account for much. 
The problem of ’unequal treaties’ was in the forefront of 
national politics at the time of the first general election.
42
In 1890, Japan was still in a position of having to 
grant preferential tariffs and rights of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction to no fewer than seventeen states. Needless 
to say, these privileges were not reciprocal. Though 
other factors entered into it, the restoration movement 
was in origin and impulse pre-eminently a nationalist 
outburst against the humiliation of these agreements; and 
the modernization programme of the new regime was from 
first to last directed towards making good those weaknesses 
in administration, armaments, and technical skills that 
had incurred it. It is against this background of a 
fervent desire to catch up - or, in Fukuzawa Yukichi*s 
words *to escape from Asia, and enter Europe* - that the 
emergence of parliamentary institutions must be seen.
For the fact that the great Powers of Europe and 
America were Liberal was, in the long run, probably even 
more important than the fact that they were Imperialist.
The Meiji Government v/as certainly anxious to promulgate 
a constitution, in order to satisfy the treaty Powers 
that Japan, should extra-territorial rights be abolished, 
would be able to provide foreign residents with the same 
safeguards with regard to law and justice as they enjoyed 
at home. Moreover, the idea put forward by John Stuart Mill
Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu, vol. 10, pp. 238-240.
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and  o t h e r s  t h a t  a  L i b e r a l  S t a t e  w as, ip s o  f a c t o ,  a 
s t r o n g  S t a t e  q u ic k ly  to o k  r o o t  i n  J a p a n ,  and  g r e a t l y  
i n f l u e n c e d  th e  t h i n k i n g  o f  b o th  th e  b u r e a u c r a t s  and th e  
J i y ü  M inken Undo l e a d e r s .  Thus we f i n d  Okubo, K ido , I t o ,  
and  Yarnagata a l l  c la im in g  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im e s  t h a t  i t  
was n e c e s s a r y  t o  have t h e  p e o p le  s a t i s f i e d  and a b le  t o  
c o - o p e r a t e  a c t i v e l y  w i th  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
r e a c h  t h e  g o a l  o f  m o d e r n i z a t io n  and f u l l  n a t i o n a l  
s o v e r e i g n t y .  On th e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  th e  L i b e r a l s  were a lw ays 
re a d y  t o  u se  J a p a n ’ s w eakness  v i s - a - v i s  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  as 
a  s t i c k  w i th  w hich  t o  b e a t  t h e  G overnm ent, and  a g i t a t e d  f o r  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  on g ro u n d s  t h a t  i n c lu d e d  
a p p e a l s  t o  th e  common good a s  w e l l  a s  t o  t h e  dogma o f  
i n a l i e n a b l e  p e r s o n a l  r i g h t s .  I t a g a k i ,  h i m s e l f ,  was a p t  t o  
a rg u e  th e  c a s e  f o r  L i b e r t y  i n  t h e s e  p o t e n t i a l l y  n a t i o n a l i s t  
and  n e o -C o n fu c ia n  t e r m s .
Y e t ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  to  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  k in d ,  th e  
Government and  t h e  e d u c a te d  p a r t  o f  th e  n a t i o n  seem by 
and  l a r g e  t o  have b e e n  f i r e d  w i th  e n th u s ia s m  by what th e y  
saw o r  l e a r n t  o f  th e  O c c id e n t .  T here  was a  f e e l i n g  t h a t  
J a p a n  was ab o u t t o  be l e d  t o  a l o f t i e r  s t a t e  o f  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  
Among t h e  y o u n g e r  l e a d e r s  o f  M e i j i  s o c i e t y ,  a t  any r a t e ,  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p a r l i a m e n t s  and  c o n s t i t u t i o n s  were o f  
im p o r ta n c e  t o  t h e  more ad v anced  e x p o n e n ts  o f  t h a t
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c i v i l i z a t i o n  was s u f f i c i e n t  t o  e n s u re  t h a t  th e y  would 
one day be found  i n  a more p r o s p e r o u s  and r e s p l e n d e n t  
J a p a n ,  ’P r o g r e s s  i s  t h e  m ost b e a u t i f u l  t h i n g  i n  th e  
w o r l d ’ -  so  r a n  one o f  t h e  a s s e r t i o n s  i n  an  e a r l y  J i y ü  
Minken Undo m a n i f e s t o . p e r h a p s  th e  i d e a  o f  p r o g r e s s  
i s  t h e  O c c id e n t ’ s g r e a t e s t  g i f t  t o  o t h e r  c u l t u r e s .  I n  
t h e  se co n d  h a l f  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  L i b e r t y  was 
t h e  g e n iu s  o f  p r o g r e s s ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e v o l u t i o n  i t s  
p h y s i c a l  em bodim ent.
I n e v i t a b l y ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e v o l u t i o n  was im p o r te d  
i n  i t s  c a p i t a l i s t  g u i s e ,  a lo n g  w i th  a good d e a l  o f  
l a i s s e z - f a i r e  economic t h e o r y .  The f u l l  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e s e  
d e v e lo p m en ts  was n o t  f e l t ,  how ever, u n t i l  a f t e r  1890.
B e fo re  t h e n ,  th e  Government a c t i v e l y  e n c o u ra g e d  new 
i n d u s t r i e s  w i th  i t s  p o l i c i e s  o f  te m p o ra ry  s t a t e - o w n e r s h i p ,  
s u b s i d i e s ,  and t h e  l i k e .  The p a r t  p l a y e d  i n  a l l  t h i s  by 
t h e  l a r g e - s c a l e  bank ing  and m e r c a n t i l e  c o m m u n it ie s ,  c e n t r e d  
on Osaka and Edo, w hich  had grown up d u r in g  th e  Tokugawa 
p e r i o d ,  i s  o b s c u r e .  A few o f  t h e s e  o ld  c o n c e r n s ,  l i k e  
M i t s u i  and K ono ike , s u r v iv e d  t h e  shock  o f  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n ;  
b u t  many d i d  n o t .  I t  seems t h a t  t h e  m erch an t  c l a s s  o f  th e  
g r e a t  c i t i e s ,  th o u g h  i t  had  become f i n a n c i a l l y  p o w e rfu l
23 ~  '
A ik o k u -k o to  m em oria l o f  17 J a n .  1874. See M cLaren,
Ja p . G ovt. D o c s . ,  p p . 426-433.
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u n d e r  t h e  S h o g u n a te ,  had  b e e n  c o n te n t  t o  rem a in  a p o l i t i c a l l y  
s u b o r d in a te  and  f u l l y  i n t e g r a t e d  p a r t  o f  th e  f e u d a l  s t a t e .
At no t im e  d i d  i t  c o n te m p la te  r e v o l u t i o n .  The Tokyo and 
Osaka t r a d e r s  t e n d e d  t o  r e t a i n  t h i s  r a t h e r  su b m is s iv e  
a t t i t u d e ,  and w i t h  i t  a n o t i c e a b l e  l a c k  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  
p o l i t i c s ,  f o r  a g e n e r a t i o n  o r  so  a f t e r  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n .
The b u s in e ssm e n  and  c a p i t a l i s t  l a n d l o r d s  o f  th e  
c o u n t r y s id e  were o f  a  more in d e p e n d e n t  t u r n  o f  m ind . T h e i r  
e n t e r p r i s e s  were f a r  s m a l l e r  t h a n  th o s e  o f  t h e i r  u rb a n  
c o u n t e r p a r t s ;  b u t  th e y  and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  were o f t e n  a l l -  
p o w e rfu l  i n  t h e  econom ic s t r u c t u r e  o f  th e  v i l l a g e s .  T h is  
im p o r ta n t  e lem en t  h ad  a  f i n g e r  i n  th e  r e s t o r a t i o n ,  s u p p o r te d  
t h e  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s  movement, and i n  some r e s p e c t s  d o m in a ted  
t h e  f i r s t  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n .  I n  te rm s  o f  th e  f e u d a l  b a ck g ro u n d , 
th e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h i s  g ro u p  was p a r t l y  th e  r e s u l t  o f  c a p i t a l  
a c c u m u la t in g  i n  t h e  h ands  o f  p r i v a t e  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  p a r t l y  
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  Tokugawa r e g i o n a l i s m  and  l o c a l  v i l l a g e  o r  
g ro u p  autonom y.
B e h in d  many o f  th e  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  f a c e t s  o f  M e i j i  
p o l i t i c a l  h i s t o r y  l u r k e d  t h e  Tokugawa p a s t .  As we have 
s e e n ,  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  b u r e a u c r a c y  and th e  p o s i t i o n  o f  
th e  s h iz o k u  a s  an  a lm o s t  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e l i t e  were a t t r i b u t a b l e  
t o  t h i s .  So , t o o ,  w ere t h e  g u id in g  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  harmony 
be tw een  g o v e rn o r s  and  g o v e rn e d ,  and th e  r u l e  o f  la w .
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The Meiji Japanese were also fortunate in inheriting 
a convention of conciliar rule, which stood them in good 
stead amid the schisms and dissensions of the first half 
of their era. Likewise, Tokugawa rationalism, and the 
habit of approaching problems of economics and politics 
in a markedly utilitarian manner, made it comparatively 
easy for Japan to understand Western science and the 
material culture built on it.
The importance of regionalism and local autonomy
cannot be over-stressed. Ito*s description of nineteenth
24century Japan as * a vast village community* does not 
seem to have been at all inaccurate. This was one of the 
strongest forces, even though in the old days it had been 
maintained by an extensive system of hereditary offices 
more often than by popular election, to which the 
centralizing programme of the new Government had to be 
adapted. To that extent, it was a power behind the Liberal 
movement - both in its formative years and after 1881. On 
the other hand, the nascent political parties were divided 
over and over again along regional or parochial lines.
The same was true of the Confucian family system. Its 
existence more or less precluded the emergence of perpetual
Okuma (ed.), Fifty Years, vol. 1, p.128.
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one-man or arbitrary rule. At the same time, it unfailingly 
laid stress on duties rather than on rights; and its 
compulsive parent-child ethic was the source of factionalism 
in the parties and elsewhere. In short, despite the 
superficial comprehensiveness of the Emperor-orientated 
constitution of 1889, the Tokugawa legacy was such as to 
make the Meiji era nothing more than the starting point 
of that long process of friction and assimilation, whereby 
the institutions of Western individualism and the traditions 
of a family and bureaucratic state are being slowly 
accommodated - the one to the other.
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Special Note On The Municipal Code and 
The Town and Village Code of 1888%
Since local government institutions are a prominent 
feature of the election, a summary of the important 
enactments of 1888 may be found helpful•
Yamagata’s thoroughgoing reform of local administration 
was one of the most noteworthy achievements of the era.
Local government assemblies had been established by the 
earlier regulations at all levels from the fu or ken down 
to the village. These assemblies, as a result of the 
promulgation of the new codes of 1888, were given more 
independence in the case of cities, towns, and villages.
Mayors of cities (Shicho) were appointed by the Emperor 
on the advice of the Home Minister, after the city 
assembly concerned had nominated three candidates for the 
post. Headmen of towns and villages (Chöcho and Soncho) 
were chosen by the town and village assemblies, subject to 
the final approval of the prefect of the area (Kenrei).
These mayors and headmen were full time officials, who 
shouldered most of the burden of local government in their 
capacity as executive heads. The city mayors worked in
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c lo s e  l i a i s o n  w i th  an e x e c u t i v e  c o u n c i l  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
t h e m s e lv e s ,  t h e i r  a s s i s t a n t s  ( c h o s e n  by th e  c i t y  a s s e m b ly ) ,  
and s i x  o r  more h o n o ra ry  members ( a l s o  c h o sen  by th e  c i t y  
a s s e m b ly ) .  These  e x e c u t iv e  c o u n c i l s  were th e  l o c a l  
governm ent a u t h o r i t i e s  o f  th e  a r e a s  i n  w hich  th e y  o p e r a t e d .  
The towns a n d  v i l l a g e s  d i d  n o t  have e x e c u t iv e  c o u n c i l s ;  
i n  them , th e  l o c a l  governm ent a u t h o r i t y  was th e  headman 
and h i s  a s s i s t a n t s .
The p o p u l a r l y  e l e c t e d  a s s e m b l i e s  i n  a l l  t h e s e  
s u b d i v i s i o n s  were n o t  e x a c t l y  im p o te n t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a s  th e y  
were th e  p rim e  m overs i n  m a t t e r s  o f  l o c a l  a p p o in tm e n ts .
They were a l s o  empowered t o  i s s u e  b y - la w s  and  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  
t o  c o n t r o l  l o c a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  and  t o  manage communal 
p r o p e r t y  o r  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s .  E l e c t i o n s  t o  t h e s e  a s s e m b l ie s  
were h e l d  on th e  b a s i s  o f  a d i r e c t  and s e c r e t  b a l l o t .  
However t h e  sy s te m  u s e d  f a v o u r e d  th e  r i c h e r  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  
a d i s t r i c t ;  s i n c e  th e  e l e c t o r s  were d iv id e d  i n t o  t h r e e  
( c i t i e s )  o r  two ( to w n s  and  v i l l a g e s )  n u m e r i c a l ly  u n e q u a l  
c l a s s e s  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i th  th e  amount t h e y  p a i d  i n  d i r e c t  
l o c a l  t a x e s .  Each o f  t h e s e  c l a s s e s  e l e c t e d  an  e q u a l  
number o f  assem blym en, w i th  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  th e  w e a l t h i e r  
e l e c t o r s  w ere  d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  r e p r e s e n t e d .  T h is  
e l e c t o r a l  d e v ic e  was i n  k e e p in g  w i th  t h e  G overnm ent’ s 
g e n e r a l  i n t e n t i o n  t o  g o v e rn  w i th  t h e  s u p p o r t ,  and  th r o u g h
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the agency, of the more privileged sections of the community. 
On the other hand, the municipal suffrage was quite wide.
The tax qualification enabling a resident of a city, town, 
or village to vote in assembly elections was only 152 per 
annum, as opposed to 1510 per annum for fu or ken assembly 
elections, and 1515 per annum for parliamentary elections.
The institutions of the three larger local subdivisions 
the metropolitan districts (fu), the prefectures (ken), 
and the sub-prefectures (gun) - were much the same as 
those operating in the cities. Each of them had its own 
executive council, made up of official and honorary members, 
with the latter being chosen by the respective assemblies. 
For the elections to the fu, ken, and gun assemblies, 
however, the electors were not segregated into classes 
of richest tax-payers, not so rich tax-payers, and so on.
The chief officials in these subdivisions were appointed 
in a manner that did not admit of any element of popular 
representation. The Government entirely at its own 
pleasure nominated the governors of the three fu (Chiji) 
and the forty-two prefects (Kenrei). The Kenrei in turn 
appointed the sub-prefects (Guncho).
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1 JULY 1890
History not Theory.
Evolution not Revolution. 
Direction not Destruction# 
Unity not Disruption#
Joseph Conrad, Under Western Eyes#
Gentlemen, this year is truly an auspicious year. It is 
the year in which we emerge from despotism and slavery, 
and are born a people of constitutional liberty#
Itagaki Taisuke, election address 
given in Mito on 18 June 1890.
CHAPTER ONE
Organization and Administration.
The general election of 1890 was carried out under
the provisions of the Law of Election of the Members of the
House of Representatives."^" As mentioned earlier, this law
was formally enacted by the Emperor at the same time as he
sanctioned the constitution, that is on 11 February 1889«
Kaneko Kentaro had been the official mainly responsible for
the drafting of the law. In the preamble to the law, it was
stated that it had been adopted with the advice of the Privy
Council (Sumitsu-in), and on 2 March it was submitted to the
Senate (Genro-in) for inspection. The Senate merely put on
record its acceptance of the law, without raising any
2objection and without entering into any discussion. Presumably 
the Privy Council was less perfunctory in its handling of the
1
McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., pp. 170-211. See also Appx.
VI below.
2
See Record Of Senate Deliberations (Genro-in Kaigi Hikki) 
for 2 March 1889.
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Law o f  E l e c t i o n ;  b u t  i t  i s  s t i l l  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  examine t h e  
r e c o r d s  o f  t h e  m e e t i n g s  o f  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  i n  o r d e r  t o  
a s c e r t a i n  p r e c i s e l y  i t s  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  d r a f t .  I n  a b r i e f  
a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  d r a f t i n g  and  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  l a w ,^  Kaneko 
d i d  n o t  m e n t io n  t h a t  i t  met w i t h  any s p e c i a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  
t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l .  The law i t s e l f  had  many p o i n t s  i n  common 
w i t h  t h e  r u l e s  f o r  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  members o f  t h e  l o c a l  
a s s e m b l i e s ,  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  M u n ic ip a l  Code and t h e  Town an d  
V i l l a g e  Code o f  1888; a n d ,  though  n o t  w i t h o u t  d e f e c t s ,  i t  
was i n  g e n e r a l  a s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and w e l l - c o n s t r u c t e d  p i e c e  
o f  l e g i s l a t i o n .
F o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e  e n t i r e  c o u n t r y  -  
w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  H o kka ido ,  Okinawa, and t h e  Ogasawara 
i s l a n d s ^  -  was d i v i d e d  i n t o  two h u n d re d  and f i f t y - s e v e n  
e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t s .  F o r t y - t h r e e  o f  t h e s e  r e t u r n e d  two 
Members; t h e  r e m a in d e r  one Member e a c h .  Thus,  t h e r e  was a 
t o t a l  o f  t h r e e  h u n d r e d  s e a t s  t o  be c o n t e s t e d ;  o n ly  t w e n t y -  
f i v e  o r  so o f  them were c o m p l e t e l y  u r b a n .  The v a r i o u s  
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  were g ro u p e d  t o g e t h e r  i n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  
f u  o r  k e n ,  and g i v e n  an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  number on t h e  b a s i s  
o f  t h e s e  g r o u p i n g s .  F o r  ex am p le ,  t h e  s i x  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  i n
3
H a y ash id a  K am eta ro ,  M e i j i  T a i s h o  S e i k a i  Sokumen S h i ,  v o l .  1 ,  
p p .  1 72 -177 .
4
These  a r e a s  were e x c l u d e d  from t h e  e l e c t i o n  b e c a u se  t h e  
s y s te m  o f  l o c a l  and m u n i c i p a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  h ad  no t  y e t  
b e e n  e x t e n d e d  t o  them.
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Kyoto fu were labelled Kyoto fu First Constituency, Second 
Constituency, and so on.
The three hundred seats were distributed on a basis of
5one Member for every 120,000 persons. This ratio was 
nothing more than a guiding principle, however, and was not 
applied with mathematical accuracy. In fact, when they came 
to draw the electoral boundaries, the authorities found it 
convenient to make them conform as closely as possible to 
the already existing lines of demarcation that separated 
one sub-prefecture (gun) from another in the country areas, 
or one ward (ku) from another in the great cities. Accordingly, 
though the theoretical norm of 120,000 inhabitants per Member, 
was never altogether abandoned, the actual allocation of 
seats was done in a very flexible, if not haphazard, manner 
in the interests of adapting it to the permanent administrative 
framework,
5 For information on the way in which the seats were 
distributed see the following:-
1. Kaneko Kentaro’s memoirs in Hayashida Kametaro, Meiji- 
Taisho Seikai Sokumen Shi, vol, 1,, pp. 172-4.
2, Suematsu Kencho’s account of the election in Meiji
Bunka Zenshü, vol, 3, pp. 200-221, especially pp. 200-201.
3» Hayashida Kametaro, Shugi-in Giin Senkyo Ho Kaisei Iken, 
The Nation’s Friend (Kokumin-no Tomo), vol. 13, no.198, 
Aug. 1893, pp. 170-171.
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A s i n g l e  gun o r  k u ,  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  which was more 
t h a n  1 0 0 ,000  and l e s s  t h a n  2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,  was d e s i g n a t e d  a s  a 
c o n s t i t u e n c y  and aw arded  one Member. What was f a r  more 
common was th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  j o in i n g  t o g e t h e r  a number o f  
a d j a c e n t  gun o r  k u ,  w i th  a com bined p o p u l a t i o n  o f  be tw een
1 0 0 .000  and 2 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,  t o  fo rm  s in g le -m em b e r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  
T h is  p r a c t i c e  was n e c e s s i t a t e d  by th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  m a j o r i t y  
o f  gun had  fe w e r  t h a n  100 ,000  i n h a b i t a n t s .  Sometimes th e  
u p p e r  l i m i t  a p p e a rs  t o  have b e e n  f i x e d  a t  1 8 0 ,0 0 0 ,  and gun 
w i th  more t h a n  t h i s  number o f  p e o p le  were a l lo w e d  t o  r e t u r n  
two Members. I n  o t h e r  p l a c e s  where gun had  b e en  am algam ated  
t o  form  a c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  i t  was d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  t e r r a i n ,  th e  
i n c l u s i o n  o f  a f a i r l y  l a r g e  p r o v i n c i a l  c i t y ,  o r  some o t h e r  
f a c t o r  f a v o u r e d  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a two-member c o n s t i t u e n c y  
anyway. Such two-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  c o n ta in e d  be tw een
200 .000  ( o r  1 8 0 ,0 0 0 )  and 3 0 0 ,0 0 0  p e o p le .  F u r t h e r  d e p a r t u r e s  
from  th e  s t a n d a r d  o f  12 0 ,0 0 0  i n h a b i t a n t s  p e r  Member a ro s e  
from  th e  f a c t  t h a t  a few r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  i s l a n d s  such  as  
Tsushim a ( p o p .  3 2 ,0 0 0 )  o r  Oki (pop. 3 4 ,0 0 0 )  w ere g iv e n  a 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  t h e i r  own, i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  th e  e x a c t  
number o f  p e o p le  d w e l l in g  on them .
E x ce p t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  th o s e  p r e f e c t u r e s  w hich  em braced  
t h e s e  i s l a n d s ,  th e  number o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  p e r  h e ad  o f
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p o p u l a t i o n  was n o t  a l lo w e d  t o  e x c e e d  th e  s t a n d a r d  r a t i o  
o f  1: 120,000 when c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  a fu  o r  k en  as  a  whole 
th o u g h  t h e r e  was n o th in g  t o  p r e v e n t  i t  f a l l i n g  below  th e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  norm. I n  f a c t ,  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  th e  r a t h e r  
rough  and re a d y  m ethod o f  d i v i s i o n  em ployed , th e  m a j o r i t y  
o f  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  d id  have more th a n  120,000 i n h a b i t a n t s  
p e r  Member. T here  were v a r i a t i o n s  i n  th e  f i g u r e s  o f  
p o p u l a t i o n  p e r  Member n o t  o n ly  a s  be tw een  one p r e f e c t u r e  
and  a n o t h e r ,  b u t  a l s o  b e tw ee n  th e  d i f f e r e n t  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  
i n  a s i n g l e  p r e f e c t u r e .  The f o l lo w in g  t a b l e  o f  t h e
a v e ra g e  number o f  i n h a b i t a n t s  p e r  Member i n  each  o f  th e
6f o r t y - f i v e  fu  and  k e n  shows som eth ing  o f  t h i s .  A c c o rd in g  
t o  i t ,  Y am anashi h a d  th e  h i g h e s t  a v e ra g e  (1 4 8 ,0 0 0 )  and  
N a g a sa k i  th e  lo w e s t  ( 1 0 7 ,0 0 0 ) .  Tokyo h ad  an a v e ra g e  o f  
a lm o s t  1 30 ,000  c i t i z e n s  p e r  Member.
------  Fu o r  Ken No. o f  I n h . No. o f  Mems. Av. pop . p e r
Mem.
Tokyo 1 , 558,454 12 129,871
Kyoto 8 7 5 ,0 8 4 7 125,012
Osaka 1 , 281,150 10 128,115
Kanagawa 9 4 7 ,7 6 6 7 135 ,395
Hyogo 1 ,521 ,8X 7 12 1 2 6 ,8 1 8
N a g asak i 752 ,402 7 10 7 ,4 8 6
N i i g a t a 1 ,6 6 5 ,3 7 8 13 128,106
6
Suem atsu  Kencho, N i - j u - s a n  Nen-no So-S enkyo , M e i j i  Bunka 
Z enshu  ( h e r e a f t e r  c i t e d  a s  MBZ) ,  v o l .  3 ,  p p . 2 0 5 -6 .
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----  Pu or Ken No. of Inh. No. of Mems. Av. pop. per
Mem.
Saitama 1 ,0 5 4 ,4 8 3 8 1 3 1 ,8 1 0
Gumma 718 ,2 1 5 5 1 4 3 ,6 4 3
Chiba 1 ,1 7 2 ,1 3 8 9 1 3 0 ,2 3 8
Ibaraki 9 9 8 ,9 7 6 8 1 2 4 ,8 7 2
Tochigi 6 8 4 ,3 4 1 5 1 3 6 ,8 6 8
Kara 4 9 6 ,4 3 1 4 12 4 ,1 0 8
Mie 9 0 9 ,7 0 2 7 1 2 9 ,9 5 7
Aichi 1 ,4 4 4 ,0 1 1 11 1 3 1 ,2 7 4
Shizuoka 1 ,0 5 8 ,2 2 6 8 1 3 2 ,2 7 8
Yamanashi 4 4 5 ,1 8 2 3 1 4 8 ,3 9 4
Shiga 667 ,5 6 3 5 1 3 2 ,5 1 3
Gifu 9 0 9 ,2 2 6 7 12 9 ,8 8 9
Nagano 1 ,1 1 1 ,9 4 6 8 138 ,9 9 3
Miyagi 736 ,6 2 8 5 1 4 7 ,3 2 6
Fukushima 913 ,4 5 9 7 1 3 0 ,4 9 4
Iwate 6 5 6 ,0 4 7 5 131 ,2 0 9
Aomori 5 3 0 ,2 9 2 4 1 3 2 ,5 7 3
Yamagata 7 4 1 ,8 9 6 6 123 ,6 4 9
Akita 6 8 2 ,9 2 8 5 1 3 6 ,5 8 6
Fukui 5 9 6 ,7 0 4 4 1 4 9 ,1 7 6
Ishikawa 745 ,110 6 1 2 4 ,1 8 5
Toyama 738 ,445 5 147 ,6 8 9
Tottori 3 9 4 ,3 3 3 3 1 3 1 ,4 4 4
Shimane @ 2 ,1 0 1 6 1 1 5 ,3 5 0
Okayama 1 ,0 6 2 ,1 5 5 8 132 ,7 6 9Hiroshima 1 ,2 8 9 ,1 0 9 10 1 2 8 ,9 1 1
Yamaguchi 9 1 4 ,0 8 3 7 1 3 0 ,5 8 3
Wakayama 6 2 3 ,8 4 2 5 1 2 4 ,7 6 8Tokushima 6 7 6 ,1 5 4 5 1 3 5 ,2 3 1Kagawa 6 6 0 ,4 8 4 5 1 3 2 ,0 9 7Ehime 9 0 6 ,4 1 4 7 1 2 9 ,4 8 8Kochi 5 6 9 ,8 7 4 4 142 ,4 6 9
Fukuoka 1 ,2 0 9 ,2 9 5 9 1 3 4 ,3 6 6Oita 7 8 1 ,5 5 4 6 1 30 ,259
Saga 553 ,4 2 3 4 1 3 8 ,3 5 6
Kumamoto 1 ,0 4 2 ,2 8 1 8 130 ,2 8 5
Miyazaki 4 0 7 ,8 2 7 3 1 3 5 ,9 4 2Kagoshima 9 8 5 ,2 7 1 7 1 4 0 ,7 5 3
Totals 3 9 ,3 8 2 ,2 0 0 300 1 3 1 ,2 7 4
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The national average of 131,274 inhabitants per 
Member was much higher than the equivalent figure for other 
parliamentary countries in Europe where Germany had the 
highest number of inhabitants per seat in the Diet, The 
German figure was 69,181, In the United States on the other 
hand, there were 173*900 citizens for every Representative,
In his memoirs, Kaneko draws attention to the fact that it 
took far more people to have one Representative in Japan 
than in most other countries, and half explains the policy 
on the grounds that if Japan had copied the West more closely 
in this matter, her House of Representatives would have 
contained approximately 520 Members; and fthis would have 
been inconvenient for our country when it was having its 
first experience /“of a parliamentary system_7. * ^ What he 
probably really meant is that the Government was frightened 
of having too large a rebellious House to deal with.
This same mood of caution was even more strongly 
expressed in the restrictions placed on the franchise. In 
1890, this was very narrow indeed. Women could not vote, 
and for men the qualifications were of three kinds:- (i)age, 
(ii) residence, and (iii) property. To be entitled to the 
vote, a man had to be more than twenty-five years of age.
To be included in the electoral roll of a fu or ken, he had 
to have his permanent residence there, and to have been
7
Hayashida Kämetaro, Meiji-TaishS Seikai Sokumen Shi, 
vol.l, p.174.
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actually residing in the area concerned for a period of not 
less than one year previous to the drawing up of the roll 
and to be still living in the same province. In addition 
to this, the vote was given only to those who had paid at 
least ¥15 per annum in direct national taxes, in the fu or 
ken in question, for a period of not less than one year 
previous to the drawing up of the roll and were still paying 
the same amount in taxation. In the case of income tax, the 
minimum time limit was three years.
The effect of these severe franchise qualifications was 
to reduce the number of voters to a mere 450,365 out of a 
population of close on forty millions - in other words, to 
1.149$ of the total number of inhabitants of those regions 
of the Empire covered by the election. Only Shiga ken had 
over 29$ of its inhabitants on the electoral rolls; and in 
Tokyo fu, the proportion of voters to residents was as low 
as 0.389$. Kagoshima ken did hardly better with 0.4l?$. The 
number of electors in relation to the number of adult (i.e. 
over twenty-five) men was one in twenty-five; and for every 
hundred households, there were approximately six electors. 
Taking the population as a whole, there were eighty-seven 
persons for every one elector.^
3
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3, 
pp. 203-4 and 208-9.
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The most disabling of these restrictions was undoubtedly 
the stipulation that in order to be allowed to vote a 
person had to be paying at least ¥15 a year in direct national 
taxes. Though every other parliamentary country, with the 
exceptions of Prance, Germany, and Switzerland, still had a 
tax qualification to limit its franchise in 1890, and there 
was no demand in Japan at that time for unrestricted manhood 
suffrage, the choice of ¥15 as the minimum requirement made 
the Japanese electorate inordinately small in proportion to 
the total population. When discussing the reasons for the 
choice, Kaneko confined himself to the remark that 1Prince
—  QIto was always a believer in gradual advance.1^  Taxation 
in 1890 was levied either on land or on personal incomes, 
and the land-tax accounted for by far the greater part of 
the national revenues. So much so, that at the time in 
question there were approximately 500,000 people paying ¥15 
or more a year in land-tax, but only 14,000 paying the same 
amount in income tax."^ This last point is an important one 
for understanding the overweening influence of the rural 
areas in the elections. It is less easy to understand why
5
Hayashida Kametaro, Meiji-Taisho Seikai Sokumen Shi, p.175.
10
Hayashida Kametaro. Shugi-in Giin Senkyo Ho Kaisei Iken,
The Nation’s Friend (Kokumin-no Tomo), vol. 13, no.201,
Sept. 1893, p*366. The statistics given by Hayashida 
relate to 1892, but there could not have been much change between I890 and then*
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t h e  i n c o m e - ta x  p a y e r s  sh o u ld  have  b een  f u r t h e r  d i s c r i m i n a t e d  
a g a i n s t  by im pos ing  on them a minimum p e r i o d  o f  payment o f  
t h r e e  y e a r s  a s  opposed  t o  one y e a r .  P o s s i b l y  i t  was b eca u se  
t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  f e l t  t h a t  s i n c e  th e  l a n d - t a x  was t h e  f i n a n c i a l  
l i f e  o f  t h e  s t a t e ,  t h e  f a r m e r s  had  t o  be g i v e n  t h e  i m p r e s s io n  
t h a t  t h e y  were b e in g  t r e a t e d  s l i g h t l y  more f a v o u r a b l y  t h a n  
t h e  c i t y  d w e l l e r s .
The s m a l l  s i z e  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  meant  t h a t  t h e  t o t a l  
number o f  v o t e r s  i n  any  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n s t i t u e n c y  was o f t e n  
c o u n te d  i n  h u n d red s  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h o u s a n d s .  Moreover  b e c a u se  
t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  d i d  n o t  a l l  have t h e  same number o f  
i n h a b i t a n t s ,  t h e  number o f  v o t e r s  d i f f e r e d  v e ry  s h a r p l y  from 
one c o n s t i t u e n c y  t o  a n o t h e r .  F o r  t h e  Empire a s  a w ho le ,  
t h e  a v e r a g e  number o f  v o t e r s  p e r  c o n s t i t u e n c y  worked o u t  a t  
1 ,7 1 4 ;  b u t  e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t s  w i t h  f e w e r  t h a n  f i v e  h u n d re d  
v o t e r s  were by no means uncommon, e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  c i t i e s .
I n  Tokyo f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  w i t h  t h e  l a r g e s t  
number o f  e l e c t o r s  was N ih o n b a sh i  w ard ,  b u t  even  i t  c o u ld  
o n l y  m u s t e r  604. The N in th  C o n s t i t u e n c y  (K o i sh ik a w a ,
Ushigome, and  Y otsuya  w a rd s )  h a d  o n ly  182 names on i t s  
e l e c t o r a l  r o l l ,  and f o u r  o t h e r  m e t r o p o l i t a n  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  
had  few er  t h a n  t h r e e  h u n d r e d .  The r e a s o n s  why Tokyo had  
such  a s m a l l  s h a r e  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  were t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  
o f  i t s  c i t i z e n s  d i d  n o t  own immovable p r o p e r t y  w i t h i n  t h e  c i t y
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and not many of them paid ¥15 or more a year in income-tax.
In the provinces, as the franchise was tied to the amount 
paid in land-tax and so ultimately to the value of land, a 
given acreage in well-favoured regions would carry with it 
the right to vote whilst the same - or an even greater - area 
of land in less fertile parts would not. Three single-member 
constituencies - Fukushima ken Fifth Constituency, Shiga 
ken Second Constituency, and Mie ken Third Constituency - 
had more than 4,000 voters. As opposed to this, three 
other constituencies - Shimane ken Sixth Constituency (Oki 
islands), Nagasaki ken Sixth Constituency (Tsushima island), 
and Kagoshima ken Seventh Constituency (Oshima islands) - 
had fewer than 60 voters each.^1
The qualifications for candidates were similar to, but 
not identical with, those required of voters. To be eligible 
for election, a candidate had to be:- (i) a male Japanese 
subject, (ii) over thirty years old, and (iii) paying, and 
to have been paying for at least one year previous to the 
compilation of the electoral rolls, ¥15 or more per annum 
in direct national taxes in the fu or ken where he wished to 
be elected. (Once again, in the case of income-tax, the 
minimum time limit was extended to three years.) There was 
no residence qualification for candidates. In other ways,
_
Hayashida Kametaro, Shügi-in Giin Senkyo Ho Kaisei Iken, 
The Nation1s Friend (Kokumin-no Tomo), vol. 13, no.198,
Aug. 1893, p.171.
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too, the regulations for candidates were slightly less 
rigid than might have been expected or, indeed, deemed 
advisable. Candidates for election did not have to pay any 
deposit to be forfeited if they failed to secure more than 
a stipulated share of the votes; and the law did not place 
them under any restraints with regard to election expenses 
as opposed to bribes. Moreover, candidates were free to 
stand for election regardless of whether or not they had 
been formally authorized by a political party or had been 
favoured with any kind of organized local support. Thus, 
the Law of Election was somewhat deficient in safeguards 
against irresponsible or reckless candidatures.
Certain categories of persons were absolutely disqualified 
on professional grounds from standing for election. These 
were members of the Imperial Household Department, judicial 
officers, auditors employed by the Government, revenue 
officials, members of the police force, and also Shinto 
priests, Buddhist clergy, and teachers of religion. Local 
government officials were not allowed to contest seats in 
areas under their own jurisdiction.
The ban on the Buddhist clergy was not without
repercussions. There were cases of priests renouncing their
12vocation to take part in the election. According to a
IF“
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3, 
p.216. Also report on the Osaka fu campaigns in TNNS (Tokyo 
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n ew sp a p e r  a r t i c l e  w r i t t e n  i n  J u l y  1890 ,  p e t i t i o n s  f o r  th e
r e s t o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  c l e r g y ’ s r i g h t  t o  be e l e c t e d  h ad  been
s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  S e n a te  s i n c e  t h e  p r o m u l g a t i o n  o f  t h e  Law o f
E l e c t i o n  w i th  such  r e g u l a r i t y  t h a t ,  f o r  t h e  c o n v en ien c e  o f  t h e
p e t i t i o n e r s ,  a s p e c i a l  i n t e r - d e n o m i n a t i o n a l  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
room had  been  s e t  up a t  t h e  Komyo tem p le  i n  t h e  S h ib a  ward 
13o f  Tokyo. One o f  t h e s e  p e t i t i o n s ,  r e c o r d e d  a few days 
l a t e r  a s  h a v in g  b e en  h an d ed  i n  t o  t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l ,  
o r i g i n a t e d  i n  two v i l l a g e s  i n  Yamaguchi p r e f e c t u r e  and 
c a r r i e d  168 s i g n a t u r e s . 1 ^
A p a r t  from p e t i t i o n s ,  t h e  B u d d h i s t  p r i e s t s  were c a p a b le  
o f  a d o p t i n g  more q u e s t i o n a b l e  m ethods t o  d e fe n d  t h e i r  
i n t e r e s t s .  I n  t h e  s p r i n g  o f  1889 ,  an  o r g a n i z a t i o n  known as  
t h e  Sonno Hobutsu D a id ö d an  ( C o n f e d e r a t i o n  f o r  Honour ing  t h e  
Emperor  and  R e v e r in g  t h e  Buddha) was fo rm ed ,  i n c l u d i n g  i n  
i t s  r a n k s  b o t h  p r i e s t s  an d  l a y - b e l i e v e r s ,  and s p r e a d  t o  
e v e r y  p r o v i n c e .  I n  some p l a c e s ,  t h e  more f e r v e n t  members o f  
t h i s  o r g a n i z a t i o n  u s e d  v i o l e n c e  i n  an  a t t e m p t  t o  p r e v e n t  
C h r i s t i a n s  o r  n o n - b e l i e v e r s  f rom b e in g  e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  town and  
v i l l a g e  a s s e m b l i e s .  Though t h i s  v i o l e n c e  d i d  n o t  a lways 
a c h i e v e  i t s  o b j e c t i v e ,  i t  was s u f f i c i e n t l y  s u c c e s s f u l  t o  
s u g g e s t  s u d d e n ly  t o  a number o f  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  g e n e r a l
13
TNNS 1 - 7 - 9 0 .  (TM S a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  Tokyo N i c h i  N ic h i  S h im b u n . )
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election of the following year the wisdom of enrolling
themselves in the Sonnö Hobutsu Daidodan, or buying Buddhist
family altars if they did not already have them, or helping
the Buddhist priests to write their sermons. To disturbances
of this sort, in favour of the restoration of the right to
be elected, some, but not all, of the leaders of the sects
were prepared to turn a blind eye. Those who were not
willing to condone violence suggested at a conference of
representatives from a number of sects, held in Tokyo during
April 1890, that the clergy should make every effort to
bring about by peaceful means the election of those candidates
18who were known to be believers in Buddhism. J
In addition to forbidding candidatures by persons 
belonging to the categories listed above, the Law of Election 
also withheld from certain other classes of people both the 
right to be elected and the right to vote. These were 
lunatics, idiots, undischarged bankrupts, members of the 
armed services not on the retired or temporarily retired 
lists, heads of noble families, and persons who had been 
deprived of their public rights or whose public rights had 
been suspended. Those who had undergone imprisonment for one 
year or more were also in danger of losing their electoral 
rights, as the lav/ stated that three years had to pass after
TNNS l-7“*90. See also Kokumin Shimbun 3-6*90.
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the completion or pardon of their sentences before they 
were entitled to vote or be elected. The same rule was 
enforced v/ith respect to persons who had been punished 
for gambling. Finally, anybody against whom a criminal 
charge had been laid, and who was in detention or on bail, 
could not elect or be elected until the completion of the 
proceedings.
It v/as by virtue of this last ruling that Kobayashi
Yushichiro, editor of the Tohoku Nippo (a Niigata prefecture
newspaper), nearly forfeited his right to stand as a
candidate. He had been sentenced for libel, and was in the
process of appealing to the Supreme Court at the time of the
election campaign. His lawyer made a special request for
an alteration to the time-table of the Supreme Court so that
his clientfs case could be concluded before the election.
The Court acknowledged the justice of this request and held
an extraordinary sitting on 17 June. At this sitting, the
public prosecutor agreed with the defending counsel that the
plaintiff had been the victim of a miscarriage of justice and
16asked for the appeal to be upheld.
Other people were not so lucky. In May, the Toyama 
prefectural office asked the Home Office for a ruling on 
the legal technicality of whether an offender sentenced to
16 “
TNNS 18-6-90.
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concurrent terms of imprisonment for several offences, but 
later pardoned for the major crime and so released from 
gaol, was eligible for electoral rights. The Toyama 
authorities had based their query on the case of certain 
Liberal militants who had been sentenced in September I887 
to five years in gaol for subversion overseas, and to one 
month’s imprisonment on the minor charge of having harboured 
criminals - sentences to run concurrently. These prisoners 
had been released in February 1889 under the terms of a 
special amnesty for political offences. In his instructions, 
the Home Minister (Saigo Tsugumichi) said that the amnesty 
had been for political offences only; and that in the case 
in question, those sentenced to confinement for one month 
on 24 September I887 for the common criminal offence of having 
harboured criminals would be given back their electoral 
rights on 23 October I89O, i,e. three years after the 
expiry of their sentences.1^
It is clear from this that although the general amnesty 
for political offences given in February 1889 to mark the 
inauguration of the constitution was more generous than an 
ordinary pardon in that it was not accompanied by forfeiture 
of electoral rights for a further three years, it in no way 
affected the operation of the Law of Election so far as other,
17 TUNS 19-6-90
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non-political crimes were concerned. The chief sufferer
from this was Oi Kentaro, one of the most prominent of the
radical leaders of the Jiyu-to. Condemned in 1886 to nine
years imprisonment for attempting to stir up a Left-wing
revolt in Korea in the previous year, with the idea of
effecting the 1liberation of Japan from there, he had been
prematurely released from gaol in February 1889* On 23 June
1890, the Osaka Court of Petty Offences ruled that Oi was
not eligible to stand as a candidate in the election, because
other sentences given at the same time for minor felonies
had not been absolved by the amnesty. The Court also held
that he was not entitled to vote as he had recently changed
18his permanent domicile.
The governor of a fu or ken was responsible for the 
overall supervision of elections held within the territory 
under his jurisdiction. These governors had been appointed 
by, and were answerable to, the Minister for the Home Office. 
Yamagata had been in charge of the Home Office from December 
I885 to May 1890 when he was replaced by Saigo Tsugumichi; 
and he had had the Prime Minister1s portfolio, too, since 
December 1889» Therefore he was all but doubly responsible 
for the enforcement of the Law of Election; however, apart 
from cases like the Toyama query mentioned above, the
TB
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officials at the Home Office did not often intervene in 
the management of the election, but rather preferred to 
leave it almost entirely in the hands of the prefectural 
authorities. The prefectural governors, too, tended to 
keep themselves in the background. They had to issue a 
certain number of proclamations, ensure that there was an 
adequate supply of ballot forms, check the electoral rolls 
and results of the voting, and generally keep a watchful 
eye on the way things were developing; but, in essence, a 
governor1s function was to make sure that his subordinate 
officials were carrying out the real work of the administration 
of the election in a manner that was both proper and efficient. 
The burden of this real work undoubtedly devolved on those 
minor local government officials who were appointed to 
act as Returning Officers.
If a constituency was limited to a single gun or a single 
city (shi), its sub-prefect (guncho) or mayor (shicho) was 
Returning Officer. When several gun or shi were combined 
into one constituency, the governor had to appoint one of 
the guncho or shicho to be Returning Officer. Likewise, 
when a city had more than one constituency within its municipal 
boundaries, the governor nominated one of the urban district 
heads (kuchö) in each of the constituencies to be its 
Returning Officer. At a lower level of administration, the
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polling stations were put under the authority of the heads
of the villages (son), towns (cho), or urban districts (ku)
in which they were situated. Thus, in every case, the
most onerous tasks of electoral administration - that is,
the responsibility of being a Returning Officer, and the
supervision of the polling stations - fell to the senior
local government official in the area concerned, Gunchö and
kucho had been appointed to their posts; shicho, chocho,
and soncho had been elected to theirs.
The Government, when drawing up the Law of Election,
had taken for granted the honesty of these petty functionaries.
Events were to prove this assumption largely correct so far
as the Returning Officers were concerned; on the other hand,
many of the local dignitaries who were not Returning
Officers used their position to influence the outcome of
the election. Accordingly, in retrospect, it was felt by
commentators on the election that it would have been better
if the Government had issued supervisory regulations to
prevent improper conduct by the minor officials in charge of,
or attached to, the administrative offices in every urban
19ward, town, or village. An extreme example of this improper 
conduct occurred in the Fifth Constituency, Saitarna prefecture, 
where the heads of the towns and villages campaigned actively
19 3
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Een-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3,
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on behalf of certain candidates and even held a meeting to 
assess their suitability. Reporting this, the pro-Government 
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun castigated it as an unhealthy 
survival of the bad old custom of 1 revere officials, despise 
the people’• These local officials sometimes justified 
their partiality on the grounds that they were acting in 
their private, and not public, capacities; but the border 
between legitimate exercise of their rights as citizens and 
outright abuse of their office by way of fraud or coercion 
must have been frequently crossed.
The costs of the election in each constituency were to 
be met out of local taxes. There is no means of ascertaining 
what these costs actually were, but one may hazard a guess 
that they were not very high. The Returning officers, the 
supervisors of the polling stations, and the clerks who 
worked at the polling stations or the offices of the Returning 
Officers were all full-time local government officials, and 
would have received no special emoluments for their electoral 
v/ork. Similarly, the polling stations themselves were 
situated in public buildings, and so the authorities would 
not have had to pay rent for them. Consequently, apart from 
such things as:- (i) the cost of printing special entry 
permits and ballot forms, of preparing the electoral rolls,
TNNS 22-6-90.
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and of supplying the requisite memorandum books and writing 
materials, (ii) the price of the ballot boxes, and the 
paying for the transport of them from outlying polling 
stations to the office of the Returning Officer after the 
voting was finished, and (iii) perhaps, the costs of any 
legal action arising from the election, it is difficult 
to see for what money would have been needed, A law suit, 
of course, if it was chargeable to a constituency, could 
have involved it in fairly heavy expense; but the cost of 
the other marginal items cannot have amounted to very much.
The Returning Officer for a constituency instructed 
its town and village heads to make a list of all persons 
qualified to be electors who were living in the areas 
under their control. On this electoral list were inscribed 
the name, official rank, profession, class, and date of birth 
of each elector, together with the total amount of direct 
national taxes paid by him and the place or places in which 
these taxes were paid. Two copies of the list had to be 
prepared by 1 April of the year in which an election was held; 
and the chocho or soncho was expected to forward one copy to 
the Returning Officer by the 20th of that month. The Returning 
Officer, after receiving the local preliminary lists from 
the headmen of the towns and villages, made up an amalgamated 
roll for the entire constituency. A duplicate of this
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amalgamated roll was then sent on to the governor of the 
fu or ken. In the case of the cities, when a whole city or 
one ward (ku) thereof formed a constituency, the Returning 
Officer, himself, (shicho or kucho) prepared the electoral 
roll without the help of preliminary lists. If several 
wards were joined together in one constituency, the respective 
kucho had to draw up the preliminary lists for their own 
wards and forward them to whichever one of their number was 
acting as Returning Officer, When a sub-prefecture (gun) 
and a city (shi) were united in one constituency for which 
the guncho was Returning Officer, the shicho drew up the 
roll of voters in the city for despatch to the guncho. If 
the shicho, himself, was the Returning Officer for such a
gun-shi constituency, he still had to make the roll for the 
municipal part of it.
Prom fifteen days from 5 May, the Returning Officer of 
a constituency was compelled to put its completed electoral 
roll on public display at the office of the gun, shi, or ku 
responsible for the management of the election. That is to 
say, at his own fhomef office. Any member of the public who 
felt that his own name had been wrongly omitted from the 
roll, or that somebody else's name had been mistakenly 
included in it, was asked to make representations in writing 
within the period of inspection. On receiving such
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r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s ,  t h e  R e tu r n i n g  O f f i c e r  had  t o  make e n q u i r i e s  
and  r e a c h  a d e c i s i o n  on t h e  m a t t e r  w i t h i n  tw e n ty  d a y s .  I f  
he saw f i t  t o  a l t e r  t h e  r o l l  i n  any  way, he was t o  do so  a t  
once and s e n d  s e p a r a t e  n o t i f i c a t i o n s  b o th  t o  th e  headman 
o f  t h e  a r e a  where t h e  p e r s o n  c o n c e r n e d  was l i v i n g  and t o  
t h e  g e n e r a l  body o f  c o n s t i t u e n t s .  The R e tu r n i n g  O f f i c e r ’ s 
d e c i s i o n  t o  amend t h e  r o l l  o r  n o t  t o  amend i t  c o u ld  be 
c o n t e s t e d  a t  l aw ,  e i t h e r  by t h e  p e r s o n  who had  made t h e  
o r i g i n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  o r  by t h e  p e r s o n  a b o u t  whom t h e y  had  
b e en  made. A p l a i n t i f f  was r e q u i r e d  t o  f i l e  a s u i t  i n  t h e  
C our t  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e s  w i t h i n  se v e n  days o f  t h e  p u b l i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r ’ s d e c i s i o n .  The c o u r t s  were 
i n s t r u c t e d  t o  h e a r  s u i t s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  amendments t o  
t h e  e l e c t o r a l  r o l l s  w i t h o u t  d e l a y ,  and  t o  r e g a r d  them a s  
h av in g  f i r s t  c l a im  on t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n .  A p p e a ls  a g a i n s t  t h e  
judgem ents  o f  t h e  C o u r t s  o f  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e  c o u l d  n o t  be 
b r o u g h t  i n  t h e  o r d i n a r y  C o u r t s  o f  A p p e a l ,  b u t  t h e  Supreme 
C our t  c o u l d  be a s k e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  them. On 15 J u n e ,  t h e  
e l e c t o r a l  r o l l s  were t o  be r e g a r d e d  as  s e t t l e d  and  c o m p le t e .  
Only a j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n  c o u ld  change  them a f t e r  t h a t  d a t e .
The r u l e s  f o r  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  and  amendment o f  t h e  
e l e c t o r a l  r o l l s  were one o f  t h e  f a i r e s t  and most  c a r e f u l l y  
t h o u g h t  o u t  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  Law o f  E l e c t i o n .  P o s s i b l y  f o r  
t h i s  r e a s o n ,  new sp ap er  r e p o r t s  o f  l i t i g a t i o n  i n  c o n n e c t i o n
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with the rolls were not very common. The following summary
of one of these reports is given as a seemingly isolated
example of what could happen, but it is perhaps worth
mentioning that this particular item concludes with the
observation that ’such suits will be frequent occurrences
from now on.’ Apparently, revaluations of property for
taxation purposes had deprived a number of influential people
of their electoral rights in the previous year, and had caused
quite a furore on the occasion of the re-election of half the
22members of every prefectural assembly in March 1890.
Perhaps, though, many people reckoned it was worth their 
while not to have the vote, if that meant they paid less in 
taxation.
The case in question concerned Kobayashi Kanichiro, 
a member of the shizoku class in Miyazaki (southern Kyushu) 
prefecture. In May, he notified the Returning Officer for 
his home constituency that his name had been mistakenly 
omitted from the roll of voters. The Returning Officer 
refused to enfranchise him; on the grounds that because of a 
special reassessment of the value of his land, it had been 
liable for a tax of only ¥13 between 1 January and 22 February 
1890. Therefore, the Returning Officer argued, he had not 
been in continuous possession of land assessed at a rate of
21 22 Yubin-Hochi 5-4-90.TNNS 24-6-90
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¥15 o r  more d u r i n g  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r .  I n  p o i n t  o f  f a c t ,  
K obayash i  h ad  p a i d  more t h a n  ¥15 i n  d i r e c t  t a x e s  o v e r  t h e  
p e r i o d  i n  q u e s t i o n ,  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  b e in g  a c c o u n te d  f o r  by 
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  he had  a c q u i r e d  some o f  h i s  p r o p e r t y  i n  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  O c to b e r  and  had p a i d  a s e p a r a t e  t a x  on i t  t o o .  
M oreover ,  h i s  c u r r e n t  t a x  a s s e s s m e n t  was o v e r  t h e  q u a l i f y i n g  
amount. F o r  t h e s e  r e a s o n s ,  he f i l e d  a s u i t  a g a i n s t  t h e  
R e tu r n i n g  O f f i c e r  i n  t h e  M iy azak i  C o u r t  o f  t h e  F i r s t  I n s t a n c e ,  
b u t  l o s t  h i s  c a s e .  I n  t h e  judgement  o f  t h e  C o u r t ,  ev en  
th o u g h  i t  was n o t  d i s p u t e d  t h a t  he had  n e v e r  a c t u a l l y  
s t o p p e d  p a y in g  a l a n d - t a x  o f  ¥15  o r  more ,  he was n o t  e n t i t l e d  
t o  v o t e  s i n c e  he had n o t  b e en  i n  u n i n t e r r u p t e d  p o s s e s s i o n  
o f  l a n d  l i a b l e  f o r  t h i s  amount .  D i s s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h i s  
d e c i s i o n ,  K obayash i  t r a v e l l e d  t o  Tokyo t o  se ek  l e g a l  a d v i c e ;  
and a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  r e p o r t ,  h i s  c o u n s e l  was p r e p a r i n g  an 
a p p e a l  t o  t h e  Supreme C o u r t .
The c o n n e c t i o n  b e tw ee n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  y e a r ,  which  ended  
on 31 March, and t h e  e l e c t o r a l  f r a n c h i s e  a c c o u n t s  f o r  t h e  
c h o ic e  o f  A p r i l  a s  t h e  month f o r  p r e p a r i n g  e l e c t o r a l  r o l l s ,  
a n d ,  a l l o w i n g  t im e  f o r  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  work and 
p o s s i b l e  j u d i c i a l  p r o c e e d i n g s ,  t h e  f i x i n g  o f  t h e  f i r s t  day 
o f  J u l y  as  t h e  d a t e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n .  The Law o f  E l e c t i o n  
d e t e r m i n e d  t h i s  n o t  o n l y  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n ,  b u t  
a l s o  f o r  e v e r y  s u b s e q u e n t  r e g u l a r  ( i . e .  q u a d r e n n i a l )  c h o o s in g
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of a new House of Representatives, Thus, at the outset
at least, the dates of general elections in Japan were
made to conform to the convenience of the financial machinery
of the central Government, rather than being left to the
less orderly and bureaucratic dictates of political
opportunity or party strategerns.
On 1 July, the polling stations were to be opened at
7*0 a.m. and were to remain open until 6.0 p.m., though
they could be closed earlier than this if all the voters in 
 ^ 23the area had voted. As a general rule, polling stations
were situated in the town, village, or ward offices of a
constituency; but they could be put elsewhere at the
discretion of the local headmen. For instance, in Tokyo
fu, there were approximately ninety-one polling stations
2Udistributed among twelve constituencies. The nine
electoral districts comprising inner Tokyo had only one 
polling station apiece; in each of these nine cases, it was 
a ward office (kuyakusho). In the outlying, semi-rural 
regions of the metropolitan area, however, primary schools, 
temples, and charitable institutions were all used as polling 
stations, as well as the more usual village offices 
(sonyakusho). Speaking of the country as a whole, it is 
—
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obvious that in the truly urban and more populous rural
districts, the electors would not have had to go very far
in order to vote; but there were instances in less densely
inhabited regions of people having to travel considerable
distances to the polls. This was because the number of
electors in any single village was too small to justify the
opening of one polling station in every village. This was
the case in Fukuoka (northern Kyushu) prefecture where the
authorities decided to provide one polling station for
approximately every fifty-five voters. Even so, some of
the electors had to make journeys of more than twenty or
25thirty miles to get to the nearest polling station.
As stated earlier, the person in charge of a polling 
station was the local headman, that is, the kucho, chocho, or 
sonchö. This official was responsible for seeing that the 
voting was carried out in the prescribed manner, and he had 
to keep an election minute book in which details of the 
voting and any unlooked for contingency or error were to 
be recorded*. To assist him, he had the clerks who were his 
subordinates in the everyday work of local administration. 
Furthermore, the Law of Election expressly stated that the 
headman had to nominate not less than two and not more than 
five election witnesses from among the electors of the
25 “ I ~
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3*> 
pp. 203 and 216*
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district under his authority. He was to tell the persons 
whom he wished to appoint as election witnesses, at least 
three days before the poll, that their presence would be 
needed in the polling station from the time it opened on 
1 July, The persons chosen, for their part, could not 
refuse the headmanTs request unless they had good reason.
In making this provision for independent witnesses, the 
Government was clearly trying to forestall any tampering 
with the votes, or other distortions of the popular will, 
by the officials in charge of the polling stations. However, 
as the nomination of these supposedly independent witnesses 
was left entirely in the hands of these same officials, there 
remained not a few loop-holes for collusion and unfair 
practices. A headman who was determined to see his own 
man win, cost what it might, had only to select witnesses 
who shared his views and lack of scruple, and the intention 
of this particular section of the law was undermined.
The ballot papers were of uniform style in each fu or
ken. They were distributed by the metropolitan or
prefectural offices to the gun or shi office in charge of
the constituency, and from there were sent on to the headmen
responsible for the various polling stations. In Tokyo fu,
the metropolitan governors office started sending out the
ballot forms to the inner, ward (ku) and outer, sub-prefectural
(gun) offices on 13 June.^ The packages of ballot papers
2? 3 27 ^Suematsu Kenchö, Ni-ju-san Hen-no 
So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3, p.217*
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also contained entrance tickets, arrival numbers, special 
paper for recording the number of votes gained by each 
candidate, notices of rules and punishments, and notices for 
the doors of polling booths. At the same time, the ward and 
sub-prefectural officials were told to return the entire 
consignment of ballot papers, should any of them be found to 
be defective. On 16 June, the metropolitan office forwarded 
copies of the administrative instructions for the actual 
carrying out of the voting in the polling stations to every
p QReturning Officer under its control; and these were
followed three days later by regulations of a similar nature
for the holding of declaration of the poll meetings.
Also on 19 June, the ballot boxes were despatched by the
30metropolitan office to the Returning Officers. On 26 June, 
the various ward offices in Tokyo began the work of handing 
out entrance tickets to the electors of the metropolis. ^
This was the time-table for administrative arrangements 
in connection with the election that was adopted in Tokyo 
fu. The other two fu (Kyoto and Osaka) and forty-two ken 
adhered to the same general procedure, though the timing was 
naturally not exactly identical in every case. For example, 
the distribution of the ballot boxes in Kochi (western Shikoku)
28 30TNKS 18-6-90. TNNS 2O-6-9O.
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prefecture did not start until 22 June; but in Kochi city 
itself, all the electors had received their entrance tickets 
by 23 June. It is a tribute to the high standards of
efficiency prevailing in local administration at the time, 
and to the wisdom of the central Governments decision 
to leave detailed arrangements for the election to the 
regional officials, that these arrangements worked virtually 
without a hitch throughout the Empire. Likewise, the same 
thing is an unspoken comment on a general state of pacification 
extraordinary for a country which had been the scene of 
bitter civil strife not twelve years before and of a number 
of armed uprisings since then. When the polls opened on 
1 July, there was not a single elector who had not been in 
a position to check whether his name was on the electoral 
roll and who had not received the necessary entrance ticket 
beforehand; and there was not a single polling station that 
lacked ballot papers, ballot boxes, and the other equipment 
requisite for the election.
Accidents did happen; but they were of a very minor 
nature, and could easily be put right before any real harm 
was done. One such accident befell Takada Kiyonobu, the 
headman of Izumi village in Ehime (western Shikoku) prefecture. 
About 23 June, he went from Izumi to the sub-prefectural
W ~
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(Kita Uwa gun) office to collect the voting papers for the 
village. Having done that, he stopped in Uwajima to do 
some shopping. While he was in a shop, he put the leather 
oag containing the ballot forms on the counter only to have 
it disappear in a moment or two. A search of the premises 
having failed to reveal it, he was forced to report to the
police and the gun office that the voting papers had been 
stolen.”
The ballot papers were not printed with the candidates' 
names. The elector himself had to write down the full name 
of the person for whom he wished to vote. In the case of 
two-member constituencies, two names could be written on the 
paper. Then, the elector had to write down his own name and 
place of residence, and affix his personal seal. Ballots 
inscribed in the native kana syllabary, or having names 
that were clearly recognizable though spelt with the wrong 
Chinese characters, were to be regarded as valid, since it 
was inherently more difficult to write personal names in 
the Chinese ideograms than it would have been if a phonetic 
script had been in use, this attitude of accepting anything 
that was unequivocally intelligible was a fair and sensible 
one for the framers of the Law of Election to take.
33“  ~ -----------------------
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The problem of the legibility or otherwise of the
ballots was further complicated by the existence of a
number of illiterates among the voters. Illiteracy was
still quite common in Japan in 1890, as the modern system
of universal and compulsory primary education had started
only a few years before that date. Exactly how many of
the electors in the first general election were unable to
read or write is not easy to say; but there were almost
certainly fewer than 10,000 illiterate voters, and very
probably fewer than 5,000. The total number of spoiled
L^lvotes was just under 3,000; and it is highly unlikely 
that many members of the class which paid ¥15 or more per 
annum in taxes were ignorant of both the kana syllabary and 
the Chinese characters. The Sanyo Shimbun (an Okayama 
prefecture newspaper) made this last point when, in a 
commentary on the application of the Law of Election, it 
remarked:-
The electors to the House of Representatives are not at all the same as the electors to the 
above /"local government_J7 assemblies. As they 
pay more than ¥15 in taxes, they cannot be illiterate. 35
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senky5, MBZ, vol.3, 
p.214.
35Sanyo Shimbun 12-6-90
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However, t h e  p a p e r  h e re  m ig h t  have been  f l a t t e r i n g  
i t s  own r e a d e r s ;  a t  any r a t e ,  t h e  same e d i t o r i a l  went on t o  
c a s t  d o u b t s  on t h e  op t im ism  o f  i t s  open in g  p a r a g r a p h s  by 
l a t e r  e x p l a i n i n g  i n  d e t a i l  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  made i n  t h e  Law o f  
E l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  p rob lem  o f  t h e  i l l i t e r a t e  v o t e r .  M oreover ,  
Suematsu Kencho, t h e  p e rm an en t  h e ad  o f  t h e  L o c a l  Government 
Bureau  i n  t h e  Home O f f i c e  and t h e  c a n d i d a t e  r e t u r n e d  f o r  one 
o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  i n  Fukuoka p r e f e c t u r e ,  d e a l t  a t  some 
l e n g t h  w i t h  t h e  same p rob lem  i n  a v a l u a b l e  l e c t u r e  w hich  he 
gave on t h e  e l e c t i o n  s h o r t l y  a f t e r  i t  was f i n i s h e d .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
i t  would seem t h a t  a l t h o u g h  i l l i t e r a t e  v o t e r s  were n o t  met 
w i t h  so  v e r y  f r e q u e n t l y  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  1890, t h e y  d i d  
e x i s t  -  i n  numbers t h a t  were p r o b a b l y  be tw een  s e v e r a l  h u n d re d  
and a few th o u s a n d  f o r  t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  a whole .
With t h i s  i n  mind,  t h e  a u t h o r s  o f  t h e  Law o f  E l e c t i o n  
i n s e r t e d  an a r t i c l e  a l l o w i n g  i l l i t e r a t e  v o t e r s  t o  a sk  one 
o f  th e  p o l l i n g  s t a t i o n  c l e r k s  t o  w r i t e  t h e i r  v o t e s  f o r  them. 
A f t e r  t h e  c l e r k  had  w r i t t e n  down t h e  v o t e  a t  t h e  e l e c t o r * s  
d i c t a t i o n ,  he was t o  r e a d  i t  o u t ;  t h e n  t h e  e l e c t o r  h i m s e l f  
had  t o  c a s t  t h e  v o t e  i n  t h e  norm al  way, i f  he was s a t i s f i e d  
t h a t  t h e  c l e r k  had h e a r d  him c o r r e c t l y .  M oreover ,  i t  had  
been  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t o r s  t o  have t h e  w r i t i n g  
by proxy  done i n  such  a way a s  t o  p r e v e n t  a s  many a s  p o s s i b l e  
o f  t h e  b y s t a n d e r s  from s e e i n g  i t .  T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  was i n
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c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  s e c r e t  b a l l o t s .  On t h e  
o t h e r  h an d ,  when b o t h  o f f i c i a l  w i t n e s s e s  and c l e r k s  were 
n o t  above s u s p i c i o n ,  th e  law by d i s c o u r a g i n g  c a s u a l  
s p e c t a t o r s  t o  t h e  a c t  o f  v o t i n g  by p r o x y  d i d  n o t  p r o v i d e  
any r e a l  s a f e g u a r d s  a g a i n s t  d o u b l e - d e a l i n g .  N o th in g  c o u ld  
p r e v e n t  t h e  l o c a l  headman o r  h i s  c l e r k ,  w i t h  t h e  c o n n iv a n ce  
o f  w h a t e v e r  o n lo o k e r s  t h e r e  m ig h t  have b e e n ,  f rom w r i t i n g  
what  t h e y  w ish e d  on a p ro x y  b a l l o t ;  an d ,  i n  f a c t ,  many 
p e t t y  d e c e p t i o n s  seem t o  have  b e e n  c a r r i e d  o u t .  Suematsu 
Kencho d e c l a r e d  i n  h i s  t a l k  on t h e  e l e c t i o n : -
There  a r e  f e a r s  t h a t  n o t h in g  c a n  remove t h a t ,  
when i t  came t o  t h e  a c t u a l  v o t i n g ,  i f  an  i l l i t e r a t e  
a s k e d  f o r  a p r o x y ,  Gombei was w r i t t e n  as  H a c h ib e i  
o r  Gosuke as  Rokusuke,  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  c o l l u s i o n  
be tw een  t h e  headmen and t h e  c l e r k s .  I  was o f t e n  a 
w i t n e s s  t o  t h i s  most  b a n e f u l ,  f o r  t h e  e l e c t o r s ,  
p r a c t i c e .  3 6
The Sanyo Shimbun, denounc ing  t h e  f o l l y  o f  g i v i n g  t h e  p o l l i n g  
s t a t i o n  o f f i c i a l s  a f r e e  hand  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  p ro x y  v o t e s ,
37s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  law was ’ i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e 1.
Some i l l i t e r a t e s ,  s u s p e c t i n g  what would happen ,  t o o k  t h e  
t r o u b l e  t o  l e a r n  b e f o r e h a n d  t h e  ideogram s u s e d  i n  t h e  names 
o f  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s ,  and  so became s u f f i c i e n t l y  l i t e r a t e  t o  
c a s t  t h e i r  own v o t e s  u n a i d e d .
36 __ _
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The ballot boxes were made of wood. They had two 
lids, each of which was fitted with a different lock. One 
of the two keys was held by the headman in charge of the 
polling station; the other was kept by the witnesses. The 
inner lid was slotted, and the boxes remained locked, with 
the outer lid off, while the voting was in progress. Before 
the voting began, the officials and the witnesses publicly 
opened the boxes to show that they were empty to the 
electors already gathered at the voting places.
The system of election used in the single-member 
constituencies was the same as the British one; that is, 
the candidate with the greatest number of votes, regardless 
of whether this majority was an absolute one or not, was 
declared the winner, and each voter had only one vote. In 
the two-member constituencies, on the other hand, the system 
of scrutin de liste was employed; that is, each voter could 
write down the names of two of the candidates, and the two 
with the highest number of votes were returned for the 
constituency. In the event of a tie between two candidates, 
the elder one was to be deemed elected; and should the dates 
of their birthdays happen to be the same, the election was 
to be decided by drawing lots.
Only the most salient features of the actual procedure 
for voting were laid down in the Law of Election itself;
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detailed instructions were left to the Imperial Ordinance
■*8ho, 3 of 9 January 1890, The voting procedure is perhaps 
best made clear by including at this point a translation of 
part of an item, headed Instructions To Voters, which 
appeared in several of the leading newspapers towards the 
end of June:-
1. An elector must put his registered seal under 
his own name on the entrance ticket which he 
has already received, and take the ticket 
with him to the polling station.
2. An elector must take his registered seal, and 
must himself go to the polling station. It is 
not permitted to vote by proxy.
3. An elector will be given a number card on
arriving in exchange for his entrance ticket, 
and should wait in the reception room until 
that number is called.
4# An elector should enter and wait in the reception 
room after leaving his umbrella, cane, or other 
hand luggage in the receptacles provided.
3* An elector, when the number on his arrival card 
is called, must proceed to the ballot paper 
distribution office where he will be given a 
voting paper in exchange for his arrival card. /”*Then_/ he must go to the voting booth and 
first write down the full name of the candidate 
of his choice, next write down his own dwelling- 
place and full name, and /“finally_7 affix his 
registered seal. /^ThenJ/ he must fold the paper 
in three and, licking the gum at the top and 
bottom edges, seal it firmly. After so doing, he 
should drop it in the box. All ideograms should 
be written in the square /“printed^/ style.
3S
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6. If an elector smears his ballot paper by
accident or makes a mistake in the writing, 
he should report the matter to the authorities 
and ask for a new one.
7. If an elector is unable to write, on making a 
report to the authorities to that effect, he 
will be allowed to write by proxy with the help 
of a clerk. Therefore /~illiterate__7 electors 
must decide on the name of the candidate whom 
they themselves prefer and ask for the writing 
to be done by proxy. On no account should they 
adopt an attitude of indifference, thinking 
anyone will do, and be late in coming to the 
polls.
8. When an elector has finished voting, since he 
has nothing more to do, he must leave the polling 
station at once.
9. While electors are at the polling station, they 
must all maintain a complete silence and should 
in no way engage in activities such as quarrels 
or soliciting other peopled votes. 39
The authorized procedure for voting, then, made the 
actual business of casting a vote reasonably straightforward, 
and as fair and as private as possible. The arrangements made 
for the special category of illiterate voters certainly left 
something to be desired; but otherwise the voting procedure 
was as foolproof and as corruption-proof as legislation could 
make it. Perhaps this, more than any other single thing, 
testified to the essential integrity of the Government’s 
attitude towards the election. Numbered arrival cards were 
used only in the polling stations which had to handle
39 TNNS 27-6-90
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a relatively large number of electors. Elsewhere, the 
elector voted immediately after surrendering his entrance 
ticket and after having had his name checked on the electoral 
roll. Needless to say, the voters’ names were also checked 
against the rolls at stations where arrival cards were 
issued.
The electorate can have hardly been left in ignorance 
of what was required of it. The articles of the Law of 
Election relating to the management of the polling stations, 
together with the prescribed punishments for breaches of the 
law or other criminal activities in connection with the 
election, were displayed at every polling station. Moreover, 
the Law of Election had been promulgated for over a year, and 
the Imperial Ordinance No. 3 for nearly six months, before the 
day of the election. Nation-wide local elections, too, had 
been held in the preceding twelve months. For the rest, the 
newspapers, as has been indicated, did their share in 
informing the public. The ’Instructions To Voters’, quoted 
above, have been taken from a Tokyo daily; but this sort 
of task was not just undertaken by the press of the capital 
alone. Mention has already been made of the detailed 
commentary on relevant sections of the Law of Election and 
the administrative regulations for voting, issued by the 
Sanyo Shimbun of Okayama prefecture. This commentary was
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printed as the paperfs editorials for the period 12-15 
June; the editor prefaced it with a declaration that it was 
just as important to have a knowledge of the rules for the 
election, so as not to make procedural mistakes when voting, 
as it was to make enquiries about the candidates. In 
Kanagawa prefecture, the electors in Tachibana sub­
prefecture, which formed part of the Second Constituency, 
met together for a special voting rehearsal on 15 June; 
because they wanted to ensure a good turn out on the actual 
day of the election, and so avoid any possibility of 
disgracing their prefecture or offending their local deity, 
Hachiman.^
Promptly at six o'clock on the evening of 1 July, the
managers of the polling stations were to declare the poll
closed, and shut the ballot boxes by putting on the outer
lids. Thereafter nobody at all could vote; no matter what
extenuating circumstances there might have been for those
who failed to do so, or were too late in coming to the polling
station. During the night of 1 July, the ballot boxes remained
at the polling stations where they were kept under strict
guard. The guards in some places were local government
clerks. They were told to try and sit up all night without
falling asleep, and to make sure that they held on to the
41boxes if in fact they did happen to doze. In the majority
no
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o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  g r o u p s  o f  e l e c t o r s  a l s o  k e p t  wa tch ;
and a lm o s t  e v e ry w h e re ,  t h e  p o l i c e ,  t o o ,  were c a l l e d  on t o
mount g u a r d .  D e s p i t e  p r e c a u t i o n s  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e ,  t h e r e
were  s u s p i c i o n s  i n  a t  l e a s t  one p r e f e c t u r e  t h a t  t h e  boxes
h ad  been  i l l i c i t l y  opened ,  and  t h e i r  c o n t e n t s  t a m p e re d  w i t h ,
L2u n d e r  t h e  c o v e r  o f  d a r k n e s s .
On 2 J u l y ,  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o l l i n g  s t a t i o n s  fo r w a r d e d  t h e i r  
b a l l o t  b o x e s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  m in u te s  o f  t h e  v o t i n g ,  t o  
t h e  g un ,  s h i ,  o r  ku o f f i c e  i n  c h a rg e  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y .
On t h i s  j o u r n e y ,  t h e  boxes  were accom panied  by a p o l i c e  
e s c o r t  and  a t  l e a s t  one o f  t h e  o f f i c i a l  w i t n e s s e s  t o  t h e  
v o t i n g .  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  remote i s l a n d s  where i t  would  n o t  
have  b e e n  p o s s i b l e  t o  sen d  i n  t h e  b a l l o t  boxes  on 2 J u l y  
u n d e r  t h e  u s u a l  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  g o v e r n o r  was 
empowered t o  h o l d  t h e  e l e c t i o n  e a r l i e r ,  i . e .  on any day 
be tw een  15 and  30 J u n e ,  and have  t h e  boxes  s e n t  t o  t h e  
m a i n l a n d  by 1 J u l y .  A f t e r  t h e  R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r  had  r e c e i v e d  
a l l  t h e  b a l l o t  boxes  f o r  h i s  c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  he had t o  h o l d  
a c o u n t i n g  and d e c l a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  p o l l  m e e t i n g .  T h i s  was 
known a s  t h e  E l e c t i o n  M e e t in g .  I n  a few p l a c e s ,  n o t a b l y  
i n n e r  Tokyo and t h e  u r b a n  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  o f  Kyoto f u  and 
Osaka f u ,  t h e  c o u n t i n g  o f  t h e  v o t e s  b e g an  and was c o m p le te d  on 
2 J u l y ;  b u t  o v e r  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  boxes
IS
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were n o t  opened  u n t i l  3 J u l y  and  sometimes t h e  c o u n t i n g
I4.3
went on u n t i l  5 o r  6 J u l y ,
Having f o r m a l l y  convened t h e  E l e c t i o n  M eet ing  and 
b e f o r e  g o in g  on t o  open t h e  b a l l o t  b o x e s ,  t h e  R e tu r n i n g  
O f f i c e r  was r e q u i r e d  t o  c o - o p t  an  E l e c t i o n  Committee o f  a t  
l e a s t  s e v e n  p e r s o n s  from among t h e  w i t n e s s e s  a s se m b le d  
from  t h e  v a r i o u s  p o l l i n g  s t a t i o n s .  Then he opened  th e  
boxes  and c o u n te d  th e  v o t e s  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h i s  c o m m it tee ;  
a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  he had  t o  c o u n t  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  v o t e r s .  
Any d i s c r e p a n c y  be tw een  t h e  two f i g u r e s  was e n t e r e d  i n  t h e  
o f f i c i a l  m in u te s  o f  t h e  E l e c t i o n  M e e t in g ,  A f t e r  do ing  t h i s ,  
t h e  R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r  i n s p e c t e d  t h e  b a l l o t s  w i t h  t h e  
a s s i s t a n c e  o f  t h e  E l e c t i o n  Committee and  d e c i d e d  which  o f  
them were v a l i d .  I n v a l i d  b a l l o t s  were t h o s e  w h i c h : -
( i )  Were w r i t t e n  by p e r s o n s  whose names d i d  n o t  
a p p e a r  on t h e  e l e c t o r a l  r o l l .  T h i s  d i d  n o t  
a p p l y ,  how ever ,  t o  v o t e r s  who had  b ro u g h t  w i th  
them t o  t h e  p o l l i n g  s t a t i o n  a C o u r t  o r d e r  t o  
t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t h e i r  name s h o u ld  have  b e en  on 
th e  r o l l .
( i i ) W e r e  n o t  made o u t  on t h e  o f f i c i a l  v o t i n g  p a p e r .
( i i i )  Were n o t  i n s c r i b e d  w i t h  t h e  v o t e r 1 s name.
( i v )  Were i n s c r i b e d  w i t h  t h e  name o f  a  p e r s o n  n o t  
q u a l i f i e d  f o r  e l e c t i o n ;  b u t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  a 
s c r u t i n  de l i s t e ,  such  a b a l l o t  was t o  be v a l i d  
f o r  any p e r s o n  named t h e r e i n  who d i d  have t h e  
p r o p e r  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .
43
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( v )  Were i l l e g i b l e  o r  ambiguous w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
t h e  name o f  t h e  v o t e r  o r  t h e  p e r s o n  f o r  
whom he had  v o t e d .
( v i )  C o n ta in e d  e x t r a n e o u s  m a t t e r ,  w r i t i n g ,  o r  
d ra w in g s .  When t h i s  a d d i t i o n a l  m a t e r i a l  
was meant t o  be o f  h e l p  i n  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  
however ,  t h e  b a l l o t  was t o  be c o n s i d e r e d  
v a l i d .
I f  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a b a l l o t  was i n  d o u b t ,  t h e  R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r
was co m p e ten t  t o  d e c id e  t h e  m a t t e r  a f t e r  c o n f e r r i n g  w i th  t h e
members o f  t h e  E l e c t i o n  Commit tee .  The a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e
r u l e s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o r  o t h e r w i s e  o f  b a l l o t s
v a r i e d  somewhat f rom p l a c e  t o  p l a c e ,  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  t h e
d i f f e r i n g  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  r u l e s  made by i n d i v i d u a l
R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r s  and t h e i r  h e l p e r s .  I n  some a r e a s ,  b a l l o t s
44b e a r i n g  o n ly  t h e  surnames o f  c a n d i d a t e s  were n o t  r e j e c t e d .
On c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  work o f  a d d in g  and  s o r t i n g  t h e  
b a l l o t s ,  t h e  R e tu r n i n g  O f f i c e r  announced  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  th e  
e l e c t i o n  t o  t h o s e  a s s e m b le d  a t  t h e  m e e t in g  p l a c e .  When 
d e t a i l s  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  p r o c e e d i n g s  h ad  b e e n  e n t e r e d  i n  t h e  
m in u te  book and  s i g n e d  by t h e  R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r  and  t h e  
members o f  h i s  E l e c t i o n  Commit tee ,  t h e  E l e c t i o n  M eet ing  was 
d e c l a r e d  c l o s e d .
E l e c t o r s  c o u ld  a t t e n d  t h e  E l e c t i o n  M eet ing  f o r  t h e i r  
c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  b u t  were u n d e r  s t r i c t  o r d e r s  t o  behave  t h e m s e l v e s .  
They had  t o  p r e s e r v e  c o m p le te  s i l e n c e  a t  t h e  command o f  t h e
IP4!
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R e tu r n i n g  O f f i c e r ,  and t h e y  were no t  su p p o sed  t o  show 
e i t h e r  by word o r  g e s t u r e  any s i g n  o f  a p p r o v a l  o r  
d i s a p p r o v a l  when th e  r e s u l t s  were r e a d  o u t .  The p ro b lem  
o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  v i s i t o r s  t o  t h e  E l e c t i o n  M ee t in g s  seems t o  
have loomed r a t h e r  l a r g e  i n  th e  minds o f  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  
and i t  was d i s c u s s e d  a t  a  s p e c i a l  c o n f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  
R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r s  f o r  t h e  Tokyo fu  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  T h i s  
c o n f e r e n c e  was h e l d  on 30 Ju n e ;  and  a new sp ap er  i n t i m a t e d
t h a t  such  words a s  ’p a t r o l s '  , , , , , . ,  ' f i r e m e n '  .............' p o l i c e '
.......... ' c l u b s '  ............ and  'pum ps '  were o v e r h e a r d  w h i l e  i t  was
he;
i n  p r o g r e s s ,  ^ Even i f  t h i s  r e p o r t  was t r u e ,  t h e  e v e n t  
p ro v e d  t h e  R e tu r n i n g  O f f i c e r s '  f o r e b o d i n g s  u n d u ly  
p e s s i m i s t i c  a s  th e  E l e c t i o n  M ee t in g s  i n  Tokyo and  e l s e w h e r e  
p a s s e d  o f f  w i t h o u t  i n c i d e n t .
The g e n e r a l  c o u rs e  t a k e n  t h e  E l e c t i o n  M e e t in g s  i s  w e l l  
i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a c c o u n t  o f  t h a t  h e l d  i n  Yokohama 
t h e  scen e  o f  one o f  t h e  most  b i t t e r  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  c o n t e s t s :
Y e s t e r d a y ,  t h e  2nd,  a t  8 ,0  a . m . , t h e  R e t u r n i n g  
O f f i c e r ,  Mr, S a to  Kiemon, opened  t h e  b a l l o t  bo x es  
i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  w i t n e s s e s ,  and  c o u n te d  t h e  
t o t a l  number o f  v o t e s  j u s t  a s  t h e y  w ere ,  s e a l e d ,  
an d  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  v o t e r s .  The number o f  
v o t e s  was 237. ( T h e re  were no s p o i l e d  b a l l o t s . )
U3
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Then,  t h e  R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r  opened  th e  b a l l o t s  
and  c h e c k e d  them, a f t e r  which  he handed  them o v e r  
one by one t o  t h e  w i t n e s s e s .  Then th e  w i t n e s s e s  
ch ec k ed  them , r e a d i n g  o u t  f i r s t  t h e  name o f  t h e  
e l e c t o r ,  f o l l o w e d  by t h e  name o f  t h e  p e r s o n  f o r  
whom he h a d  v o t e d .  Two c l e r k s  e n t e r e d  t h e  s c o r e s  
o f  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  who had  r e c e i v e d  v o t e s  i n  t h e  
s c o r e  book .  Such was t h e  p r o c e d u r e .
W e l l ,  t h e  R e t u r n i n g  O f f i c e r ,  when c h e c k in g  th e  
v o t e s ,  fo u n d  n in e  t o  be w i t h o u t  s e a l s ,  and  a s k e d  
t h e  o p i n i o n  o f  t h e  w i t n e s s e s .  I t  was d e c i d e d  t h a t  
t h e y  were t o  be a l l o w e d ;  a s  even  th o u g h  v o t e s  t h a t  
h ad  n o t  b e e n  s e a l e d  were n o t  p e r f e c t ,  t h e y  d i d  no t  
come w i t h i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  i n v a l i d  v o t e s  i n  
A r t i c l e  L I  o f  t h e  Law o f  E l e c t i o n ,
ih e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  p o l l  was a s  f o l l o w s ; —
- ^ 6 ................................ . ..............Shimada S ab u ro .
........................... .....................Hiranuma Senzo.
_/"~The t h i r d  c a n d i d a t e  p o l l e d  2 v o t e s ;  s i x  
c a n d i d a t e s  p o l l e d  1 v o t e  e a c h . _ 7
Mr, Shimada was e l e c t e d  by a m a j o r i t y  v o t e .  
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  a  r e p o r t  was made o f  th e  above names 
and  numbers o f  v o t e s  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  A r t i c l e  L1X 
o f  t h e  Law o f  E l e c t i o n ;  and  a t  9*30 a . m , , t h e  c h ec k in g  
o f  t h e  v o t e s  was f i n i s h e d .  A f t e r  w h ich ,  t h e
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proceedings were concluded by the Returning
46Officer reading out the score for each candidate.
The final duty of the Returning Officer for a 
constituency was to report the result of the election to 
the governor of the fu or ken. The governor then sent 
official notifications of election to the successful 
candidates, asking them to say whether or not they accepted. 
In Tokyo fu, this was done by 4 July,^ The persons elected 
had to let the governor know whether they were willing to 
accept election - within ten days, if they were residing in 
the fu or ken concerned; within twenty day, if they were not. 
Failure to reply within the stipulated time limit, or a 
declaration of unwillingness to serve as a Representative, 
meant that the governor had to order a new election in the 
constituency unless there had been a tie vote.
If a candidate had managed to get himself elected in 
two constituencies, he was to tell the authorities which one 
he wished to represent. Though there was nothing in the Law 
of Election to prevent a candidate standing in two separate 
constituencies and a number of them did so, there were in 
fact only two cases of double election. In Ehime prefecture, 
Suzuki Juen was returned for both the First and Fourth
4S 47
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Constituencies; and in Oita prefecture, Motoda Hajime
was equally fortunate in the First and Fifth Constituencies.
In both instances, the constituency for which they refused
1,0election had to go to the polls again.
Once it was settled that he was lawfully and willingly 
elected, the new Representative received a certificate of 
election from the prefectural governor. The governor also 
had to send in a report to the Minister for Home Affairs, 
detailing the names, qualifications, and personal histories 
of the Members returned for his province. Thus, in its 
concluding stages, the election procedure came back into the 
hands of the Home Office bureaucrats. These were the people 
who had organized and initiated it, and then withdrawn while 
the subordinate provincial officials, the candidates, and 
the electors ran the course they had mapped out. From this 
rather elevated point of view, the first general election was 
a masterpiece of impartial and nation-wide administrative 
organization; and the fact that the arrangements made for the 
voting, in spite of the numerous upsets of the campaigning, 
went off like a well-sprung and cleanly oiled clock was a 
tribute, among other things, to the efficiency as well as 
the authority of the bureaucratic system.
The Law of Election provided that ballots should be kept 
for sixty days if they were valid, and for one year if they
1+5
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were not, in the office of the shi, gun or ku in charge 
of the election for a particular constituency, and then 
burnt. Another article of the Law allowed anyone who 
wished to challenge the legality of a result to do so by 
bringing a suit in a Court of Appeal. These suits had 
to be filed within thirty days of the official publication 
by a governor of the names of the elected persons; and 
the plaintiffs had to deposit a sum of ¥300 with the 
judicial authorities. This sum was to be used in part 
payment of the costs of the suit; and if the plaintiff 
lost his case, he was obliged to pay the whole amount of 
legal costs. A person whose seat in the House of 
Representatives was in jeopardy as a result of a legal 
action, retained it pending the decision of the Court. In 
fact, none of the elected Members were unseated as a result 
of legal actions initiated by their defeated opponents.
No doubt the ¥300 deposit protected some of them.
To recapitulate for a moment, then, the principal features 
of the electoral system of 1890, these were:- (i)irregular 
constituencies; (ii) an electorate that was no more than 
1.14^ of the total population; (iii) a heavy preponderance 
of rural voters; (iv) a high property or income qualification 
for candidates as well as electors; (v) a procedure for the 
supervision of the actual voting that relied too much on the
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probity of town and village headmen or other minor local 
government officials; (vi) election by simple majority; 
(vii) signed but otherwise secret ballots; (viii) an 
over-all efficiency and sense of fair play on the part of 
the senior officials responsible for the drafting and 
enforcement of the Law of Election, notwithstanding the 
limitations inherent in points (ii) and (iv) or the 
defects arising from points (i), (v), and (vii). The 
importance of items (i), (ii), and (iii) will become more 
and more apparent with the development of the story of the 
election. Therefore there is no need to say anything more 
about them here, except that they were all subjects of 
controversy and criticism before and after the election. 
For example, the manifestos issued by two of the Liberal 
factions contained proposals for widening the franchise, 
lowering the qualifications for candidates, reforming the 
system of seat distribution, etc.^9
As m  all cases where proportional representation is 
rejected m  favour of single-member constituencies and 
election by relative majorities, it sometimes happened that 
in a particular prefecture a minority of votes secured a 
majority of seats. For instance, in Kagawa prefecture, the 
Progressive Party managed to return only one Representative
55 ' — -------------
See Appendices VIII and IX below.
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w i th  i t s  t o t a l  o f  1 ,2 4 1  v o t e s ,  w hereas  t h e  L i b e r a l s  g o t
t h r e e  s e a t s  f o r  1 ,1 6 0  v o t e s .  I n  Ehime,  t h e  f i g u r e s  were -
P r o g r e s s i v e s ,  3*542 v o t e s  and  two R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ;  L i b e r a l s ,
503 ,2 6 0  v o t e s  and  f i v e  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  However, c o n s i d e r i n g
t h e  c o u n t r y  a s  a w h o le ,  a n o m a l i e s  be tw een  v o t i n g  s t r e n g t h  and
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i n  t h e  s e p a r a t e  p r e f e c t u r e s  t e n d e d  t o  b a l a n c e
o u t ;  an d ,  c e r t a i n l y ,  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  s e n t i m e n t  o f  o p p o s i t i o n
t o  t h e  Government was r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  n u m e r ic a l  s t r e n g t h
o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,
S in c e  p o l i t i c a l  o p i n i o n  a t  t h a t  t im e  was n o t  m a r s h a l l e d  i n t o
two l a r g e  p a r t i e s ,  p r o p o r t i o n a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  c o u l d  have
e a s i l y  l e d  t o  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which an o t h e r w i s e  i n s i g n i f i c a n t
f a c t i o n  would  have  had  an  i n o r d i n a t e  power i n  t h e  D i e t  by
v i r t u e  o f  b e in g  a b l e  t o  t i p  th e  s c a l e s  a g a i n s t  i t s  b i g g e r
r i v a l s .  M oreover ,  c r i t i c s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  m a j o r i t y  sy s te m
were n o t  unaware  o f  t h e  d a n g e r  o f  e x t e n d in g  th e  e x i s t i n g
s c r u t i n  de l i s t e  m ethod ,  by g i v i n g  a l l  t h e  s e a t s  i n  a
p r e f e c t u r e  t o  t h e  g ro u p  which  had  p o l l e d  t h e  most  v o t e s
t h e r e .  T h i s  would have b r o u g h t  a b o u t  t h e  swamping o f  m i n o r i t y
51o p i n i o n s  by t h e  m a j o r i t y .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  on t h e  morrow o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  t h e r e  were 
a  number o f  s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  a  change t o  m u l t i -m em ber
50
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constituencies consisting of whole prefectures, and a voting
system based on proportional representation. Indeed, the
demand for bigger constituencies had appeared in both the
party manifestos previously mentioned; and Kaneko Kentaro
declared that the choice between big or small constituencies
had been the most difficult problem confronting him and his
52colleagues when drafting the Law of Election, Critics of
the system of small, sub-prefectural election districts
argued that it favoured candidates with strong local
connections who were resident in the area. Such candidates
did not necessarily have in them the making of a good
Representative, but they nevertheless came off best when
pitted against an outsider - no matter how talented the
53latter might have been. Similarly, it was said that many
capable men were prevented from standing as candidates, 
because of the ¥15 a year minimum tax qualification. This 
line of argument had especial relevance to Japan, where, as 
a result of the peculiar antecedents of the shizoku class, 
wealth was by no means a sure indication of superiority in 
learning or ability.^4
52
Hayashida Kametaro, Meiji-Taishö Seikai Sokumen Shi, vol.l, 
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While neither of these objections was without foundation, 
the first House of Representatives contained not a few men 
of sterling worth and quick wits, and in this respect did 
not compare unfavourably with later ones elected on a v/ider 
franchise and from bigger constituencies. Also, almost two 
thirds of its Members belonged to the shizoku class. Another 
strong argument, in favour of small constituencies as opposed 
to large ones and having nothing to do with the ¥15 tax 
qualification for candidates, was the one put forward by 
Kaneko himself, i.e., small constituencies were more in 
keeping with the extremely narrow fvillage politics* of
the time.55
With regard to the arrangements for the preparation of 
the electoral rolls and the casting of ballots, these were 
on the whole beyond reproach. Their general efficacy was 
made evident by the very small number of electors who failed 
to vote, as well as by the paucity of spoiled ballots.
Perhaps the only notable defect was the failure to provide 
adequate supervision for the headmen in charge of the polling 
stations. It seems that the authorities had intended that 
policemen should be on duty inside as well as outside the 
polling stations while the voting was going on; but in many 
places this scheme was abandoned in face of accusations that
55 Hayashida Kämetaro, Meiji-Taisho Seikai Sokumen Shi, 
vol. 1, p.172.
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it could have been construed as interference on the part of
c gthe Government.5 Furthermore, since the headmen had a 
great deal of social influence in addition to their official 
powers in the society of 1890, it would have been difficult 
to devise a set of regulations strong enough to keep them 
completely in check.
The stipulation that ballots should be signed with 
the voter's name was attacked in one section of the press. ^
It was alleged that information about an elector's choice 
of candidate would almost certainly be divulged by the 
official witnesses at the Election Meetings. The outcome 
of this would be that voters would feel themselves obliged 
to vote in accordance with their material or family interests, 
rather than in accordance with the less immediate promptings 
of political principle. Furthermore, it was held, knowledge 
about who had voted for whom would bring about estrangements 
and enmities in the social life of a village. Thus the 
system of signed ballots would seem to have left the way open 
for coercion or a disinclination to vote at all. No doubt 
it did in fact give rise to these abuses in a number of 
instances, but over the greater part of the country it did 
not have this effect. If such abuses had been widespread, 
both the rate and the pattern of the voting would have been
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3,P.217.
Yubin-Hochi 3-7-90 and 4-7-90.
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different from what they were. The Law of Election imposed 
heavy penalties on persons found guilty of intimidating 
or corrupting the electors; and an electorate restricted 
to the most wealthy tax-payers would, on the whole, have 
been less subject to unfair persuasion or apathy than one 
made up of the more impoverished and ignorant. Indeed, far 
from being reticent about what they intended to do at the 
polls, many electors up and down the land allowed their 
names to be used in electioneering advertisements. These 
announced in advance that Messrs X, Y, and Z, had decided 
to vote for Mr So-and-so,
The police and the Courts played a vital role in the 
management of the election - not only a vital role but also 
a salutary one. Paced with the welter of corruption, 
trickery, and violence that attended the campaign, one finds 
oneself wondering what sort of stained monster the infant 
Japanese parliament would have been, but for the careful 
midwifery it received from the law and its guardians. It 
is necessary to emphasize the fact that - in complete contrast 
to what went on at the time of the second general election 
two years later - the Government refrained from abusing its 
executive or judicial powers to secure the electoral defeat 
of its opponents. The law was neutral, and so was its 
enforcement by the police and the higher political or judicial
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authorities. So far, I have discovered only one example 
of something that even begins to look like an infringement 
of this principle. It occurred during a meeting of the 
Kyobashi ?/ard Political Discussion Group, held in Tokyo on 
28 June, at which some of the candidates for the House of 
Representatives made speeches. A newspaper report of the 
meeting said that the speakers gave full expression to their 
views, but one of them, Nakajima Matagoro, was cautioned by 
a policeman for straying off the subject. The report went 
on to state that the matter at issue was a trivial one, so 
Nakajima left it at that.^
However, before describing other types of activities 
undertaken by the police in connection with the election, the 
legal statutes which gave them the power to act the way they 
did should be summarized. The Law of Election itself 
contained a section entitled Punitive Rules, which had for 
its scope the following offences:- fraudulent entries in 
the electoral roll; bribery of any kind, indirect or direct, 
and no matter whether the goods, money, or employment were 
actually given or only promised; acts of violence against 
electors; mass intimidation of electors; riots at polling 
stations or Election Meetings; and armed entry into polling 
stations or Election Meetings. The penalties for such crimes
5B TENS 29-6-90
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varied in accordance with whether the objectives envisaged 
had actually been achieved or not; but, even in the event of 
the latter being the case, they were hardly lenient. For 
the more serious ones, such as corruption that had achieved 
its effect, violence, and creating a public disturbance, 
the Law authorized the Courts to impose imprisonment for 
a tern of between two weeks and six years depending on the 
gravity of the offence and a fine of two to three hundred 
yen. Persons accepting bribes were to be given the same 
punishments as those who offered them.
Peeling, as the election campaign got under way, that
this section of the Law of Election was not achieving its
purpose, the Government promulgated on 29 May the Supplementary
Penal Regulations for the House of Representatives Election 
59Law, These Supplementary Regulations made some additions
to the list of actions constituting breaches of the Election 
Law proper.
The definition of bribery was widened to cover the 
serving of food or drink to electors on their way to or in 
the vicinity of either the polling stations or the places 
where the Election Meetings were held; and also to cover 
offers of transport to or from the polling stations or Election 
Meeting places, offers of lodgings, and offers of expense
w
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money. Likewise, individual, as opposed to mass, intimidation 
of the electors became a punishable offence for the first 
time. So, too, did the abduction of electors on election 
day, or the hindering of their movements with the idea of 
preventing them getting to the polls. Another new offence 
was the spreading of rumours about who was or was not eligible 
for election, and false stories to the effect that a 
particular candidate would not accept his seat in the House 
of Representatives if elected. Article IV of the Supplementary 
Regulations made election demonstrations subject to police 
control. It read:-
Persons who, in the sub-prefectures and cities 
where there are polling stations or Election Meetings, 
assemble in large numbers or go about in bands, or 
light bonfires or pine torches, or make a noise with 
bells, drums, or conch shells, or horns, or make use 
of flags or other emblems, in order to stimulate 
election fever, and do not obey police orders to 
desist, shall be sentenced to not less than fifteen 
days and not more than three months imprisonment with 
light labour, and shall be fined not less than five 
yen and not more than fifty yen.
Finally, the Law of Election had made it an offence for anyone 
to incite others to a breach of the peace either by word of
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mouth or through newspaper articles. The Supplementary 
Regulations prohibited in like manner the display of posters 
offering inducements to the electors in the form of free 
refreshment or transport of the sort outlined above.
The Supplementary Regulations were not opposed in the 
press. The Tokyo Kichi Nichi Shimbun remarked that it was
60far from being surprised by the rigour of the legislation. 
More significantly, the ’opposition1 papers - the Yubin- 
Hochi Shimbun^ and the Kokumin Shimbun - both admitted the 
need for such laws in a society where public morality was of 
a shamefully low standard. The Kokumin asserted that the 
offences enumerated in the Regulations were a photographic 
record of what was happening in all districts at the time, 
and that this was true even in the case of Article IV which 
read like a page from a medieval chronicle. The elections 
of half the members of the prefectural assemblies earlier 
in the year had afforded abundant proof of widespread 
chicanery.
The Punitive Rules in the Law of Election, as well as 
the Supplementary Penal Regulations, were directed primarily
W
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at the triple abuses of corruption, violence, and public 
disorder. Here, I believe, it is necessary to draw a 
fairly sharp distinction between the actual polling and 
election results on the one hand, and the events of the 
campaigning that preceded them on the other. These abuses, 
in my opinion, were not sufficiently serious or effective 
to have vitiated the outcome of the election as a whole and 
so have made the holding of it pointless; nevertheless they 
did occur on many occasions in many different places, and 
instances of them will be a recurrent theme in the chapters 
that follow. Therefore at this stage I shall confine myself 
to no more than one or two examples of each, merely in order 
to give some idea of the conditions with which the police 
and Courts were expected to deal.
No part of the country was absolutely free from corruption 
but it was perhaps more rife in Saitama prefecture than 
anywhere else. One case that came to light towards the 
middle of June involved a number of the inhabitants of two 
villages - Kambe and Tagaya - in the sub-prefecture of Kita 
Saitama. These people had been sending out sums of ten sen, 
together with the visiting card of a local celebrity who was 
standing for election. The Shinto priest of another village 
in the area, Sukage, had also been sending out money on behalf 
of the same man. A confession by one of the electors, who
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had accepted the bribe only to find his conscience getting
the better of him, had disclosed what was going on. The
priest, when summoned by the village office at which the
elector had made his confession, sent word that he was not
at home, but later told the police that he had received a
sum of money to be used as bribes from an agent for the
candidate. The agent then had to report to the Court-house
at Kumagaya to undergo preliminary interrogation, and at
least eighteen other persons were summoned for questioning
63in connection with the case. Later, it was alleged that 
an opposing candidate had bribed the original informer to 
make a spurious confession.64
There was a similar case in the Fourth Constituency of 
Ibaraki prefecture, where an agent campaigning on behalf of 
one of the candidates was interviewed at the police-station 
in Ishige village, Toyoda sub-prefecture. He was suspected 
of having bought votes. Once again, the corruption had not 
been confined to a single village. The Ishige police also 
saw a Mr and Mrs Hirose who were living in the sub-prefecture 
adjoining Toyoda. The police, when they had satisfied 
themselves that there was a prirna facie case against the
S3
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people questioned, had the investigations transferred to 
the public prosecutor1s office in Shimotsuma. Many other
65citizens were summoned there as time went on.
Violence, like bribery, was endemic; but most of it
was petty. Kumamoto, Kochi, Ishikawa, Toyama, and Niigata
prefectures were frequently mentioned as having been
66particularly notorious trouble-spots; and one may perhaps 
add Yokohama city to this list.
In the Fifth Constituency, Kumamoto prefecture, the 
turbulence of the two rival political parties - Nationalists 
and Progressives - obliged the police to fall back on their 
emergency powers, and order them to disband in Yatsushiro 
sub-prefecture. This order was put out on 24 June; and 
behind it lay a whole series of minor incidents, culminating 
in a set fight between adherents of the two factions armed 
with swords and clubs. The battle, which took place 
probably on 22 or 23 June, had been started by the Nationalists 
but the Progressives do not seem to have been much in awe 
of the swordsmen hired by their opponents, and rallied well 
enough to start gaining ground. The newspaper reporting 
this neglected to say how many combatants were involved on
65 TNNS 18-6-90.
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e ach  s i d e ;  b u t  t h i s  was e v i d e n t l y  q u i t e  a m a jo r  a f f r a y ,  
o v e r  a f a i r l y  e x t e n s i v e  p i e c e  o f  g r o u n d ,  a s  t h e  c o r r e s p o n d e n t  
d i d  s t a t e  t h a t  s k i r m i s h i n g  had  b e en  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f i e r c e  
n e a r  t h e  t w i n  v i l l a g e s  o f  Kagumi and M iyanohara .  A p p a r e n t l y  
no one was k i l l e d  -  e v en  i n  t h e s e  two s e t t l e m e n t s  where t h e  
’w a r f a r e ’ was a t  i t s  h o t t e s t .  E l s e w h e r e ,  on t h e  e v en in g  o f  
23 J u n e ,  a  member o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  f a c t i o n  had  met w i t h  
a s u p p o r t e r  o f  t h e  P r o g r e s s i v e s ,  and  t h e  two had  s t a r t e d  
t o  f i g h t .  By t h e  t im e  t h e  p o l i c e  a r r i v e d ,  t h e  N a t i o n a l i s t  
had  a l r e a d y  p u sh e d  h i s  a d v e r s a r y  o v e r ,  and  had  b i t t e n  him 
on h i s  c h e e k ,  s i d e ,  and  r i g h t  arm . ^
C ases  o f  t h e  p o l i c e  o r  o t h e r  e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c i a l s  
o r d e r i n g  t h e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  were 
e x t r e m e l y  r a r e ;  and  i n  t h e  a b o v e -m e n t io n e d  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  
ban  a p p l i e d  t o  o n ly  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  c o n c e rn e d .
E a r l i e r  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  cam p a ig n ,  t h e  Home M i n i s t e r  h i m s e l f  
had  i n t e r v e n e d  t o  a u t h o r i z e  t h e  t o t a l  p r o s c r i p t i o n  o f  an 
a s s o c i a t i o n  known as  t h e  Sanyo S o c i e t y  o f  R i g h t e o u s n e s s .
T h is  S o c i e t y  was a c t i v e  i n  H im e j i ,  a  m ed iu m -s iz e d  town i n  
Hyogo p r e f e c t u r e ;  and  i t s  members had  o r i g i n a l l y  b e lo n g e d  
t o  t h e  U n i o n i s t  P a r t y  (D a id o  D a n k e tsu )  and  t o  t h e  H im ej i  
Young Men’ s C lub .  At t h e  e l e c t i o n s  t o  t h e  H im ej i  C i t y  C o u n c i l
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in 1889, the Unionists had won twenty-nine of the thirty 
seats. Thereafter, however, the future members of the 
Society of Righteousness had broken with the Daido Danketsu 
and joined the Harima Club, In October 1889, they quit the 
Harima Club when it started campaigning against the scheme 
for treaty revision put forward by the Government, and 
organized themselves into an association which they called 
the Sanyo Union of Righteousness (Sanyo Daido Gikai),
The record of disorderly conduct by members of the 
Society dated from the following month, November, when they 
attended a speech meeting on the subject of treaty revision, 
heckled the speakers, and assaulted a member of the audience. 
Shortly afterwards, they challenged the writer of a series 
of articles that appeared in a Kobe paper to a duel. There 
then came a brief interlude for internal re-organization.
In January 1890, they invited Count Itagaki to address them, 
and held a meeting of their supporters from all over Hyogo 
prefecture. It was at this rally that they declared their 
approval of Itagaki*s prospective Aikoku-koto (Patriots* 
Party), and changed the name of their own organization to 
the Sanyo Society of Righteousness (Sanyo Gikai). In 
February, a member of the Society assaulted Tanaka Tokitaro, 
the editor of a Himeji journal, while he was opening a 
meeting. As a result of this outrage, the police asked the 
Sanyo Gikai to submit a list of its members* names. In the
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same month, the Society appointed a candidate for election 
to the House of Representatives in the Seventh Constituency 
of Hyogo prefecture.
The decision to compete in the parliamentary elections 
seems to have bereft the Sanyo Gikai of whatever shreds of 
respectability remained to it. On 9 March, members rioted 
with drawn swords at a meeting of supporters of the 
Progressive Party (Kaishin-to) held in the village of Kokubuji, 
Shikito sub-prefecture; and on 25 March, they caused a 
disturbance during a Progressive Party speech meeting at 
another place, Masuisan, in the same sub-prefecture.
Throughout April and May, they were responsible for a series 
of similar outbreaks in the constituency, as well as finding 
time to challenge the Progressives to a debating contest.
The Home Office order for the dissolution of the Sanyo Society 
of Righteousness was issued on 6 June. Undaunted, its ex­
members announced their intention of setting up a Hyogo
68Prefecture Patriots Club.
Finally, to complete this preliminary sketch of the 
circumstances in which the police all too frequently found 
themselves, it is appropriate to include here a verbatim 
translation of an item which appeared in the Tokyo Nichi 
Nichi Shimbun for 20 June. It was headed Violence At A 
Speech Meeting’ :-
leg T
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At a Kaishin-to speech meeting held by a 
certain Mr Kato of* Usui village, Nakakanbara 
gun, Niigata prefecture on the 16th of this 
month, the audience was thrown into a state of 
great confusion during the speech of the second 
speaker, Mr Shigeno Tamaki* (A member of the 
staff of the Mainichi Shimbun.) A gang of 
hooligans stood up together and, overturning 
the dais, assaulted the speaker* In a state of 
affairs which even the police lacked the means 
to control, Mr Shigeno had his head injured and 
his face was dripping with blood* Gould anything 
be more outrageous?
The examples given - one from Kyüshü, the second from 
the Kansai area, and the third from the Töhoku region - show 
that violence was not limited to any one particular district. 
To repeat, most of the incidents in themselves did not amount 
to very much; the battle between the Progressives and 
Nationalists in the Fifth Constituency, Kumamoto prefecture, 
was on a bigger scale than the great majority of cases where 
participants in the election campaign took the law into their 
own hands. Nevertheless the police in all areas were 
understandably apprehensive lest petty outbreaks of this 
sort should multiply as the campaign ran its course, and
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eventually reach their climax in a deluge of major riots 
and attacks on or just after the day of the election.
Therefore they took great care to guard the polling stations 
and their environs while the voting was in progress.
Similarly, they made efforts to ensure that the ballot boxes 
would be safe after the polls had closed, and that there 
would be no disorders at the declaration of the poll meetings. 
One newspaper forecast that there might be difficulties in 
supplying adequate police protection for every polling station 
in the prefectures where competition was at its most keen. 
Generally speaking, there were between two and three hundred 
polling stations in each prefecture, and no more than four 
or five hundred policemen to deal with any disorders that 
might occur. y This meant that a single polling station 
would have only one or two policemen to guard it; with the 
result that there was a loss of the advantage, from the 
point of view of quelling possible disturbances, of having 
a lot of polling stations and so making it impossible for 
the electors to congregate in large numbers at any one 
particular place on the day. In the event, however, these 
difficulties, where they existed, were overcome; and the 
police, by dint of careful forethought and sound preparations
69
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were able to discharge their duties without incurring any 
sort of blame or disgrace.
In Tokyo, the fu office ordered the Returning Officer
for each constituency to tell the Metropolitan Commissioner
for Police by 25 June how many policemen he expected to
need on the day of the election.7° The Commissioner
eventually decided to allocate one sergeant and five constables
to every polling station.^1 In Kagawa prefecture (eastern
Shikoku), election fever ran high enough to warrant the
posting of 'several hundred' policemen to each constituency
72during the last week of the campaign. If this report is 
accurate, one must assume that as there were five 
constituencies in the prefecture, many of the constables 
involved must have been 'borrowed' from other prefectures 
or else had been specially recruited to supervise the 
election. In Kanagawa prefecture, a total of 200 special 
force policemen were distributed among the 219 polling 
stations. These men were to work in conjunction with another 
hundred who had been assigned to the constituencies earlier.
On 29 June, the Chief-Inspector of the Prefectural Police 
Department, accompanied by the Chief-Inspector of the Public
70
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Peace Preservation Department, set out on a tour of all
the electoral districts in order to check the arrangements
made for the safe-guarding of both polling stations and 
77ballot boxes.'^ For Yokohama city itself, i.e. the First
Constituency in Kanagawa prefecture, the police control was
74especially strict. The solitary polling station was
protected by a force consisting of four police-sergeants,
ten uniformed police-constables, and ten constables in
Japanese dress. In addition, stationary guards were on
duty at thirty strategic points in the city. This show of
strength completely demoralized the Yokohama gangsters, who
had been actively concerned in the election right down to
the evening of 30 June. In Kumamoto prefecture, the police
erected guard posts on all the roads into the Fourth and
Fifth Constituencies where most of the trouble had broken
out during the campaign, and would not let anyone other than
75voters enter these areas.
These and similar precautions in other parts of the 
country achieved the desired effect. As will be shown later, 
the assaults and rowdyism that preceded the voting had been
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perpetrated by a type of person who was not likely to 
stand his ground when confronted by a superior force. 
Organized political violence on a really wide scale was 
hardly ever attempted; and when it was, it met with the fate 
meted out to the Sanyo Society of Righteousness. Still, 
there is no saying what might have happened on the day of 
the election, if the police had not adopted a very firm 
attitude. As it was, despite the unruliness that had 
marked the campaign, and despite a number of half-hearted 
endeavours on the part of known trouble-makers to stir up 
incidents in front of the polling stations on the day of 
the election, the voting itself was everywhere peaceable.
A Tokyo journalist., reporting the election scene in the 
capital, was able to write:-
In front of the gate of every polling station, 
white-uniformed policemen were placed on guard; 
and beside them, the sparrows pecked for their 
food and the dogs slept. 76
Prom the provincial centres, too, the telegrams, without a 
single exception, all brought the same message:-
Voting completed; no incidents.^
76
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CHAPTER TWO
Parties, Principles, and Issues.
The persons standing for election in 1890 may be 
conveniently divided into three major groups:- the Liberal- 
Progressive factions, the Conservative factions, and the 
Independents. The majority of candidates belonged to the 
last group, which was, of course, non-party. The principal 
parties were all, lineally or spiritually, descended from 
the three earlier national political associations:- the 
Jiyü-to, the Kaishin-to, and the Teisei-to. Indeed, the 
Kaishin-to, it will be remembered, had never formally 
dissolved itself, even after enduring the resignation of 
its leader, Okuma Shigenobu, in 1884; and it was the same 
organization and the same platform that bore the label 
’Progressive* in the first general election.
(i) The Daido Danketsu.
The case of the Liberals was very different. After 
the dissolution of the first Jiyu-to in October 1884, there
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was virtually no legitimate political activity among the 
ranks of the Governments opponents until 1886 when Goto 
Shojiro started a campaign against the administration’s 
alleged mishandling of the treaty revision problem. All 
this time, there had been a steady growth in the extent 
and depth of popular feeling against the existing treaties; 
and this feeling could be quite easily converted into a 
formidable and widespread expression of hostility towards 
the authorities. Inoue Kaoru’s scheme for revision had 
finally broken down in the summer of 1887; partly because 
of the uncompromising policies of the Treaty Powers, partly 
because of the antagonistic attitude of Japanese opinion. 
Sensing this opportunity, and making clever use of the fact 
that the Ito Cabinet’s rather fatuous policy of excessive 
fraternization with the Occidental diplomatic communities 
had produced no worthwhile results, Goto worked hard to 
combine all the different disaffected elements - conservative, 
moderate, and radical - in one large body of agitators. The 
name of this organization was the Daido Danketsu (Unionist 
League); its slogan was Unity in Diversity (Daido Shoi, i.e. 
’alike in great matters, of differing views in small’); its
avowed aim was the rectification of the diplomatic situation;
1its real purpose, the unseating of the Sat-Cho clique.
Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seitö Shi, vol.l, pp. 241-244«
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This revival of party activity gained force with
explosive speed. Speech meetings were held throughout
the country; and in the capital, petitions flowed into
the Senate, or else were presented at the private residences
of the ministers of state. These petitions were the same in
form and substance; and since they were limited to three
demands - that is, (i) reduction of the land-tax, (ii)
freedom of speech and assembly, and (iii) an improvement
in the country*s diplomacy - they were collectively known
as the Petition on Three Serious Matters. In September 1887,
the Home Minister, Yamagata Aritomo, issued orders to the
effect that all petitions would be rejected, and that anyone
seeking to violate this regulation by handing in a petition
would be severely dealt with. The following month, Goto
and his closest confederates founded the Teigai Club ('87 Club),
a political but non-party organization designed to hold
- 2together the adherents of the Daido Danketsu movement.
Meanwhile groups of these adherents v/ere continually 
moving into Tokyo from the provinces, and the political 
temperature of the metropolis was rising to heights last 
reached at the time of the Hokkaido Development Board 
scandal in 1881. At the beginning of December, Goto presented 
a lengthy memorial to the Lord Chamberlain, asking that it 
2 ' *
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should be passed on to the Emperor.^ Immediately afterwards,
he (Goto) left for a highly successful and inflammatory
speech-making tour of the north-eastern prefectures, where
resentment at the victory of the south-western forces at
the time of the restoration still rankled in the hearts of
many. The Emperor, it seems, was not allowed to see Goto's
memorial; and on 26 December, the Government struck a hard
blow at his movement by promulgating the emergency Peace
4Preservation Ordinance.
The effect of this ordinance was to shift the opposition 
from the capital to the countryside. Article IV of the new 
law empowered the authorities to order the removal of anybody 
they considered likely to promote civil strife or disorder 
to a place more than three ri (about seven miles) from the 
Imperial palace. Applying the power conferred by this 
article with prompt and relentless vigour, the police by 
the evening of 28 December had brought about a mass exodus 
of upwards of 570 prominent party politicians from the 
inner regions of Tokyo.
However, the opposition, though foiled in its first 
objective of putting immediate and unbearable pressure on 
the Government, proved itself quite capable of carrying on
3
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the struggle from the provinces, Itagaki Taisuke had 
come out from his political retirement in the previous 
autumn, and was actively engaged in realising the aims of 
the Daido Danketsu. Goto, himself, revisited the north­
eastern regions in the summer of 1888, Prior to this, Okuma 
had re-entered the Government as its Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. This development, which had taken place in February 
1888, had a number of important repercussions; one of them 
was a considerable relaxation of the hostility so recently 
displayed by the Cabinet to the Unionists,
The endless scheming and campaigning began to bear 
visible fruit in October 1888, when the Daido Danketsu took 
formal shape for the first time at a series of conventions 
of local politicians held in Chiba, Osaka, and Kumamoto,
The new association, as such, remained a non-political one; 
but it acknowledged Goto as its leader, and accepted a 
common programme of action. It also decided to issue a 
'party1 journal, known as the Seiron (Political Discussion),
The Daido Danketsu soon crashed. The Government, 
conscious of having gained something of a Pyrrhic victory 
in December 1887, had invited Okuma to assume the responsibility 
for treaty revision as a gesture of conciliation towards its 
opponents. Though Okuma had long since severed his formal 
connection with the Kaishin-to, the unofficial links between
1 2 4
him and  h i s  s y m p a th i z e r s  had n o t  b een  i m p a i r e d .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
a f t e r  t h e i r  e x - l e a d e r  had e n t e r e d  t h e  Government ,  many 
members o f  t h e  K a i s h i n - t o  became f i r s t  o f  a l l  lukewarm i n  
t h e i r  z e a l  f o r  t h e  Daido D a n k e t su ,  and l a t e r  when Okuma’ s 
p r o p o s a l s  f o r  t r e a t y  r e v i s i o n  were made t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  h e a t e d  
c o n t r o v e r s y ,  o p e n ly  a n t a g o n i s t i c  t o  t h e  a t t i t u d e  o f  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c a l  a l l i e s .  Thus ,  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a r o s e  t h a t  t h e  
K a i s h i n - t o  and  i t s  p r e s s  came o u t  i n  f a v o u r  o f  Okuma and 
t h e  Government on t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t r e a t y  r e v i s i o n ;  w h i l e  t h e  
L i b e r a l s  and t h e  C o n s e r v a t i v e  e x t r e m i s t s  c o n t i n u e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  
a s t a n c e  o f  u n f l i n c h i n g  o p p o s i t i o n .  The p r o m u l g a t i o n  o f  th e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n  i n  F e b r u a r y  1889,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  s p e c i a l  
am nes ty  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  o f f e n d e r s  t h a t  marked t h e  o c c a s i o n ,  
a l s o  s e r v e d  t o  e a s e  t h e  s t r a i n  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r ,  and 
n a t u r a l l y  won some m easu re  o f  p u b l i c  e s t e e m  f o r  t h e  Government .
The d e a t h - b lo w  f o r  t h e  Daido D a n k e t su ,  however ,  v/as 
d e a l t  i t  by i t s  own l e a d e r .  I n  March 1889,  Goto S h o j i r o  
s u d d e n l y  and w i t h o u t  any  s o r t  o f  w a rn in g  e n t e r e d  t h e  C a b in e t  
a s  M i n i s t e r  o f  Com m unica t ions .  The m o t iv e  b e h in d  t h e  
i n v i t a t i o n  t o  Goto i s  c l e a r  -  as  a lw a y s ,  t h e  M e i j i  s t a t e s m e n  
were n o t  u n w i l l i n g  t o  win o v e r  t h e i r  m ost  d an g e ro u s  enem ies  
i f  t h e  chance  t o  do so o f f e r e d  i t s e l f .  They p r e f e r r e d  
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  t o  i s o l a t i o n .  As f o r  G o to ,  i t  seems t h a t  he 
was o p p o r t u n i s t  by n a t u r e ,  and  had u s e d  t h e  Daido D anke tsu  
a s  a means o f  a d v an c in g  h i s  own p o l i t i c a l  f o r t u n e s .
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The Government, at the time when it had begun
negotiations with Goto, had extended an invitation to
Itagaki, too, with the idea of persuading both of them to
rejoin the Ministry. If this strategem had worked, it would
have been a major tactical victory for the clan bureaucrats.
Itagaki refused for himself, however, while advising Goto
to accept. He told Goto that as the constitution had now
been promulgated, it would be better for him to take part
in the affairs of state as a member of the Government rather
5than to stay in the ranks of the people. Prom this, it 
looks as if Itagaki was anxious to oust Goto from the 
position of recognized national leader of the party movement, 
and resume that role himself.
The remaining leaders of the Daido Danketsu, sorely
stricken by their chief1s defection, were soon divided into
6 —two factions. The more radical one, under Oi Kentaro,
Arai Shogo, Ishizaka Masataka, and others, wished to retain 
the technically non-political character of the organization; 
opposed to them was a group led by Kono Hironaka, Inoue 
Kakugoro, Oe Taku, Inukai Takeshi, and others who wished to 
turn it into a properly constituted political party. At 
the beginning of May 1889, Itagaki tried hard to heal the
5Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seito Shi, vol. 1, p.258.
6 __
Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seito Shi, vol. 1, pp. 258-261.
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division between these two sections of his former supporters, 
making a special journey to Tokyo to do so. His efforts 
proved unavailing, however, and on 10 May, the political 
party faction’, now calling itself the Daido Club, held a 
meeting at Tokyo at which a formal statement of policy was 
discussed and approved. The other branch of the Daido 
Danketsu, the ’non-political party faction’, adopted the 
name Unionist Harmony Society (Daido Kyowa Kai), and 
entered into a spirited but sadly wasteful strife with its 
sister-body in Osaka and elsewhere.
(ii) The Liberal Factions - the Jiyu-to, the Daido Club, 
and the Aikoku-kgto.
In this way, the once formidable Daido Danketsu came 
to an inglorious and rancorous end. It passed beyond recall 
in October 1889 when the severe wounding of Okurna Shigenobu 
in a bomb outrage brought about the indefinite postponement 
of treaty revision, and so destroyed the only basis there 
was for an alliance between the Conservative and Liberal 
extremists. Itagaki, now that Okurna was in hospital and Goto 
in the Government, was the only one of the three outstanding 
leaders of the old popular rights movement who was both fit
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and ready for combat. Thinking of the election, he went 
on trying to get some semblance of order and unity out of 
the scattered remnants of his former followers. His plan 
was to re-found the Liberty Party, and make it wide enough 
to attract both the Daido Club and the Daido Kyowa Kai, each 
of which would be dissolved. When he suggested this to the 
various leaders, he encountered many obstacles in the form of 
regional jealousies and personal rivalries. Undeterred by 
these, he then sent out invitations to all the prominent 
leaders of the popular rights movement, asking them to attend 
a meeting in Osaka on 17 December. He proposed in his 
letters that the meeting should discuss the formation of a 
new party.
The Daido Club leaders travelled en masse to Osaka in 
response to these invitations; so, too, did their opposite 
numbers in the Daido Kyowa Kai. But the latter, taking 
offence at Itagaki*s professed intention of reconciling the 
two factions, as revealed in a preliminary interview they 
had with him, refused outright to attend the actual convention. 
As a result, only the Daido Club element was present when 
Itagaki opened his meeting on 19 December. To them, he 
explained what he had had in mind when he arranged the 
conference, and read out a draft prospectus for a new party. 
This he wanted to call not after the old Jiyu-to, but after
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the still earlier Aikoku-koto (Patriots Party), The 
meeting heard him out; but it came to an end without 
anything definite being decided. As soon as these 
proceedings had finished, the Daidö Club opened a separate 
meeting of its own to discuss the proposed change of name.
In the end, it rejected the suggestion that it should 
start calling itself the Aikoku-köto.
This debacle notwithstanding, Itagakifs initiative 
did lead to something. However this fsomething* was not 
one large and re-invigorated Liberty Party decked out with 
a *Patriots Party* label. Rather, it was the formation of 
three, instead of two, splinter parties. In Osaka, after 
having brusquely turned down Itagaki's overtures, the Daido 
Kyowa Kai stole his policy and set about reviving the Jiyu-to. 
A provisional inauguration ceremony for the new party was 
held then and there in Osaka; and this was followed by a 
full-dress affair held in the Koto Nakamura Ro, in Tokyo, 
on 21 January 1890, at which the metamorphosis of the Daido 
Kyowa Kai into the Jiyu-to was properly effected. The 
revived Jiyu-to did not have a single national leadership, 
but was divided into two wings. These corresponded to the 
two great geographical divisions of Japan. There was a 
Kanto Jiyu-to (north and east of Osaka), the president of 
which was Oi Kentaro; and there was a Kansai Jiyu-to (south
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and west of Osaka), under the control of Kobayashi Kusuo.
The next step was the holding of a grand convention of all 
the leading members of the Liberty Party from 21 to 23 February. 
This convention, which was held in Tokyo, drew up and 
approved a formal statement of the party's principles and 
election manifesto.^
While the Daido Kyowa Kai was busy turning itself into 
the Jiyu-to, its rivals in the Daido Club were also closing 
their ranks and preparing for the election. The Daido Club 
manifesto received unanimous assent at a party convention held 
on 4 May. Kono Banshu acted as chairman. As with the 
Jiyu-to, the Daido Club policy statement was not just an 
election manifesto; its leaders took the opportunity to make 
public for the second time the unchanging axioms of their
political beliefs, as well as to put forward a series of
8 _ _vote-catching promises. Again like the Jiyu-to, the Daido 
Club used the Koto Nakamura Ro for their election convention.
The day after this, 5 May, Itagaki, who had not abandoned 
his scheme for reviving the Aikoku-koto after the fiasco of 
the Osaka conference in the previous December and who had, 
in the meantime, made a speech tour in the south-western
7See Appx. VIII below.il 8See Appx. IX below.
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provinces, called a meeting of his closest supporters.
More than five hundred of them came to the meeting which 
took place in the Kosei-kan, Kobiki-cho, Tokyo, and was the 
occasion of the official re-birth of the Aikoku-koto and 
also of the publication of that party’s general prospectus 
and election programme.^
It was these three splinter parties, then, - the Jiyu-to 
the Daido Club, and the Aikoku-koto - which, together with 
the Kaishin-to, represented the ’popular rights’ end of the 
Japanese political spectrum in the general election of 1890. 
Before going on to discuss the different prospectuses and 
election promises in detail, it is worthwhile pausing a 
moment to point out that the history of the rise and fall of 
the Daido Danketsu illustrates very well the general political 
temper of the times, and, in particular, the endemic 
weaknesses of the Liberal movement. The principal opponents 
of the Meiji bureaucracy could present a united front on a 
single issue of overriding importance and far-reaching appeal; 
but they found it next to impossible to coalesce into a 
broadly based organization, owing allegiance to a single 
leader. Their popular rights movement was never permanently 
damanged by official repression; but many of its chief 
officers were not immune to offers of Government posts.
See Appx. X below.9
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The disputes and secessions of the Liberal and Progressive 
party politicians meant that they faced their enemies in 
the Government with badly divided forces when it came to the 
election, and suffered accordingly. On the other side of 
the political gulf, within the ranks of the bureaucracy, the 
feeling for a transcendental Cabinet* was strengthened by 
the discords in the 'popular1 camp.
While these strictures may be fairly made on one - the 
organizational - aspect of party politics, however, the 
theory and content of the election manifestos issued by the 
Jiyu-to, Daido Club, and Aikoku-koto in I89O give a very 
much better impression of the Liberal half of the popular 
rights movement. The truth seems to have been that the 
Liberal cause in 1890 still carried with it the marks of 
its origins. Having come into existence as an instrument 
of struggle - struggle to wrest concessions from the authorities 
on the one hand, and struggle to teach the people basic 
democratic theory on the other hand - the Jiyu Minken Undo 
had attracted to its upper echelons not only opportunists 
like Goto, but also many men of great talent and imaginative 
zeal, such as Kono Hironaka, Nakajima Nobuyuki, and Suehiro 
Shigeyasu. Opportunist or not, all these leaders were persons 
of strong character and an individualistic bent; many of them 
had 'done time' in prison. Moreover, in the conditions in 
which it had taken root, the old popular rights movement had
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been forced to put a premium on abstract principles -
Liberty • ••• Independence •••. Progress - and to rely
heavily on its political theorists. This was because its sponsors
were seeking a power which they had not yet actually
experienced. The wide scope given to theory by the Liberals
was made plain in the manifesto of the original Liberty
Party. Finally, there was the always simmering clash within
the movement between the militant minority in favour of
direct action against the Government and the more cautious
majority which believed in enforcing its political claims
by peaceful means. The history of the dissolution of the
first Jiyu-to afforded ample proof of this basic cleavage.
Thus, in the rarefied 'Fabian’ period of 1873-1889, 
the period of power-seeking without responsibility, the 
internal ethos of the Liberal movement lent itself to 
(i) individual initiative and ambition, giving rise to 
bitter personal rivalries, (ii) the politics of theory and 
propaganda, and (iii) a serious difference of opinion over 
the use of force, coupled with armed uprisings by frustrated 
extremists. In some ways, these tendencies were strengthened 
by the outside events of the decade of the 1880s, with its 
agricultural depression, Governmental arbitrariness, and the 
mounting tension over the treaty problem. Again, over the 
whole national scene hung the miasma of a vanished feudalism; 
some of its more inauspicious traits - regionalism and
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factionalism - have already been described. Therefore the 
breakdown of the Daido Danketsu followed by the emergence 
of three rival heirs to the mantle of the first Jiyu-to is 
quite intelligible; though this does not mean that it and 
similar disruptions in the future were anything but disastrous 
for the Liberal cause as a whole. On the other hand, what 
the advocates of Liberty lost by their failures in the sphere 
of organization, they to some extent recovered by the good 
sense that they showed in compiling their respective election 
declarations. This was a task which they were well qualified 
to do; and they made the most of both their previous 
experience in political polemics and the opportunities 
presented to them by the Government.
The first thing to notice about these manifestos is 
that, compared with the short, abstract declaration of 
principle issued by the Jiyü-to in 1881, they were more 
moderate, more specific, and a good deal longer. These 
differences were in part a reflection of the post-1884 
resurgence of traditional feeling, and in part a reflection 
of the imminence of the first parliamentary election. After 
all, the Liberal leaders would have had a plausible case in 
1881, had they argued that as the summoning of the Diet was 
not to take place until a further nine years had elapsed, it 
was hardly the time to frame a detailed electoral programme; 
even though this sort of consideration had not deterred either
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the Kaishin-to or the Teisei-to from being a good deal 
more precise about their intentions.
However, even when we have made full allowances for 
the changes in the country's mood and in the tactical 
requirements of the situation, we are left, I think, with 
the conclusion that the comparative conservativism of 1890 
arose, at any rate in part, from a falling off of radical, 
near revolutionary fervour in the Liberal ranks. The 
principal reason why the Liberal movement underwent this 
change of spirit in the course of the 1880s - i.e., the 
growing power of the wealthy rural capitalist element within 
the party - has already been explained; and here I wish to 
point to only one of the more obvious touchstones of this 
trend towards moderation as revealed by a comparison of the 
manifesto of 1881 with the party declarations of 1890. The 
old Jiyu-to three-clause manifesto of 1881 had been rather 
remarkable in that it had made no mention whatsoever of the 
Imperial House; now, in 1890, the Daido Club was implicitly, 
the Jiyu-to explicitly, and the Aikoku-koto effusively 
monarchist. Therefore in this respect (and also in others) 
the Liberal position had moved appreciably closer to that of 
the Progressives over the intervening years.
The greater pragmatism of the I89O manifestos is even 
more readily apparent. The Daido Club went furthest in this
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direction. It introduced its programme to the public in 
a very cut and dried manner under short headings, such as 
’The Strengthening of Independent Sovereignty’, or ’The 
Introduction of Party Cabinets’. The Jiyu-to did hardly 
any better, though it did preface its proposals with the 
general statement that it was a party based on a belief in 
Liberty. The Aikoku-koto stood alone in making a deliberate 
effort to recapture the spirit and terminology of the 
earlier and more heroic age of the popular rights movement. 
Even so, sandwiched between the somewhat highflown 
perorations on Liberty and Natural Rights that begin and 
end the Aikoku-koto manifesto, there are not a few ca’canny 
reservations as well as a compact legislative programme.
Another important and obvious feature of the election 
manifestos is the fact that they all said much the same 
things. They all came out in favour of:- (i) equal treaties 
with the foreign powers, (ii) responsibility of the Cabinet 
to the Diet, (iii) reduction of the land-tax and a policy 
of financial retrenchment, (iv) extension of the authority 
of the organs of local self-government, (v) abolition of the 
Peace Preservation Ordinance and the amendment of other 
regulations which they held infringed the freedoms of speech 
and assembly, (vi) a reduction in the number of officials, 
and (vii) the withdrawal of special Government subsidies for
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commerce and industry. In all these matters, there was 
virtually complete agreement among the three Liberal parties 
not only about ends but also about means. The solitary 
slight exception to this seems to have been that whereas the 
Jiyu-to and Aikoku-koto both asserted the need for 
specifically party Cabinets, the Daido Club was content with 
a resolution that ministers of state should be obliged to 
acknowledge their responsibility to the Diet as well as to 
the Emperor. In their attitude towards armaments, too, the 
Liberal politicians more or less thought alike. The Aikoku- 
koto manifesto said that the party would arm the country no 
more than was necessary for its own defence, and decisively 
rejected policies of aggression. Though the Daido Club., on 
the other hand, stated that it would enlarge the Army and 
Navy so far as the gradual increase in the strength of the 
nation would allow, both it and the Jiyu-to promised to 
revise the conscription system in order to shorten the 
periods of active or reserve service it entailed.
A look through the items listed above shows that the 
Liberal opposition could launch a shrewd and damaging attack 
on the Government in matters relating to its personnel as 
well as its policies. In some ways this attack was an unfair 
one, but that simply made it all the more effective. As has 
been demonstrated, the unequal treaties were in many ways
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the Achilles heel of those in power; and to raise an 
unthinking cry for the revision of them was one of the surest 
ways of winning popular support and at the same time 
bedevilling the Government’s diplomatic efforts. Yet though 
the Liberal manifestos all contained a clause saying that 
equal treaties would be signed, none of them went on to 
elaborate exactly how the foreigners would be brought to 
view the question with the same urgency as the Japanese did. 
The promise to reduce the land-tax would produce an equally 
favourable response from the predominantly rural electorate. 
Again, though, there was more than a tinge of irresponsibility 
in this proposal. Granted that the manifestos implied or 
explicitly declared that economies would be made by 
streamlining the administration and dismissing supernumerary 
officials, the amount of money thus saved would have hardly 
compensated for any large-scale reduction in the land-tax.
This was still the Government’s main source of revenue. 
Moreover, the easiest way to secure treaty revision was to 
have a big Army and Navy, and that took money.
The same general judgements may be passed on two of the 
other planks in the Liberal platform - consolidation of 
local self-government and a thinning out of the numbers of 
Civil Servants at all levels of administration. These pledges 
were good politics, but both of them were to some extent 
poor statesmanship.
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The process of centralization had gone a very long way 
in the first two decades of the Meiji period; and this 
development could be made to seem all the more onerous when 
contrasted to the fief-autonomy of Tokugawa times. Therefore 
the Governments opponents were no doubt able to rely on a 
backwash of regional sentiment. Of course, I do not wish to 
deny that the opposition had reasonable grounds for complaint 
in this matter, and that regional loyalties were still one 
of the main supports of the whole Liberty and Popular Rights 
Movement. Nevertheless there was something a little unreal 
in 1890 about some erf the more particularist statements to 
be found in the Liberal manifestos, such as the one emphasizing 
the separate rights of the provinces or the one to the 
effect that local custom should be made the basis of the 
Municipal and the Town and Village Codes. Anything but a 
uniform and closely supervised system of local self-government 
would have been hampering and wasteful to a country in the 
throes of modernization.
Likewise, the demand for a reduction in the numerical 
strength of the Civil Service might have proved a little more 
difficult to realise in practice than it had been to make on 
paper. Certainly, the Civil Service was over-staffed, and 
the Government itself issued orders for the dismissal of 
redundant officers in the weeks preceding the election. But
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it is probable that the Liberals tended to exaggerate for 
their own ends the numbers of ’drones’ living at the tax­
payers’ expense; and since the officials, civil and military, 
were in many ways the standard-bearers of Japan’s march to 
the West, their numbers could not have been cut back too 
ruthlessly. The Liberals were on very safe ground tactically 
speaking, though, in making plain their animosity to the 
bureaucrats. There is no reason to doubt Suematsu Kencho's 
word on this matter and he declared:-
/"judging _7 by the experiences of the recent 
general election, it would appear to be very hard 
for an official to become a Member /"""of the House 
of Representatives^. Apparently, officials were 
generally detested so far as the election of Members 
was concerned. In so saying, I would appear to be 
praising myself; because I was elected while holding 
an official post. However, consider my election to have been quite exceptional! 10
In Suematsu’s opinion, many of the electors feared that 
if they elected officials to the House of Representatives, 
the Government would pass whatever legislation it pleased 
without paying attention to public opinion. Such a prospect 
was the reverse of pleasing to the mass of electors. Suematsu 
himself made this clear when he spoke elsewhere in his talk 
of the voting public’s disenchantment with the fact that:-
TO
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju—san Nen—no So-Senkyo, p.216. MBZ, vol.3,
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The p r e s e n t  Government ,  even  though  t h e r e  have 
b e e n  some comings and g o i n g s  amongst  t h e  m i n i s t e r s ,  
h a s  b e en  i n  t h e  hands  o f  t h e  same g roup  o f  p e o p le  
e v e r  s i n c e  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n ,  11
A l i t t l e  e a r l i e r  t h a n  t h i s ,  b u t  s t i l l  on t h e  same p o i n t  o f  
t h e  e l e c t o r s 1 d e s i r e  f o r  c h an g e ,  he had  s a i d  t h a t  t h e r e  was 
a vague b u t  w i d e s p r e a d  hope t h a t  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s c en e  would  
be r a d i c a l l y  a l t e r e d  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  t h e  
D i e t ,  and  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  Twould be o f  g r e a t  u se  t o  t h e  
p e o p le  i n  e v e r y  w a y , ' O th e r  e v id e n c e  p r o v e s  t h a t  Suematsu 
was q u i t e  c o r r e c t  i n  h i s  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  tem p er  
o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  i n  t h i s  m a t t e r  o f  Government v e r s u s  p e o p l e .  
I t  was t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h a t  gave  t h e  demand f o r  
p a r t y  o r  D i e t - c o n t r o l l e d  C a b in e t s  such a p ro m in e n t  p l a c e  
i n  a l l  t h r e e  m a n i f e s t o s ,  and made i t  t h e  open ing  s h o t  o f  
a  b i t t e r  s t r u g g l e  t h a t  went  on f o r  t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  t h e  
e n s u in g  d e c a d e .  I n d e e d ,  b o th  i n  t e rm s  o f  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  a s  
i t  e x i s t e d  i n  1890 and  i n  te rm s  o f  f u t u r e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
d e v e lo p m e n t ,  t h i s  demand was t h e  k e y s to n e  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l  
( a n d  P r o g r e s s i v e )  programme. Once t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  p a r t y  
governm ent  was c o n c e d e d ,  t h e  r e s t  ( r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  l a n d - t a x ,  
s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  l o c a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ,  e t c ,  e t c , )  would  
a u t o m a t i c a l l y  f o l lo w  i n  so f a r  a s  i t  was p r a c t i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e .  
Moreover  a p a r t y  C a b i n e t ,  i f  i t  had  s t i l l  w an ted  t o ,  would
U
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have had little difficulty in abolishing the more obnoxious 
relics of the past such as the Peace Preservation Ordinance 
(the Government had soon allowed it to lapse, but still had 
the pov/er to re-impose it), and in removing minor irritations 
like the excessive red-tapism, not to mention the latent 
tyranny, of the Newspaper, Public Meetings, and Publications 
Regulations. Naturally, in view of the internecine squabbles 
of the Liberal leaders and the country1s lack of experience 
in representative government, it was possible for the 
bureaucrats to argue with a fair degree of plausibility that 
’transcendental1, i.e. non-party, Cabinets were better for 
the time being. Yet nothing is perfect, and as has been 
pointed out earlier, making the Cabinet responsible to the 
Diet was the next step in securing a fully effective 
parliamentary democracy for Japan.
Compared with the promise to introduce party Cabinets, 
the attack on Government subsidies or other forms of protection 
for private industry was of a lesser order of political 
magnitude. In 1890, these subsidies were still inconsiderable 
and they were to be multiplied many times during the following 
two decades; but throughout the Meiji era, Government 
assistance formed one of the pillars of industrialization.
Prom the Liberal point of view, however, hostility towards 
the growing manufacturing and trading combines of the cities
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a c c o r d e d  as  w e l l  w i t h  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  dogma o f  l a i s s e z - f a i r e  
as  i t  d i d  w i t h  t h e  e a r l i e r  commitment t o  c u t  t h e  l a n d - t a x .  
M oreover ,  even  though  a p o l i c y  o f  ’ no p r o t e c t i o n ’ was h a r d l y  
p r a c t i c a l  so lo n g  as  J a p a n  had  n o t  r e g a i n e d  t a r i f f  autonomy 
and rem ained  i n  t h e  i n f a n c y  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  d ip lo m acy  
and n a t i o n a l  economic s t r e n g t h  were s t i l l  t h e  s o l e  c o n c e r n  o f  
t h e  L i b e r a l s ’ enemies  i n  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  S i m i l a r l y ,  
t h e  p r o p o s a l  t o  d i s p e n s e  w i t h  s p e c i a l  f i n a n c i a l  a i d  t o  b ig  
b u s i n e s s  was w e l l  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  s e c t i o n a l  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  t h e  r u r a l  a r e a s  where  most  o f  t h e  v o t e r s  l i v e d ,  
even  th o u g h  i t  opened a r i f t  b e tw een  t h e  L i b e r a l s  and  th e  
c i t y - b a c k e d  P r o g r e s s i v e s .
As h as  been  n o t e d ,  t h e  m a n i f e s t o s  p u t  o u t  by b o th  t h e  
Daido Club and t h e  J i y u - t o ,  b u t  s t r a n g e l y  enough n o t  t h a t  
o f  th e  A ik o k u -k o to  i n  s p i t e  o f  i t s  g r e a t e r  em phas is  on t h e  
t h e o r y  o f  L i b e r a l i s m ,  c o n t a i n e d  s u g g e s t i o n s  f o r  e l e c t o r a l  
r e f o r m .  These  s u g g e s t i o n s  c o n s i s t e d  i n  t h e  main  o f  a p l e d g e  
t o  make t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  b i g g e r  -  t h i s  i m p l i e d  t h a t  a l l  
f u t u r e  e l e c t i o n s  would be c o n d u c te d  i n  a c c o rd a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
sy s te m  o f  s c r u t i n  de l i s t e  -  and  a p ro m ise  t o  w id en  t h e  
f r a n c h i s e  by l o w e r in g  t h e  age and  t a x  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  
e l e c t o r s .  P e r h a p s  t h e  r e a s o n  why t h e  A ik o k u -k o to  d i d  n o t  
i n c l u d e  e l e c t o r a l  r e fo rm  i n  i t s  programme o f  l e g i s l a t i o n  
f o r  t h e  f i r s t  D i e t  was t h a t  t h i s  programme was d e l i b e r a t e l y
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r e s t r i c t e d  t o  what t h e  p a r t y  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be t h e  most 
u r g e n t  o f  u r g e n t  m a t t e r s .  Be t h a t  a s  i t  may, t h e r e  can  
be l i t t l e  d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  Daido Club and J i y u - t o  p o l i t i c i a n s  
were s e r i o u s  and i n  many ways j u s t i f i e d  i n  p u t t i n g  f o r w a r d  
t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s .  The e x i s t i n g  e l e c t o r a l  sy s te m  c r i e d  o u t  
f o r  an  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s e  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .
The g e n e r a l  i m p r e s s i o n  l e f t  by t h e  t h r e e  L i b e r a l  
m a n i f e s t o s  a s  a w h o le ,  even  a f t e r  one has  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t  
t h e i r  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  and  e l e c t i o n e e r i n g  o p p o r tu n i s m ,  i s  one 
o f  s o l i d  w o r th  and p u r p o s e f u l  z e a l .  T h e i r  o v e r - a l l  e f f i c a c y  -  
b o t h  a s  a  means o f  w inn ing  v o t e s  and a s  a p o i n t e r  t o  f u t u r e  
p o l i c i e s  -  was p ro v e d  by t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  i n  
which  t h e  t h r e e  L i b e r a l  p a r t i e s  be tw een  them won a lm o s t  
h a l f  t h e  s e a t s  i n  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  and  by what 
h ap pened  a f t e r  i t  was a l l  o v e r .  T r e a t y  r e v i s i o n  was 
e v e n t u a l l y  a c c o m p l i s h e d  by d i r e c t  and s e c r e t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  
b e tw ee n  t h e  M e i j i  Government a n d  t h e  powers c o n c e r n e d ,  w i t h o u t  
e i t h e r  t h e  c o n c u r r e n c e  o r  t h e  i n t e r f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  I m p e r i a l  
D i e t .  The L i b e r a l s  c o u l d  have h a r d l y  q u a r r e l l e d  w i t h  t h e  
outcome o f  t h e s e  ’p r i v a t e *  t a l k s ;  s i n c e  t h e y  a b o l i s h e d  
e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  f o r t h w i t h ,  an d  e n s u r e d  t h a t  
J a p a n  would  r e g a i n  h e r  t a r i f f  autonomy a t  t h e  end o f  a 
f i x e d  number o f  y e a r s .  I n  o t h e r  m a t t e r s  -  n o t a b l y ,  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  p a r t y  C a b i n e t s ,  t h e  w id e n in g  o f  t h e  f r a n c h i s e ,
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the curtailment of expenditure, and the abolition of the 
Peace Preservation Ordinance - interested Members of the 
House of Representatives fought on until they won most or 
part of what they and their spiritual forbears of 1890 had 
wanted. Only on the issue of decentralization do they seem 
to have scored a complete blank; but there, they were to a 
not inconsiderable extent forestalled by Yamagata’s broad­
minded approach to the problems of local self-government.
The new Municipal and Town and Village Codes were only Just 
going into operation at the time of the election. Then 
again, as has been explained already, the more regionalist 
overtones of the Liberal pronouncements on local government 
were not appropriate to the day and age.
If in the last analysis the Liberal ideas on regional 
autonomy were somewhat out of date and an unwelcome vestige 
of the country1s own feudal past, yet another and even more 
important aspect of their election manifestos was, at the 
time when they were composed, rapidly becoming obsolescent 
in terms of Western European political development. This 
was the conviction, running all through the manifestos, that 
Liberty would of itself and quite unaided cure all the evils 
of society. Already in I89O, laissez-faire carried to this 
extent had a taste of mid-century naivete and selfishness.
The corollary of this was the Liberals’ singular lack of 
interest in matters of social, as opposed to political, reform.
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The Jiyu-to declared that it would amend the education 
system and encourage the spread of learning; the Aikoku- 
koto looked forward to improving the prison system, but 
whether it was actuated by philanthropic motives or by 
thoughts of saving the tax-payers’ money was not clear.
Apart from these minor, if not quite meaningless asservations, 
the Liberal manifestos were bereft of any black and white 
proposals for the betterment of social conditions. Their 
prevailing philosophy was that of upper-class individualism; 
and their overriding objective was to bring about a decrease 
in the powers and expenditures of the Government,
The ideological sections of the Aikoku-koto manifesto 
raised two or three interesting points. Firstly, it 
contained a definite attempt to clarify the position of 
the followers of Itagaki vis-a-vis the Imperial House,
Briefly, the argument was that Liberalism by making the 
monarchy constitutional would strengthen it, whereas 
absolutism v/ould only endanger it by antagonizing public 
opinion; and further, that by making the Empire strong and 
independent by means of the correct application of Liberal 
principles, the innate glory of its august Sovereign would 
be put on view for all to see. The Emperor, in other words, 
was to be the topmost and most resplendent flower on the 
Liberal tree. Not being permitted to govern himself,
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he was thereby to be made the all the more secure, and 
still semi-divine, symbol of the greatness and prosperity 
of his subjects under Liberal rule. For Japan, republicanism 
was out of the question; and this was probably as good a 
way as any of trying to solve the knotty problem of 
reconciling the formal omnipotence of the dynasty with the 
actualities of constitutional government. In advancing 
these ideas, the Aikoku-koto undoubtedly drew much moral 
support from the example of England.
Elsewhere in what I have called the ideological 
sections* of its manifesto, the Aikoku-kotö urged the need 
for a large united party in the ’popular* camp, so that the 
radical politicians would be able to meet the forces of the 
Government on something like equal terms in the Diet. This 
again was an important issue. Not only would a large number 
of small parties in the House of Representatives have made 
it easy for the Government to control the Diet rather 
than the other way round; but it was of special relevance 
to the election of 1890, when the Liberals themselves were 
split into three factions and there were many Independent 
candidates. More will be said about the influence and 
attitudes of these Independents later. Mention should be 
made here, however, of the fact that the whole notion of a 
political party, avowedly organized to advance personal
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ambitions or sectional interests, ran counter to the 
Confucian and feudal ideal of disinterested public service. 
As a result of this, there was always a certain antipathy 
in many minds to the idea of a political party as such, and 
so an inclination to vote for Independents simply because 
they were Independents. This sort of antagonism was a 
constant worry to the advocates of popular rights; and 
none of them was more conscious of its damaging effects 
than Itagaki himself. The use of such terms as 'Patriot* 
and 'Public* (Aikoku-koto = Public Party of Patriots; 
Aikoku-sha = Patriotic Society) in naming his Liberal 
organizationswas one of the means he devised for trying to 
rid them of the stigma of being thought a cabal.
Finally, at the very end of the Aikoku-koto manifesto, 
there appeared a passage about the possibility of Japan 
exerting her influence all over the world as the Oriental 
fortress and protagonist of freedom and independence. This 
glittering hope was held out in contrast to the existing 
state of affairs under which
Ah, our land of the dragon-fly is an orphan isle I
Short and vaguely couched, it is hard to know exactly what 
to make of these sentences; but they would seem to confirm
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other evidence that expansionism and a sense of national 
mission were sentiments affecting all quarters of the 
political world in Meiji Japan. In this case, though, the 
implication was that the way to world-wide influence lay 
through moral leadership rather than military hegemony.
Itagaki, in the speeches he made during the election 
campaign, played upon these three themes of constitutional 
monarchy, stable parties, and'world influence; as well as 
dealing with the other main issues such as the necessity 
for financial retrenchment and the evils of too much 
centralization. When talking to a gathering at Mito, he 
used the metaphor of a strong colt to describe the vigour 
that a constitutional and parliamentary state would derive 
from its institutions. One of his purposes here was to show 
that the people could expect an improvement in the country*s 
diplomatic position, and by implication an extension of its 
international prestige, if they adopted the principles of 
Liberalism.
At the same time, by saying that the Emperor would be 
made to accept the honour of riding this strong colt, he was 
attempting to explain the Liberal conception of the relations 
that, properly speaking, should have subsisted between the 
Sovereign and his subjects. In the part of the speech 
immediately preceding this, he alleged that 1 absolutist*
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methods o f  h o n o u r in g  th e  Emperor would amount t o  no more t h a n
e l e v a t i n g  Him by b u ry in g  t h e  common p e o p le  u n d e r  
t h e  g ro u n d  and  l e a v i n g  His M a je s ty  above i t .  12
He was uncompromis ing  i n  h i s  d e c l a r a t i o n s  t h a t  L i b e r a l i s m ,  as  
i t  would  i n c r e a s e  t h e  w e l f a r e  and  h a p p in e s s  o f  t h e  mass o f  
t h e  I m p e r i a l  s u b j e c t s ,  was t h e  b e s t  way o f  showing l o y a l  
r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  t h r o n e .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  t h e  s t a t i s t  t h i n k i n g  o f  
t h e  M e i j i  b u r e a u c r a t s  he c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be d i s l o y a l  t o  t h e  
t h r o n e ;  and ,  what was m ore ,  i l l o g i c a l  i n  i t s e l f : -
I f  i t  were s a i d ,  ’you p e o p le  s h a l l  be p o o r ,  b u t  
y o u r  S t a t e  s h a l l  be r i c h  and p o w e r f u l ’ -  who would 
subm it  t o  such  a n  a rgum ent?
I t a g a k i  a s k e d ,  a f t e r  s t a t i n g  t h a t : -
The L i b e r a l i s m  which  o u r  P a r t y  a d v o c a t e s  i s  
i n d i v i d u a l i s m .  T h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  i t  i s  t h e  view 
t h a t  i f  one s e t s  o u t  t o  e n l a r g e  n a t i o n a l  r i g h t s ,  
one must  w iden  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s .  I f  i t  i s  d e s i r a b l e  
t o  make t h e  S t a t e  w e a l th y  and s t r o n g ,  one must  
make i n d i v i d u a l s  w e a l th y  and  s t r o n g .
I t  w i l l  be s e e n  t h a t  t h e  a t t a c k  was made n o t  so much 
on t h e  l o n g - t e r m  M e i j i  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  s t a t e  
and e n l a r g i n g  n a t i o n a l  r i g h t s ,  a s  on t h e  means whereby th e  
Government was s e e k in g  t o  a t t a i n  them. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  even
12
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though there was an unequivocal assertion of the individualist 
basis of Liberal philosophy, and even though the idea that 
a free community would ipso facto also be a powerful one had 
been popular outside Japan for several generations, Itagaki’s 
words on this occasion would seem to indicate that he still 
had to appreciate the fact that at the root of Western 
individualism lay the purpose of realizing the full 
potentialities of a man as a personal soul rather than as 
a national subject. This is a point to be made more in 
sorrow than anger; and it should not be taken as a completely 
damaging reflection on either Itagaki’s outlook or the 
achievements of the popular rights movement. Just over 
twenty years had elapsed since the overthrow of feudalism, 
and the position of Japan in international affairs was still 
weak. In these circumstances, the fact that Itagaki was 
able to give such a trenchant exposition of one side of the 
Liberal.case and to insist that individual rights must take 
precedence over state rights, at any rate in so far as one 
could not have the latter without the former, was of very 
great credit to him and the cause for which he had fought.
This speech showed that Itagaki had remained consistent 
since the birth of the Liberal movement in Tosa to his belief 
in the need to build a strong Empire on the energies of an 
emancipated people, living under a representative system.
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On the other great questions of parties and the part they 
should be expected to play in a national assembly, however, 
there were signs that he had moved away from the doctrinaire, 
Rousseau-esque approach of the early days* The theory of the 
General Will, implying as it did that the Members of the 
House of Representatives would be no more than the delegates 
of the voters and bound to obey them in every particular, 
was demolished with the observation that as the majority of 
electors were fools, this would inevitably lead on to a 
government of fools. *The object of a representative system*, 
he declared, * is to make use of the wise.* The proper task 
of a Representative was, in his opinion, to represent 
indirectly the views of his constituents. This trend away 
from the cruder interpretations of the doctrine of the mandate 
of the people, interpretations which had been prominent in 
the by-gone years of struggle for a constitution and a 
national assembly, was indicative of the power of the upper- 
class and politically moderate forces behind Itagaki’s main­
stream Liberalism. At the same time, it displayed a greater 
understanding of the true nature of parliamentary government 
as known in England. In less theoretical terms, it was 
yet another step towards the Kaishin-to position, and 
foreshadowed the long period of control of the House of 
Representatives by two parties that shared the same general 
conservative point of view.
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But, if the Representatives were not to be the talking 
puppets of their masters in the constituencies, how was the 
bond of representation to be retained at all, and how were 
the voters going to be able to discriminate between honest 
men and dishonest rogues? ItagakiTs answer was given in 
one word - ’principle’. Men of principle, he said, would, 
if elected to parliament, remain true to their beliefs as 
a general criterion of political morality while exercising 
their right to use their own judgement in more mundane 
matters. Further, by persuading the candidates to make 
public their principles before the day of the election, the 
voters would be able to sort out the sheep from the goats. 
Finally, principles were the thing around which political 
parties were formed; therefore it was of the utmost 
importance that electors should vote for candidates who 
were enrolled in a political party, and not for Independents 
Thus, from two points of view - from the point of view of 
checking the tyranny of government, and from the point of 
vie?/ of obtaining a House of Representatives that would 
effectively represent the general interests of the electors 
’political parties are the foundation of a representative 
system of government,’
To recapitulate Itagaki’s arguments in favour of a 
system of strong parties founded on principle, and to get
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something of the flavour of his own personality, it is 
best to let him speak in his own words for a little longer: -
Principles are the compass of the political 
world. Political parties are founded on them; 
and Representatives move in accordance with them.
The confidence which the electors have in their 
Representatives is nothing other than a confidence 
in their principles. Therefore, in electing 
Representatives, we must first of all discover 
their principles and ascertain their talents.
To ascertain men’s talents and to discover their 
principles is the way to become a people that 
gives its support to political parties, and to 
make clear the condition of the political world. 
Moreover, Representatives must on the one hand 
stand by their parties and advance their cause, and 
on the other hand reflect upon the parties and 
criticize them of their own accord. That is how 
it is. If the people sees fit to put its trust 
in principles and to discover men’s talents, by 
means of forming a large and vigorous party, it 
will ensure the creation of a perfect representative 
system from the first, without there being any 
opportunity for ruffians and flatterers to practise
thefcrarts
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  g i v e  any more 
e x t r a c t s  from I t a g a k i * s  Mito s p e e c h ,  o r  t o  go on d i s c u s s i n g  
i t  i n  d e t a i l ;  b u t  I  hope t h a t  enough has  b e e n  s a i d  t o  show 
how l a r g e  t h e s e  i s s u e s  o f  S t a t e  R i g h t s  v e r s u s  I n d i v i d u a l  
R i g h t s ,  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  D y n a s t i c  A b s o lu t i s m  v e r s u s  p r a c t i c a l  
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  Monarchy, and  o f  I n d e p e n d e n t s  v e r s u s  P a r t y  
C a n d id a t e s  loomed i n  h i s  m ind ,  and p re s u m a b ly  i n  t h e  minds 
o f  h i s  h e a r e r s  t o o .  The p a s s a g e s  q u o te d  w i l l  a l s o ,  I  t r u s t ,  
have  conveyed  som eth ing  o f  h i s  p o i n t  o f  v iew  on t h e s e  t o p i c s ,  
and  o f  t h e  h ig h  p l a n e  o f  i m p a r t i a l  m o r a l i t y  and  c l a r i t y  o f  
t h o u g h t  on which  he c o u ld  c o n d u c t  a  p o l i t i c a l  d e b a t e .  Some 
have  c a l l e d  I t a g a k i  t h e  R o u s s e a u ,  b u t  I  -  a t  any r a t e  i n  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  p o s i t i o n s  he to o k  up i n  1890 -  would p r e f e r  
t h e  t e rm  f t h e  G la d s to n e  o f  J a p a n * .
The Mito s p e e c h  was d e l i v e r e d  on 18 J u n e .  On t h e  p r e v i o u s  
d a y ,  I t a g a k i  had  c o v e r e d  much t h e  same g ro u n d  i n  an  a d d r e s s  
g i v e n  i n  I b a r a k i  p r e f e c t u r e .  On t h a t  o c c a s i o n ,  he s t a r t e d  
o f f  w i th  a s h o r t  e u lo g y  o f  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g o v e rn m e n t ,  
c o n g r a t u l a t i n g  h i s  a u d ie n c e  on t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  w i t h  t h e  
open ing  o f  t h e  D i e t ,  t h e y  were g o in g  t o  be b o r n  a s  ^genuine 
human b e i n g s . *  (He u s e d  more o r  l e s s  t h e  same words a t  t h e  
b e g in n i n g  o f  h i s  Mito  s p e e c h . )  A f t e r  d e s c r i b i n g ,  i n  a 
s u i t a b l y  g u a rd e d  way, h i s  v iew  o f  how t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  had  
b e e n  g r a n t e d ,  i n  fo rm  a s  a n  a c t  o f  g r a c e  on t h e  p a r t  o f  the  
Emperor  b u t  i n  r e a l i t y  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  u n r e m i t t i n g  e f f o r t s
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of the campaigners for popular rights, Itagaki made a 
series of rapier thrusts at what he held up as examples 
of the tyrannical and wasteful methods of the pre­
constitution bureaucracy. The specific evils named were 
conscription (blood-tax) and general taxation. While 
speaking on the theme of burdensome taxation and misuse 
of public funds by the Government, he was able to give some 
under-cover rubs to two other sores of the body politic - 
centralization and the failure to revise the treaties.
This is what he said, in part:-
Despite the fact that we, together with you, 
are burdened with taxes, two-horse carriages are 
driven round /""in the capital_7, fat horses neigh at the gates, the notes of organs resound mightily 
in the Rokumei-kan, and the currency leaves the 
countryside to become the plaything of Government 
contractors in Tokyo. Our manufactures and industries 
are short of capital and are on the verge of
extinction .... looking at it from our point of
view, we are entitled to ask whether the Government 
does not spend money wastefully. The value of land 
falls; more and more bank-notes are issued. Our 
misfortunes pile up; and starvation hangs over us 
morning and evening. However, we cannot give voice 
to our complaints. Truly, ours is a miserable and 
piteous condition. Gentlemen, I hope you will give 
this your fullest consideration. Could anything be 
more miserable and piteous? 13
The reference to the Rokumei-kan was particularly astute. 
This was the name of the pleasure pavilion which had been 
specially constructed by the Government in Tokyo for 
entertaining the diplomatic representatives of the Treaty
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Powers, There, Inoue Kaoru, Ito Hirobumi, and other high 
Japanese officials had passed the time in the years 1886-7 
by playing cards or dancing with members of the foreign 
communities, in the hope, of course, of encouraging them to 
persuade their home governments that Japan was sufficiently 
Westernized to have equal treaties. Not only had the 
manoeuvre failed to convince the governments of the powers 
concerned of the merits of the Japanese case (history is 
more or less silent on the subject of what the foreign 
envoys, their staffs, and their respective families themselves 
thought of the entertainments), but it made the Japanese 
Government unpopular with a large section of public opinion 
that did not like to see the leaders of the country behaving 
in too Western a fashion. Consequently, the whole Rokumei- 
kan episode could be easily presented by Itagaki and other 
opponents of the Government as a very extravagant and, what 
was more, dangerously.Western fiasco.
The manufactures and industries mentioned in the above 
extract can be taken, I think, to mean rural enterprises 
like the distilling of sake or the making of soy sauce. It 
was certainly not the case that the Government was withholding 
much-needed capital from the heavy industries in the cities. 
Even the rural industries were in much better shape, 
economically speaking, in 1890 than they had been six or
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seven years before at the height of the agricultural 
depression. Similarly, the complaint that ’we cannot 
give voice to our complaints’ was more a piece of retrospective 
rhetoric - that is, a casting back to the Government’s use 
of such measures as the Peace Preservation Ordinance or 
the Public Meetings Regulations in its contests with the 
Liberals and their extremist supporters over the past ten 
years - than a valid expression of an existing grievance. 
Obviously it cannot be taken literally; otherwise, Itagaki 
and the other opposition politicians would not have been 
allowed to make anti-Government speeches.
So far, comparing the Ibaraki speech with the one that 
was given on the following day at Mito, it is clear that 
the former did not contain any of the latter’s analysis of 
fundamental problems to do with the status of the Emperor 
or the nature of the State. However, in the second part of 
the Ibaraki address, Itagaki did enlarge on the dangers of 
electing Independents. Party men, he said, were honourable, 
and not prone to theft or telling lies. In this, they stood 
in flattering contrast to their non-party opponents, in 
particular to those of them who were retired officials or 
members of the local assemblies, whom he accused of being 
both corrupt and stupid. He expressed the hope that at 
least one hundred and fifty members of his own party would 
be returned to the House of Representatives; and throughout
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his words there ran the idea that parliamentary rule
could be expected to function well, only if the parties
were represented in sufficient numbers,
Itagakifs strictures and exhortations on these two
occasions reached a wider audience than that for which they
had been originally intended; as they were re-printed in the
newspapers. Moreover, he was by no means exceptional in
his efforts to win over the electors by arguing his case.
We shall see that speech-making and to a lesser extent
public debates were one of the most prominent features of
the campaign as a whole. At this stage, however, space
permits the mention of only two other examples of campaign
oratory. The first is the draft of a speech prepared by
Okamoto Takeo for the voters in the Second Constituency of 
14Mie prefecture; the second is a speech given by Matsuo
15Sei.jiro. a candidate for the Third Constituency in Tokyo.
Okamoto was something of a lone bird, politically. He 
had fought for the Tokugawa during the War of the Restoration; 
but later came to terms with the Meiji Government, and 
served it in various capacities. For a few months in 1872 
and 1873, he was a member of the Left Board of the Dajokan, 
but lost his post when the Board was re-organized. The next
m
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two years he spent working for the local government 
authorities in Ibaraki and Mizusawa prefectures, but was 
dissatisfied either with his immediate superiors or else 
with the type of work handled by prefectural offices, A 
patriot and an individualist, with a keen interest in 
educating both himself and his countrymen, neither his 
temperament nor his ambitions suited him for the routine- 
ridden life of a local government official. Therefore, when 
the Imperial rescript of 1875 promising the gradual 
introduction of constitutional government was published, 
he left the world of officialdom for good in order to begin 
a career in journalism.
To his new profession he remained constant for the 
rest of his life, clearly because he found in it a proper 
outlet for his talents and aspirations. For several years, 
he was editor of the Akebono Shimbun (Daybreak Newspaper), a 
Jiyii Minken Undo journal, but later left it to join the 
staff of the generally pro-Government Tokyo Nichi Nichi 
Shimbun for which he was one of the leader-writers at the 
time of the election. When the Constitutional Imperial 
Party had been first formed in 1882, Okamoto had become a 
member of it, but soon resigned because - to put it in his 
own words - fI was put off by its inevitable one-sidedness.* 
Thereafter, though in many ways he tended to find common
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ground with the Liberals and Progressives and was strongly 
in favour of Japan developing a system of united and 
responsible parties like that to be found in Britain or 
the United States, he refused to join any other party and 
stood as an Independent candidate in 1890, Evidently, he 
objected as much to the factionalism and self-interest of 
the radicals in 1890 as he had done to the 1 one-sidednessf 
of their political enemies in 1882,
It is clear from this record of an inability to see 
eye to eye either with the Government or its principal 
opponents that Okamoto was a highly intelligent man of 
affairs, who had failed in some respects to adjust to the 
restoration. Having fought, out of a sense of loyalty, for 
the losing side in the War of the Restoration, he was made 
to realise that he could never expect to rise to very great 
heights in the Sat-Cho regime. He had personal grounds, 
therefore, for throwing in his lot with the popular rights 
agitators. Moreover, he was genuinely attracted by much of 
what he had taught himself about the West in long years 
devoted to study; but it was an idealistic view of the 'West 
that had stamped itself on his mind. So, too, with his own 
country. The Japan of Okamoto*s imaginings was as heroic as 
the best traditions of its own feudal past - a country in
.
See Shugi-in Giin Kohosha Retsuden, pp. 220-252.
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which everyone’s first allegiance was to a particularly 
enlightened brand of patriotism. It was not the Japan of 
his own day and age - a country in which, to his way of 
thinking, both those in power and those seeking power were 
willing to sacrifice the national good to party interest 
and individual ambition. In short, Okamoto was an idealist 
who remained an idealist, and was both behind and ahead of 
his times. Therefore he discovered his metier, and no doubt 
his consolation, in educating the people for their future 
under a constitutional system of government by making 
constant reference in his own mind to the most altruistic 
standards of a bygone age.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that 
Okamoto should have preferred to stand as an Independent, 
when he v/as asked by a number of people in the Yokkaichi 
district of Mie prefecture if he would agree to be one of 
the candidates for their constituency. The address in question 
was one that he had written for a tour of the constituency 
(Second Constituency, Mie prefecture) from 25 to 30 May.
The purpose of the tour had been to introduce himself to 
the general body of voters and have his nomination confirmed. 
Subsequent to his tour, the first draft of his speech was 
published by the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. His opinions, judging 
from this document, were straightforward and intelligent,
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though characteristically utopian. It was in keeping, too, 
with what we know of his career and temperament that he 
should have concentrated on explaining the opportunities 
and dangers of the representative system as a whole. He 
spent little or no time in attacking either the Government 
or the popular rights parties.
He seems to have come close to the thinking of the 
bureaucracy in stressing the fact that parliaments role 
was to assist the Cabinet, not to replace it, and to Rectify 
the administration.1 He did not advocate party Cabinets. 
Nevertheless, even though the House of Representatives 
would be the junior partner in the administration, indeed 
precisely because it would be the junior partner in the 
administration, it was of the utmost importance to have it 
as strong and as upright as possible. This could come 
about only if the right sort of people were elected; and so 
everything depended on the choice and good sense of the 
voters.
The rest of what he had to say was chiefly devoted to 
advising the people on how to regard their responsibilities 
as voters. The model he wished them to bear in mind was 
England, where, he said, elections were usually fought 
keenly but fairly by two candidates representing the Liberal 
and Conservative Parties,who had been chosen by the local
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members of the parties. He realized that it would have 
been virtually impossible for a country such as Japan, 
without any previous experience of parliamentary elections 
and in the grip of a general uncertainty as to the manner 
in which a representative system would work in practice, 
to reach in a day the English level of internal stability 
and political maturity. Nevertheless this realization did 
not prevent him from urging that the Japanese should make 
every possible effort to ensure that their first House of 
Representatives would be an effective and honest one.
An ineffective or dishonest House, he argued, would 
prove worse in some ways than no House at all, and would 
be the cause of endless troubles in the future. Therefore 
as this initial step under a constitutional system was the 
vital one, and as the takers of this initial step were 
none other than the electors, and as the situation in the 
majority of constituencies was far from satisfactory; he 
considered himself justified in asking his audiences to 
take their responsibilities as voters very seriously indeed.
To help them in their task of selecting worthy Representatives 
he offered them four suggestions. These were:- (i) that 
they should choose competent men, (ii) that they should not 
allow themselves to be swayed by bribery or intimidation 
in making their choice, (iii) that they should not surrender
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t h e i r  r i g h t  t o  v o t e ,  and  ( i v )  t h a t  t h e y  s h o u ld  n o t  g i v e  
t h e i r  v o t e s  t o  a l a r g e  number o f  c a n d i d a t e s ,  so t h a t  
whoever was s u c c e s s f u l  owed h i s  e l e c t i o n  t o  what had  b e e n  
i n  f a c t  a  m i n o r i t y  v o t e .
P o i n t s  ( i )  and  ( i i )  need  no f u r t h e r  comment f o r  t h e  
moment. The i d e a  b e h in d  th e  o t h e r  two s u g g e s t i o n s  was t h a t  
i f  f o r  one r e a s o n  o r  a n o t h e r  t h e  House d i d  n o t  f a i r l y  
r e p r e s e n t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o p i n i o n  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  i t  would  be 
w i t h o u t  a r a i s o n  d ’e t r e  i n  l o g i c  and  i n c a p a c i t a t e d  i n  
p r a c t i c e .  G e n e r a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  Okamoto t h o u g h t  t h a t  so 
lo n g  as  t h e  e l e c t o r s  remembered and conformed t o  t h e s e  f o u r  
r u l e s  o f  c o n d u c t ,  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  government  would have a 
f a i r  chance  o f  p r o s p e r i n g  from t h e  s t a r t  i n  J a p a n ,  One 
t h i n g ,  i n d e e d ,  he n o t e d ,  t h e  e x p e r im e n t  o f  1890 d i d  have 
i n  i t s  f a v o u r ,  and  t h a t  was t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  
had  b e e n  p r o m u lg a te d  i n  t im e s  o f  p e ace  and  p l e n t y ,  J a p a n e s e  
dem ocracy ,  s t a r t i n g  u n d e r  t h e  t r a n q u i l  m andate  o f  t h e  h i g h e s t  
i n  t h e  l a n d ,  would n o t  c a r r y  w i t h  i t  t h e  p o i s o n  o f  h a v in g  
o r i g i n a t e d  i n  s t r i f e  o r  u s u r p a t i o n .  T h is  a s s e t  t o  some 
e x t e n t  made up f o r  t h e  d i s a d v a n t a g e s  o f  a t r a d i t i o n  o f  
’d i c t a t o r s h i p ’ , and  o f  b e in g  ’b e fo g g e d  on a l i m i t l e s s  o c e a n ’ 
when i t  came t o  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  b e tw een  t h e  m u l t i t u d e  o f  
c a n d i d a t e s ,
A p ro m in e n t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  1890 was t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  were u s u a l l y  a t  l e a s t  f o u r  and  o f t e n  a s  many
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as ten or twelve candidates for each seat. The majority 
of them had not been nominated by one of the recognized 
parties; neither had they been asked to stand by a group of 
responsible public men in the constituency, in the way 
Okamoto himself had been. They had come forward unasked 
and completely of their own initiative to stand for election. 
In other words, they were - in the phrase of the time - 
’self-nominated’ Independent candidates. The low calibre 
and questionable strategems of the great majority of these 
self-nominated Independents, together with the baneful 
influence they exercised on the election, were denounced, 
fully and fairly, in the following passage of Okamoto’s 
speech:-
If one goes around the provinces and sees 
what is happening in them at the present time, 
either there are people suddenly coming forward as candidates who had no status in political 
society hitherto, or else there are occasionally 
people who, belonging to old provincial families, 
have the singular good fortune /"of being able to_7 
rely on their friends among the electors and do not 
/"have to_7 take into account their own strength 
even •••• And then, looking at the behaviour of 
these self—nominated candidates, when one sees that 
their behaviour is in most cases not straightforward 
and impartial, such as seeking a large measure of 
support by getting up on a rostrum and giving vent 
to their own views on politics, and that for the 
most part they are planning to get hold of votes 
in stealth and secrecy, it will be realized that 
they are having recourse to those measures which, 
in the normal course of events, should be most 
avoided in electing Members. 17
17 TNNS 4-6-90
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The blame for this sorry state of affairs Okamoto 
laid in part on the leaders of the popular parties; because 
they had not maintained them at a high enough level of 
organization, and, in particular, because they had not 
ensured that there would be a reasonable and proper 
distribution of reputable candidates among the prefectures. 
Consequently there were cases of three or four candidates 
sharing the same political views but contesting with each 
other for the same seat, while in a neighbouring constituency, 
perhaps, there was nobody with Liberal convictions and a 
name for integrity in the list of competitors. He also 
blamed the local men of affairs in many areas for having 
failed to form nomination committees to pick men who would, 
if elected, be of service to their constituents and of 
credit to their country. In order to rid the political 
world of the evils of self-nominated Independents and 
their electioneering methods, he called for the speedy 
formation of nomination committees of this kind in areas 
where they did not already exist. He wanted members of the 
prefectural or village assemblies or other men of local 
fame to serve on these committees. In addition to nominating 
responsible candidates, they were also to act as an electors* 
watch committee, examining the credentials of any others 
who offered themselves for election and * driving away’ all
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those contestants guilty of unfair practices. Only by 
measures such as these could a clean election be held,and 
a responsible and powerful House of Representatives returned.
The fact that Okamoto, himself an Independent, could 
deliver himself of these views, concerning the purposes of 
parliamentary government in general and the conduct of 
the majority of his fellow Independents in particular, meant 
that Itagakifs censure of non-party candidates as a class 
could not have been applicable in each and every instance.
On the other hand, both Okamoto and Itagaki had no time 
for the usual run of Independent candidatures. Perhaps, 
as Okamoto suggested, a broad distinction should be made 
between the numerous self-nominated Independents and the far 
fewer Independents who had been reguested to stand by a 
responsible group in the constituency.
To continue comparing the opinions expressed by Okamoto 
with those revealed in the speeches of Itagaki, the former 
seems to have been rather less contemptuous of the electors. 
He at no time so much as hinted that he considered most of 
them to be fools. On the contrary, he was continually 
stressing the great powers for good or evil that the 
constitutional system had given to the electorate. Again, 
while Okamoto made it clear that the supreme value of an 
energetic, well-informed, and incorruptible House of 
Representatives would lie in its ability to check stupid or
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tyrannical tendencies on the part of the bureaucracy, he 
did not bother to cite specific examples of Governmental 
arbitrariness or to delimit the prerogatives of the throne 
as Itagaki had done. His overriding concern had been to 
point out the dangers in having so many self-nominated 
candidates of little worth and no scruple, and to emphasize 
the importance of electing talented and honest men.
This last was a theme which was given more and more 
prominence in the candidates’ speeches and newspaper editorials 
as the election campaign neared its end. The tendency was 
for rather high-minded explanations of the people’s rights 
to give way to outspoken diatribes on electoral corruption. 
Matsuo Seijiro’s speech was one of the diatribes. Matsuo 
was a Tokyo lawyer and a member of the fu assembly; in 
politics, he was a Liberal who had for a while dallied with 
the Kaishin-to. His speech was one of a series given by 
the local candidates at a discussion meeting in Kyobashiward 
on 26 June. Following the same general line of argument as 
that used by Itagaki, Okamoto, and many others, he began 
by drawing the attention of his audience to the important 
role which the new Diet would play in the affairs of a 
constitutional country, and, having made that point, went 
on to stress the need for clean elections. Once again, the 
high standard of parliamentary life in England was presented
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as the objective at which Japan should aim; and, like 
Itagaki, Matsuo was of the opinion that all candidates 
should be forced to make a public declaration of their 
principles. The main part of the speech, however, was 
entirely given over to bitter denunciations of the dishonest 
or unfair methods by means of which many of the candidates 
were running their campaigns. The method he criticized 
most harshly was the shameless (and illegal) bribing of 
the electors - that is, the making of agreements * after the 
glasses and before the plates,J
Thus, we find that, as well as the larger and more 
abstruse issues, like the position of the monarchy and the 
right of the parties to form the government of the Empire, 
the more circumscribed but none the less significant 
question of how the election should be conducted, or more 
properly speaking of how the election should not be conducted, 
was itself an all-important topic at the time.
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( iii) Attempts To Amalgamate The Three Liberal Parties 
and To Organize A Coalition 3etween The Liberals 
and The Progressives - The Kyushu Confederation of 
Progressive Parties and The Koin Club«
It has already been noted that when the Jiyu-to, the 
Kaishin-to, and the Teisei-to were formed in the early 1880s, 
numerous regional clubs and associations, all of them 
political, came into existence* Most of these had been 
affiliated to one or other of the big national parties, 
though some of them had been independent bodies. Exactly 
the same sort of thing took place after the revival of 
party activity in the years 1887 and 1888; and these local 
associations figure prominently in the records of the first 
general election* For example, in Yokohama city, the seat
was fought for by the Kodo Club on the one side, and the
--- --- 18Koyu-sha in co-operation with the Doko-kai on the other*
The Kodo Club (Justice Club) was the local landlords1 
stronghold and connected with the Liberals, while the 
Koyu-sha and Doko-kai (both these names mean something 
like ’Friendly Society’) represented the mercantile interest 
in the city and were linked with the Kaishin-to,
For our present purposes, however, the most notable of 
these regional political clubs were the ones to be found in
18 "
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Kyushu. There, every prefecture seems to have had at 
least one ’progressive’ association; and as the conservatives 
were particularly strong in places like Kumamoto and 
Kagoshima, their opponents no doubt felt all the more keenly 
the weaknesses of their own divisions. In April 1889, 
representatives of the various progressive factions had 
met in Kagoshima and had agreed to form themselves into a 
Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties. The groups 
that came together in this confederation retained their 
separate identities, but they do seem to have had a measure 
of success in framing an organization that would link them 
all together and so prevent them from cutting each other’s 
throats. On the other hand, although the Kyushu Confederation 
of Progressives contained elements that elsewhere would have 
found themselves under the banners of either the Liberals 
or the Progressives (i.e. the Kaishin-to), none of its 
constituent parts did in fact have anything more than the 
most tenuous relations with the ’up-country’ parties."^
Thus, the Kyushu Confederation of Progressives was at one 
and the same time a precedent to show the feasibility of 
uniting the Liberals and the Kaishin-to, something which 
only the Daido Danketsu movement had attempted before, and
15Kokumin Shimbun 2-6-90
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an example also of the strength of the separatist tradition 
in the southern island1s politics, something which had 
revealed itself most openly on the occasion of the 
Satsuma rebellion.
A year after its inaugural meeting, the leaders of the 
Kyushu Confederation of Progressives met again in Kagoshima 
on 17 April 1890, and resolved to do what they could to 
bring about a reconciliation between the Liberal factions 
and the Kaishin-to on the national level. In effect, 
they were anxious to do for the country as a whole what 
they had achieved in one region of it. Not unnaturally, 
these developments in Kyushu had been closely watched by 
observers elsewhere and had attracted much comment.
Therefore when, in conformity to the resolution adopted at 
Kagoshima, four delegates of the Kyushu Confederation 
arrived in Tokyo at the end of May to open talks on the 
subject of a National Confederation of Progressive Parties, 
the newspapers of the metropolis were for a few days full 
of articles on the matter.
Meanwhile, for some time before this, attentive readers 
of the press of the capital had been able to follow the 
somewhat tortuous details of a completely separate series 
of negotiations. These had had for their aim the more 
limited, but possibly even more essential, one of bringing
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together the three Liberal parties. In other words, in 
May and early June 1890, there was a definite movement 
afoot to unite the Jiyu-to, the Daido Club, and the Aikoku- 
koto. Since their respective election manifestos had had so 
much in common, since there was a great deal to be gained 
from refraining from fighting each other at the polls, and 
since the potential rewards of making a united and determined 
stand against the Government in the House of Representatives 
were plain to see; a basis for this sort of rapprochement 
clearly existed. Indeed, the only real obstacle was the 
mutual jealousy and distrust displayed by the Liberal 
factions’ leaders. The fact that union proved so difficult 
to achieve in practice was a fitting comment in itself 
on the virulence of those feelings. However three of the 
most senior people in the Liberal movement - Nakajima 
Nobuyuki, Takenouchi Tsuna, and Kato Heishiro - busied 
themselves with arranging an understanding among the three 
parties.
Nakajima, Takenouchi, and Kato first of all relied on 
holding private conversations with each of the three 
parties in turn, so that none of them had a first-hand 
knowledge of the others’ attitudes. These discussions 
showed that there was a genuine interest in amalgamation 
on all sides. Nevertheless, there was disagreement over
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problems such as the date for making a firm decision on 
a common programme of action, and the exact form of the 
proposed organization, i.e. was it to be a political or 
non-political association?
If yet another election manifesto, this time in the 
names of all three Liberal parties, had been issued within 
four weeks of the election, Jiyu-to, Daido Club, or Aikoku- 
kotö adherents who up till then had been fighting each other 
in the provinces might well have felt disheartened. On 
the other hand, the weakest of these three parties would 
probably benefit from incorporation in the other two, as 
this would ensure the election of its leaders, at any rate, 
and, what was more, would give them some followers to lead 
in the House of Representatives.
In the same fashion, the question of having a political 
or non-political association depended for its answer on 
the immediate interests of each of the parties involved.
A non-political body would have served to link the Liberal 
factions together in a very loose way, but would have been 
powerless to intervene in the election campaign on its own 
behalf. If it had done, it would have contravened the 
Public Meetings Regulations which made it obligatory for 
all organizations with any sort of interest in politics to 
register themselves with the police as political associations.
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A p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  f o r m a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d  a s  su c h ,  
would  n o t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  have had t h i s  d i s a d v a n t a g e ;  b u t  a 
to o  v i g o r o u s  cam paign  by an  a s s o c i a t i o n  r e p r e s e n t i n g  a l l  
t h e  L i b e r a l  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e i r  new fo u n d  u n i t y  would have 
d e m o r a l i z e d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y .
B eh ind  h a g g l e s  o f  t h i s  n a t u r e ,  l a y  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  b o th  
t h e  J i y u - t o  and t h e  Daido Club were i n  r e l a t i v e l y  good 
shape  t o  f i g h t  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  and so were  n o t  v e ry  
e n t h u s i a s t i c  a b o u t  p u t t i n g  t h e m s e lv e s  o u t  o f  e x i s t e n c e  
b e f o r e  knowing t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  p o l l s .  The A ik o k u - k o to ,  
on t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  as  t h e  l a t e s t  a r r i v a l  i n  t h e  L i b e r a l  
f a m i l y ,  was s t i l l  h a v in g  i t s  t e e t h i n g  t r o u b l e s .  T h e r e f o r e  
i t  was f a r  more e a g e r  t h a n  th e  o t h e r  two t o  have a q u i c k  
m e r g e r .
At l e n g t h ,  on 14 May, t h e  t h r e e  m e d i a t o r s  changed t h e i r  
t a c t i c s ,  and b r o u g h t  d e l e g a t e s  from t h e  t h r e e  p a r t i e s  f a c e  
t o  f a c e  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t im e  a t  a  m e e t in g  h e l d  i n  t h e  
Y a n a g i - y a  (W il low  I n n ) ,  n e a r  t h e  G o f u k u - b a s h i .  As a r e s u l t  
o f  t h i s  c o n f e r e n c e ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a g re em en t  was r e a c h e d : -
1 .  The e x i s t i n g  t h r e e  p a r t y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s h a l l  
be a b o l i s h e d ,  and a new, c o m p reh en s iv e  
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  s h a l l  be fo rm ed .
. The p a r t y  t o  be e s t a b l i s h e d  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  
t h i s  m e r g e r  s h a l l  be c a l l e d  t h e  Koin Club 
1890 Club__7. I t  s h a l l  be an  a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  
e q u a l s  and  s h a l l  have no l e a d e r .
2
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3* The Köin Club declares its support for the 
principles of Liberalism.
4« The Köln Club shall appoint nine officers to 
manage its affairs. They shall be elected in 
equal numbers from each of the three former parties.
5» The Koin Club shall be convened again not 
later than next August to determine its 
policies, and to carry out the official 
inauguration of the party. The need to 
preserve the spirit of the principles that 
have animated each of the existing parties is hereby affirmed. 20
The general effect of the above was to usher in the union, 
nob federation, of the three Liberal parties in principle, 
bub to delay the practical consequences of this decision 
until August, that is until after the election. It was 
rather like a triangular marriage by proxy, with at least 
two of the prospective partners wanting to have a final 
night out before settling down to consummate the affair.
In this sort of strained situation, it was hardly 
surprising that they should have very soon begun to bicker 
among themselves. By the end of May, a major quarrel had 
broken out between the DaidS Club and the Aikoku-koto over 
the question of whether the Köin Club was to be treated as 
the opening phase of full amalgamation, or simply as the 
first step towards a federation of the three parties. The
20 ------------
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Daido Club leaders in Tokyo had written to their supporters
in the provinces to tell them officially of the formation
of the Koin Club, stressing the fact that their party
would continue to contest the election as a separate entity
on the strength of the manifesto it had already issued.
In addition, this letter even went so far as to say that
there would possibly still be a need for the Daido Club
even after the full inauguration of the Koin Club in August,
News of the attitude adopted by the Daido Club leaders
when corresponding with their followers in the country
provoked an angry riposte on the part of the Aikoku-koto.
Two of the leaders of the latter party, Kobayashi Kusuo
and Kurihara Ryoichi, sent a written protest to Nakajima
21Nobuyuki and his colleagues. In this protest, the 
Aikoku-koto complained that the Daido Club letter to its 
supporters had contradicted the spirit of the agreement 
entered into at the Yanagi-ya on the evening of 14 May, 
by placing too much emphasis on independent competition 
at the elections. The Aikoku-koto spokesmen insisted that 
the Koin Club had been founded to replace the existing 
parties, not just to associate them in a loose federation. 
This dispute quickly developed from a fairly private 
exchange of letters into a newspaper war; and it seemed for
21
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a while as if the whole hard won achievement of the Koin 
Club was nearing collapse. In the words of one Osaka 
man of affairs, whose opinion had been canvassed by the 
Tokyo Nichi Nichi, and who was personally in favour of the 
idea of federation rather than amalgamation:-
Cats are cats, and dogs are dogs - and, when 
all is said and done, you cannot keep them in 
the same cage. 22
Nevertheless, despite these unhappy beginnings, the Koin 
Club did survive to play a brief but important part in 
the reunion of the Liberals after the election. Thus, 
it was in due course to fulfil the hopes of its original 
sponsors.
Even before the day of the election, that is throughout 
the month of June 1890, the Koin Club was asserting its 
right to an independent existence in a number of ways.
On 17 June, its founders, taking their stand on the phrase 
’new, comprehensive political party’ in the first article 
of the Club’s constitution, formally notified the police 
in Kyobashi ward of their desire to be registered as a 
political association. Registration with the police, as has 
been explained, was the sine qua non for participation in 
the election. The police, after the secretary had sent
22
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them a r e m i n d e r ,  o f f i c i a l l y  a u t h o r i z e d  t h e  Koin  Club on 
21 J u n e .  T h i s  a l l o w e d  t h e  s e c r e t a r y  t o  s t a r t  on t h e  work 
o f  s e n d in g  t h e  C l u b ’ s f i r s t  and  s e co n d  r e p o r t s  t o  c o u n t r y  
m e m b e r s . ^  The K o in  C l u b ’ s m em bersh ip ,  when a p p l i c a t i o n s  
was made t o  t h e  K yobash i  ward p o l i c e  f o r  r e g i s t r a t i o n  as  
a p o l i t i c a l  a s s o c i a t i o n  on 17 J u n e ,  was r e p o r t e d  t o  be
pi t
o n ly  f o r t y - o n e  p e r s o n s .  ^  As e a r l y  a s  25 J u n e ,  however ,  
t h e  Tokyo N i c h i  N i c h i  Shimbun announced  t h a t
A p p l i c a t i o n s  t o  j o i n  t h e  Club have shown no 
s i g n s  o f  f a l l i n g  o f f  o f  l a t e .
T h e r e f o r e  t h e  f i g u r e  o f  f o r t y - o n e  must have meant on ly
t h o s e  who had  been  f o r m a l l y  e n r o l l e d  by t h e  d a t e  o f
a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  r e g i s t r a t i o n ;  and  i t  would a p p e a r  t h a t
r e e r u i t i n g  o f  one s o r t  o r  a n o t h e r  had  been  go in g  on f o r
some t im e  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e  o f f i c i a l  a u t h o r i z a t i o n .
I n  Chiba  p r e f e c t u r e ,  t h e r e  had  b een  more t h a n  t h r e e  t h o u s a n d
25
a p p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  membership  by 25 Ju n e ;  and  i n  o t h e r  
r e g i o n s ,  t h i n g s  were s u f f i c i e n t l y  f a r  advanced  f o r  t h e  Koin 
Club t o  be a b l e  t o  p u t  f o r w a r d  i t s  own c a n d i d a t e s  i n  t h e  
e l e c t i o n .  T h i s  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  o f  A ic h i  p r e f e c t u r e ,  
where t h e  A i c h i  K o in  Club was v e ry  w e l l  o r g a n i z e d  and to o k
23
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the lead in representing the Liberal interest in every 
constituency. ^'0
Prom the above details it is clear that the Koin Club 
lost little time in trying to get itself accepted as a new 
and growing political group, with a mind and an organization 
of its own, and, what is more, was able to shout its name 
from the hustings in some districts at any rate. Furthermore, 
within three weeks of its formation on 14 May, the Club had 
won a rather sudden distinction in a field other than 
electioneering. This was because the delegates of the 
Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties approached the 
Koin Club direct, without bothering to have separate 
consultations with the Jiyu-to, Daido Club, and Aikoku-kötö, 
when they appeared in the capital towards the beginning of 
June with their scheme for a pre-election understanding 
between the Liberals on the one side, and the Kaishin-to 
on the other.
The Kyushu delegates planned to hold talks with the
27leaders of both sides and soon got down to business.
The opening moves in this latest round of inter-party 
diplomacy had already been played by 4 June, on which date 
fourteen senior members of the Koin Club entertained the
25
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visitors from Kyushu (whose numbers had risen from four
pO
to six) to a banquet,~L This banquet took place in the 
Jubi-ya (Tea-House of Long Life and Beauty), in the Tsukiji 
district of Tokyo, and lasted from midday. While it was 
in progress, the Koin Club hosts told their guests that 
they personally all approved of federation with the 
Kaishin-to, but they would have to have this preliminary 
decision confirmed by the general body of their members at 
the first full convention of the Koin Club in August.
During the afternoon of the next day, the standing committee 
of the Kaishin-to met privately, and unanimously adopted 
the following resolution:-
Item. We shall meet the members of the committee 
from Kyushu to-day, the 5th, at 6.0 p.m. in 
the Sanen-tei, in Shiba park; and shall make 
the following reply, which has been agreed 
on by all the members of the standing 
committee of the Kaishin-to. (However in 
the last ten days of July, we shall hold an 
extraordinary general meeting, and will ask 
the party members from the entire country 
to endorse this.)
Item. Since we have already approved of federation, 
we cannot leave this work to the gentlemen 
from Kyushu and just be lookers-on. In order 
that this intention should be fully seen in 
practice, we must first of all call on the 
members of the Koin Club and make various 
arrangements with them. 29
28
TNNS 6-6-90 and Yubin-Hochi Shimbun 6-6-90. 
29
TNNS 6-6-90
181
In conformity to the above resolution, three representatives 
of the standing committee of the Kaishin-to - Kato Masanosuke, 
Shimada Saburo, and Ozaki Yukio - went immediately after 
the end of the meeting to call on the various Liberal 
leaders* These, in turn, expressed their satisfaction 
with the way things were developing.
In this way, with or without the aid of wine and 
geisha, the attempts made by the Kyushu politicians to 
bring about a coalition of Liberals and Progressives at 
the national level had met with a success that was as quick 
as it was unexpected. As with the union of the Liberal 
factions, however, while the decision in principle to form 
some sort of institutional alliance had been taken by both 
sides at the beginning of June, the practical working out 
of this decision was postponed by mutual consent until after 
the election. The neutral Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun was 
quick to point out the lack of logic in this attitude, which 
it likened to two enemies agreeing to have one more fight 
to the death before they became friends.^0 The same paper 
reminded its readers that it was highly unlikely that an 
enduring compact could be made between the Liberals and the 
progressives, so long as the treaty revision problem remained 
unsolved, as only a few months had passed since the time when
30
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the two parties were at loggerheads on this issue. This 
raised the question of whether a party Minister for Foreign 
Affairs could be trusted to look after the Empire’s interests 
as competently as the bureaucrats had done. There were 
hints, too, in this editorial that:-
The essential element uniting the parties must 
have been congeniality of temperament rather 
than identity of principle.
However, this was a rather unfair insinuation, as on the 
whole the Liberals and Progressives had more to unite 
than divide them. Though the leader-writer in this 
particular issue of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi was insistent in 
his professions of sympathy for the trend towards federation 
in the popular parties, he concluded somewhat waspishly:-
We simply think that a free wedding is very 
wonderful, but fear that we shall soon have news of a divorce.
The same day, a member of the Aikoku-koto was reported to 
have expressed himself in very much the same vein.^1
Not all the newspapers and publicists took this gloomy 
view of the prospects of the half-negotiated federation of 
the Liberal and Progressive parties. Admittedly, the leading 
Laishin-to newspaper, the Yubin-Hochi Shimbun, advised the 
party leaders in Tokyo to give very careful consideration
31
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to the Kyushu proposals, and warned against a too hasty 
acceptance of them; but it was quite ready to concede the 
necessity for a link of some sort between the major anti- 
Gove rnment parties.^ The Sanyo Shimbun (Okayama prefecture)
was far more welcoming than this, and congratulated both 
the Koin Club and the Kaishin-to on having taken the first 
step towards federation, which it thought would be of 
benefit not only to the popular parties but also to the
7 7 -Empire as a whole.^ It was left to the Tohoku Mainichi 
(Miyagi prefecture), however, to praise virtually without 
reservations what had been accomplished so far, and at 
the same time to argue with the greatest enthusiasm the 
case for federation. It did so in an editorial entitled 
’Whyever Don't The Gentlemen Of Tohoku Bestir Themselves 
And Organize A Confederation Of Progressive Parties?1, the 
closing paragraph of which was:-
We are not alone in advocating the need for 
a confederation of progressive parties. Most of 
the gentlemen of the Empire have acknowledged 
this need. The fact that we have gone on to the 
present day, even, without a confederation was,
32~~3
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as we have explained, simply due to emotion, 
to suspicion, and to thinking about what is 
past and done with. At this juncture, it was 
the Kyushu Kaishin-to which, not ready to be 
controlled by its emotions, not caring to be 
misled by its suspicions, and not prepared to 
cling go uhoughts of the past, magnanimously 
broke with the fashion, and by forming a great 
confederation of progressive parties pitted 
itself against the various conservative parties 
of the Government. In view of this, a few of 
our colleagues could not help but urge the same 
thing on our Tohoku Kaishin-to. This was the 
general situation in the Empire as a whole. Now 
the Kyushu Kaishin-to has sent delegates all the 
way to Tokyo, in order to bring together all the 
progressive parties. Therefore our Tohoku Kaishin-to 
must also get a move on, and, by joining forces 
with the Kyushu Kaishin-to, work for a grand 
national confederation of progressive parties.
Now is the timei Whyever don't the gentlemen of 
Tohoku bestir themselves and organize a confederation 
of progressive parties? ^
Tohoku Mainichi 6-6-90.
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As for the general position of the Liberals at the 
time of the 1890 election, it is clear that their principal 
weaknesses were bad organization in the field, and a 
divided leadership at headquarters. As has been said, some 
constituencies did not have any Liberal candidates; others 
had too many. In addition to this, the appearance of no 
fewer than three different Liberal parties in the six months 
before polling day was little short of an insult to the 
gods of politics-with-elections. Yet, despite these 
handicaps and omissions, the Liberal parties between them 
had many more candidates in the field than any of the other 
political parties, and they also had the advantage of 
widespread popularity among the electors. This popularity 
was something which the Liberals were able to rely on from 
the start of the campaign to the time it was completed. To 
a large extent, the general climate of opinion - with its 
belief in progress and a considerable amount of Westernization 
still favoured them; even more beneficial was the success 
they had had in establishing themselves in the countryside.
Nor should the wide appeal and intrinsic excellence of the 
Liberal manifestos be forgotten. The Whig philosophy with 
which they buttressed their attacks on the Government was 
in many ways as apposite for the times as it was formative 
for the future. Thus, the reduction of the land-tax or the
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shortening of the conscription period were matters of 
immediate interest to the nation at large; while the 
introduction of party Cabinets was the necessary next step 
for its political elite. Moreover, there were in the ranks 
of the Liberal leaders not a few men of high calibre. 
Finally, we have seen how the Liberals themselves were not 
altogether incapable of taking steps to remedy their own 
failings. A union of the three factions had been half- 
accomplished, and a coalition with the Progressives was in 
the offing.
(iv) The Progressive Party (Kaishin-tö).
Unlike the Jiyu-to, the Kaishin-to was never a party 
seriously divided against itself. Not even the shock of the 
resignations of its president and vice-president in 1884 had 
managed to being about its dissolution and the party of the 
Centre was in 1890 far more united, and so in far better 
condition to fight the election, than either its Conservative 
foes to the Right or its Liberal rivals to the Left. It is 
interesting to try and see for a moment why this should have
been the case
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Very probably the nature of the elements that made up 
the nucleus of the party was what kept it united. Of 
particular importance was the fact that, though the 
Progressive influence extended into the countryside, the 
party never ceased to be first and foremost an association 
representing the interests of the urbanized middle classes. 
By comparison with the Liberals, it had little influence 
with, and so in turn it itself was not much influenced by, 
the rural capitalists; it had even less in common with the 
forces of ultra-nationalism. The middle classes of the 
cities on which the Kaishin-to relied were naturally less 
prone to provincialism and obscurantism than the village or 
reactionary adherents of the other parties. Therefore the 
Progressive Party was always free, relatively speaking, 
from the regionalist pressures which often split both the 
Liberal and the Conservative groups, and also from the heady 
chauvinism that made some Liberals indistinguishable from 
Ultra-Conservatives to the detriment of the Liberty party 
as a whole.
In the structure of its leadership, too - a leadership 
consisting in the main of 1 radical* bureaucrats, university- 
trained intelligentsia, and businessmen such as Iwasaki of 
the Mitsubishi Company - the Progressive Party was very much 
in the forefront of the modernization taking place in Japan.
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An elite drawn from these groups found it much easier to 
act in hamony with one another than the Liberal leaders 
did. The latter, as has been said, were often outstanding 
as individuals; but because of their strong personalities 
and their impulse to destroy rather than reform what they 
considered objectionable, they were not by nature so well 
fitted to work together in a team as their opposite numbers 
in the Kaishin-to.
Putting these two points together, one may say that two 
of the chief characteristics of the Kaishin-to were a 
preponderance of well-off and city-dwelling bourgeois 
in its membership, and a leadership composed of men 
whose education or business interests had given them 
a good knowledge of the outside world as well as a strong 
belief in the essential rightness of the bureaucrats* 
modernization policies for their own country and its trade. 
Both in its general membership and in its leadership, the 
Progressive Party was in the hands of those who preferred 
government by reason to dictates of emotion. Consequently 
the dominant impression given by this party at the end of the 
last century was one of urbane sophistication and carefully 
thought out modernism. This spirit, which derived from the 
personnel of the party, enabled its members to retain not 
only their common objectives but also their unity of
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association in the years 1882 to 1890, To summarize 
briefly by putting the matter in a slightly different way - 
the Kaishin-to as it was the most Modern’ of the political 
parties, was ipso facto the least ’feudal’ of them. Therefore 
it suffered few, if any, of the symptoms of the breakdown 
of the feudal order - regionalism, excessive factionalism, 
two-sworded turbulence, and recurrent attacks of xenophobia 
or other forms of political extremism.
This is not to say that the Progressive Party did not 
have its handicaps. The greatest of these was the heavy 
concentration of voters in the rural areas, where, as has 
been said, the influence of the party tended on the whole 
to be slighter than that of its adversaries. True, this 
disadvantage was to some extent compensated for by the fact 
that any city with a population of 100,000 or more was 
entitled to its own Member regardless of how many voters 
actually lived in it. But, in the Japan of 1890, only 
three provincial cities (Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya) other than 
Kyoto and Osaka did have populations of more than 100,000.
All other provincial centres of any size, such as Sendai, 
Niigata, and Hiroshima, were linked with part of the 
surrounding countryside to form a joint ruro-urban constituency. 
Again, in point of total size of membership, though not of 
course in degree of organization, the Kaishin-to was probably
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rather inferior to the Liberal factions as a group. On the 
other hand, the Kaishin-to was bigger than either the 
Jiyu-to, Daido Club, or Aikoku-koto by itself; and in 
regions where it functioned was usually more than a match 
for Conservative opponents. Though Itagaki was able to 
tour the country on behalf of his party, the national leader 
of the Kaishin-to, Okuma Shigenobu, had Just left hospital 
after losing a leg in the bomb attack of the previous October, 
and was still too weak to take an active part in the election 
campaign. Whether the Kaishin-to actually lost seats 
in the election because of Okuma*s absence is a moot point; 
but there can be little doubt that both the party and the 
public missed some election panache through not being able 
to hear his oratory as well as Itagaki*s.
The general calibre of the Kaishin-t3 candidates was 
very high. A brief account of the careers of two of the 
most influential men in Japanese politics will illustrate 
this. Both of them have been mentioned a little earlier as 
having been chosen by the standing committee of the party 
to make formal approaches to the Liberals on the question 
of federations. At the time of the election, they were both 
prominent members of this standing committee.
Shimada Saburo, who was elected for Yokohama city in 
1890, after studying English and working for some up-and-coming
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wealthy merchants in his youth, first of all made a name 
for himself as editor of the Yokohama Mainichi in the 
early 1870s. The paper had just been founded* so Shimada 
was its first editor. With his articles on politics and 
social reform, he made the Yokohama Mainichi a leading 
and extremely influential organ of moderate-progressive 
opinion. After 1875» he entered the Government service, 
and was appointed Grand Chancellor of the Senate (Genro-in). 
Later, he became Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Education 
but resigned from this post when Okuma fell from power in 
1881. For the next eight years he worked as one of the 
founders and policy-makers of the Kaishin-to, as well as 
publishing a number of books and taking part in the local 
government of Kanagawa prefecture. He was elected to the 
prefectural assembly, and before long was chairman of it.
In 1889, he travelled widely in both Europe and North 
America, in order to study the political systems and actual 
conditions of the various countries. After being elected 
to the House of Representatives in 1890, he continued to 
be a Member until his death in 1923, holding in due course 
the posts of deputy Speaker and Speaker of the House. He 
was also a minister in several party Cabinets. Keenly 
interested throughout his long (72 years) life in social 
welfare and the future progress of constitutional government
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in Japan, Shimada wrote many books and articles on these 
topics and others related to them. In 1901, he was invited 
to give lectures in all parts of the United States, and 
the tour he made on that occasion was highly successful.
Shimada*s career in many respects resembled that of 
his colleague - Ozaki Yukio. Ozaki, too, had spent the 
earlier part of his working life as an official - he was a 
senior Civil Servant in the Treasury Department - and had 
resigned in sympathy with Okuma. Then he returned to the 
Yubin-Hochi Newspaper Company, for which he had worked for 
a short while before entering the Treasury Department. Prom 
there he joined the staff of the Choya Shimbun. His skill 
in journalism and the close relations he always enjoyed 
with Okuma naturally made him a person of importance in the 
Progressive Party. In 1889, he visited Europe. He was 
returned for the Fifth Constituency, Mie prefecture, in 
the election of 1890, and from that time onwards was a 
Member of the House of Representatives for more than fifty- 
five years, that is until he died a few years after the 
end of the Pacific War. He was an extremely active Member 
as well as a very long-lived one. Like Shimada, he was a 
minister of state on several occasions; he also found time 
to serve as mayor of Tokyo for three separate terms. Ozaki*s 
chief claim to fame, however, was the vigour of his speeches
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in the Diet. In these speeches, he consistently put forward 
a Liberal interpretation of the constitution, and attacked 
the transcendentalist theories of the bureaucracy. More 
than any other single person, he was responsible for 
forcing the resignation of Prince Katsura in 1913 - an 
event that marked the beginning of the end for the Sat-Cho 
monopoly of executive power. In his old age, Ozaki continued 
to defend the canons of parliamentary democracy - this time, 
against the militarists.
With men like Shimada and Ozaki in the field, then, and 
they were by no means the only outstanding candidates in 
Progressive colours, the Kaishin-to was clearly a formidable 
party at the time of the 1890 election. The fact that it 
contained so many gifted politicians able to work in harness 
together was no doubt one of the reasons why it put up a 
good showing at the polls, even though it did not have 
Okuma to lead it into battle.
On what principles and objectives did the Progressives 
take their stand in appealing to the electors, and in what 
respects did their outlook differ from that of the Liberals? 
Generally speaking, the Progressives had from the first 
atood for the same things as the Liberals did; and the 
differences between the two parties at the time when they 
were originally formed in the years 1881-2 had been 
narrowed by the growth of conservative feeling among the
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Liberals since then. The two parties had also learnt 
during the intervening years how much they could lose by 
fighting each other and not the Government, Therefore 
when drawing attention to what did distinguish the Progressives 
from the Liberals in 1890, one must remember all the while 
that these differences of opinion or emphasis were really 
no more than small rocks of discord in a placid ocean of 
ag re erne nt.
Even in I89O, the Progressives were still more
conciliatory abroad and a little more moderate at home
♦
than the Liberals. They seldom, if ever, went to prison 
for carrying their opposition to the Government too far.
Thus, in the previous year, the majority of them had come 
round to support Okuma’s proposals for a gradual abolition 
of extra-territorial rights. The Liberals, on the other 
hand, had joined with the Conservative factions in a full 
scale campaign for suspension of the treaty negotiations.
In domestic matters, the Kaishin-tö fought the election 
on the basis of the original manifesto of the party, which 
had been issued when it was founded in 1882. In some ways, 
this would appear to have been a mistake, as the 1882 
manifesto was already a little out of date by 1890 and was 
by no means a comprehensive statement of the party’s beliefs 
and policies. Therefore, it might have been better if the
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Progressives had brought out a revised edition of their 
manifesto on the occasion of the promulgation of the 
constitution or during the months just before the election.
But it is very probable, of course, that the electors knew 
for themselves that the 1882 manifesto v/as not a complete 
guide to the thinking and planning of the Progressive Party.
Comparing this 1882 document with the three Liberal 
manifestos of 1890, there were two major differences not so 
much of principle as of emphasis, and one serious cleavage 
of interest. The Kaishin-to did not give formal, black and 
white, adherence to two items that figures prominently in 
the Liberal pronouncements - institution of party Cabinets, 
and reduction in the land-tax. Moreover, the Liberal censure 
of Government aid to private industry was a direct blow to 
the economic interests of the most important group of 
Kaishin-to supporters.
To look at the above points in a little more detail for 
a moment - the lack of a specific reference to party Cabinets 
in the Kaishin-to manifesto was, by 1890, a failure to make 
the official charter of the party correspond as meticulously 
as possible to the views it held. This lack should not be 
regarded as an indication that the Progressives were lukewarm 
in this respect. As much as the Liberals, the Progressives 
had always regarded the constitution as the bulwark of popular
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rights and happiness, and parliament as the means by 
which government was to be made conformable to public 
opinion. Indeed, it had been the bald demand for party 
rule which had made Okuma’s 1881 memorial so repugnant to 
his colleagues in the Government. The most that the 
Progressives were prepared to concede was that there should 
possibly be a short transition period after 1890, during 
which the Sat-Cho bureaucrats would govern in coalition 
with one or other of the popular parties; and after the 
opening of the Diet, they joined with the Liberals in 
putting pressure on the Government to accept the doctrine 
of ministerial responsibility to parliament. Before this, 
the Progressive attitude of looking forward to the 
inauguration of party Cabinets among other things had been 
expressed during the election campaign in words such as 
these. They are taken from an electioneering song, the 
full version of which will be given later:-
Time flies like an arrow -
The First of July is at hand!
Soon our hearts’ desires will be realised.
Similarly, the omission of any formal proposal to cut 
the land-tax in the Kaishin-to manifesto to some extent 
belied its real intentions. By 1884, an argument had 
developed within the party on the feasibility of reducing 
the land-tax; and it was on this issue that Okuma and Kono
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Binken had chosen to resign. Both of them had been of the 
opinion that the existing rate of taxation had to be maintained 
to keep the Empire solvent. Their departure meant, in 
effect, that the prevailing view in the higher ranks of 
the party hierarchy v/as that the Government could afford 
to lighten the fiscal burdens it had imposed on the peasants 
and landowners. To some extent, of course, the whole issue 
of a reduction in the land-tax was more of an academic one 
for the Progressives than it was for the Liberals. This 
was because most of the Kaishin-to supporters lived in 
the towns and not the country villages. Nevertheless it 
would have been reasonably clear to the electors of 1890 
that the Kaishin-to was scarcely less eager than the 
Liberal parties to do what it could to curtail the costs 
of administration in general, and achieve some alleviation 
of the land-tax in particular. So much could have been 
deduced from newspaper articles, political speeches, and 
what was known of the views of leading members of the party. 
This supposition would have been made all the more tenable 
by. the markedly pacific tone of the Kaishin-to manifesto 
on foreign relations. Armaments were to be a major item in 
Government expenditure after I890.
Since the views actually held by the two parties on 
the role of parliament under the constitution and a reduction
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of taxation were identical or very similar, the only 
real bone of contention between them was Government subsides 
to private industry. This was a relatively minor issue, 
however, and it would have been by no means impossible for 
the Liberals and Progressives to settle it amicably. In 
other points, the Kaishin-to manifesto agreed well enough 
with those put out by the Liberals. The Progressives, too, 
did not want government to become completely centralized; 
and though they were seven years too early to make any 
concrete proposals for amending the Law of Election, the 
hope that the franchise would be gradually widened in keeping 
with the general progress of the people was a statement 
in principle of what the Liberals later asked for in 
practice. Finally, though the Kaishin-to document did not 
cover such matters, there was absolutely nothing to separate 
the attitude of the Progressives from that of the Liberals 
on matters of basic popular rights - freedom of speech, 
assembly, and so on.
Therefore, in spite of the facts that the two parties 
represented rather different social groups and were still 
in a sense the separately organized following of two rival 
statesmen, at the time of the election, the general outlook 
and objectives of the Progressives were very much the same 
as those of the Liberals. This judgement may be readily
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confirmed by reading the editorials published by the Yubin- 
HSchi Shimbun of Tokyo in the months preceding the election. 
The Yubin-Hochi was the most influential Progressive Party 
newspaper; and in its political comments during this 
period, it usually took a line that was the same as the one 
adopted by the Liberals. The following extracts from these 
editorials will illustrate this point, and they may be taken 
as good evidence of run-of-the-mill Kaishin-to policies.
Ill-Gotten Gains. (2-4-90)
It is generally held that evil cannot overcome 
good. Nevertheless when political consciousness 
is still in its infancy, and has not had time to 
develop to the full, and one is dealing with a 
people that is all too quick to cultivate bad 
habits; there may be a temporary reversal of the 
usual state of affairs. Upright methods will be 
hard pressed by dishonest strategems; and good will 
be overcome by evil. Of course, it is not to be 
supposed that the issue will be thus decided for 
once and for all; but, regardless of whether it is 
for a long time or a short time, such things as the 
triumph of trickery over fair play should never be 
tolerated here in this country of righteousness.
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The Period of Non-Party Government (8-4-90)»
What sort of policies will non-party Governments
adopt towards the Diet?....  /”*Government__7
strategists /~~if they try to imitate Bismarck_7 
will be able to make a Buddha statue, but will 
not be able to breathe any life into it • ••• Though 
we shall never believe that the schemes of these 
strategists will all turn out well, looking at the 
matter from the point of view of a Ministry that 
wishes to stand aloof from political parties, the 
best plan would surely be for such a Ministry to 
form an alliance with a powerful party in the 
Diet, and to make use of it. However the 
business of making a full alliance with the chosen 
party and winning its confidence is not Just a 
matter of adopting the partyfs view. Its leaders 
must be prevailed upon to enter the Government; 
and something like a coalition Cabinet should be 
formed •••• If it should eventually fall foul of 
the majority in the Diet, it will simply have 
to resign. This will be one step towards party 
Cabinets,
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The Constitutional Progressive Party (1U-U-90)»
Although the fortunes of the Kaishin-to have 
inevitably been subject to fluctuations from time to 
time; looking back over the past ten years, one really 
cannot but be impressed by the over-all progress made, 
and the degree of stability achieved. Certainly of all 
the political parties in our country, the Kaishin-to 
is the one that is the most orderly and the furthest 
developed. Indeed, it is doubtful if there are any 
others to compare with it in these respects,
Donft Discourage The Industrialists From Thinking 
About Politicsi -(15-4-901
There is no necessity for industrialists to 
mix with politicians, and openly engage in political 
activities of their own accord. Nevertheless it is very 
important that they should know about politics and take 
an interest in them. The attitude of taking no interest 
in politics, on the grounds that since they are 
industrialists, they need not concern themselves with 
political affairs, is an evil relic of feudal times.
In those days, politics were the preserve of the samurai 
classes and their superiors alone. The industrialists, 
being unable to have any say in them, were completely 
excluded from politics. The industrialists themselves
were obliged willy-nilly to put up with this; and,
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losing any desire to hear about /~politics_7, as time 
sanctioned the convention, they virtually gave up 
thinking about them. So it is hardly surprising that 
they should have been indifferent to politics in 
bygone times. But the feudal system has been abolished, 
and the four classes have been made equal. Moreover a 
Liberal system of government is gradually being put 
into operation, and now that we are about to be given 
the right to participate in the government, it is 
essential that industrialists should be thoroughly 
conversant with politics.
Not Biased, Non-Party (16-4-90)»
Most of those who call themselves ’not biased and 
non-party’ stink; and it is no accident either •••.••
If they are not completely without principles, even 
though they do not set themselves up as /"members of__7 
a political party, they will inevitably be partial to 
one side or another. If they are not partial to one 
side or another, then they must be men without fixed 
principles. People without principles drift around like 
seaweed in the waves; preaching progress to-day, and 
favouring conservativism to-morrow. They are never 
constant. Is not this what is meant by ’not biased
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and non-party’? Well, what virtue is there in being 
not biased and non-party?
Hesitant Reform An Evil -(20-4-90*1
Following the Government’s decision to reform the 
Civil Service and get rid of superfluous officials, the 
bureaucracy has been in a state of jitters ..•••From 
what v/e have seen of Government offices during the 
last fortnight, none of them appears to be over-worked; 
rather, it would seem that a certain amount of leisure 
has had to be sacrificed. With regard to this, all but 
two of the Ministers of State went off to see the 
military and naval manoeuvres, and then stayed on to 
make tours of the Kyoto and Osaka regions and so forth. 
Therefore it is natural that there should not be any 
great pressure of business. All the same, the days of 
leisure /""the bureaucrats_7 are enjoying now are not 
the same as the usual period of mid-summer relaxation 
from strenuous toil. Their bodies rest; but they are 
not easy in their minds, and are afflicted by all 
kinds of doubts. From the point of view of the Government, 
this can hardly be termed a happy state of affairs; 
and it is a positively disagreeable one for the 
individual officials concerned. It is clearly a matter 
of immediate urgency that the Government should take 
at once suitable steps to deal with this situation.
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In order to cut down administrative expenses, 
and simplify the management of /”"Government_7 
business; unwanted officials must be dismissed.
The People's Strength (6-5-90)»
Under an absolutist political system, decisions 
are made in an arbitrary fashion, and once the Government 
has made up its mind to do something, it can do it as 
and when it pleases, without having to pay any 
attention to public opinion. Even serious issues do 
not require a great deal of delicate handling, and 
are easily settled. Under a representative system, 
on the other hand, the people must be consulted, and 
it is not possible to act unless one has the consent 
of the majority of them. Consequently a considerable 
amount of time and trouble has to be spent on getting 
them to agree to anything. Politicians who have grown 
used to absolutism may well find these exertions 
beyond them, and no doubt will be full of complaints 
about the representative system. Nevertheless the 
people are on the move, and their advance cannot 
possibly be checked. The tyranny of a minority will 
have to defer to opinion of the majority. This is the 
inescapable outcome of the development of the strength 
of the people.
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Danger of Political World Becoming Abysmally 
Degraded (10-5-90*
The world of politics is one that is always apt to 
be ruled by unsavoury characters; and it is frequently 
in danger of falling into a bottomless pit of degradation.
True patriots ought to be ever conscious of the need 
to avoid this danger.•••••••It is natural for politicians
to fight each other for the reins of power, and we have 
no intention of denying them this H right_7. However 
they should be expected to conform to certain standards 
of conduct in their disputes.
The Enemies Of Liberty (16-5-90).
Tyranny is the enemy of Liberty. Tyrannical actions, 
no matter whether they stem from governments or peoples, 
are all alike in being opposed to Liberty.....Liberal 
politics are the politics of discussion. The misuse 
of force is nothing other than the politics of tyranny. 
Those who wish to violate in any way the freedoms of 
speech and action, no matter whether they belong to 
the Government or the people, must all be thought of 
as being equally opposed to Liberty. The freedoms of 
speech and assembly, not to mention the right to life, 
will be seöured under a Liberal system. Those who by 
any means whatsoever violate them in any way are all 
enemies of Liberty.
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If I were to play the complete politician, and 
tell you that the taxes levied on the country should 
be reduced by one half, and that we would cleverly 
adopt policies that would enable us to meet the 
costs of government on only one half of the present 
amount brought in by taxation: my words would be 
highly gratifying, and would no doubt rejoice the 
hearts of the more ignorant tax-payers. Yet it is 
plainly impossible to do any such thing. To prate 
on about cutting administrative expenditure and 
reforming the methods of the bureaucracy, when one 
is in the position of an outsider who knows nothing 
about the true facts of the political situation, is 
just irresponsible talk.
(Part of a speech given on the 
26-6-90 to the residents of the 
Nihonbashi ward of Tokyo by Pujita 
Mokichi, a local Kaishin-to candidate. 
The Yubin-Hochi Shimbun gave a 
summarized version of this speech 
as its editorials for the three 
days 28-30/6/90.)
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It will be seen, then, that the Progressive Party, 
while remaining true to its motto of 1 Slow but Steady’, was 
nevertheless an organization that in 1890 fully merited 
the epithets ’progressive’ and ’popular’.
(v ) Some Conservative Parties - the Jichi-to, the Kokumin-ha,
and the Hoshu Chusei Ha.
In its editorial for 7 June 1890, the Tokyo Nichi 
Nichi remarked that the Conservatives were as divided as the 
Liberals. It would have been truer to have said that the 
Conservatives were even more divided than the Liberals. For 
not only did they resemble their opponents on the furthest 
Left in having a large number of splinter factions and 
regional associations, they also made no attempt to join 
forces before the election. There was never any Conservative 
equivalent of the Koin Club. The Conservative factions were, 
of all parties, the ones most closely linked with the 
feudal tradition. To an even greater extent than was the 
case with the Liberals, therefore, they were animated by 
feelings of attachment to a particular district and a 
particular leader. This was one of the reasons why they
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failed to unite. Yet another reason for the divisions 
between them was a deep and abiding difference of outlook. 
There was a moderate, Westernizing, constitution-minded 
conservativism of the bureaucrats in power£ and there was 
an extremist, ultra-nationalist, absolutist conservativism 
of a few public figures out of power.
Some of the numerous provincial Conservative parties 
were well established in their own districts and did well 
in the elections - notably the National Rights Party 
(Kokken-to) in Kumamoto prefecture, and the Miyagi Political 
Association (Miyagi Seikai) in the area round Sendai.
However the influence of these groups did not extend beyond 
the boundaries of their respective prefectures, and the 
overall national strength of the Ultra-Conservatives in 
particular was not very great. Moreover, these regional 
clubs were not destined to last or grow bigger. Consequently, 
unlike either the Jiyu-to or the Kaishin-to, they cannot be 
regarded as direct ancestors of modern political parties, 
though of course, depending on their position in the 
Conservative camp, they did keep alive a tradition of Right 
wing extremism or else rallied support to the moderate 
conservativism of the ruling bureaucrats. On the national 
level, the Conservatives fared even worse. In fact, the 
only Untra-Conservative organization with any claim to be
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a national, as opposed to a provincial, political party, 
the Hoshu Chüsei Ha, was just about the weakest electorally.
On the other hand, the sponsor of the Hoshu Chüsei Ha was 
one of the ablest exponents of the Ultra-Conservative point 
of view during the Meiji period. Therefore an adequate 
idea of the main strands of Conservative thinking and practice, 
as revealed by the election and the characters of the 
principal Conservative leaders taking part in it, can be 
gained from describing no more than three of the Right wing 
parties. These were Inoue Kaoru’s Jichi Kenkyü Kai (Society 
for the Study of Self-Government), General Tani Kanjofs 
Kokumin-ha (National Party), and General Torio Koyatafs 
Hoshu Chüsei Ha (Moderate Conservative Party).
( a) Moderate Conservativism - Inoue Kaoru!s Jichi-to.
Inoue Kaoru was a Chüshü man, a close friend of Ito 
Hirobumi, and a permanent office-holder in the Meiji 
administration from the time of the restoration in 1868 
to the time of his formal retirement in I898. Thereafter 
he continued to wield considerable influence behind the 
scenes as an aged and respected Genro until the day of his 
death in 1915- He founded the Jichi Kenkyu Kai in 1888, 
intending it to be a comprehensive political body like the
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Daido D a n k e t su ;  u n l i k e  t h e  l a t t e r ,  however ,  t h e  J i c h i  
Kenkyü Kai  was t o  be n o r m a l ly  p ro -G overnm en t  and n o t  
a n t i - G o v e r n m e n t • The S o c i e t y  had  no f i x e d  programme, and 
n e v e r  e v o lv e d  o ne .  T h u s ,  i t  e n t e r e d  on th e  e l e c t i o n  v / i th o u t  
a  m a n i f e s t o  o f  any s o r t .  O r i g i n a l l y ,  i t  had c o n c e n t r a t e d  
on s t u d y i n g  d i f f e r e n t  sys tem s  o f  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ,  w i t h  t h e  
h e l p  o f  f o r e i g n e r s  who were l i v i n g  i n  Tokyo e i t h e r  a s  
o f f i c i a l  a d v i s e r s  t o  t h e  Government  o r  a s  l e c t u r e r s  a t  t h e  
I m p e r i a l  U n i v e r s i t y .  The t o t a l  m em bersh ip  o f  t h e  J i c h i  
KenkyCT Kai  was n e v e r  a n y th i n g  more t h a n  m in u t e ,  th o u g h  t h e r e  
were  no f o rm a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on e n t r y .  I t  c o n s i s t e d  o f  a  
number o f  I n o u e ! s c o l l e a g u e s  i n  t h e  r a n k s  o f  m i n i s t e r s  and  
d e p u ty  m i n i s t e r s  o f  s t a t e ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a s p r i n k l i n g  o f  
l e a d i n g  men o f  a f f a i r s  o u t s i d e  t h e  Government .  One o f  
t h e s e  l a t t e r  was Shibuzawa E i i c h i ,  a  p ro m in e n t  b a n k e r .
I n  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  i t  i s  n o t  t o  be wondered  t h a t
t h e  J i c h i  Kenkyu Kai  was t h o u g h t  o f ,  by t h e  c o g n o s c e n t i
35and by t h e  i g n o r a n t ,  a s  ’ I n o u e ' s  p a r t y * .  The c a p i t a l  
and t h e  n a t i o n  as  a whole would  have  none o f  i t .  I n  a 
s e n s e ,  i t  was a r e v i v e d  b u t  even  w eaker  T e i s e i - t o .  I t  
w ish e d  t o  g o v e r n  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  t o  be 
s u r e ,  b u t  i n  a cc o rd a n c e  w i t h  t h e  most o r th o d o x  o f
H a y a s h id a  K am etaro ,  Nihon S e i t o  S h i ,  v o l . l ,  p .2 6 2 .
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bureaucratic interpretations of the constitution. The 
Society barely survived the difficulties of its birth and 
soon broke up. Its speedy disappearance demonstrated once 
again that there was no room for a party that was both 
Conservative and truly constitutional to the Right of the 
Kaishin-tS, so long as the Government intended not to 
become part of the Diet.
Despite the virtual failure of his schemes so far as 
Tokyo and the greater part of the country were concerned, 
however, Inouefs efforts led to the victory of several 
so-called Self-Government Party (jichi-to) candidates at 
the elections. In some areas where they were particularly 
successful, such as Kyoto fu, these Jichi-to candidates do 
not seem to have had very close links with Inoue, and the 
Kyoto Komin-kai (Citizens Association) which won five seats 
v/as probably a fairly autonomous organization in its own 
right. On the other hand, in his home province of Choshu 
(Yamaguchi prefecture), Inoue, acting in conjunction with 
Ito, had a large personal following. This Inoue-Ito faction 
was opposed by a group owing allegiance to Yamagata Aritomo, 
and also by an Untra-Conservative faction headed by Torio 
Koyata and Viscount Miura.^
36Choya Shimbun 25-5-90
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The Jichi Kenkytt Kai or Jichi-to, therefore, would 
appear to have had three rather different existences at 
three separate levels:- i) national, ii) provincial 
outside Choshu, and iii) inside Choshu. In Tokyo, it 
had been an abortive attempt to re-found a national 
Government party along the lines of the defunct Teisei-to; 
in districts like Kyoto fu or Wakayama prefecture, it 
reappeared at the time of the election as a convenient 
vehicle for moderate Conservative opinion; in Yamaguchi, 
it was a well-established local party comprising the closest 
adherents of Inoue and Ito in the central bureaucracy as 
well as in the prefecture.
Although the Yamaguchi Ultra-Conservatives under Torio 
and Miura had made approaches, apparently without success, 
to the Yamagata party with the idea of forming an electoral 
alliance, they were bitterly opposed to the Inoue-Ito party. 
Thus, in Choshu at any rate, there was no prospect of an 
understanding between the Ultra-Conservatives and the 
moderate Conservatives. This lack of sympathy is important 
because it delineates the frontier between conservativism 
and reaction. Bureaucrats like Inoue and Ito were Conservative 
in the proper sense of the word. That is, they wished to 
conserve the bureaucratic connotations of the system of 
government first set out in the constitution. They favoured
213
non-party Cabinets, formally subject to the Emperor alone, 
and regarded the people or their representatives as 
privileged participants in the rites of Imperial administration. 
Yet, with them, there was no question of revoking the 
constitution once it had been granted, or of seeking to 
undermine in practice the popular rights on which it stood. 
Parliament had come to stay; so, too, had the industrialization 
and Westernization of Japan.
(b) Ultra-Conservativism - Tani KanjöTs Kokumin-ha, and 
Torio Koyata's Hoshu Chüsei Ha.
The political world of Generals Tani and Torio was 
vastly different from this, though they usually took care 
to hide the discrepancies under a mask of more moderate 
conservativism. Their real aim was total reaction. They 
wished to turn back from the whole constitutional and 
parliamentary experiment to the older collective and 
hierarchical order. In short, they wished to negate the 
ideal of Liberty - to stamp out its supposedly noxious 
effects in Japan, and, by extension, to destroy its original 
homelands in Europe and the Americas.
Tani Kanjo was born in Tosa in 1837, the son of a 
samurai of that fief. His formal education began at the age 
of nine, when he started going to relatives and fellow 
clansmen for instruction. A great deal of this childhood
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training seems to have been spent on acquiring proficiency 
in the military arts - fencing, archery, and, later on, 
gunnery. In 1856, he was sent by his clan to complete his 
education in Edo; and it was there that he embarked on an 
exhaustive study of the Chinese classics, concerning which 
he was to become a recognized authority. The next few 
years saw him travelling constantly between Tosa, Edo, and 
Osaka, becoming all the while more and more deeply involved 
in the Imperialist movement. In 1865 > he v/as recalled to 
Kochi and made an assistant instructor at the clan school. 
Before long he was sent to Nagasaki on clan business, and 
from there managed to visit Shanghai. After his return to 
Nagasaki, he fell in with Sakamoto Ryuma and Goto Shojiro, 
two Tosa samurai who were already leaders in the restoration 
plot. In 1867» he visited Osaka to have talks on behalf of 
his clan with Imperialist samurai from Satsuma; and later 
in the same year, Tani accompanied the Daimyo of Tosa, 
Yamanouchi Yodo, when he journeyed to Kyoto to take part 
in the deliberations held after the formal resignation of 
the Shogun. Tani was a successful commander on the Imperialist 
side during the War of the Restoration. He captured the 
castles of Takamatsu and Marugame in Shikoku in January 
1868, and later served with distinction at battles near 
Nikko and Aizu.
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For the next decade, his career lay with the new Army,
By 1870, he was a major-general, and held the post of 
Director-General of the War Department, Shortly after this, 
however, he was moved away from the capital to be Commander- 
in-Chief of the Kumamoto (central Kyushu) Garrison. He 
was on the staff of the punitive expedition sent to Formosa 
in 1874, and succeeded in adding to his laurels on this 
campaign. Two years after this, he returned to his former 
post in Kumamoto; and, in 1877 at the time of the Satsuma 
rebellion, he earned deserved fame by successfully holding 
the castle at Kumamoto for over a month against rebel 
attacks and investment. In 1878, he was promoted to the 
rank of lieutenant-general, and appointed Director-General 
of the Eastern Command, He then became Commandant of the 
Military Academy, but resigned from this post in 1881.
From this time on, he ceased to be a professional 
Army officer, though he kept his rank, and his interests 
took him increasingly into the worlds of letters and politics. 
In 1884, he was made Head of the Peers School, and created 
a Viscount. He was chosen to be a member of the Imperial 
Academy in 1885; and in October of the same year, he entered 
the Ito Cabinet as Minister for Trade and Agriculture.
Within a few months of taking office he left for a tour of 
Europe, and returned to Japan in June I887. His trip abroad
216
did not lessen his nationalist sentiments in any way; and 
in July 1887, he resigned from the Cabinet. He did this 
ostensibly because he objected to certain changes in 
agricultural policies, but really because he v/as profoundly 
dissatisfied with the Government’s attitude towards treaty 
revision and uncompromisingly opposed to Westernization of 
the country. Viscount Tani’s resignation v/as the coup de 
grace for Inoue Kaoru’s schemes for treaty revision; they 
would have necessitated the appointment of foreign judges 
to the Japanese higher Courts. For the next year or two, 
Tani tried to follow up this success by joining Goto’s anti 
Government campaign. His was one of the most powerful 
voices on the Right wing of the Daido Danketsu; and it was 
about this time that he founded the Meiji Club to give 
currency to his views. From the opening of the Imperial 
Diet in November 1890 to the time of his death in 1911,
Tani sat in the House of Peers, where he was as eloquent 
as he was redoubtable in opposing successive Governments, 
no matter whether they had been formed by the Sat-Cho 
bureaucrats or the popular parties.
As an organization, the Kokumin-ha, which Tani formed 
in succession to the Meiji Club, was even more amorphous 
than Inoue’s Jichi Kenkyü Kai, and it received hardly more 
than a bare mention in newspaper accounts of the election.
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True, there was a report in one paper on the day of the 
election to the effect that a growing number of the 
supporters of the rival Conservative general, Torio Koyata, 
were 1 surrendering’ to General Tani; but the report itself 
cast doubts on its own authenticity.-^ Certainly, it would 
seem that the members of the Kokumin-ha had little to 
hold them together, apart from a common allegiance to 
fJapanismf and to Tani himself. So far I have not been 
able to discover a formal party manifesto; and presumably 
the scattered company of National Party candidates was 
left to fend for itself at the election.
However it may be that at a time when the electors were 
overwhelmingly in favour of the Liberal and Progressive 
parties, Tani was not ill advised to abandon tactics of 
publicity and direct appeal for the more cautious approach 
of doing what he could to get his sympathizers, avowed or 
potential, into parliament by the back door. For at the 
same time as he kept the Kokumin-ha at any rate in existence 
for the purposes of the election, he interested himself in 
a number of regional clubs with nationalist leanings and 
possibly backed the candidatures of some Independents too.
Tani was strongest on his own home ground in Kochi 
prefecture, where the Kokumin-ha, calling itself by that name, 
challenged the Liberals in every constituency. Unfortunately 
37TNNS 1-7-90
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for the Nationalists, Kochi was also the birth-place of
the Liberal movement and they were defeated in all these
contests, A foretaste of what was going to happen at the
parliamentary elections had been given to the National
Party by the prefectural elections in March 1890, Then,
its candidates had been routed, more or less, by their
Liberal opponents. So, even in Tosa, Tani’s election
prospects were not very good, and he seems to have wisely
accepted the fact that for him the election had taken on
much of the character of a salvage operation. Tani was a
prolific letter-writer; and a communication, dated 19 May
1890, which he sent to the Tosa Koyo Kai gives some evidence
of the way he went about things.
The Tosa Koyo Kai was a local ultra-nationalist
society with its headquarters in Kochi city; and the subject
of Tani’s letter to it was the collapse of the old Daido
Danketsu and the impending amalgamation of the three Liberal
factions. The Tosa Koyo Kai had apparently formed part
of the Daido Danketsu, and was still linked with the Daido
Club. By 1890, extreme Conservative groups such as it
were clearly embarrassed by their continued association
with the now predominantly Left wing Daido movement.
38Tani, in his letter, put forward two alternative plans for
dealing with this problem, and asked the senior officials
—  -  -
Tani Kanjö Iko, vol.2, pp. 556-559.
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of the Tosa Koyo Kai (the letter’s contents were to be 
withheld from ordinary members) to consider them.
The first plan was that his followers in the Tosa 
Koyo Kai should renounce their allegiance to the Daido Club,
and stand as best they could on their own feet for the time 
being. In the opening sentences of his message, Tani 
recalled how the original Daido Danketsu had been neither 
too reformist nor too obscurantist. The position had 
deteriorated, however, and the existing Daido Club was a 
group of ’demagogues’, whose Liberal principles stemmed 
from ’blatant individualism*. The disadvantage of this 
course of action was that the local Ultra-Conservatives 
would lose what little chance they had of influencing the 
results of the elections. Too weak to fight for themselves, 
their only hope lay in maintaining their co-operation with 
the more powerful radical elements.
Tani was nothing if not realistic about this. He told 
his henchmen in the Koyo Kai that before they finally made 
up their minds whether or not to secede from the Daido Club, 
they would have to give careful consideration to the 
following points:- (i) would the Ultra-Conservative 
organization be able to keep going in isolation, even for a 
few months?, (ii) would they be able to secure the election 
of any candidates at all? (iii) would they be able to
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survive the shock of their overwhelming defeat in the 
recent local elections? If they did decide to secede, 
he said, it would inevitably mean that they would have to 
give up their political activities for the time being and 
return to their professional occupations in agriculture or 
trade, ’swallowing their shame and putting up with their 
misfortunes’ until a more favourable opportunity arose. 
Speaking of himself, he wrote
Of course, I myself cannot participate 
directly in political party movements; but, 
indirectly, I shall help the parties which 
I consider to be good, and shall do my utmost 
for the state. Never for one moment shall I 
forget the principles of ’Japan first!’, for 
which I have made myself a spokesman!
Then he went on to advise them to pay attention to what 
they would read in the Nippon Shimbun.
As an alternative to the above proposal, Tani also 
suggested that the Tosa Koyo Kai members might find it 
easier to hide their disgust with the Daido Club and remain 
part of it - at any rate until after the election. The 
immediate advantage of this plan was that it would enable 
them to have some say in who should be elected; and he 
listed the names of two or three candidates whom he thought 
it worth supporting. What he was really counting on, however,
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was the likelihood of a fresh split in the Liberal ranks 
when they came together in August to give some substance 
to their paper federation. It will be remembered that the 
Koin Club was merely the first step in the long drawn-out 
process of Liberal amalgamation; Tani more than once 
referred to it as being no more than a nominal amalgamation, 
and confidently predicted that the pattern of party 
alliances would undergo a further sweeping change later in 
the summer. When that happened, he argued, societies 
like the Koyö Kai would be in a strong position to act as 
the nucleus of a new, Right wing Daidö Danketsu. As we 
have seen, Tani was by no means alone in holding these 
views about the probability of the Koin Club being overtaken 
by failure. However, in his case, they were obviously 
reinforced by conversations he had recently had with two 
of the leaders of the Daido Club - Inoue Kakugoro, and Oe 
Taku,
Naturally, as Tani pointed out, the same prospect of 
eventual re-affiliation with the more congenial Liberals 
still held good, even if the Tosa Koyö Kai chose to adopt 
his first proposal and broke with the Daido Club, Either 
way, it was merely a matter of beating a strategic retreat; 
and so the letter really boiled down to a short discussion of 
two alternative methods of doing just this. It is an
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interesting document not only because it showed how Tani 
played the political game, but also because of the clear 
indications it contained of the grave electoral weaknesses 
of Conservatives of Tani’s stamp and the extremely fluid 
nature of inter-party divisions. In short, the Ultra- 
Conservatives were forced by their general unpopularity to 
be opportunistic; and their opportunism had some chance of 
reward by reason of the fact that certain Liberals were 
only too ready to treat with them.
As might be expected, there were many similarities 
between Tani Kanjo and his Kokumin-ha on the one hand, and 
Torio Koyata and his Hoshu Chusei Ha on the other; but there 
were also some differences between them. Like Tani, Torio 
was a soldier turned politician. B o m  in 1846, he was the 
eldest son of a Choshu samurai. As a child, he had been 
noted for his intelligence and all round ability; and in 
his early manhood, he joined the kiheitai. Kiheitai 
(literally 1 shock troops1) was the name given to a force of 
samurai and plebeian volunteers, which was raised in Choshu 
from 1860 onwards to fight the Shogunate. These bellicose 
activities earned Torio the hostility of the greater part of 
acquaintance, and, in the end, the extreme displeasure of 
his parents who formally disowned him. Undaunted, he continued
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to make himself known as an ardent supporter of the 
Imperialist cause, surviving all the perils that attended 
a life of political agitation in those troubled days to 
take part in the battle of Fushimi at the head of a little 
band of twenty irregulars. These irregulars were his 
personal followers, and were known as ^orio's Twenty1. 
Fushimi is a place half way between Kyoto and Osaka; and 
it was there, in an engagement that lasted for two days, 
the Imperialist forces routed the Shogun1s army in January 
1868. This victory, in effect, settled the issue of the 
War of the Restoration.
After the fighting was finished, Torio was in Kii 
province for a while, helping with the reform of the fief 
government. In I87O, he was given a post in the War 
Department; and during the next few years, he held a number 
of senior positions in that Department. In 1875, he was 
appointed to the Da^okan. In the following year, he acted 
as Minister for the Army for a few months before becoming 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff. When the Satsuma 
rebellion broke out in I877, he was responsible for sending 
reinforcements to the Imperial Army. He did this task so 
well that, after the rebellion had been crushed, he was 
given a higher Court rank and a special award of six hundred 
yen. His next post was that of Court liaison officer to the
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I m p e r i a l  G e n e r a l  S t a f f .  He h e l d  i t  f o r  o n ly  a few months 
u n t i l  O c to b e r  1 8 7 9 , when he was a p p o i n t e d  Commander o f  
t h e  I m p e r i a l  G u a rd s .  At t h i s  p o i n t ,  t h e r e  came a b r e a k  
i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  c a r e e r ,  a p p a r e n t l y  b e ca u se  o f  h i s  i l l  
h e a l t h .  By F e b r u a r y  1 8 8 1 , he had r e s i g n e d  from t h e  I m p e r i a l  
Guards  and a l s o  from t h e  D a jo k an ,  and  had  gone t o  l i v e  i n  
Osaka where he was s t u d y i n g  Zen Buddhism. A V i s c o u n t c y  was 
c o n f e r r e d  on him i n  J u l y  1 8 8 4 , i n  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  h i s  
s e r v i c e s  t o  t h e  s t a t e .
I n  1 8 8 5 , he r e - e n t e r e d  p u b l i c  l i f e  a s  a member o f  t h e  
N a t i o n a l  D efence  C o u n c i l .  From F e b r u a r y  1 8 8 6 , he was away 
from J a p a n  f o r  a p e r i o d  o f  t h i r t e e n  months most  o f  which  
was sp e n t  i n  E u r o p e .  While  he was a b r o a d ,  he was a p p o i n t e d  
t o  t h e  S e n a t e .  From t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  u n d i s t i n g u i s h e d  r an k  
o f  S e n a t o r  he was r a i s e d  i n  June  1888 t o  t h e  d i g n i t y  o f  
P r i v y  C o u n c i l l o r ;  and so he v/as one o f  t h e  p e r s o n s  who were 
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  th e  r a t i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  I n  
May 1 8 9 0 , j u s t  b e f o r e  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  he r e s i g n e d  from t h e  
P r i v y  C o u n c i l ;  and l a t e r  i n  t h e  same y e a r ,  he was s u c c e s s f u l  
i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  members o f  h i s  o r d e r  t o  
t h e  House o f  P e e r s .  I n  1895 > T o r io  to o k  t h e  r e v e r s e  s t e p  
t o  t h e  one he had  t a k e n  f i v e  y e a r s  p r e v i o u s l y ,  and r e s i g n e d  
from t h e  House o f  P e e r s  t o  become a P r i v y  C o u n c i l l o r  f o r  
t h e  second  t i m e .  He c o n t i n u e d  t o  s e r v e  on t h e  P r i v y  C o u n c i l  
u n t i l  h i s  d e a t h  i n  1905.
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As a publicist, Torio was perhaps not so eloquent 
as Tani; but he wrote well, and was, if anything, even 
better educated than his fellow general, as he had not 
only as deep a knowledge of the Chinese classics but also 
a virtually complete mastery of the Buddhist canon as well.
He wrote several essays on political theory, which were a 
success in their day and are of no little interest to a 
student of Meiji constitutional developments. In these 
writings, he sought to preserve unsullied the principles of 
respect for the Emperor and punishment for the barbarian that 
had inspired his youth.
Though Torio was more successful as an essayist and 
a publisher of political reviews than as a leader of a 
political party, his Hoshu Chusei Ha was, at any rate on 
paper, the best organized and most articulate of all the 
Conservative groups, moderate or otherwise. It was first 
launched in November 1888, when Torio circulated the 
prospectus of the new party among his friends. He was 
reprimanded by the then Minister for War, Marshal Oyama, 
for taking part in politics while still retaining his 
commission in the Army. (This perhaps was one of the reasons 
why Tani Kanjo felt that he could not intervene openly 
in politics.) The immediate upshot of this reprimand was 
that Torio had to issue a statement severing his connection
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with the new party; and his closest aide, Fujita Ichiro, 
did what he could to recover the circulars that had been 
sent out. Then, Torio resigned from the Army; and on 20 
January 1889, he published the same manifesto in a 
magazine, the New Conservative Review, that he had started 
to bring out as a journal for his new party.
This manifesto was by far the briefest of all the party 
platforms prepared especially for the election of 1890.
What is more to the point is the fact that it was notably 
defensive in tone. In a few words Torio cleverly managed 
to steal some of the opposition’s clothes, and yet at the 
same time made clear the fundamental conservativism of his 
own position. The Moderate Conservative Party’s manifesto 
was: -
Conservativism has as its aim the preservation 
of the existing state of affairs, and the acceptance 
and use of its consequences. Now, in order to 
elucidate this principle, I shall point to its 
opposite. The opposite views are those of reformism 
and radicalism. The advocates of reformism and 
radicalism abandon the fruits H of the past_7, and 
wish to make the reconstruction of the State the 
the basis of their thinking. This idea of
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reconstructing the State does not recognize any 
limitations, (if it did, it would not be reformist, 
it would be conservative.) Therefore they will 
always be reconstructing the State and making 
experiments. If there is no Conservative party 
to check this, it will be very dangerous for the 
future. The differences between the two views lie 
in their principles and objectives. In practice, 
though, there is also a reforming element in the 
Conservative parties; and no doubt there is a 
conservative element in the reformist parties. 
/~Nevertheless_7 since /"the differences between 
them_7 stem from their principles and objectives, 
their intentions naturally cannot be the same.
In the following, I inform my political friends 
of the intentions of conservativism.
General Prospectus of the Moderate Conservative Party.
1. Our Party will stand erect among the parties that 
are established in our Empire of Japan - loyal 
and upright, steadfast and indomitable.
2. Our Party will respect the constitution granted 
by our Emperor of His own free will, will uphold 
the dignity of the Imperial Sovereignty, and 
v/ill honour the rights of the people.
3• Our Party will never hesitate nor show any scruple
in perfecting moral relationships and advocating 
righteousness.
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4. Our Party, recognizing the fixed rights of 
the Upper and Lower Houses, /~holds that_7 
the division of power between the legislature 
and the executive must be made to comply with 
the constitution in every respect,
5. Our Party will base the national administration 
on frugality and simplicity. It will reduce 
government expenditure, foster the strength
of the people, and shall be eternally resolved 
on a policy of sound administration,
39November 1888. Torio Koyata.'
r
On the fact of it, this declaration, with its promises 
to respect the constitution and honour popular rights, was 
conservative rather than reactionary; and the last article, 
in particular, echoed the propaganda of the Liberal and 
Progressive parties. Moreover, the very choice of the name 
’Moderate Conservative Party’ would tend to give the same 
impression. However, in the circumstances prevailing in 
the years 1888 to I89O, we are, I think, at liberty to 
regard the overtones of caution and moderation as a smiling 
face put on by Torio for the purpose of doing what he could 
to influence an electorate which he knew was antipathetic 
to his ideas. In any study of the 1890 election, it must 
always be remembered that the popular parties, numerous 
though their mistakes and defects were, never lost the 
initiative. Therefore Torio chose to make it sound as if
Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seito Shi, vol. 1, pp.262-263*
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his new party was conservative but constitutional. Certainly, 
when one compares the Hoshu Chusei Ha prospectus with other 
works by Torio, one is forced to conclude that the former 
was no more than a very attenuated expression of his real 
opinions.
Torio deceived no one at the time with his unaccustomed 
air of moderation. On 28 May 1890, the Tokyo Nichi Nichi 
carried a report about an interview between one of its 
correspondents and a member of the Kumamoto Progressive 
Party; the subject discussed was whether groups like the 
Hoshu Chusei Ha could be included in the Kyushu Confederation 
of Progressive Parties. Their conversation went as 
follows:-
TNNS Correspondent:- ’With regard to the New 
Conservative Party led by General Tani (sic), 
the General himself declared, when he introduced 
his party to the public, that he favoured a 
progressive outlook in politics; but what is your attitude to that party?
K.P.P. Member:^  ’Quite right! He did say he
favoured progressive principles; but, here in 
Kumamoto, we regard him on a par with the Shimyo 
faction.’
TNNS Correspondent:- ’In that case, policies such 
as Moderate Conservativism are altogether outside your objectives of course?*
K.P.P. Member:- ’Of course!’
The correspondent then ended his report by noting that it 
would be quite impossible for Torio’s organization to become
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part of the Kyushu Confederation of Progressives. A 
few days later, the Osaka Mainichi, itself no particular 
friend of the popular parties, stated that the Hoshu 
Chüsei Ha had held a business and social meeting in a hotel 
in the eastern part of the city where Torio was staying.
The proceedings of this meeting were a strictly guarded 
secret, but it was known that the principal item on the 
agenda had been the election campaign. Not even the names 
and occupations of those who attended it were divulged to 
the press; but again, the Osaka Mainichi did state that 
more than half of them were Buddhist priests.^
Thus Torio*s attempts to curry favour with the electors 
and the popular parties were a complete failure. Consequently, 
like Tani, he was driven back to a position of having to 
campaign by stealth in those few places where he campaigned 
at all. Despite his best efforts, the Moderation* of the 
Moderate Conservative Party had not convinced anybody. To 
return to the actual manifesto of the Hoshu Chüsei Ha for 
a moment, this document itself did contain one slight clue 
that everything was not what it seemed to be. This clue 
was the substance and wording of article three taken as 
a whole. Determination to perfect moral relationships and
Osaka Mainichi 2-6-90.
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a concern for righteousness were one of the hallmarks of 
the type of conservativism with which we are dealing.
People like Tani and Torio do not seem to have objected 
so much to the political forms of Liberalism, such as the 
constitution and the Imperial Diet, though these in their 
eyes were bad enough, as to its moral spirit. This latter, 
they felt, would if it went unchecked give rise to an 
unhealthy sense of individualism among the Japanese, and 
make each of them think only of himself. The consequence 
of this would be that the religious ties that bound a man 
to his family, to his master, and to his Sovereign would 
snap, and human society would fall into a state of bestial 
anarchy. In 1890, the nation1s moral culture was still 
pre-eminently Confucian, and it had but recently emerged 
from conditions of feudalism under which hereditary status 
and personal service had been immeasurably more important, 
in terns of prestige at least, than abstract freedoms and 
private wealth. Therefore the general relevance of this 
line of reasoning is obvious, Torio v/as shrewd in insisting 
too, as he did, that it would be impossible for everyone 
in a poor and populous country like Japan to secure an 
adequate gratification of their material desires.
It is in ideas of this kind that we hit on the true 
strength of the Ultra-Conservative reaction to the Meiji
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innovations; and the hints of radicalism in the objection 
to the economic inequalities that unfettered Liberalism 
would bring should not be missed. Thus, we are faced with 
a paradox - the Ultra-Conservatives, though completely 
reactionary in their political outlook, were by no means 
incapable of appearing to be the poor man’s friend when it 
came to economic or social questions. This paradox was of 
course balanced by the other one we have already noted - the 
Liberal groups, and to a slightly less extent the Kaishin-to 
too, as organizations of the rich, were politically 
progressive but socially conservative. It is important to 
appreciate these points, in order to gain any real insight 
into the over-all development of Japanese parliamentary 
institutions. Because of this, and because the poor 
electoral performance of the factions led by Tani and Torio 
tends to overshadow their underlying historical significance, 
and because it was a remarkably able exposition of the 
Ultra-Conservative point of view; it is worthwhile having 
a look at Torio Koyata’s essay on Kingship. This essay 
was originally published in 1880, and a translation of it
41appeared in the Japan Daily Mail for 19 and 20 November 1890.
Ta
See also Lafcadio Hearn, Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan,vol.II, pp. 676-68I.
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Order and disorder in a nation ... is determined 
by the disposition of the people. The pivot on 
which the public disposition turns towards order 
or disorder is the point where public and private 
motives separate ... To regard our family affairs 
with all the interest due to our family, and our 
national affairs with all the interest due to our 
nation, - this is to fitly discharge our duty, and 
to be guided by public considerations. On the 
other hand, to regard the affairs of the nation as 
if they were our own family affairs, - this is to 
be influenced by private motives and to stray from 
the path of duty •••••••
Selfishness is born in every man; to indulge it 
freely is to become a beast. Therefore it is that 
sages preach the principles of duty and propriety, 
justice and morality, providing restraints for 
private aims and encouragements for public spirit ••••
In the Orient, from ancient times, national 
government has been based on benevolence, and directed 
to securing the welfare and happiness of the people ... 
The inhabitants of this empire live, for the most 
part, by manual labour. Let them be never so 
industrious, they can hardly earn enough to supply
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their daily wants.....They achieve as much as 
their opportunities permit.....Yet there is nothing 
in human society that does not owe its existence 
to labour. Now, to satisfy the desires of one 
luxurious man, the toil of a thousand is needed. 
Surely it is monstrous that those who owe to 
labour the pleasures suggested by their civilization 
should forget what they owe to the labourer, and 
treat him as if he were not a fellow-being. But 
civilization, according to the interpretation of 
the Occident, serves only to satisfy men of large 
desires. It is of no benefit to the masses, but is 
simply a system under which ambitions compete to
accomplish their aims...... It is plain that if the
mutual rights of men and their status are made to 
depend on degrees of wealth, the majority of the 
people being v/ithout wealth, must fail to establish 
their rights; whereas the minority who are wealthy 
will assert their rights, and, under society's 
sanction, will exact oppressive duties from the 
poor, neglecting the dictates of humanity and 
benevolence. The adoption of these principles of 
liberty and equality in Japan would vitiate the 
good and peaceful customs of our country, render
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the general disposition of the people harsh and 
unfeeling, and finally prove a source of calamity 
to the masses....
Though at first sight Occidental civilization 
presents an attractive appearance, adapted as it 
is to the gratification of selfish desires, yet 
since its basis is the hypothesis that men's wishes 
constitute natural lav/s, it must ultimately end in 
disappointment and demoralization.••••.Occidental 
nations have become what they are after passing 
through conflicts and vicissitudes of the most
serious kind..... Just now their motive elements
are in partial equilibrium, and their social 
condition is more or less ordered. But if this 
slight equilibrium happens to be disturbed, they 
will be throv/n once more into confusion and change, 
until, after a period of renewed struggle and 
suffering, temporary stability is once more attained.... 
Perpetual disturbance is their doom. Peaceful 
equality can never be attained until built up among 
the ruins of annihilated Western states and the 
ashes of extinct Western peoples.
This, then, was the voice of genuine reaction - to 
nineteenth century industrialism as it affected the East.
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I n  I89O, i t  was l i t t l e  more t h a n  a v o i c e  c r y in g  in-the 
w i l d e r n e s s ;  b u t  f i f t y  y e a r s  l a t e r ,  i t  o r  som eth ing  v e r y  
l i k e  i t  had  grown i n t o  t h e  b a t t l e  c r y  o f  a n a t i o n  r e a d y  t o  
f i g h t  t h e  w o r l d  i f  need  b e .  C l e a r l y ,  T o r i o ’ s argument  
was n o t  w i t h o u t  i t s  f a l l a c i e s  o f  one s o r t  o r  a n o t h e r .  The 
p h y s i c a l  o b l i t e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  O c c i d e n t ,  a t h i n g  he y e a r n e d  
f o r ,  was n o t  f e a s i b l e  u n l e s s  J a p a n  f i r s t  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
h e r s e l f  a lo n g  W e s te r n ,  c a p i t a l i s t  l i n e s  -  t h a t  i s  t o  s a y ,  
t o o k  t h e  c o u r s e  t h a t  T o r io  d r e a d e d  m o s t .  The p r i n c i p l e s  
o f  L i b e r a l  dem ocracy ,  i f  c a r r i e d  t o  t h e i r  l o g i c a l  c o n c l u s i o n s  
and e v e r y  i n d i c a t i o n  on t h e  L i b e r a l  s i d e  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  
s t r u g g l e  was t h a t  t h e y  would b e ,  v/ould g i v e  e v e r y  s u b j e c t  
e q u a l  v o t i n g  r i g h t s ,  and t h e r e b y  d e s t r o y  th e  a d v a n ta g e  
o f  t h e  m i n o r i t y  o v e r  t h e  m a j o r i t y  so  f a r  a s  t h e o r e t i c a l  
p o l i t i c a l  power was c o n c e rn e d .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  a u t h o r  
r e f u s e d  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  l o n g  s i n c e  a p p a r e n t  t o  
o t h e r s  o f  h i s  coun trym en ,  t h a t  a d v a n c e s  i n  t e c h n o l o g y  
a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  r e v o l u t i o n  would  e v e n t u a l l y  
p ro v e  c a p a b le  o f  c r e a t i n g  enough w e a l t h  f o r  e v e ry b o d y ,  and 
so p r o v i d e  a s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  p rob lem s  o f  s o c i a l  i n j u s t i c e .  
F i n a l l y ,  by i g n o r i n g  t h e  whole q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  r u l e  o f  law 
b e f o r e  v/hi c h  a l l  men a r e  e q u a l ,  T o r io  was a b l e  t o  p r e t e n d  
t h a t  L i b e r a l i s m ’ s g r e a t e s t  s a f e g u a r d  a g a i n s t  i t s e l f  d i d  
n o t  e x i s t .  These  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  and  o m i s s i o n s  made h i s  
a t t a c k  seem a good d e a l  more p l a u s i b l e  t h a n  i t  r e a l l y  was.
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Nevertheless, even after we have taken into full
account these and other shortcomings in Torio’s essay,
it is not hard to see that there was more than a particle
of right in what he said. In Japan, as in other countries,
parliament was first set up on the basis of an extremely
restricted and plutocratic franchise. (Much earlier than
this Torio had called the Risshi-sha proposals for a
42national assembly ’upper-class democracy.1) Moreover, 
the fact that unlimited political freedom will give rise 
to intolerable economic privations is the classic dilemma 
of undiluted Liberalism. The Fabians and others were 
confronting this kind of problem in Europe during the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, a period which in many 
ways was the Indian summer of laissez-faire; and only a 
few decades had elapsed since Marx had written Das Kapital 
in part as a protest against the animal conditions of 
economic life in mid-Victorian England. It should be 
remembered, too, that these difficulties became even more 
difficult when transplanted to the Japanese environment.
In Western Europe, politics, economic conditions, and 
general morality all sprang from the same individualistic 
root, and so could be sorted out without endangering the
Ike, Beginnings, p.59
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whole structure of post-Renaissance civilization. In Japan, 
on the other hand, the new, imported political and economic 
apparatus stood at first in raw, and seemingly irreconcilable 
opposition to the native non-material and collectivist 
ethic; and the danger there was that a large-scale collision 
between the two would destroy the unique culture of the 
archipelago.
It follows then that Torio’s stand, mistaken in many 
respects though it was, was by no means unintelligible.
He raised issues that were not only of special significance 
to Japan at that time, but were also, mutatis mutandis, 
worrying some of the best minds in contemporary Europe. 
Furthermore, these same issues, again mutatis mutandis, are 
still relevant when discussing the moral basis of present- 
day affluent societies in the United States and elsewhere. 
Sooner or later, the rulers of Japan would have to come to 
terms with some of his criticisms.
To finish by looking at the matter from a totally 
different point of view for a moment, however, the controlled 
fury of Torio’s reaction does indicate the great influence 
which Liberalism had come to have on Japanese political 
thinking by the end of the first half of the Meiji era.
Tani and Torio stood virtually alone in the small circle of 
governing bureaucrats, as well as in the wider world of
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the Meiji intelligentsia. It is not surprising therefore 
that the electors in 1890 should have been so unresponsive 
to them. The Kokumin-ha and the Hoshu Chusei Ha, needless 
to say, were not helped by the fact that the voters all 
belonged to the classes which had most to gain from a 
parliamentary system. Among the newspapers, the Ultra- 
Conservative Nippon Shimbun did what it could to rally 
support to the generals; but it had little that v/as original 
or constructive to say in the weeks immediately preceding 
the election, though it was full of careful analyses and 
devious comment after the results were known.
To sum up the general position with regard to the 
Conservative parties, then:- Those Conservatives who were 
not also reactionary scarcely existed as a recognizable 
party at all. Those who were reactionary came to the polls 
not altogether without a case to argue and leaders to 
argue it, but divided, demoralized, and for the time being 
all but impotent.
(vi) Independents.
Of the numerous Independent candidates there is not 
much more that can be usefully said at this stage. By 
definition they were non-party; and so it is not easy to pin
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them down as  s u b s c r i b e r s  t o  any p a r t i c u l a r  s e t  o f  v i e w s .
I n  g e n e r a l ,  how ever ,  t h o s e  who s u c c e e d e d  i n  g e t t i n g  th e m s e lv e s  
e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  D i e t  t e n d e d  t o  s i d e  w i t h  th e  Government and 
a g a i n s t  t h e  p o p u l a r  p a r t i e s .  T h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  p r o b a b l y  
c o r r e c t  t o  t h i n k  o f  In d e p e n d e n t  c a n d i d a t e s  who t o o k  t h e i r  
p o l i t i c s  s e r i o u s l y  a s  b e in g  on t h e  whole  a  s a f e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
g ro u p  o f  t h e  s o r t  f a v o u r e d  by In o u e  o r  I t o ,  t h o u g h  no doubt  
a few o f  them were w i l l i n g  to  go t o  t h e  e x t re m e s  s u g g e s t e d  
by T a n i  and  T o r i o .  Among them, and p e r h a p s  t y p i c a l  o f  
them , were t h e  f o r t y  o r  so s e r v i n g  o r  r e c e n t l y  r e t i r e d  
o f f i c i a l s ,  i n c l u d i n g  one m i n i s t e r  o f  s t a t e  i n  t h e  Yamagata 
C a b i n e t ,  who o b t a i n e d  s e a t s  i n  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  
a f t e r  ru n n in g  t h e  g a u n t l e t  o f  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  h o s t i l i t y  
to w a rd s  anyone c o n n e c te d  w i t h  t h e  Government .
I n c i d e n t a l l y ,  Suematsu Kencho’ s rem arks  on t h i s  a s p e c t  
o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  were bo rn e  ou t  by t h e  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  
r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  t i m e ,  wrh i c h  s t a t e d  t h a t  any o f f i c i a l  who 
r a n  f o r  a s e a t  and l o s t  would  be c o m p e l l e d  t o  r e s i g n  h i s  
p o s t*  The o b j e c t  o f  t h i s  was t o  s p a r e ,  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  t h e  
b u r e a u c r a c y  from t h e  ignominy o f  even  a s i n g l e  d e f e a t  a t  
t h e  hands  o f  t h e  1 p e o p l e f . ^  At t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  need  
f o r  such  a d r a s t i c  p r o v i s i o n  shows how c o n s c i o u s  t h e  
Government was o f  i t s  own weak s t a n d i n g  w i t h  t h e  e l e c t o r s .
Ü3
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S u e m atsu ,  h i m s e l f ,  and  t h e  more r a d i c a l  Okamoto Takeo 
m e n t io n e d  a b o v e ,  a r e  p r o b a b l y  f a i r l y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  
t h e  b e t t e r  t y p e  o f  In d e p e n d e n t  c a n d i d a t e s ,
Hov/ever, t h e  sad  f a c t  r em a in s  t h a t  men o f  t h i s  s o r t  
were c o m p a r a t i v e l y  few and f a r  b e tw e e n ,  when one t a k e s  a 
l o o k  a t  t h e  b lo c  o f  I n d e p e n d e n t  c a n d i d a t e s  a s  a w h o le .
The g r e a t  m a j o r i t y  o f  them were ’ s e l f - n o m i n a t e d  I n d e p e n d e n t s ’ 
mere n o b o d ie s  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  whose q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
f o r  g i v i n g  u s e f u l  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
were a t  b e s t  o n ly  s l i g h t l y  l e s s  meagre t h a n  t h e i r  c h a n c e s  
o f  e l e c t i o n .  C o n s i d e r in g  what was i n v o l v e d ,  t h e i r  numbers 
came n e a r  t o  assum ing  p la g u e  p r o p o r t i o n s ,  and t h e y  were 
s p r e a d  more o r  l e s s  e v e n ly  o v e r  t h e  c o u n t r y .  The r e s u l t s  
f o r  Tokyo f u ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  show t h a t  i n  t h e  Second 
C o n s t i t u e n c y ,  one c a n d i d a t e  p o l l e d  two v o t e s ,  and t h r e e  
o t h e r s  one v o t e  e a c h ;  i n  t h e  S ev e n th  C o n s t i t u e n c y ,  i t  was 
t h e  same; i n  t h e  E l e v e n t h  C o n s t i t u e n c y ,  s e v en  c a n d i d a t e s  
s e c u r e d  o n ly  one v o t e  a p i e c e ;  and so on. I n  Okayama 
p r e f e c t u r e ,  a c e r t a i n  c a n d i d a t e  was dubbed t h e  ’g e n e a lo g y  
c a n d i d a t e ’ . The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  was t h a t  when t h e  f u t i l i t y  
o f  com pe t ing  a g a i n s t  a p o p u l a r  f a v o u r i t e  was p o i n t e d  ou t  
t o  h im,  he r e p l i e d : -
I  have no e x p e c t a t i o n  a t  a l l  o f  b e in g  e l e c t e d .  
Were I  t o  r e c e i v e  o n ly  one v o t e  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
o f  Members t o  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  I  
s h o u l d  v/ant t h i s  f o r  my f a m i l y  t r e e .  44-
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As t h i s  was t h e  c a s e ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  now a r i s e s  -  why 
did. so many p e r s o n s  embark on what  t h e y  must have  known 
from t h e  f i r s t  was an a lm o s t  h o p e l e s s  q u e s t  f o r  a s e a t  i n  
t h e  D i e t ?  Not o n ly  a h o p e l e s s  o n e ,  b u t  a l s o  one t h a t  c o u l d  
be v e r y  c o s t l y  -  p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  t h o s e  c a n d i d a t e s  whose 
a t t r i b u t e s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e i r  f a t  p u r s e s  d i d  n o t  amount t o  
much. (T h e re  were  a number o f  s t o r i e s  o f  w e a l t h y  c a n d i d a t e s  
h a v in g  b e g g a r e d  th e m s e lv e s  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  t h e i r  enormous 
cam paign  E x p e n s e s ’ . )
The answ er  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  d o u b t l e s s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  
t h e  a n e c d o te  a b o u t  t h e  ’g e n e a lo g y  c a n d i d a t e ' .  I t  i s  c l e a r  
t h a t  J a p a n ’ s f i r s t  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  e l e c t i o n  a r o u s e d  a v e r y  
g r e a t  d e g re e  o f  p o p u l a r  i n t e r e s t ;  and t h a t  t h i s  i n t e r e s t  
was n o t  i n  any way r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  a l o n e ,  
b u t  e x t e n d e d  t o  t h e  p u b l i c  a t  l a r g e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  
e n t h u s i a s t i c  mood o f  t h e  d a y ,  ä l a r g e  number o f  p e o p le  were  
w i l l i n g  t o  r i s k  b o th  f o r t u n e  and r e p u t a t i o n  t o  a c h ie v e  
what t h e y  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be t h e  h o n o u r  o f  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e i r  
home d i s t r i c t  i n  t h e  new l e g i s l a t u r e .  Suematsu Kencho 
s a i d  a s  much when he spoke o f  'men o f  p r o p e r t y  and l o c a l  
r e p u t e  who d i d  n o t  n o r m a l ly  g iv e  a damn f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
d i s c u s s i o n ’ e n t e r i n g  i n t o  t h e  f r a y ,  and ' f i g h t i n g  f o r  a l l  
t h e y  were w o r th .  ’ C e r t a i n l y ,  t h e r e  was enough i n  t h e  
n ew spapers  o f  t h e  t im e  t o  v i n d i c a t e  h i s  ju d g em en t .
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( v i i )  Summary. #
Though t h e  B u d d h i s t s  were c a p a b l e  o f  a l i m i t e d  
a g i t a t i o n  on t h e i r  own b e h a l f ,  and C h r i s t i a n i t y  was 
d e c i d e d l y  u n p o p u l a r  everywhere  o u t s i d e  N a g asak i  p r e f e c t u r e ,  
r e l i g i o n  p l a y e d  no d i r e c t  p a r t  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  1 8 9 0 . ^
T h i s  means t h a t  a l l  t h e  g r e a t  n a t i o n a l  i s s u e s  t h a t  o c c u p ie d  
t h e  minds o f  c a n d i d a t e s  and v o t e r s  a l i k e  a t  t h a t  t im e  have 
b e en  d e a l t  w i t h .  (Of c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  were  p u r e l y  l o c a l  
i s s u e s ;  b u t  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  I  have t r i e d  t o  s t e e r  c l e a r  
o f  t h e m . )
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  t h e n : -  t h e  e l e c t i o n  was c o n t e s t e d  by 
a number o f  d i s t i n c t  g r o u p s  o f  p o l i t i c i a n s  and men o f  
a f f a i r s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  L i b e r a l - P r o g r e s s i v e  P a r t i e s  on t h e  
L e f t  w ing ,  t h e  more r e s p e c t a b l e  I n d e p e n d e n t s  and  
b u r e a u c r a t i c  c a n d i d a t e s  t o  t h e  m o d e ra te  c o n s e r v a t i v e  R ig h t*  
and beyond t h e s e  a g a i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e  and 
r e a c t i o n a r y  f a c t i o n s ,  t h e  members o f  w hich  were r e d u c e d  
by t h e  c o u r s e  o f  e v e n t s  t o  t h e  r o l e  o f  l i t t l e  more t h a n  
scheming o b s e r v e r s .  Over  t h e  whole  f i e l d ,  l i k e  a c l o u d  o f  
g n a t s ,  hung t h e  s e l f —n o m in a te d  I n d e p e n d e n t s  -  t h e  m a j o r i t y  
o f  whom were d e s t i n e d  t o  be t h e  ephemera  o f  t h e  h o u r .
Pu t  i n  d ia g ra m m a t ic  form,  t h e  l i n e  o f  b a t t l e  l o o k e d  so m e th in g  
l i k e  t h i s : -
w-------------------
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Talking of the main issues raised at the election, 
Suematsu Kencho made a general criticism of the party 
manifestos and the performances of the anti-Government 
candidates in these words:-
Although all sorts of ’Party Principles’ or 
’General Principles’ were adopted by each party, 
their wording was for the most part vague and 
they did not really touch public opinion.
Especially in the case of the ’General Principles’, 
they never did anything more than unthinkingly 
take over each other’s opinions, putting them in 
valueless words to the effect that they would 
foster the national interest and promote the 
happiness of the people; because all the parties 
strove to find a basis for their arguments which 
would not allow other people to criticize them....
The cry for curtailment of administrative expenses 
and a reduction of the land-tax was heard virtually 
everywhere.••.1 did not hear of anyone who produced 
a satisfactory plan for realizing _/~"these objectives_7. 
Of course, plenty of proposals for equal treaties 
emerged; but these, too, were vaguely worded. 47
There is some truth in this condemnation. Nevertheless 
it is by no manner of means the whole truth. We have seen 
that the Liberal and Progressive opponents of the Government 
did make what was on the whole a full and intelligent use of 
their unprecedented opportunity to challenge its policies, 
and try and influence the future course of events. Of all 
the questions they raised, perhaps the problem of whether the 
Cabinet could or should remain ’transcendental’ was the most
tjt 3
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crucial. Second only to this as an electoral issue of 
prime importance ranked the problem generated by the 
election campaign itself - the problem of the fairness 
or otherwise of electioneering tactics.
(viii) 1890 - Before and After.
What follows is in the nature of a postscript, and 
a rather speculative one at that. Its purpose is to try 
and assess the broad historical relationship of the 
principal groups as they were at the time of the election 
of 1890 to past and subsequent events. In other words, to 
try and look outside the electoral arena for a moment, and 
relate what was happening there to the pattern of Japanese 
constitutional and parliamentary development as a whole.
The most striking thing about the situation in 1890 
is the absence of any party that was both politically and 
socially Left wing. There was no Socialist party. As we 
have seen, whatever leanings towards radicalism of a 
social kind there were, belonged to the Ultra—Conservative 
and absolutist factions. On the other hand, the Liberals, 
though, in political terms, they lived up to their title 
and were the most ardent advocates of a fully parliamentary 
form of government, were, in social terms, the party that 
did most to reflect the interests of the conservative rural 
landlord and village manufacturer class. Three main reasons
2 46
can, I think, be adduced for this rather extraordinary 
state of affairs, (i) The small number of voters in 1890; 
obviously, an electorate limited to the richest 1% of the 
adult male population would not have had any immediate 
interest in social reform, (ii) The fact that both the 
Liberty Party and the Ultra-Conservatives had their 
antecedents in the revolt against the Shogunate in the 
closing years of the Tokugawa era, (iii) The great influence 
of the shizoku in forming Meiji Japan, The first of these 
underlying causes may be accepted as it stands, and there 
is no need to say anything more about it here. The other 
two, however, will bear further examination.
Looking back to the decades just before the restoration 
of 1868, we find that a number of fiefs were controlled by 
factions which have come to be known collectively as Han 
Reform Parties. In each case, these Reform Parties were 
formed as a result of a natural alliance of interest between 
the lower samurai and the village capitalists who were often 
manufacturers or traders in their own right. The lower 
samurai felt themselves politically frustrated (to say nothing 
of their economic hardships) by a system that had for 
generation after generation given a monopoly of power to 
frequently corrupt and inefficient councils of senior samurai 
at the clan level, and to an exclusive and now nationally 
dangerous Shogunate at the centre.
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The v i l l a g e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  were e c o n o m ic a l l y  f r u s t r a t e d  
by c l a n  governm ent  and Bakufu p o l i c i e s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r  
l o c a l  i n d u s t r y  and e s t a b l i s h e d  m o n o p o l ie s  i n  t r a d e .  These  
m o n o p o l ie s  were o f t e n  i n  t h e  hands o f  t h e  g r e a t  b u s i n e s s  
h o u s e s  o f  Osaka and Edo; b u t  t h e y  a l s o  o p e r a t e d  i n  t h e  
’ c a s t l e - t o w n s ’ ( J o k a -m a c h i )  o f  t h e  daimyo. I t  has  b een  
p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t o o ,  t h a t  t h e r e  was a b a s i c  c o n f l i c t  o f  
economic i n t e r e s t  be tw een  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  b o t h  n a t i o n a l  
and  l o c a l ,  and t h e  v i l l a g e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  o v e r  t h e  u se  t o
K O
which t h e  l a b o u r  o f  t h e  p e a s a n t r y  c o u ld  be p u t « '  The 
Shoguna te  and  t h e  f e u d a l  d a im y a te s  were b u i l t  on a 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y  s im p le  r i c e - g r o w i n g  economy. T h e i r  m ain  
need  from t h e  p e a s a n t s  was income i n  t h e  form o f  fo o d .  The 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  han d ,  were by t h e i r  o c c u p a t i o n s  
co m m it ted  i n  p r i n c i p l e  t o  a f u r t h e r  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  o f  
i n d u s t r y ,  and  t h e  s e t t i n g  up o f  ’ f a c t o r i e s ’ i n  t h e i r  v i l l a g e s .  
T h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  r e q u i r e m e n t  from t h e  p e a s a n t s  was t h e  work 
o f  t h e i r  hands  i n  t h e s e  f a c t o r i e s .
The p r e c i s e  a ims o f  t h e s e  s a m u r a i - e n t r e p r e n e u r  
c o a l i t i o n s  d i f f e r e d  from c ase  t o  c a s e ;  b u t ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  
t h e y  were r e v o l u t i o n a r y ,  a n t i - B a k u f u  and a n t i - c l a n  
’E s t a b l i s h m e n t ’ i f  n o t  a n t i - f e u d a l ,  and p r o - i m p e r i a l i s t .  
W hether  t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r  e lem ent  a c t u a l l y  l o o k e d  f o r w a r d  t o
ns
I k e ,  B e g in n i n g s ,  p . 21
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the creation of an absolutist type of government after the 
destruction of the Shogunate is not easy to determine. 
Nevertheless one fact has been established about the Han 
Reform Parties; this is that through them, and in other 
ways too, the rural capitalists were able to play a back- 
stage part in bringing about the restoration. Writing of 
them in his Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan,
Ike Nobutaka says:
In several ways they actively supported the 
underground movement directed against the 
existing regime. They facilitated the work, for 
example, of the many ronin and samurai who 
travelled from locality to locality laying the 
foundations of revolt by providing them with 
lodgings. More notable, however, were their 
financial contributions..... they gave assistance
to individual ronin who were without funds....
provided relatively large sums for various illegal 
activities, including the purchase of arms. 49
The next thing to notice about the sonno joi (revere 
the Emperor; expel the barbarian!) movement of the Bakumatsu 
period, which so far as its samurai leadership was concerned 
was virtually by definition both militarist and absolutist, 
is that, as well as attracting the rural capitalists (i.e., 
the richer villagers) to its support, it was also in places 
able to enlist the aid of poorer commoners - particularly
W  ”Ike, Beginnings, p.22
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among t h e  p e a s a n t s .  P e a s a n t  r e v o l t s  were a lw ays  f l a r i n g  
up i n  Tokugawa Ja p a n ;  and som etim es t h e  I m p e r i a l i s t  
p l o t t e r s  made u se  o f  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  r e c u r r e n t  r i o t  
t o  add  t o  t h e  t r o u b l e s  o f  t h e  S h o g u n a te .  I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  
r e s t o r a t i o n  u n d e rg r o u n d  i n  some a r e a s  a c q u i r e d  t h e  c o l o u r s  
o f  p o p u l i s m .  At f i r s t  s i g h t ,  i t  may seem odd t h a t  
I m p e r i a l i s t  a b s o l u t i s m  and f l i c k e r s  o f  a g e n u in e  d e s i r e  
f o r  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s  s h o u ld  have been  so l i n k e d .  Y e t ,  
remembering t h e  d e p r e s s e d  economic c o n d i t i o n s  o f  most  o f  
t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s a m u ra i ,  and  remembering ,  t o o ,  t h a t  i n  
t h e  abnorm al  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h a t  p r e v a i l  j u s t  b e f o r e  a m a jo r  
s o c i a l  o r  p o l i t i c a l  u p h e a v a l  e x t r e m e s  t e n d  t o  m e e t ,  one may 
s e e ,  I  t h i n k ,  t h a t  such  an a l l i a n c e  o f  c r o s s - p u r p o s e s  c o u ld  
have  come a b o u t .
T h a t  i t  d i d  i n  f a c t  come a b o u t  i n  c e r t a i n  d i s t r i c t s  i s  
shown by t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  p a r a - m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  l i k e  t h e  
K i h e i t a i  i n  ChOshu, T h i s  was o r g a n i z e d  by t h e  a n t i -
Bakufu r e t a i n e r s  o f  t h a t  f i e f ,  w i t h  t h e  e x p r e s s  i n t e n t i o n  
o f  i n c l u d i n g  p e a s a n t s  and  a r t i s a n s  a s  w e l l  a s  s a m u ra i  i n  
t h e  f i g h t i n g  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  c l a n .  S i m i l a r  I m p e r i a l i s t  
m i l i t i a s  were c r e a t e d  i n  t h e  f i e f  o f  t h e  A sh ik a g a  c l a n  
( T o c h i g i  p r e f e c t u r e ) ,  where t h e  s p e c i a l  c o r p s  was known as
Norman, S o l d i e r  and  P e a s a n t ,  pp ,  2 1 -30 ,
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the Seishintai (Band of the Whole-Hearted) and defeated 
the Bakufu troops at the battle of Karnata in March 1867> 
and also in the province of Kii (Mie and Wakayama 
prefectures). In the latter place, the citizen-soldiers 
were given the name of Tenchugumi (Heaven* s Avengers); and 
they, too, took part in a local uprising against the Tokugawa. 
In all these cases, the fighting commoners were kept under 
the control of their samurai or rural gentry sponsors, and 
they do not seem to have developed any distinctively 
democratic ideology of their own. Hatred of the Shögunate, 
veneration of the Throne, and a rabid xonophobia were the 
political ideals that united all ranks. The real importance 
of the Imperialist militias set up by these clans is that 
they provide yet more evidence of the ability of the samurai 
and the commoners to act together if need be. Moreover, 
they to some extent foreshadowed the abolition of the 
feudal class distinctions in the very early years of the 
Meiji period; and they perhaps gave the commoners concerned 
an enhanced awareness of their own powers.
Though bodies of irregular troops such as the Kiheitai 
and others mentioned above continued to be dominated 
politically by their upper-class leaders, there is evidence 
that in other regions matters had taken a slightly different 
turn, and that the populist elements in the anti-Bakufu 
coalitions were starting to assert their own claims on the
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future. Perhaps the fusion of the classes, and the 
evolution of a rudimentary but none the less genuine 
representative system had gone further in Tosa than 
anywhere else. There, the ’new’ militia locally recruited 
from all classes was known as the people’s Army (Mimpei); 
and as the clan leaders were on the whole friendly to the 
Tokugawa until just before the restoration, its main task 
was to guard the coasts against foreign attack. The real 
significance of these developments in Tosa, however, was 
not to become apparent until the rise of the Liberty and 
Popular Rights Movement five or six years after the 
restoration.
In Muramatsu (Niigata prefecture), though, the leaders 
of a peasant rising that broke out in 1868 clarified their 
aims in ten written demands. The authorship of this 
manifesto is not clear, but it was possibly drawn up by a 
samurai. Though there is little or no evidence of a direct 
link between Imperialist agitators and the Muramatsu revolt, 
considering the conditions of widespread unrest and the 
formation of peasant militias in other fiefs, we are at 
liberty to assume that there may well have been such a 
connection - not only between the Muramatsu peasants and 
Imperialist samurai, but also between the latter and other 
peasant erneutes that occurred just before or during the
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War of the Restoration. Anyway, the significant thing
about the Muramatsu affair for our purposes is that the
rebels’ manifesto had definite constitutional overtones.
Article four, for instance, was a request that the number
of village officials should be fixed after consulting
public opinion, and that the officials should usually be 
51elected.
Nothing that has been said about the participation of 
(a) the rural entrepreneurs, and (b) the plebeian 
volunteers in the events leading up to the restoration 
vitiates in any way the idea that the restoration itself 
was essentially a coup d’etat, carried out by a group of 
samurai conspirators from the four Western clans acting in 
conjunction with a handful of Court nobles. This is exactly 
what the restoration was in itself. Nevertheless it is 
important for a number of reasons, and in particular in 
order to understand part of the genesis of organizations 
such as the Jiyu-to and the Hoshu Chüsei Ha, to realize that 
behind the Western Clan-Court Noble nexus that produced the 
restoration, and more or less closely associated with it 
depending on circumstances of time, place, and personality, 
there stood two other nascent relationships. One of these 
was the entente between the rebellious samurai and the rural,
51
Tanaka Sogoro, Ishin Chokuzen-no Noson, Rekishi, No.14, 
March 1938, p.39.
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plutocratic entrepreneurs; the other was the contacts 
between politically active samurai and the poorer commoners, 
especially the peasants.
After 1868, this complicated network of revolutionary 
links underwent considerable change, as a result of the 
policies of Westernization and stabilization carried out 
by the Meiji Government during the first twenty years of 
its existence. Old ambitions lingered, and basic economic 
interests continued to work themselves out. Yet, though 
we can quite easily see the same spirit or the same 
material considerations at work at different times over a 
period of thirty years or more, the formal shape of the 
political world and the goals devised as remedies for 
standing grievances altered almost out of all recognition. 
These alterations corresponded, of course, to the enormous 
social and political transformations taking place. Briefly, 
what happened was that a substantial element of the 
Bakumatsu revolutionary partnership of samurai and wealthy 
rural entrepreneurs survived the restoration to evolve 
eventually into the Liberty Party of 1881 and 1890. At 
the same time, a mere handful of extreme supporters of the 
sonno joi movement not only retained their belief in 
Imperialist absolutism and their detestation of everything 
foreign without any diminution of intensity at all, but
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also somehow managed to preserve the memory - at any 
rate - of a connection between ultra-conservativism and 
social reform.
Naturally, in practice the distinction between the 
separate development of the Liberty Party on the one hand, 
and the 1890 Ultra-Conservative factions on the other, was 
not nearly so sharp as it has been made to seem here.
Oi Kentaro is an example of a Liberal, whose ardour for 
constitutional government led him to try and make war on 
his native country, whose nationalism made him one of the 
earliest overt advocates of JapanTs mission to save Asia 
for democracy and the Asiatics, and whose concern for his 
less fortunate compatriots at length took him out of the 
Liberty Party to found a Right wing activist group of his 
own. Again, the Daido Danketsu of 1887 and 1888, with 
its all-out attack on the Sat-Cho fShögunate’ and its 
bitter opposition to treaty revision on terms that involved 
any sort of concession to the foreign Powers, was in some 
ways a throwback to the palmiest days of sonno joi. 
Nevertheless, in order to summarize intelligibly the process 
whereby the Han Reform Parties and the Nohei detachments 
of the Bakumatsu period grew into or influenced the mid- 
Meiji Liberals and Ultra-Conservatives, it is better to 
imagine the two strands of this double evolution as having 
been in fact separate.
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The rural entrepreneurs, as a group, went from strength 
to strength after the restoration. One reason for this was 
that they had already acquired a tradition of hostility 
towards the authorities in the mutinous decade or two 
before the fall of the Bakufu, and no doubt a certain degree 
of self-confidence, too, as a result of the successful 
outcome of the struggles of those days. Another reason 
was the inherent power of their economic position, as they 
were favourably placed to lead the nation into the new 
era of machine capitalism. Just as significant as either 
of these were two other factors. There was a continuation 
of the rural entrepreneurs’ pre-1868 association with a 
group of active, talented, and extremely politically- 
minded samurai. The isolated coterie of ruling bureaucrats 
in the Dajokan and elsewhere were before long convinced of 
the necessity of making capital, urban and rural, one of 
the bed-rocks of the new state.
In these circumstances, it is not hard to see how 
large segments of the Han Reform Parties of the 1860s 
could have turned into the Liberty and Popular Rights 
Movement of the 1870s. In both cases, the samurai had 
reasons of their own for opposing the Government of the day; 
but, in both cases, the rural entrepreneurs were their 
natural allies. The great difference between the two
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movements was t h a t  t h e  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  sam ura i  c l a s s  
(now s h i z o k u )  t h a t  h ead e d  t h e  L i b e r t y  and  P o p u l a r  R i g h t s  
Movement had  abandoned  i t s  o l d  programme o f  r e v e r e n c e  t o  
th e  Throne  and e x p u l s i o n  f o r  a l l  f o r e i g n e r s  f o r  t h e  more 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d  t e a c h i n g s  o f  W e s te rn  L i b e r a l i s m ,  I  doub t  i f  
t h e  r u r a l  e n t r e p r e n e u r s ,  as  a c l a s s ,  when t h e y  r e a l i z e d  
what a d v a n ta g e s  a L i b e r a l  sys tem  would  b r i n g  them p e r s o n a l l y ,  
h ad  any r e g r e t s  a t  a l l  o v e r  t h i s  change  o f  h e a r t  on t h e  
p a r t  o f  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  m e n t o r s .  The sonno j o i  a g i t a t i o n  
h ad  p r o v e d  i t s e l f  i n v a l u a b l e  as  a means f o r  t o p p l i n g  t h e  
B akufu ;  i t  was u s e l e s s  f o r  a n y th i n g  e l s e ,
t
The o t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  c o i n  t o  t h e  r u r a l  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  
deep in v o lv e m e n t  i n  t h e  J i y ü  Minken Undo was t h e  M e i j i  
G o v e r n m e n t s  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  come t o  t e rm s  w i t h  i t s  o p p o s i t i o n  
f o r  t h e  sake  o f  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  and  th e  r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  i t s  
own p l a n s  f o r  th e  c o u n t r y ’ s f u t u r e .  By a c t i o n s  such  as  
t h e  rem ova l  o f  t h e  f e u d a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  
l a n d ,  t h e  s a l e  o f  Government f o r e s t s ,  and  t h e  encouragem en t  
i t  gave  t o  modern bank in g  and  m a n u f a c t u r in g  o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
t e c h n i q u e s ,  i t  b u t t r e s s e d  t h e  a l r e a d y  s t r o n g  economic 
p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  r u r a l  e n t r e p r e n e u r s .  On t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f r o n t ,  
t o o ,  i n  a s e r i e s  o f  s k i l f u l l y  t im e d  c o n c e s s i o n s  c u l m i n a t i n g  
i n  t h e  p r o m u lg a t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  I 8 8 9 ,  i t  g r a n t e d  
t h e  a g i t a t o r s  f o r  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s  and t h e i r  l a n d l o r d  b a c k e r s  
much, i f  n o t  m o s t ,  o f  what t h e y  had  b e en  demanding.
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The outcöme of all this was the somewhat ambivalent 
attitude of the Liberals in 1890. The Jiyu-to, the Daido 
Club, and the Aikoku-koto all spoke in the main for a class 
that was economically and socially established as a 
dominant group, and which, in its political aspect, desired 
no more than a number of additional and comparatively minor 
reforms. These latter would have topped off its earlier 
successes, and would have given it a hold over the 
government of the Empire commensurate with its power and 
status in other fields. Hence the concern expressed in 
the manifestos for things like the reduction of the land- 
tax or the institution of party Cabinets, matters which 
were narrowly political, and the failure to put forward any 
proposals for social reform. This acceptance of parliamentary 
democracy as an adornment to their own privileged economic 
status rather than as a means to the gradual redistribution 
of wealth was to remain the distinguishing feature of the 
Liberty Party (destined to become the Seiyukai) from 1890 
to 1945* When grave social unrest threatened, its members 
invariably chose to defer to the Ultra-Conservative Right 
and so run the risk of undermining the parliamentary system, 
if the only immediate alternative was the safeguarding of 
parliament at the expense of their properties.
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Meanwhile ,  what was h a ppen ing  t o  t h e  o t h e r s  -  t h e  
m i l i t a r i s t ,  x e n o p h o b ic ,  a b s o l u t i s t ,  and  sometimes r a d i c a l  
e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  sonno j o i  movement? I n  t h e  f i r s t  two 
d e c a d e s  a f t e r  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n ,  t h e y  s u f f e r e d  from a 
p r o c e s s  o f  d i s i n t e g r a t i o n  -  e x t e n s i v e  b u t  n o t  c o m p le t e .
F o r  them , t o o ,  t h e  s l o g a n s  sonno and  j o i  were d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y  
s t e r i l e  once t h e y  had  im p r e g n a t e d  t h e  a n t i -T o k u g a w a  movement 
w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  vim t o  b r i n g  i t  t o  a  s u c c e s s f u l  c o n c l u s i o n .  
The b a r b a r i a n s  had  made i t  q u i t e  p l a i n  t h a t  t h e y  n e i t h e r  
would n o r  c o u l d  be e x p e l l e d ;  and when t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  had  
b e e n  a c c o m p l i s h e d ,  nobody was q u i t e  s u r e  what t h e y  meant 
by t h e  p h r a s e  ’ r e v e r e  t h e  E m p e r o r ! ’ now t h a t  t h e  c o u r s e  
o f  e v e n t s  had  r o b b e d  i t  o f  i t s  o r i g i n a l  a n t i - S h o g u n a t e  
c o n n o t a t i o n s .  Though i t  i s  e a s y  t o  c a l l  t h e  u l t r a s  
a b s o l u t i s t s ,  t h e y  d i d  n o t  r e a l l y  b e l i e v e  i n  a b s o l u t i s m  i n  
t h e  s e n se  o f  d i r e c t  p e r s o n a l  r u l e  by t h e  m onarch .  L ik e  
any o t h e r  r u l i n g  o r  w o u ld -b e  r u l i n g  g ro u p  i n  t h e  l a s t  
t h o u s a n d  y e a r s  o f  J a p a n e s e  h i s t o r y ,  t h e  ex trem e  L o y a l i s t s  
and  xenophobes  i n  t h e  sonno j o i  movement were s i n g l e - m i n d e d  
i n  s t r e s s i n g  l o y a l t y  t o  t h e  S o v e r e ig n  a s  a  means o f  
o b t a i n i n g  p o l i t i c a l  power;  b u t  once i n  pow er ,  t h e y  i n t e n d e d  
t o  keep  i t  f o r  t h e m s e l v e s .
I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  i f  t h e  ’R ig h t  w in g ’ e x t r e m i s t s  i n  t h e  
sonno j ö i  movement were n o t  a b s o l u t i s t  i n  t h e  p r o p e r  se n se
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of the word, what were their real aims and the policies 
by which they hoped to achieve them? Any answer to this 
question must necessarily be tentative; because this 
particular group never actually controlled the state. However, 
it is probable that they wished to preserve as much as 
possible of what remained of the existing han system and 
social order after they had eliminated the Tokugawa domain 
and Shogunate. In other words, the Kyoto Court was to 
replace the Edo Bakufu as the 1 national Government1 of an 
extremely decentralized polity. Since the Court still 
lacked an independent financial basis for its authority owing 
to the small size of the Imperial estates, it would have 
been far weaker as a feudal overlord than the Bakufu ever 
was even in its closing years of atrophy. Therefore the 
Court would have inevitably fallen into the hands of those 
clans which had chosen to take the lead in advancing its 
claims against the Bakufu; and within those same clans, the 
most ardent advocates of the Imperialist cause could look 
forward to an increase in their own personal prestige and 
power at the expense of more senior advisers who had been 
lukewarm to the idea of a complete overthrow of the Tokugawa. 
Thus, apart from wishing to destroy the Shogunate which 
admittedly was a big change, what these particular extremists 
in the Imperialist movement seem to have wanted were
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comparatively minor modifications to the internal national 
and fief balances of power. All else was to remain 
unchanged, in particular the four-class social system.
It must be emphasized that the group of sonno joi 
adherents we are talking about here are the ones who were, 
and were to remain, irreconcilaby opposed to Western 
influence; and it was this uncompromising hostility towards 
the West which was to distinguish them from the other 
groups of samurai Loyalists who later led the Liberal 
popular rights movement or who through the agency of the 
Meiji Government embarked on the wholesale Westernization 
of the country. It was these - the irreconcilables - who 
were the spiritual ancestors of the 1890 Ultra-Conservative 
groups. In 1868, however, their aspirations for a sort of 
feudalism without the Shogunate clearly depended for their 
realization on one thing - the speedy expulsion of the 
Westerners and a further closure of the country. In my 
opinion, with all but a few of the active sonno joi 
partisans, it was because they were vehemently anti-foreign 
that they were anti-Bakufu, not the other way round. The 
Shogunate had failed to maintain the time-honoured ban on 
intercourse with foreign countries, and this failure 
endangered the existing political and social structure, 
which as we have seen, they wished to amend but not destroy.
261
Therefore the radical groups had taken up arms against 
the Edo regime; and from the point of view of the most 
adamant proponents of sonno joi, the Meiji Government had 
been put into power, precisely in order to carry out the 
policies which the Tokugawa had not been able to enforce.
In fact, of course, the Meiji Government, too, was no more 
capable than its predecessors in office had been of expelling 
the barbarians.
Eo governing group could have done this. The extremist 
sonno joi outlook rested on a gross lack of realism in 
foreign affairs; and this misconception in turn made quite 
impracticable the desire to retain the general framework of 
domestic feudal and Confucian institutions. The vast 
impracticality of the whole Right wing extremist programme 
must be ascribed, I think, to the fact that the initial 
reaction to Western intrusion had been overwhelmingly 
emotional and cultural rather than reasoned and political.
*Japanism* was to be a semi-religious upsurge of basically 
anti-modern feeling, not a clearcut policy for achieving 
certain definite and limited national goals.
Anyway, many of the samurai who went on adhering to 
the xenophobic and ultra-conservative point of view began 
to wish for a return to a version of the old feudal system 
after 1873» when the Meiji Government launched its attack
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on the military class as a whole, and shov/ed unmistakable 
signs of a deep and irreversible commitment to Westernization 
The feelings of the nationalists had been further outraged 
by the miscarriage of plans to chastise Korea, Saigo 
Takamori made himself the leader of this ’feudal reactionary' 
element; and with his defeat at the end of the Satsuma 
rebellion, it became thoroughly demoralized and disappeared. 
This was the first great weakening of the Ultra-Conservatives
Other weakenings followed. Many of the former samurai 
militants and ’irreconcilables', after the initial shock 
of their disestablishment as a separate class, must have 
arrived at a modus vivendi with the Meiji system, both 
economic and psychological, and found themselves reasonably 
remunerative jobs either in the new industries, or else in 
Government service as school-teachers or policemen.
Similarly, the gradual discovery that the ’West was not 
going to push its claims on Japan to the extreme of taking 
over the Empire, so long as it was not unreasonably provoked, 
and that this same West had in its own civilization much 
that was of potential benefit to mankind in general, probably 
caused an increasingly large number of genuine changes of 
heart.
That other antecedent of mid—Meiji Ultra—Conservativism 
the distinctively plebeian mutterings in the sonno joi
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storm - also grew more muted as time wore on* The scattered 
peasant agitators had never had the support of more than a 
tiny minority of samurai sympathizers; and after 1868, 
this ’plebeian’ group as a whole, which had never been very 
big or articulate, was overwhelmed by the bourgeois nature 
of the restoration* In some ways, the foremost champions 
of the common man in the Bakumatsu and early Meiji periods 
may be likened to the Levellers in seventeenth century 
England. Too soon, too few, and too crude. Moreover, many 
of the ’plebeians’ naturally found themselves absorbed in 
the Liberty and Popular Rights Movement, their energies 
taken up by Itagaki’s ’theoretical’ struggle for a Liberal 
constitution and their aspirations satisfied by the one 
actually achieved.
The Government, too, played its part in turning the 
tide of agrarian discontent. Peasant disturbances of a 
limited and local nature, that is to say of essentially the 
same kind as had occurred at frequent intervals under the 
Shogunate, were not uncommon in the early years of the Meiji 
era. They were usually directed against such necessary 
innovations as schools, modern taxation methods, and 
conscription. A little later than this, the agricultural 
depression of the years 1882-5 produced another flurry of 
minor outbreaks. This time, the militant wing of the
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Jiyu-to sided with the peasant insurrectionaries. This 
goes to show that in the early 1880s the Ultra-Conservatives 
still did not have a monopoly of tender social consciences; 
they were not to have this until several years later, by 
which time the Liberals had entered into an indissoluble 
union with the rich peasants and village manufacturers*
The rebellions and riots were no problem in themselves to 
the Meiji Government, which suppressed them quickly and 
easily* At the same time, the bureaucrats1 programme of 
reform and modernization - the legal and social emancipation 
of the commoners, new opportunities for the peasants to 
find employment in the towns and elsewhere, and the removal 
of the grosser abuses of officialdom especially in the 
sphere of local government - tended to reduce the intensity 
of popular resistance of a direct and truly revolutionary 
kind. Not, of course, over-night, but over a period of 
twenty years or so* Finally, the return of better 
agricultural conditions after 1886 led to the slackening of 
economic tensions in the villages, and ushered in three 
decades of comparative prosperity for the mass of peasants* 
The governing authorities and the established economic 
ruling classes succeeded in getting time as well as the 
greater part of the nev/-born democratic movement on their 
side. The Ultra-Conservatives, for their part, had lost out
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b e c a u s e  t h e i r  x en ophob ic  and  ’ f e u d a l ’ l e a n i n g s  h ad  b e en  
t o o  i n a p p r o p r i a t e ,  and because  t h e i r  p r o l e t a r i a n  ’b a s e ’ 
h a d  b e e n  t o o  weak. Above a l l ,  an d  i n  s p i t e  o f  a l l ,  t h e  
M e i j i  e r a  was a p e r i o d  o f  g e n e r a l  a n d  i n t e n s e  m odern ism .
The Government was d e te r m in e d  t o  implement  i t s  i d e a  o f  
W e s t e r n i z a t i o n ;  and  t h e  on ly  g r e a t  body o f  o p p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  
a g i t a t o r s  f o r  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s ,  were e q u a l l y  a n x io u s  t o  
i n t r o d u c e  t h e i r  i d e a  o f  W e s t e r n i z a t i o n .  Between them ,  
t h e s e  twro g r o u p s ,  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t s  and  t h e  L i b e r a l  o r  
P r o g r e s s i v e  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  c a r r i e d  most  o f  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
c o u n t r y  w i t h  them. T h is  t r e n d  l e f t  l i t t l e  room f o r  t h e  
w i l f u l  a n t i - m o d e r n i s m  o f  t h e  U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e s .  I t  i s  
t o  a c o m b in a t io n  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  o u t l i n e d  above t h a t  we 
must  l o o k  f o r  an  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  
a n d  g e n e r a l  u n p o p u l a r i t y  o f  t h e  U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e  
p h i l o s o p h y  i n  1890.  To most  o b s e r v e r s  a t  t h e  t im e  and 
a f t e r w a r d s ,  t h e  r e a c t i o n a r y  i d e a s  o f  t h e  Kokurnin-ha and 
t h e  Hoshu C h u se i  Ha must  have seemed i n a p p o s i t e  t o  t h e  
p o i n t  o f  b e in g  p a t e n t l y  r i d i c u l o u s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  f a c t  rem ains  t h a t  t h e  U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e s  
r e m a in e d .  What i s  more,  t h e y  numbered among t h e i r  l e a d e r s  
f i g u r e s  o f  n a t i o n a l  im p o r ta n c e  and g e n e r a l  e s t e e m  l i k e  T o r i o  
and  T a n i .  Here wre come t o  a n o t a b l e  t r u t h  a b o u t  t h e  
U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e s  -  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  some o f  them t o  keep
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up with the times in their own way. While most of the 
former unregenerate Absolutists1 of Bakamatsu days had 
chosen to plunge over the cliff of a false day-dream of 
restored feudalism, a minority had preferred to set their 
courses by other stars. We have seen that both Tani and 
Torio played a conspicuous and talented part in the 
campaigning against the Satsuma rebels. Their actions on 
that occasion are symptomatic of an important facet of 
their thinking - their acceptance of the administrative 
and technological bases of the Meiji state, especially in 
so far as these contributed to the over-all fighting 
strength of the country.
Moreover it is significant that both these national 
Ultra-Conservative leaders should have been high-ranking 
Army officers. It is not true that the Army had in Meiji 
times the independent political power it was to exert later. 
Yet in a society that was in all its major aspects given 
over to the antithesis of what it had been previously - to 
freedom of occupation,to freedom of discussion, to self­
advancement, and to a surging belief in general and 
individual progress - the Army was the only institution 
of the new state which of its own nature afforded a really 
secure shelter and resting-place to the fugitive bands of 
Ultra-Conservativism. The Army was indubitably modern; yet,
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as all armies are and must be, it was to a large extent 
geared to pre-modern ideals of non-materialism, group 
loyalty, and a fixed hierarchy of command. Therefore, after 
the great failure of * feudal reaction* and the decisive 
movement of opinion in the civil bureaucracy towards an 
accommodation with the Jiyü Minken Undo, it was natural 
that the few outstanding Modern1 Ultra-Conservatives 
should have been found in or close to the Army. Military 
life was a metier that gave them some consolation for 
present disappointments, and at the same time was the best 
vantage point from which they could effect a re-entry into 
politics should the need or opportunity ever arise. In 
many ways, the political role of the Imperial Japanese 
Army was not unlike that of the Ultra-Conservative, Catholic, 
hierarchic, and intensely nationalist professional officer 
corps in Prance under successive republican administrations.
For the rest, Tani, Torio, and their kind were not 
at all at home with the constitutional innovations and 
spiritual changes going on all round them. In this respect, 
it is interesting to note that whereas statesmen such as 
Ito Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo were wont to argue that 
as Japan had re-entered a world where Liberalism was in the 
ascendancy, it was not possible for her to remain untouched 
by it; their Ultra-Conservative opponents in the Dajokan
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would reply that on the contrary, Japan had to secure 
her own matchless way of life by cleansing the world of 
European influence.
The Ultra-Conservatives of 1890 and later were 
important, then, not for what they did but for what they 
were. Their essential role was to pass on the most 
impassioned strains of Bakumatsu feelings for the throne 
and against all foreigners to the ’secret societies’ of 
the late Meiji and Taisho eras, and to the Showa Young 
Officer Movement. In the intervening period, and more 
particularly in 1890, they were weak and nearly everywhere 
at a discount. So much so that one might have said of 
them that if they drew their inspiration wholly from the 
past, their moment of destiny lay entirely in the future. 
They had survived, but only just as a shadowy, scarcely 
recognizable alternative to the newly created parliamentary 
and plutocratic institutions. As is known, recourse was 
eventually had to this alternative; and that is why the 
Ultra-Conservatives of I890, negligible though they were 
in themselves, are worthwhile subjects for study, and it is 
interesting to assess briefly their potential, as opposed 
to their actual, strength in 1890.
We have already noted how the Army provided them with 
a secure and modern base for possible reaction. Under the
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surface of mid-Meiji politics and society, there were a 
number of other factors which ultimately proved to be of 
use to the Ultra-Conservatives. Some of the most important 
of these were:- (i) the somewhat v/arped development of 
the Liberty Party, with its emphasis on social conservativism 
at the risk of parliamentary decay; (ii) the heavy over­
population of the rural hinterland of Japan, with all 
that that meant in terms of peasant traditionalism, 
drudgery, and debt; (iii) the very serious psychological 
stresses that could result from rapid modernization. I 
do not wish to deny, or even question, the wisdom of and 
the necessity for the modernization or its rapidity; but 
it is foolish not to remember that for the last hundred 
years, modern Japanese chiefly by virtue of the great extent 
of their modernism have lived perilously close to the 
mental clime of their feudal forbears. (We can see something 
of the same condition in modern Turkey, where Islam would 
appear to have been reinvigorated by Ataturk*s attempt 
to restrict it.) The Japanese Ultra-Conservatives of 1890 
and afterwards, then, lay in wait, always ready to make 
their appeal to those of their compatriots who were most 
grievously disrupted by the psychological impact of the 
..est, as well as to those of them in the country areas who 
were hardest hit economically speaking by the rising sun 
of landlord capitalism.
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Over and above all this, the Ultra-Conservatives 
also got a measure of indirect help from the conservative 
bias of the state’s institutions and ruling classes.
The morale of the Meiji constitution was that of the 
traditional family system; and this same family system 
was to have its other chief mode of political expression 
in the militarist and theocratic ideas of the Ultra- 
Conservatives. The Ultra-Conservatives were also able to 
take some slight advantage of the fact that for two decades 
or so after 1890, they were the formulators of the only 
body of coherent and acceptable criticism directed at 
the powers and pretensions of the ruling economic class.
It is paradoxical, of course, that the same group of Right 
wing extremists were able to rely on a certain amount 
of tacit ’moral support1 from the bureaucrats and plutocrats 
in power, and yet at the same time make an appeal over their 
heads to the most impoverished and disaffected elements 
in the nation. The explanation of this paradox is to be 
found largely in the peculiar nature of Japanese Right 
wing radicalism itself, with its origins going back to the 
strange fevers of the sonno joi agitation and even beyond, 
and with its social centre in the homes of a conservative- 
minded but economically exploited peasantry. The very 
elasticity of their ideal of Japanism was another thing
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which enabled the reactionaries to keep a foot in both 
camps. All in all, it says a good deal for the solidity 
and general good sense of the major elements in the Japanese 
polity, including the agrarian class, when one discovers 
that, so long as times were good or even moderately good, 
the Ultra-Conservatives, scheming and noisy though they 
were, never made much of an impression - either on the inner 
body of captains of state, or on the public as a whole.
When times were definitely bad, however, it was a different 
story.
Tracing the separate streams of Liberal and Ultra- 
Conservative development back from 1890 to the Han Reform 
Parties and forwards from I89O to the present day, one may 
write the former, Liberal stream so:-
Han Reform Parties (sonno joi) - Korean War
party of 1873 - Liberty and Popular Rights Movement -
Risshi-sha - Aikoku-sha - Jiyü-to - Koin Club -
Rikken Jiyu-to - Seiyu-kai - MacArthur's land reform -
part of the modern Jiyumin-to (Governing Liberal
Party).
and the latter, Ultra-Conservative stream so:-
Han Reform Parties (sonno joi) - Korean War party 
of I873 - Saigo Takamori's Shigaku-in - Satsuma
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rebellion - Tani and Torio - Genyo-sha,
Amur River Society, etc, etc* - Kita Ikki and 
the 'Showa Restoration' - pre-war Young Officer 
Movement - post-war disbanding of the armed 
forces - contemporary Right wing extremist groups / 
Zengakuren (the students are nationalist and 
egalitarian but not militarist)*
Cn the basis of the above hypothesis, it has been 
possible to explain the particular standpoints of the Liberal 
and Ultra-Conservative groups in the election of 1890, and 
also the fact that there was no socially Left wing 
democratic party, in terms of the separate developments of 
two of the elements in the late feudal sonno joi agitation 
after 1868. Such an explanation has necessarily involved 
writing about the tenacity as well as the mutability of 
two Bakumatsu political traditions, and, in the case of the 
Liberals, the interests of an important and rising economic 
class. Besides these, there was another major factor which 
helped to bring about the I89O situation of (i) socially 
conservative Liberalism, (ii) radical Ultra-Conservativism, 
and (iii) no democratic proletarian party. This was the 
shizoku leadership in all fields of national life.
In the circles of political opposition, we find shizoku 
at the head of all the factions - from the militarist Right
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to the populist Left, Moreover, both sets of leaders,
the Liberal and the Ultra-Conservative, first gained
their power by exploiting the tides of ex-samurai discontent
that were flowing strongly against the Government from
about 1873 to 1881 on questions of foreign policy,
Westernization, abolition of feudal privileges, and
commutation of pensions. Consequently the Liberty and
Popular Rights Movement and the Ultra-Conservative activities
were basically attempts to bring about a change from above
by a former hereditary elite which still retained a sense
of its own superiority in social and cultural matters; they
were not distinctively proletarian revolutions from below.
This predominance of former samurai, in the Government
as well as in the opposition, was nothing but the continuation
for a generation or so in the new era of the habits and
traditions of the old one; and it had its natural counterpart
in the post-feudal spirit of submissiveness which
characterized the labouring classes for four of five decades
after the restoration. Even the peasant rebellions of the
early Meiji period were really more of a feudal phenomenon
than a modern one; and until well after the end of the
nineteenth century, the industrial proletariat was still
outnumbered by its agricultural equivalent by something like 
three to one,52 jn these circumstances, it is not 
52
Allen, Short Economic History, p*57»
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surprising that Socialism had to wait for the general 
economic and social patterns of national life to catch 
up with political developments before it could take root* 
Again, there was probably something in the class 
background of the early and middle Meiji era shizoku- 
reformers which inhibited them from identifying themselves 
completely with lower class aspirations, though there was 
nothing to prevent the eventual merger of the children 
and grandchildren of these * first generation1 shizoku with 
the general body of commoners. Traditional feudal society 
had been homogeneous, but it had also been hierarchic.
This produced the noticeably de haut en bas tone of Meiji 
politics even at their most progressive, and many of the 
underlying conservative assumptions of the transformation.
The majority of shizoku reformers with a Liberal bent were 
predisposed by their upbringing, apart from anything else, 
to think in terms of an ’upper-class democracy’; and it 
was Just as ’natural’ for Ultra-Conservative shizoku 
reformers to gravitate towards the idea of some sort of 
Army control of the nation. I do not mean to imply that 
those of the shizoku who were interested in a greater 
measure of political liberty or social welfare for the 
’ordinary’ commoners, were not personally sincere in their 
aims. Quite the contrary - the sincerity of most of them 
is patent. But usually it was the sincerity of an upper-class
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reformer, something akin in English history to the
aristocratic conviction of an Earl of Shaftesbury, or else
to the middle class consciences of later Labour leaders*
That most notable of notable Meiji reformers, Pukuzawa
Yukichi, has told how on one occasion just after the
abolition of the laws relating to the feudal distinctions
between the classes, he was walking along a country road
and met an old farmer riding a horse. The farmer, recognizing
Pukuzawa as a member of the former elite, hastily dismounted
and bowed humbly by the roadside as the young ex-samurai
approached. This, of course, was in accordance with the
time honoured and compulsory gestures of respect that had
been made by commoners (heimin) to people of the military
class in feudal days. Pukuzawa, one of the earliest and
most ardent advocates of European civilization, hated what
he regarded as instances of feudal subservience. Therefore
he grew angry, and berated the old farmer for having
complied with an absurd and out-dated custom. He finished
his reprimand with the words:- ’If you don’t get back on
53your horse, I’ll beat you.’
The Liberals and Ultra-Conservatives occupied 
respectively the extreme Left and extreme Right positions
53 Pukuzawa Yukichi, Autobiography, trans. by Kiyooka 
Eiichi, pp. 260-261.
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in Japanese politics in 1890, One of the major groups 
in between them was that consisting of the ’main-stream’ 
bureaucrats and their moderate conservative supporters.
The existence and weight of the bureaucratic tradition 
require no further emphasis or detailed comment here.
Highly developed under the Tokugawa Shogunate, it quickly 
re-asserted itself after the restoration coup, when the 
bureaucrats fathered modernization, and eventually devised 
the 1889 constitution as a means for arriving at a hoped-for 
detente between themselves and their Liberal attackers.
These policies of modernization and reform pursued by the 
bureaucrats after 1868 also had some of their roots in the 
sonno joi agitation of the preceding twenty years. But in 
replacing the Tokugawa Bakufu, the Meiji bureaucracy had 
inherited many of its responsibilities and even more of 
its attitudes. The great difference was that the new rulers 
had the courage and authority to impose changes which the 
Bakufu, particularly under Ii Naosuke, had attempted in 
vain to effect. Therefore their revised version of sonno 
joi - full, peaceful, and permanent relations abroad; 
Westernization and controlled experiment at home - triumphed 
because it was more practicable in itself and more immediately 
enforceable in terms of government power than the ideas of 
either the Liberal or Ultra-Conservative opposition.
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Though as it were occupationally biased in favour 
of a certain degree of statism and political staticisrn, 
the bureaucracy in general was staffed by well-trained and 
intelligent men, whose chief concern was to find a 
reasonably satisfactory solution to the problems of the day 
without thinking over-much of the possible implications 
of their policies for the morrow. In addition, there were 
a number of officials who showed themselves capable of 
radical acts of initiative, either by carrying out worthwhile 
reforms of administrative policy or procedure within their 
own departments, or else by challenging the basic tenets 
of the bureaucracy as a whole. In the former case, these 
non-conformist efforts have contributed much to the 
continued smooth running of the Japanese government machine. 
In the latter case, the outright opposition of men like 
Shimada Saburo and Ozaki Yukio pointed to the errors 
inherent in a fully bureaucratic system, and helped to 
strengthen parliament as a place for correcting them.
Taking the bureaucracy as a whole, however, and 
considering its general behaviour over the past ninety or so 
years, its most remarkable attribute has been its careful 
aversion to extremism or precipitate action of any kind.
It is in the ranks of the officials that we find a vital 
balancing-force of moderate conservative progressivism, the
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existence of which does much to account for the over-all 
constitutional stability and economic success of the 
Japanese transition.
It is true that the bureaucrats of the 1930s seem to 
have undergone a collective loss of nerve; but that was 
at a time when they were caught between the upper and nether 
mill-stones of a landlord-dominated parliament and a 
destitution-threatened peasantry, of growths in population 
and production and shrinkages of lebensraum and markets, 
of recalcitrant, chauvinistic Service officers at home 
and endemic civil conflict in China. In short, it was a 
time that called for a super-man or two, and not a 
sheltered group of officials acting on the principle of 
a trading company’s board of directors, talented and 
competent though they might have been. After the Pacific 
War, however, the bureaucracy remained to resume control 
of the country, and to salvage what it could from the 
wreckage of defeat. On that occasion, it was able for the 
first time in its history to work quite unhindered by 
pressures from the Army or Navy. Since that revival of its 
fortunes, it has given if not irrefutable proof at any 
rate increasing evidence of its ability and desire to carry 
out its functions of government in open and unreserved 
collaboration with the Diet.
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However, to return to the bureaucracy as it was 
in 1890. Politically, its topmost echelon was by that 
time definitely conservative. The leaders of the state had 
been in office for more than twenty years, and had 
accomplished all that they had intended to do in the 
fields of political and social reform. Nov/, they wanted 
to grow old in peaceful tenure of power. To achieve this 
end, they needed to stabilize for once and for all times 
the political institutions and life of the country. The 
constitutional history of the years 1881 to 1889 is in many 
ways a record of the bureaucrats’ search for stability.
This search ended in the constitution of 1889, which 
attempted to impose a v/ide measure of political equilibrium 
from above by (a) allowing the richest and so the most 
powerful elements in the nation to participate in the 
government, and (b) presenting a carefully doctored version 
of the traditional family system .as the moral basis of 
the national polity. With this conservative attitude of 
mind prevalent in the bureaucracy, with the transmutation 
of the erstwhile ’radical’ Liberals into a conservative 
country party already fairly far advanced, and with an 
Ultra-Conservative and reactionary tradition that was 
still managing to keep itself in being and was endowed 
with a quality of latent strength; one might feel that the
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o u t lo o k  f o r  J a p a n e s e  p a r l i a m e n t a r y  democracy was n o t  a l l  
t h a t  p r o m is in g  a t  t h e  moment o f  i t s  b i r t h  i n  t h e  y e a r s  
188 9 -9 0 .  I t  would  seem as i f  i t  was d e s t i n e d  from t h e  
s t a r t  t o  a l e a s e ,  lo n g  o r  s h o r t  d e p en d in g  on t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  
o f  l i f e  o f  c o n s e r v a t i v e  i n e r t i a  which  would v e r y  p r o b a b l y  
be ended by an opening  t o  t h e  d i c t a t o r s h i p  o f  t h e  R i g h t .  
C o n s e q u e n t ly  one m ig h t  w ish  t h a t  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t s  had  
r e t a i n e d  t h e i r  l i k i n g  f o r  r e a l l y  r a d i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n s  
l o n g e r  t h a n  t h e y  d i d .
However, t h i s  q u e s t  f o r  s t a b i l i t y  and i t s  c o n c o m i ta n t  
c o n s e r v a t i v i s m  was on ly  one a s p e c t  -  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t  -  
o f  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t s 1 s t a n d p o i n t  i n  1890.  The p i c t u r e  o f  th e  
economic a s p e c t  o f  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  i s  u t t e r l y  d i f f e r e n t .
The most e n d u r in g  and momentous r e s u l t  o f  t h e  e n d e a v o u rs  
o f  t h e  M e i j i  r u l e r s  was t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  o f  J a p a n ;  
and  i n  1890,  t h i s  p r o c e s s  s t i l l  had  t o  go t h r o u g h  a l l  bu t  
i t s  p r e l i m i n a r y  s t a g e s .  I t s  m a jo r  e f f e c t s  on c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
h i s t o r y  were n o t  t o  be f e l t  f o r  a n o t h e r  tw e n ty  o r  t h i r t y  
y e a r s .  W ith  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  came t h e  t r u e  an d  l a s t i n g  
m o d e r n i z a t i o n  o f  J a p a n .  Any s tu d y  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  s i t u a t i o n  
i n  1890 must  o f  n e c e s s i t y  c o n c e n t r a t e  on t h e  L i b e r a l  and 
U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e  e l e m e n t s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  we must  see  
a l l  t h i n g s  i n  t h e i r  p r o p e r  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  one a n o t h e r ;  and 
I  v e n t u r e  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  were we t o  t a k e  a s h o r t  j o u r n e y
281
in a historical spaceship from mid-Meiji Japan, we should 
soon discover that both the Liberals and the Ultra- 
Conservatives were really no more than impressive but 
minor satellites hurtling round a central sun of continuing 
bureaucratic control and steadily accelerating industrialization»
This industrialization, proceeding as it did along 
capitalist lines, produced in Japan as elsewhere two 
important new social groups. One consisted of large-scale 
industrial entrepreneurs; the other was the great body of 
urban and factory workers. These two groups, in turn, gave 
rise to two new political parties to look after their 
interests - the conservative businessmen’s party, and the 
Japanese Socialist Party.
The latter did not really begin to take shape until 
after the end of the Meiji period, that is until after 1912.
It suffered considerably in its earlier years from the 
divisive tendencies common to all Japanese political parties, 
and also from acts of oppression of varying intensity and 
scope carried out against it by Right wing forces entrenched 
in the Diet, bureaucracy, and other branches of the state. 
Moreover, the Socialists were no more immune than anybody 
else to the stresses of breakdown and reaction that assailed 
the country after 1930. Despite all this, the Japanese 
Socialist Party has come through. Its underlying power has
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grown pari passu with the spread of modern industry, and 
its constitutional position was strengthened by the 
reforms of the Occupation period* It stands to-day, 
therefore, as easily the most formidable and legitimate 
body of opposition to the Government, both ineide and 
outside the Diet. Its great historical significance is 
that it has provided, and gone on providing with 
increasing relevance to the changing economic environment, 
a counter-force that is by and large both politically 
liberal and socially reformist. In so doing, it has taken 
more and more of the wind from the sails of the Ultra- 
Conservative factions, and at the same time has done a 
great deal to prevent the growth of a big, anti­
parliamentary movement to the political Left.
The ancestor of businessmen1s parties in modern Japan 
is the Kaishin-to of 1882 and 1890. We have seen that the 
Progressives of those days were politically a little more 
moderate, in the sense of being more inclined to seek a 
rapprochement with the bureaucracy, and socially definitely 
more plutocratic than the Liberals. These facts, though, 
tend to obscure the true historical role of the Meiji 
Progressives as the fore-runners of the present governing 
combination of medial bureaucrats and enterprising big 
businessmen.
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The seeds of this future development lay in the 
composition of the old Kaishin-to. Its members were drawn 
in the main from the professional, intellectual, and 
wealthy manufacturing classes of the great cities, and also 
from the least conformist sections of the bureaucracy.
In 1890, this Progressive bloc was not so strong as the 
Liberals to its Left or the moderate conservative Government 
groups to its Right; but it was destined to grow. The 
business community has gained as much as the Socialists, 
in terms of power and prestige vis-a-vis other elements 
in the nation, from the continuing process of industrialization. 
The land reform that took place after the Pacific War left 
the urban entrepreneurs for the first time in indisputed 
control of the political and parliamentary Right; and the 
pressing need for increased exports in a world without 
Manchoukuo has confirmed their pre-eminence. In this 
connection, it is worthwhile pointing out that everywhere 
urban, manufacturing conservatives have been more willing 
than landed gentry conservatives to make concessions of 
one kind or another to the under-privileged groups in a 
capitalist community, and thereby enhance the durability 
and effectiveness of the parliamentary system. The economic 
reason for this is quite clear. An increase in industrial 
v/ages can lead to more sales and, ultimately, greater profits;
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a decrease in agricultural rents can only mean a reduction 
of landlord income.
Therefore, again looking backwards and forwards from 
1890, we find that while it was the Liberals who did the 
most to formulate and popularize the guiding principles 
of a representative system in the early stages of the 
democratic movement, it was the Progressives who, in the 
fullness of time, were to go furthest in attaining to the 
efficient, equitable, and stable practice of parliamentary 
rule. This achievement of theirs was not all that easily 
won, A number of blemishes marred and obstructions 
hindered the progress of the Progressives, One was the 
fhigh Whig* flavour of the party during the first two or 
three decades of its existence; another was the deference 
that had to be paid by the city interests to the intransigent 
Liberal-landlord bloc in the conservative camp through all 
the years before the Pacific War; and a third one was the 
lingering on of memories of the feudal separation of trade 
from politics, together with the dependence of the Meiji 
Zaibatsu on the support of their Government sponsors.
Yet, as has been said, economic growth, military defeat, 
loss of overseas territories, and forfeiture of the estates 
of the rural landlords have greatly altered the internal 
balance of power; and now we can see that of all the parties
285
that competed in the first general election, it was the 
Kaishin-to which held out most promise for the future.
It is into this always distending and sometimes near 
cataclysmic pattern of subsequent events, then, that we 
have to fit our ideas about the four (Ultra-Conservative, 
Moderate Conservative, Progressive, and Liberal) great 
political groupings of the election of 1890, In addition 
we have to see them against their own special historical 
background the chief elements of which were:- (i) continuous 
bureaucracy, ( ii) the distinctive and unusual morale of a 
revolution begun and carried through to its logical 
conclusions from above, together with the concealed 
stresses of a modernization that was in some ways over- 
hasty, (iii) the enduring and all-important link between 
the Liberty Party and the rural entrepreneurs. Seen in 
these terms, the entire field of constitutional history 
in the Meiji and later periods down to 1945 may be likened 
to a forest. The medial bureaucrats were the keepers of 
the forest. On the whole, they did their job well, but 
were sometimes over-cautious or else completely unnerved 
by the complexity of their tasks. The old Liberal movement 
was a quick-growing but half-rotted tree, which sprang up 
to a surprising height and sent down roots to a considerable 
depth over a relatively short period of time in the second
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h a l f  o f  t h e  l a a t  c e n t u r y .  Once i t  h ad  r e a c h e d  t h e  end  
o f  t h i s  f o r m a t i v e  s t a g e ,  however ,  i t s  i n n e r  r o t t e n n e s s  
began  t o  w i t h e r  i t ,  u n t i l  i t  a t  l e n g t h  came i n  d a n g e r  o f  
f a l l i n g  o v e r  o f  i t s  own a c c o r d  o r  e l s e  o f  a t t r a c t i n g  
t h e  f a t a l  a t t e n t i o n s  o f  t h e  bands o f  w o o d -ch o p p ers  o u t s i d e  
p a r l i a m e n t .  Decay and demise  d i d  n o t  e v e n t u a t e ,  however ,  
u n t i l  t h e  L i b e r a l  t r e e  had  g i v e n  s u f f i c i e n t  shade  t o  
p r o t e c t ,  and by t h e  a c t i o n  o f  i t s  r o o t s  had  b r o k e n  up 
t h e  s o i l  w e l l  enough t o  n o u r i s h ,  l a t e r - p l a n t e d  and s l o w e r -  
growing b u t  f a r  more d u r a b l e  sp ec im ens  o f  d e m o c r a t i c  
p a r t y  v e g e t a t i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h e  P r o g r e s s i v e  a n d  S o c i a l i s t  
p a r t i e s .  I f  t h e  L i b e r t y  P a r t y  was such  a t r e e ,  t h e n  t h e  
U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e s  o f  1890 and onwards t o  a b o u t  1930 
were  a s o r t  o f  f u n g i  -  a lways b r i g h t  and a t t r a c t i v e  t o  
some, b u t  i n c a p a b l e  o f  any r e a l  l i f e  and g ro w th  u n l e s s  
a t t a c h e d  t o  v/hat was a l r e a d y  dead .
CHAPTER THREE
The Election Campaign - General Survey.
The purpose of this chapter is to give an account in 
general terms of the main features of the 1890 election 
from the standpoint of relations between candidates and 
voters. In other words, we shall be dealing for the 
first time in extenso with the campaigning part of the 
campaign. How did a candidate come to stand for a particular 
constituency? In what ways did he seek to make his mark on 
its voters? But first, before developing this theme, there 
are a few words to be said about the general body of 
candidates as such.
(i) Candidates and nominations.
It is not possible to give an exact figure for the 
total number of candidates who took part in the election. 
The details given in various newspapers sometimes conflict 
with one another, and, what is more, this information is 
lacking for large areas of the country. At one stage, the
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Tokyo.Nichi Nichi Shimbun estimated that there was a total
of nine hundred candidates for the three hundred seats in
the House of Representatives;1 2but since the same report
mentions that there were from three to six hopefuls in
each constituency, this figure of nine hundred would seem
to be far too conservative. Doubtless the Yubin-Hochi
Shimbun was nearer the mark when it reckoned that there
were between fourteen and fifteen hundred candidates for 
2the House.
Certainly, this second and larger estimate is more in 
keeping with the following table which shows details of 
the ratio of candidates to seats in a handful of districts. 
The table has been compiled on the basis of the few 
reports that do give fairly specific information on this 
subject; but, even so, the figures in the third column 
should be treated with caution, as not too inaccurate 
approximations rather than as statements of hard fact.
There were either none or very few candidates returned 
unopposed.
1
TNNS 26-6-90.
2
Yubin-Hochi Shimbun 5-6-90
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Fu or Ken No. of Seats No. of Candidates Candidates per Seat
Tokyo 12 7b 6
Osaka 10 51 5
Niigata 13 27 2
Aichi 11 52 5
Miyagi 3 26 5
Okayama 8 69 9
Yamaguchi 7 16 2
Wakayama 5 12 2
Totals 71 327 5
The quality, as opposed to the number, of candidates is 
more readily determined. In terms of their occupations or 
social status, they may be divided into four main categories. 
In all but the second of these categories, an impressive 
majority of the people concerned were, or had been, members 
of the local assemblies.
The first bloc consisted of those whom we may fairly 
call the professional politicians - the stalwarts of the
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J i y ü - t ö  and th e  K a i s h i n - t o .  I n d i v i d u a l s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
o f  t h i s  g ro u p  were K ataoka  K e n k ic h i  and  Oe Taku i n  Kochi 
p r e f e c t u r e ,  and  Shimada Saburo and  Nakajima Nobuyuki  i n  
Kanagawa p r e f e c t u r e .
N e x t ,  t h e r e  was a g roup  o f  ’ c a r e e r  b u r e a u c r a t ’ c a n d i d a t e s ,
most o f  whom had b e e n  employed as  s u b - p r e f e c t s  i n  t h e
l o c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  A number o f  t h e s e  o f f i c i a l s  were
s t i l l  h o l d in g  t h e i r  p o s t s  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,
b u t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  them had t e n d e r e d  t h e i r  r e s i g n a t i o n s
j u s t  b e f o r e  t h e y  s t o o d  f o r  t h e  D i e t .  The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s
was t h a t  t h e  Law o f  E l e c t i o n  f o r b a d e  l o c a l  governm ent
o f f i c i a l s  t o  p r e s e n t  th e m s e lv e s  f o r  e l e c t i o n  i n  t h e  a r e a s
u n d e r  t h e i r  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  I n  a l l ,  upwards o f  f o r t y
c a n d i d a t e s  o f  t h i s  t y p e  were r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  new House.
The most s e n i o r  o f  them was t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  A g r i c u l t u r e
and Trade  i n  th e  Yamagata  C a b i n e t ,  Mutsu Munemitsu,  who
was e l e c t e d  f o r  a c o n s t i t u e n c y  i n  Wakayama p r e f e c t u r e .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  Mutsu, t h e r e  were i n  t h i s  g ro u p  t h r e e
fo r m e r  S e n a t o r s ,  e l e v e n  p e r s o n s  who h e l d  o r  h ad  h e l d  h ig h
p o s t s  i n  t h e  c e n t r a l  g o v e rn m e n t ,  and  t w e n t y - f i v e  p r e f e c t u r a l
3
o r  fo rm e r  p r e f e c t u r a l  o f f i c e r s .
The t h i r d  c a t e g o r y  was made up o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  men -  
c h i e f l y ,  i f  n o t  e n t i r e l y ,  l a w y e r s  and  j o u r n a l i s t s .  One
3
Kokumin Shimbun 6 -7 -9 0
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constituency had an auditor among its candidates, and a 
qualified doctor who had held a number of high government 
appointments was elected for the Fifth Constituency in 
Niigata prefecture. Sometimes, too, a person in private 
life was nominated by the residents of a constituency or 
else attracted attention because of his scholastic 
abilities. Nevertheless, despite a few aberrations of this 
sort, professions like school or university teaching and 
medicine seem to have been hardly represented at all in the 
lists of candidates; and the wig and the pen between them 
virtually monopolized this section of the field. Typical 
of this category of professional men* candidates were 
the journalists okamoto Takeo and Seki Naohiko, and the 
lawyers Tsunoda Shimpei and Oyagi B ’ichiro. Mention has 
already been made of Okamoto, who was at the time of the 
election one of the most important members of the staff 
of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. Seki, too, was a prominent 
newspaperman (in 1890, he was Chairman of the Tokyo Nichi 
Nichi Company), and enjoyed a good deal of fame as a 
theorist on the moderate Right wing of Meiji politics.
He had been one of the leading members of the defunct 
Teisei-to during the period 1882-84, and was the translator 
of Disraeli’s novel, Coningsby, into Japanese. Tsunoda 
and Oyagi were two of Tokyo’s leading barristers, who
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fought each other for the Seventh Constituency 
(Kanda ward) in the metropolis.
The fourth, and numerically largest group of candidates, 
was composed of comparatively wealthy industrialists, 
merchants, and farmer-landowners. Presidents of the various 
National Banks were quite conspicuous in this category.
This mixed group of 'plutocratic* candidates was on the 
whole very successful at the elections; and its size and 
prominence is good evidence of the fairly rapid rise of 
the Meiji bourgeoisie. In general, their sympathies lay 
with the popular rights parties; and though in 1890 the 
shizoku still provided the leadership of the parliamentary 
movement, its grass-roots strength was already coming from 
the rural and urban entrepreneurs. The following is a 
thumb-nail sketch of a typical representative of this 
plutocratic group and one of the 'new men' of the Meiji 
era. Its subject is Yumoto Yoshinori, who in I89O was 
elected to the House of Representatives where he sat as 
a pro-Government Member.
This gentleman, who is standing as a candidate 
for the House of Representatives in the Fourth 
Constituency (Kita Saitaraa, Osato, Hara, Hanzawa, 
and Obusuma sub-prefectures) of Saitama prefecture, 
is a manufacturer of sake in Saitama-mura in Kita
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Saitama sub-prefecture and a notable man of 
property in that area. Rising forty this year, 
he played a part in politics at the time of the 
restoration, and gained a great deal of popularity 
by this. He was a member of the prefectural 
assembly from the time it first opened; in 1886, 
he was again elected /"to the assembly_7. In the 
meantime, he became very interested in education 
and founded a number of schools, followed by a 
company for employing samurai of the former Oshi 
clan. He has made the manufacture of Gyota 
stockings, which are a product of that area, a 
very prosperous £~indust ry_7* Although his 
influence has become so great, he is of a 
retiring disposition and does not boast,^
It is clear, when one considers these four categories 
of candidates as a whole, that what was being put into 
operation in 1890 was an upper middle class democracy with 
respect to candidatures for the Diet as well as in the 
matter of electoral qualifications. The most immediate 
reason for this state of affairs was obviously the fact 
that a citizen had to be paying not less than ¥15 a year 
in direct national taxes in order to be eligible as a
u
THNS 17-6-90
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candidate. This requirement prevented the great majority 
of the people from standing for election; and with the 
poor thus removed, the richer members of any local 
community had the field to themselves. In terms of round 
figures, we may calculate the number of persons eligible 
for election in 1890 as having been roughly 400,000; since 
the same tax qualification, coupled with a slightly lower 
age qualification, produced an electorate of 450,000.
This figure of 400,000 was exactly 1% of the total 
population of forty million.
This said, however, it is important to note that 
within the social classes not excluded by the ¥15 a year 
barrier, it was not necessarily the most monied elements 
that predominated among the candidates as a whole and among 
the successful candidates in particular. For one thing, 
the fifteen richest inhabitants of a fu or ken elected 
their own special representative to the House of Peers, 
and so were unlikely to be directly embroiled in the House 
of Representatives elections. Apart from this, persons of 
the local millionaire class do not seem to have been either 
very interested in representative institutions or over 
popular with the general run of electors. A particular 
contest was sometimes summarized in the press as having 
been a triangular match between ’money power1, ’innate
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abilities’, and ’physical force1 - in circumstances like 
these, the victory of the first was by no means a foregone 
conclusion, as the voters’ sentiments often lay with the 
second. Moreover, too rash a use of ’money power’ could 
easily bring down a criminal prosecution on the heads of 
its manipulators.
Finally, this reading of the electoral situation - 
that is that the candidates were ipso facto men of means 
but not, generally speaking, extravagantly wealthy - is 
borne out by some data supplied by Suematsu Kencho on the 
pecuniary standing of the three hundred Members of the 
first House of Representatives. He has shown that the 
average amount of tax paid by those Members of the House 
who sat for twenty-six of the forty-five fu and ken was 
less than ¥100 per annum, and that the average tax payment 
per Member for the House as a whole was ¥126 per annum. 
Only five indivuals in the newly elected House paid more 
than ¥1,000 a year in taxes, and at least forty-eight paid 
less than ¥50.
Two important elements in the upper and upper middle 
classes did not appear at all in the roll of candidates. 
One of these was the officer corps of the Army and Navy, 
no matter whether its members were on the active list or
5
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3, 
pp. 204-205, 209-210.
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temporarily retired therefrom. The other one consisted 
of those persons belonging to aristocratic families who 
did not actually have the title. The first of these two 
groups was excluded from taking part in the election by 
law; the second refrained from choice. Aristocratic 
younger sons descended from the old daimyo stock had 
maybe a family disdain for associating v/ith other commoners 
on terms of equality, or perhaps it was simply that they 
had inherited their forbears1 vacuity in matters political.
As for the less historic families of the peerage, i.e. 
those which had been ennobled for services rendered at 
the time of the restoration or after 1868, since they did 
not form a landed upper class with its roots deep in the 
traditions and local hierarchies of the countryside, it 
is probable that they had neither the wish nor the 
opportunity to place junior members in the House of 
Representatives.
We must now turn to consider the ways in which a candidate 
was appointed to stand for, or otherwise made his candidature 
known in, a constituency. Broadly speaking, there were 
three techniques by means of which this was done. A person 
either simply announced that he was standing for election; 
or he was adopted as its official candidate by one of 
the recognized national parties; or else he was nominated
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as a desirable Representative by a number of local 
residents.
Into the first of these categories fell the so-called 
’self-nominated’ candidates. Candidatures of this sort 
were usually, though not always, rather hopeless if not 
downright frivolous. The ’genealogy candidate’ in Okayama 
prefecture, mentioned earlier, was by no means atypical of 
them. An even more striking example was furnished by 
Wakayama prefecture, where an otherwise decorous campaign 
was enlivened by the activities of a person named Shiga 
Horissei.
This man was the second son of a sake manufacturer, 
and had been locally famous for his eccentric behaviour 
for some time. Shortly before the election campaign 
opened, he spent a week meeting the people of Wakayama 
city. The reason he had given for doing this was that he 
was about to depart for Europe in order to complete his 
studies in philosophy. When he did leave town, however, 
it was not overseas he went. He merely climbed a not too 
distant mountain, Koya-san, which is one of the most 
historic Buddhist sites in all Japan, and started living 
on its summit - presumably in one of the temples. Once 
the election campaign had begun ( 'perhaps under the 
impression that the time to save all beings had come'), he
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suddenly left Koya-san and, returning to Wakayama, 
established himself in a temple dedicated to the Amida 
Buddha which stood on an island in the middle of the city. 
From there, he introduced himself to the Wakayama citizenry 
as a non-party candidate for the House of Representatives. 
Horses were tethered and rickshaws lined up inside the 
temple gate,
while he himself, attired in robes of spotless 
purple and a white sash, with his hair hanging 
down two feet at the back •••• gravely occupied 
a room, and was interviewed by admiring gentry 
and citizens. 6
Candidatures sponsored by one of the big national 
parties or else by an influential local club were usually 
less colourful than this, though they enjoyed of course 
a better chance of success. In some areas like Niigata 
prefecture (Daido Club versus Kaishin-to), Yokohama city 
(jiyu-to versus Kaishin-to), Kochi prefecture (Jiyu-to 
versus National Party), and Kumamoto prefecture (National 
Rights Party versus Kaishin-to), the competition between 
candidates affiliated to rival parties dominated the 
electoral scene, and the campaign resolved itself into 
what was virtually an orthodox two-party contest. In other
~5~  ""
TNNS 17-6-90.
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places, notably Yamaguchi prefecture, there was a single
well established regional association which was able to
field a strong team of candidates. As a rule, the system
of party nominations worked tolerably well, always allowing
for the fact that it could lead to a situation in which
two or even more members of the same party or closely
allied parties competed with one another.^ There was
one case of a Kaishin-to member in Tochigi prefecture
resigning from the party because he disapproved of its
8choice of candidate; and at a meeting held in Nagano 
prefecture, three hundred Liberals unanimously agreed to
9disown a certain candidate. Ruptures of this kind were 
rare, however, even though the parties seemed sometimes 
ready to give their blessing to likely looking candidates 
who did not necessarily accept all their policies.
Bona fide party nominations were frequent enough and 
an indication of the way in which elections were to be 
held on an increasingly greater scale in the future; but 
non-party endorsements of popularly chosen Independents 
were just as common and in many respects more characteristic
7
TNNS 29-6-90.
8
TNNS 21-6-90.
9
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of the political conditions of the time. Characteristic, 
because the history of these local nominations draws 
attention to two of the outstanding traits of the election 
campaign, and by implication of the political world as a 
whole:- the influence of regionalism, and the influence 
of personality.
Sometimes these two influences, which were present in 
one form or another in virtually every constituency, were 
seen to be in conflict with each other, as in a newspaper 
report on the Second Constituency in Saitama prefecture.
In that one area alone, there were no fewer than two dozen 
candidates for two seats; and though representatives of 
the Jiyu-to and Kaishin-to were among them, the correspondent 
explicitly stated that:-
The election in this constituency is a 
contest between personality-ism and regionalism, 
rather than strife between parties. In other 
words, those who put their faith in personalities 
hold that they should return men of the finest 
possible character, irrespective of whether they 
are inhabitants of the constituency or not; and 
regionalism means that at all costs one should 
elect a native of the district, 10
On the other hand, in other constituencies, for example the
Second Constituency in Fukui prefecture, the strongest
challenger as a personality was a permanent resident of the
area at the time of the election,
10
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I n  one r e s p e c t  t h i s  s o r t  o f  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  b e tw een  
p e r s o n a l i t y - i s m  and r e g i o n a l i s m  was more a p p a r e n t  t h a n  
r e a l .  The Law o f  E l e c t i o n  l a i d  down t h a t  a c a n d i d a t e  h ad  
t o  be p a y in g  h i s  1£15 a y e a r  i n  d i r e c t  t a x e s  i n  t h e  f u  o r  
k en  f o r  w hich  he w ish ed  t o  be r e t u r n e d .  T h i s  m e a n t ,  i n  
e f f e c t ,  t h a t  a p e r s o n  c h o sen  f o r  h i s  o u t s t a n d i n g  a b i l i t i e s  
was u s u a l l y  someone who had  b e e n  b o r n  i n  t h e  a r e a  and 
c o n t i n u e d  t o  pay t a x e s  on p r o p e r t y  owned t h e r e ,  b u t  who 
had  a c t u a l l y  l e f t  i t  t o  f o l l o w  a c a r e e r  e l s e w h e r e .  Thus 
Suematsu Kencho, t h e  C h i e f  o f  t h e  L o c a l  Government A f f a i r s  
Bureau  i n  Tokyo, r e t u r n e d  ’home* t o  Fukuoka p r e f e c t u r e  i n  
o r d e r  t o  s t a n d  f o r  e l e c t i o n .  I n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  t h e n ,  t h e  
* r e g i o n a l i s t f c a n d i d a t e s  m e n t io n e d  above must be t h o u g h t  o f  
a s  p e o p l e  who had  n e v e r  l i v e d  o u t s i d e  t h e i r  n a t i v e  d i s t r i c t s  
f o r  any l e n g t h  o f  t i m e .
R e g io n a l i s m  was by no means c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  c o u n t r y s i d e ,  
where i t  most  o f t e n  a p p e a r e d  i n  t h e  g u i s e  o f  e ach  sub ­
p r e f e c t u r e  (g u n )  i n  a c o n s t i t u e n c y  p u t t i n g  f o r w a r d  i t s  
own c a n d i d a t e  o r  c a n d i d a t e s .  E x a c t l y  t h e  same g e n e r a l  t r e n d  
was v e r y  much i n  e v id e n c e  i n  t h e  c i t i e s ,  t o o ;  and  t h e r e ,  
p e r h a p s  p a r o c h i a l i s m 1 would be a b e t t e r  t e r m .  A good 
example  o f  t h e  s o r t  o f  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  c o u l d  e a s i l y  a r i s e  
was p r o v i d e d  by t h e  F i f t h  C o n s t i t u e n c y  i n  Tokyo. T h i s  
c o n s t i t u e n c y  was made up  o f  t h e  two wards  ( k u )  o f  Honjo 
and  Fukagawa. At t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  cam paign ,  t h e
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voters in Honjo chose the former mayor of their ward and 
deputy president of the Tokyo stock exchange, Ota Sane, 
as their candidate for the seat; and since he was popular 
in his own district at any rate, his election seemed 
certain. The residents of Fukagawa, however, were 
disappointed at not having a candidate of their own to 
pit against the one put up by their neighbours in Honjo. 
Therefore they decided to nominate one of the most notable 
men in their own midst, Shibuzawa Eiichi, and sent a 
deputation to him to ask him to agree to stand.
Shibuzawa was one of the most outstanding representatives 
of the ’new class’ of Meiji Japan. His family had been 
for generations wealthy farmers, indigo manufacturers, and 
money-lenders in Saitama prefecture. After the restoration, 
he had held a government post until 1873» and. had 
subsequently pursued a brilliant career in banking. Despite 
these successes, he was not willing to serve in the 
House of Representatives. Accordingly, when the delegates 
of the Fukagawa voters met him, and complained, in words 
which are themselves quite illuminating, that
if there was a person in Honjo ward, there was 
also somebody in Fukagawa ward; and that they did 
not relish the idea of leaving their own shrine 
in the alcove in order to carry round somebody 
else’s shrine on their backs 11
II
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he rejected their proposal. It transpired that he had 
already had several invitations to stand before this 
particular delegation visited him; but he was firm in 
his resolve not to enter parliamentary politics, even 
going so far as to declare that he would resign the seat 
if elected. For their part, the Fukagawa electors, not 
to be outdone, decided to nominate Shibuzawa as a candidate 
regardless of his refusal, and sent him a jocular Ultimatum1 
in which they said that they intended to vote for ’the 
late Shibuzawa Eiichi*.
Of course, candidates were usually less reluctant, 
and the business of sponsoring them a good deal less 
rumbustious, than the above incident would lead us to 
believe. Pre-selection of candidates, both party and non- 
party, by a ballot of voters was quite common, but not the 
general rule. Okamoto Takeo (Second Constituency, Mie 
prefecture) and Seki Naohiko (Third Constituency, Wakayama 
prefecture) were both ’popular nominees’, who were invited 
to stand by the voters of the area concerned without the 
formality of a pre-selection ballot. On the other hand, 
elections to choose the local candidate were definitely 
held in - to name but a few places - Tokyo’s Eighth and 
Ninth Constituencies; the Second Constituency, Fukui 
prefecture; the Third Constituency, Fukushima prefecture; 
and the Third Constituency, Shizuoka prefecture*
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The situation in the capital’s Eighth Constituency
(Shitaya and Hongo wards) was extremely confused, with
several hopefuls competing for the position of ’favourite son’
in each ward without any of them having a clear chance of 
12success. In Hongo, the electors were asked to say in
advance whom they wished to elect, but this investigation 
did not lead to any decisive results. Similarly, in 
Shitaya, there was an organized pre-selection poll, but 
neither of the two persons who came top were eager to 
stand for the constituency. Eventually, three leading 
local residents in Shitaya decided to hold a ’ward party’ 
at a restaurant in Ueno, in order to try and reach some 
measure of general agreement on the question of who would 
best represent the ward in the House of Representatives. 
Invitations were sent to more than two hundred and fifty 
important wardsmen (there were only 126 voters in the ward), 
but no more than thirty-eight of them bothered to attend 
the meeting. Those present listened to a number of 
individuals putting forward their ideas on how to set about 
choosing candidates, and there were moments of angry 
argument. Just when matters were taking a turn for the 
acrimonious worst, somebody got up and made ’a half mocking,
12
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half jocular, conciliatory speech; and as a result of 
this, the place gradually quietened down*. The ward 
party ended happily enough, qua party, with a drinking 
session; but, as an election nomination meeting, it had 
done little good.
In the Ninth Constituency (Yotsuya, Koishikawa, and 
Ushigome wards), Tokyo fu, the position was rather better 
than in the Eighth Constituency, in that each of the three 
component wards was able to pin its hopes on a single 
individual.13 Consequently three rival candidates 
emerged to contest the election itself, and all of them 
enjoyed the united support of their own particular wards.
In Ushigome, the twenty-eight persons who represented the 
ward in the Tokyo City Assembly, met together and, after 
a formal and secret ballot, decided that Hatoyama Kazuo 
(a lawyer) should be the official ’ward candidate’.
These 'ward nominations’, by whatsoever methods they 
were achieved, were clearly important at the time; and, 
as historical evidence, their importance does not diminish 
in retrospect. They show better than anything else the 
intense localism of the campaign of 1890. In the cities, 
more often than not, it was a case of each ward in a multi­
ward constituency putting up its own candidate. In the
13 TNNS 27-6-90
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country areas, also, a constituency containing several 
sub-prefectures (gun) usually had several candidates, each 
of whom would be a man of note in his own particular sub- 
prefecture but would probably enjoy little favour outside 
it. It is against this background of keenly felt and 
narrow local loyalties that we should see the growth of 
a parliamentary and party system in Meiji Japan.
There were, of course, a number of exceptions to this 
general condition of gun or ku localism. A few 
constituencies, e.g. Yokohama or the Second Constituency 
in Aichi prefecture, consisted of only one ward or sub­
prefecture; and in them, the ways in which candidates 
were nominated and ran their campaigns naturally differed 
in some respects from the standard inter-ward and inter- 
sub-prefectural contests. In other cases, though a 
constituency might have had a number of gun within its 
boundaries, one of the competitors was a man of such 
commanding influence that he enjoyed a wide measure of 
support throughout the constituency as a whole, and not just 
in a single part of it. An instance of this was the Second 
Constituency (Yoshida and Sakai sub-prefectures) in Fukui 
prefecture. There, the election of one of the candidates, 
Sugita Teiichi, was a virtual certainty from a time long 
before the campaign actually opened. Sugita was immensely
307
popular all over Fukui prefecture, and a prominent member 
of the national Liberal movement as well. At the time of 
the election, he was chairman of the prefectural assembly, 
and living in Sakai sub-prefecture. However his candidature 
was formally approved on 7 and 8 June not only by the 
village headmen and voters of Sakai, but also by those of 
Yoshida sub-prefecture.1 -^ Here we have an example of the 
*local nomination* and * party nomination* aspects of the 
campaign becoming indistinguishable.
Constituencies where there was this degree of fusion 
between the nascent national party movement and older 
district loyalties were by no means uncommon. To give 
just one more example - the Third Constituency in Fukushima 
prefecture returned as its Members two leading Daido Club 
politicians and men of affairs, Kono Hironaka and Suzuki 
Manjiro. Both of them were locally popular as well as 
nationally famous; and a formal nomination-of-candidates- 
meeting held by the Daido Club in Shirakawa-machi on 19 June 
was carried out in the spirit of a public endorsement rally^ 
Even though there were five sub-prefectures in this 
constituency, Kono alone polled more than 1500 votes.
—
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One of the most elaborate pre-selection ballots of
the election was that conducted in the Third Constituency,
16Shizuoka prefecture. The organization which initiated 
it was known as the Natives Party - clearly a strictly 
regional body. Since the constituency involved was a rural 
one, the holding of such a ballot required more time and 
trouble than it would have done in the towns. What the 
Natives Party did was to take a poll of its supporters in 
every village in the constituency. These ballots were then 
all sent to the town of Pujieda-machi, where on 6 June 
they were counted at a meeting of all those interested in 
securing the Natives Party nomination. A total of almost 
1,000 votes had been cast in this pre-selection ballot; the 
counting of them took place in a local restaurant, and 
lasted some twelve hours. Whether the checking of the votes 
was so drawn out because the pre-selection candidates 
themselves were acting as scrutineers, or whether it was 
because they were working in surroundings conducive to 
relaxation, is anybody’s guess.
These examples of pre-selection of candidates by ballots 
or other means, and they could be duplicated a number of 
times, give a picture of fairly vigorous local interest and 
community participation in the election of 1890. This
16
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picture itself reinforces other evidence of regionalism 
and communal self-government under the old feudal order. 
Moreover, in so far as ’local nominations’ were substantially 
the same as ’party nominations’, it is clear that the 
recently imported party movement was sending down some of 
its roots deep into the traditional experience of the people. 
This was happening to some degree in at least one half of 
the total number of constituencies; and in their case, it 
is possible to see that Meiji politics were beginning to 
change the old regional and personal ties into a national 
and party system of eventual government.
On the other hand, what was the case with the remaining 
half of the total number of constituencies, where the 
party movement was either not very strong or not very 
successful? Did the desire to elect at all costs a local 
’somebody’ mean that the candidate returned in such areas 
was usually a national ’nobody’? Not at all. It was 
perhaps inevitable that an individual’s continued residence 
in his native district should have sometimes outweighed 
different and possibly more sterling qualifications in 
other individuals, when it came to making a pre-selection of 
candidates. Yet the persons nominated by groups of voters 
with any worthwhile claim to represent the community or 
communities of the constituency were often men of real
310
distinction. The few names mentioned so far - Suematsu 
Kencho, Okamoto Takeo, Seki Naohiko, Ota Sane, Shibuzawa 
Eiichi, Hatoyama Kazuo - were those of people who had all 
achieved a measure of national fame or worldly success, 
each in his own way. Likewise, Tsuda Mamichi, the person 
who was eventually prevailed upon by the electors in the 
Hongo ward of Tokyo to stand as their candidate, was until 
his nomination a member of the Senate (Genro-in) and later 
became the first Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
Thus, even in those constituencies where party politics had 
not yet made much impact, the gulf between local and 
national interests was often bridged by the fact that the 
electors for reasons of parish pride preferred to sponsor 
somebody of widely recognized status. This is true, of 
course, only of those non-party constituencies where there 
was a definite attempt by at least one responsible group 
of citizens to nominate a suitable candidate. In many 
constituencies, no such attempt was made, and they fell by 
default into the hands of the ’self-nominated1 Independents.
The practice of local nomination by a group representing 
the general body of voters in a district carried with it 
the obvious danger of splitting a constituency into several 
mutually antagonistic territorial parts. Nevertheless, in 
those areas not touched by party politics, it was better
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on balance to have such a practice; because the 
Independent candidates so chosen were usually of higher 
calibre than their self-nominated namesakes.
All this speaks well for the political good sense of 
the voters and leading personalities in the areas concerned. 
At the same time, it should be remembered that their 
ability to pick the best man for the job was facilitated 
by the absence of party politics in those places, by the 
small size of the electorates, and - last but not least - 
by the seeming infrequency of serious local issues of the 
sort that would have brought a little community into sharp 
conflict with the outside world or divided it hopelessly 
against itself. At ground level, the election may be seen 
as a complicated tangle of regional and personal rivalries. 
In those places where the system of local nomination worked 
best, it was hardly ever regarded as an opportunity to 
seek redress for injuries suffered by a community (i.e. 
a city ward, or a rural sub-prefecture) as a whole, or 
else to find new fields for its internal squabbles to 
express themselves in. Generally speaking, the most 
desirable type of candidate for the non-party nominations 
was one who had established a reputation outside the local 
community, and yet was prepared to look after its interests 
if and when he was returned to the Diet. Seki Naohiko owed
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much of his electoral strength to the support given him
by relatives, who had gone on living in Wakayama after he
himself had left it. Yet his bid for the Third Constituency
in that prefecture was undoubtedly helped by the name he
had made for himself as a friend of the people a few
months before the election. In 1889, Wakayama suffered
extensive flood damage. Seki had set up a relief fund in
Tokyo as soon as news of the disaster reached the capital;
and when the Governor of Wakayama, accompanied by the
chairman of the prefectural assembly and other delegates,
visited To£yo in order to enlist the aid of the Government,
he did all that he could to make their mission successful. ^
For the inhabitants of Shitaya ward in Tokyo, the
general election did coincide with a local issue of
considerable dimensions. They had set themselves against
a proposal by the Japan Railways Company to construct a
line across a section of the inner city from Ueno to 
18Akihabara. The Company wished to do this in order to 
complete its network of lines in that area, and had made 
plans to lay a surface railway as this would have been the 
cheapest method of construction. The people of Shitaya,
T7 TNNS 17-6-90.
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whose homes and businesses lay in the path of the proposed 
line, objected strenuously to the scheme, on the grounds 
that it was unnecessary, dangerous, and harmful to the 
commercial prosperity of their ward* A public petition 
signed by more than three thousand of them was presented 
to the authorities in April, and the Government then 
opened an official Court of Enquiry on the matter. Since 
it came so close in point of time to the opening of the 
parliamentary campaign, this purely local dispute was bound 
to get caught up in the general scrimmaging for popular 
favour that went on in the ward. At least one candidate 
(unsuccessful) made as much capital as he could out of 
his part in taking the lead in the struggle against the 
Railway Company.
One of the most interesting contests in the election 
took place in the Twelfth Constituency in Tokyo fu - an 
outlying, rural region. There, the principal protagonists 
were Hirabayashi Kyubei and his nephew Takagi Masatoshi.
Both Hirabayashi and Takagi were self-nominated candidates, 
standing with a good deal of local support; and both of 
them were members of the fu assembly. Some of the villagers 
in the constituency were said to have given their support 
to Hirabayashi; because when the assembly passed a by-law 
against the carrying of manure during the day-time, he
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had been in favour of allowing this so long as the
19buckets used for the job were covered. Even though 
the accounts of this particular contest mention this fact, 
it is clear that the play of legitimate interests of this 
sort was negligible in comparison with the force of 
longer standing rivalries between different villages in 
the area. In the event, after a campaign that involved 
family quarrels as well as village feuds, Hirabayashi was 
runne r-up•
It could sometimes happen, especially in the single­
ward constituencies of the great towns but also in rural 
sub-prefectures forming part of a constituency, that the 
same locality would produce two or more popularly-chosen or 
popularly-favoured candidates. For example, in the Third 
Constituency (Kyobashi ward) in Tokyo, there were at least
four candidates enjoying approximately the same amount of
20support from the electors. In a few places, the local
’bosses', gangster or otherwise, were strong enough to
/
dictate who should be chosen as candidates, and to affect,
21if not actually to determine, the results of the voting. 
These instances of a number of strong candidates in one 
small area, or of boss control, were but extreme examples
15TENS 2-7-90
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of the influence of personality. This influence - 
together with a greater one, localism, and a lesser one, 
sectional interests - was responsible for the general 
pattern of constituency by constituency nominations and 
campaigns. These three factors were in their own way 
just as important as the 'national politics’ of the election, 
i.e. the role of the Diet, extension of national rights, 
and so on. With them and on them the parliamentary system 
had to work.
(11) Speech Meetings and Canvassing.
Certain constituencies, both inside and outside the
cities, suffered from a dearth of suitable candidates.
The Shibuzawa contretemps, and the unwillingness of some
people in the Hongo-Shitaya wards to stand for election,
show this. Similarly, no candidates at all had been
sponsored or come forward in the Fifth Constituency,
22Yamaguchi prefecture, as on 10 June; and candidates chosen 
for the island of Sado (Niigata prefecture) and for a 
district of Hyogo prefecture did not leave Tokyo until 
26 June, because of delays in nominating them.2^
_
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Such late starts were quite exceptional, however, 
and most of the candidates began their campaigns during 
May and continued them through June. Tactics employed 
during these campaigns varied widely, covering the whole 
gamut of the permissible and the not so permissible - from 
speech meetings, canvassing, posters, newspaper advertisements, 
social gatherings, and other forms of entertainment on the 
one hand, to bribery, slander, violence, crude intimidation, 
and trickery on the other.
With candidates who ran a 1 clean* campaign, by far 
the most popular way of making their views known to the 
electors and meeting them individually was to organize a 
speech meeting, followed by a party of one kind or another.
A candidate no longer resident in his native prefecture 
naturally found it convenient to return home for a short 
while, and base his campaign on a quick tour of the 
constituency for which he wished to be elected, making 
speeches and meeting as many of its inhabitants as he could - 
sometimes finding that he had to leave it at that, and 
go back to Tokyo before the date of the poll. In such a 
case, of course, a strong candidate relied on his 
supporters in the constituency to canvass for him.
Suematsu Kencho (independent), who was returned for 
the Eighth Constituency in Fukuoka prefecture, waged a
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campaign along these general lines. He left Tokyo to
start nursing his constituency early in May, and apparently
did not go away from it again until after the election.
During this period of eight weeks or so, he gave a large
number of speeches and attended many social functions,
A newspaper report gives some details about three of these
engagements. On 16 May, he visited the secondary school
at Toyotsu, and made a speech to its students at the
request of the headmaster. On 18 May, he was invited to
a banquet given by a Mr Koimai, who lived in a village
called Unshima in Koge sub-prefecture. The banquet was
was attended by more than four hundred other guests.
Finally, on 21 May, Suematsu was present at a social
gathering held at another village (Nishisaigawa) in
Nakatsu sub-prefecture, and was asked to address the 
24meeting.
From this account of his activities, it is apparent 
that Suematsu's campaign exemplified the method of 
personal endeavour at its best and most successful. The 
candidate travelled widely throughout the constituency,
—
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speaking and meeting people wherever possible. His 
energetic approach to the problem of electioneering and 
the general esteem it earned him stirred the opposition 
faction in the constituency, the Buzen Club, into 
copying his methods. It, too, held speech meetings in 
Toyotsu and elsewhere, and tried hard to recruit members.
As has been said, Suematsu Kencho seems to have spent 
all of two months on his campaign. This period was probably 
rather longer than was usually the case with Outside1 
candidates, and certainly longer than some of them allowed 
for their final campaigning. For instance, Suematsu's 
namesake and fellow official, Suematsu Saburo, did not 
arrive in the First Constituency, Yamaguchi prefecture, 
for which he was elected, until after 20 June. His campaign, 
once it did get under way, resembled Suematsu Kencho's 
in that it consisted of a series of speech meetings and 
parties. J Though Saburo (a Ministry of Justice official) 
was so late in putting in his last appearance before the 
election, he had visited the constituency on a number of 
occasions in the previous twelve months in order to prepare 
the way for his candidature.
Okamoto Takeo did not over-favour his constituency with 
his presence. No doubt, as a newspaper editor, he found
25
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it difficult to leave Tokyo for any length of time; but 
the fact remains that he was, so far as can be judged 
from press reports, in his constituency (Second Constituency, 
Mie prefecture) for only five days - that is, from 25 May 
to 30 May. ' On the other hand, he made full use of his 
five days. He started by holding a speech meeting in a 
theatre in one of the chief towns of the area, Yokkaichi 
(Mie gun), entertaining his audience to a party afterwards. 
Then, he travelled to Tsu (Ano gun), another important 
local centre, to repeat the procedure. 27 May was taken 
up with another big speech meeting and party in the village 
of Isshinden (Ange gun); and two days later, on 29 May, 
he delivered his final address to an audience in Kameyama 
village (Suzuka gun), following it, too, with an entertainment. 
Thus, within a week, Okamoto had visited and talked to 
voters in each of the main divisions of his constituency.
His tour, rapid though it was, was hardly perfunctory•
Speech meetings, when arranged, were popular, and the 
candidates do not seem to have had any cause to worry about 
whether they could attract an audience. Of course, the 
fact that a party generally came after the speeches may 
have had something to do with this. Nevertheless, 
disregarding this last point for the moment, the following 
audience figures are quite impressive, especially when one
26 “
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remembers t h a t  t h e  a v e ra g e  number o f  v o t e r s  p e r  c o n s t i t u e n c y  
was o n ly  1 , 7 5 0 : -  25 May, S a i ta m a  p r e f e c t u r e ,  *more t h a n
t h r e e  h u n d red * ;  17 J u n e ,  I b a r a k i  p r e f e c t u r e ,  *more t h a n  
f i f t e e n  h u n d red * ;  18 J u n e ,  S h iz u o k a  p r e f e c t u r e ,  *more t h a n  
t h r e e  th o u s a n d * ;  26 J u n e ,  Fukushima p r e f e c t u r e ,  *more 
t h a n  one t h o u s a n d * .  The lo w e s t  a u d ie n c e  f i g u r e  I  have  so 
f a r  come a c r o s s  i s  * tw e n ty  o r  t h i r t y * .  T h is  was i n  a 
v i l l a g e  (Y o sh id a  mura i n  Mino s u b - p r e f e c t u r e )  i n  Okayama 
p r e f e c t u r e ,  where a sp e ec h  m e e t in g  on 14 June  a p p a r e n t l y  
c l a s h e d  w i t h  a p e r i o d  o f  e x c e p t i o n a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  r i c e -  
f i e l d s .  Those v i l l a g e r s  who d i d  abandon  t h e i r  c r o p s  f o r  
p o l i t i c s  h e a r d  t h e  s p e a k e r  t a l k  a b o u t  t h e  n eed  t o  e l e c t  
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  ( h e  was one h i m s e l f ) ,  r e s p o n s i b l e  C a b i n e t s ,
27
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  sy s te m s  o f  Germany and F r a n c e ,  and  so f o r t h .
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  sp e e c h  m e e t i n g s  were 
a t t e n d e d  n o t  on ly  by t h e  e l e c t o r s  o f  a  d i s t r i c t  b u t  a l s o  by 
o t h e r  i n h a b i t a n t s  as  w e l l .  T h is  i s  c o n f i r m e d  by t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o f  women i n  t h e  a u d i e n c e s  on a number o f  o c c a s i o n s .
What a p p e a r s  t o  have b e e n  t h e  most  s p e c t a c u l a r  sp eech  
m e e t in g  o f  t h e  e n t i r e  campaign  was h e l d  i n  t h e  m ain  c e n t r e  
o f  A i c h i  p r e f e c t u r e  -  Nagoya c i t y .  I t  was a r r a n g e d  f o r  
t h r e e  s u c c e s s i v e  days  -  8 ,  9 ,  and 10 J u n e .  The e l e c t o r a l  
s t r u g g l e  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  k e e n  a l l  o v e r  A ich i  p r e f e c t u r e ,  b u t
27 3
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nowhere was it fiercer than in the First Constituency 
(Nagoya), where the principal candidates for the single 
seat were Kunishima Haku (Koin Club) and Horibe Katsushiro 
(Nagoya Discussion Society, and chairman of the city 
assembly). The speech meeting was organized by the Koin 
Club, and took place in one of the city halls. Though 
formal invitations were sent to only five hundred voters, 
more than three thousand people attended on each of the 
three days. Kunishima himself spoke on three main topics - 
the reduction of taxes and the position of ministers of 
state, on the first day; pruning administrative costs and 
the enactment of new legislation, on the second day; and 
problems of national defence, on the third day. Other 
Koin Club members spoke in support of Kunishima on each 
occasion, and attacked the opposition groups. After the 
meeting, printed notes of Kunishima1s speeches were
28distributed to electors throughout the constituency.
The correspondent reporting this particular speech 
meeting found time to include a short description of the 
scene inside the hall where it was held. Such descriptions 
are not very common.
2Ö
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Across the entrance to the meeting place 
was stretched a great curtain with the two 
words LIBERTY FOREVER written on it. In 
addition, national sun emblems and flags, 
inscribed with LONG LIVE THE EMPEROR, were 
standing crossed with each other here and 
there. Around the dais, there was a big 
banner with the words SINCERITY MOVES HEAVEN 
in large letters on it. Moreover, they had 2g 
added brilliancy by installing electric lights.
The nineteenth century Japanese were no strangers to the 
idea of showmanship - in the theatre, religious festivals, 
and elsewhere. Here, we have an instance of this tradition 
being successfully married to the more modern requirements 
of Liberal polemics and national elan.
It was quite usual for more than one speaker to take 
the platform at a meeting. Generally, the candidate was 
introduced by a leading local supporter, and after he 
had made his speech, other sympathizers would speak in 
turn. Sometimes a single speech meeting or a series of 
speech meetings would be organized by local supporters of 
a particular party, without the participation of a candidate. 
With the exception of Itagaki, who was ineligible by 
reason of his peerage to sit in the House of Representatives, 
none of the leading national politicians went on a ‘grand 
tour’ to raise support for .their cause in all quarters of 
the Empire; and most of the candidates confined their 
campaigning to their own constituencies. However, Nakajima
29 TNNS 13-6-90.
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Matagoro, who contested a seat in Fukui prefecture, 
spoke at a meeting held in Tokyo on 28 June; and well known 
candidates sometimes spoke on behalf of political colleagues 
in constituencies adjoining their own. In the villages, 
the customary venue for a speech meeting was either a 
private house, a temple, or some sort of public hall; in 
the cities, speech meetings were held in theatres or in 
large assembly rooms. Open air meetings were not common. 
Frequently, a speech meeting was interrupted or brought 
to a tumultuous and premature close by the intervention of 
hecklers and semi-professional rowdies (soshi). This is a 
point which will be taken up later.
As a variant of the orthodox, one-party type of speech
meeting, a public debate between two or more rival
candidates was sometimes attempted. One of the more
successful of these, comparatively speaking, was organized
30in the Eighth Constituency, Hiroshima prefecture. Persons 
representing eleven villages asked the three candidates for 
the seat if they would meet together and publicly state 
their views on the Imperial Diet in turn, so that the 
electors in their area would have a chance to decide 
impartially which of them was the most deserving of their 
support. One of the candidates, a former local official, 
replied that he did not yet have any special point of 
30“  —
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view on the functions of the Diet, Hearing this, the
voters' delegation promptly withdrew their invitation.
The remaining two candidates, Inoue Kakugoro (Daido Club)
and Tsugawa Migiyumi (member of the prefectural assembly),
both accepted, even though the latter also stated that he
did not have any definite ideas on the subject proposed
for debate. As a result a public debate was arranged
for 13 June - to be held in one of the village temples.
Elsewhere, in the Sixth Constituency of Kanagawa
prefecture, some of the local people tried to arrange a
31similar public debate among the three candidates. This 
time, only one of the three agreed to the suggestion. He 
was Mizushima Yasufaro, a member of the prefectural assembly. 
Therefore, when the meeting was opened - again in a temple - 
at Isebara on 16 June, it took the form of a straightforward 
speech meeting on behalf of the Mizushima faction. The 
idea of holding these public debates may have been a 
development of traditional Buddhist practice. Itinerant 
priests frequently visited local temples, and on occasion 
there were formal disputations between different groups 
of clerics.
Mention has been made of the social gatherings that 
normally followed speech meetings. These parties (konshinkai)
31 TNHS 21-6-90
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served an obvious and useful purpose in enabling the 
candidate to meet his supporters and the voters in 
a rather less ceremonious atmosphere than that of the 
debating hall. When the candidate himself was an honest 
man or capable politician, their function was no doubt 
restricted to this; but if he was not a very good orator, 
or if he was not above trying to corrupt the electors, then 
the konshinkai, instead of coming after the speech meetings 
in the general priorities of campaigning, could easily 
take precedence over them, and even replace them altogether. 
The border line between legitimate entertainment and 
outright corruption was necessarily ill-defined and 
correspondingly easy to cross. A party could be arranged, 
with the tacit assumption that those invited would feel 
obliged to repay their host with their votes in due course.
The absence of any legal limit to campaign expenses
encouraged this type of electioneering; and there can be
little doubt that it was highly successful in a number of
places. For example, a message from Gifu prefecture
reported that in conditions of economic depression, the
restaurant trade alone was flourishing ’with guests at
all hours of the day and night, while singing and music 
,32 •issue forth.' A few weeks later, a telegram from Fukui 
prefecture announced that:- 
32
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Among the candidates in the Third Constituency, 
the campaign of Mr Nakajima Matagoro’s party 
has been specially noteworthy for its impartiality; 
but it seems that the banquets of the opposition 
party are gradually influencing public opinion. 33
34Even though a second cable contradicted the first one 
with the news that the ’mobile speeches’ of the Nakajima 
faction had overcome the ’banquet opposition’ of the 
Nagata party, it was all to no avail. Nagata won the 
election, without having to answer any bribery charges.
On occasion, these methods of persuasion back-fired 
on their users. One candidate in Tokyo was apparently 
very doubtful from the start of his chances of election; 
yet since he was a local ’somebody’, he felt that his 
prestige would suffer if he failed to stand. Consequently, 
he stuck up posters in his home ward announcing that he 
was a candidate. This brought most of the electors in 
the constituency to his door, wanting to hear his views on 
politics. Naturally, he could not give his visitors the 
cold shoulder, and -
emptying his purse, which was not so heavy, he 
treated them to sake and food. For those who were 
important men, he bought some rather valuable 
objects. His household became bankrupt before 
the election, with his wife, children, and entire
33
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family giving loud voice to their innumerable 
complaints, and making his life a misery. 
Nevertheless, on 1 July, he riskily went out 
on the spree, diverting others as well as 
himself. But when the votes were counted on 
the 2nd - alas, alas - all those on whom he 
had been counting were turncoats. His own 
score - a mere three votesj 35
Of similar nature, as it was a case of bread being 
cast upon the waters and not returning, is a story about 
the contest in the Twelfth Constituency of Tokyo. This 
constituency consisted of Ebara gun on the mainland outside 
the urban limits of the city, and the Seven Islands of 
Izu at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. As has been mentioned 
earlier, the chief parties to the contest were an uncle 
and nephew, Hirabayashi Kyubei and Takagi Masatoshi. The 
following account of some of the incidents in the strife 
between these two is worth re-telling in full. Not just 
because of its innately humorous qualities, but also 
because it illustrates practices and conditions which, 
allowing for change, must have been widespread in many 
other regions besides the District of Ebara and the Seven 
Islands of Izu.
35
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36A Strange Tale Of Rivalry.
In the Twelfth Constituency of a locality 
which we shall not specify, there is an old 
man called -bayashi. For a long time he has 
been a member of the local assembly, and since 
he also served as head-fisherman, he ranked first 
among the notable men of the District, He had a 
nephew called Taka-, who, despite the fact that 
he was very young, had a great deal of ability.
So he, too, was elected to the assembly, and the 
influence of the nephew was not inferior to that 
of the uncle. These two were on friendly terms 
in the local assembly, as might be expected seeing 
that they were uncle and nephew.
Therefore, at the time when the constitution 
was promulgated last year, they both had the 
opinion that in that District they were second to 
none. They were under the impression that running 
as a candidate for the Diet would in fact present 
no difficulties, especially if they had the 
assistance of their relative. Accordingly, they 
were unable to restrain themselves. First of all, 
they privately sounded out people to see how the 
ground lay, and having come to the conclusion that
36
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there were no other candidates and that the 
moment was a propitious one, they both came 
out ras candidates_7 at the same time. Whereupon, 
rfeeling_7 that the person whose help they had 
been counting on up till then had failed them... 
uncle ....nephew....both parted in silence.
After a while, the nephew, Taka-, fell sick; 
and the uncle, beside himself with joy, made 
full use of the chance to extend his influence.
In the meantime, unfortunately /“for the uncle_7, 
he /“the nephew__7 soon recovered, and sent out 
celebratory /“presents of_7 rice-cakes and dried 
bonito to the electors throughout the District. 
When he heard of this, -bayashi’s indignation 
knew no bounds. 'You really are a man of 
gratitude l After all, those who to-day are in 
the assembly, and up till now have been thought 
of as gentlemen by the public, all enjoyed the 
patronage of this uncle •••• You, in particular, 
have long since said that you hold to the 
principle of honouring one's seniors; but what 
your lips say_7 is different from what your 
heart /“thinks_7, and your action in sending out 
rice-cakes in order to shut out your uncle is 
most strange and uncalled for. You'll pay for it,
you ....young Taka- youj'
330
So saying, _/~the uncle__7 summoned a family 
council on that very day, and declared:- ''Well,
I am going to seek your advice. As you will 
already know, I have a popularity in this District 
quite beyond my deserts, and it is my intention 
to run for the Diet. However a certain imprudent 
nephew of mine has distributed rice-cakes throughout 
the District in celebration of a recovery /"*from 
illness_7 so that he might cross swords with me, 
and seems to have had a great effect on public 
opinion. Since my feelings about this are that 
for me to be defeated by him would be the mistake 
of a lifetime, I have decided to spend ten 
thousand yen out of my own fortune on election 
expenses. While I do not for a moment expect you 
to oppose /“my scheme_7, I am letting you know 
to make sure.” Since there was no reason why 
the listeners should object to the old man’s 
saying that he v/ould use his own money himself, 
they all said "Very well." 'Whereupon old -bayashi, 
with a broad smile, but without saying ’Bravo, 
bravol ’ or anything at all /“of that nature_7 
said:- "In that case, would you at any rate please 
put your seals on this document to signify that
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you have no objections1'; and they all of 
them covered it with their seals.
News of this quickly spread; and as this 
was more promising than rice-cakes, -bayashi 
became popular all of a sudden, -bayashi did 
not idle his time away; but spent money on a 
speech meeting in one place and a social 
gathering somewhere else, and entertained the 
electors. He also spent money on a second 
meeting after this. On that occasion, when the 
second meeting was drawing to a close, people 
suggested that a third meeting should be held 
later on in Kitazato. After the hero had 
agreed to be involved in that, they decided to 
make a move at once. However one old man (aged 
sixty) declined, saying:- "I am sixty this year, 
and have grandchildren. More especially, up 
till now I have never bought a harlot, not even 
once, and so I beg you to excuse me in this 
matter only." Answering "Gome, come, don*t say 
such things^", they took him by force to a certain 
house.
Well, the very old man had a really wonderful 
time. The previous nightTs refusal completely
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forgotten, he himself insisted on spending 
the next evening there alone. As a result, 
the news that he was spending his time out of 
doors buying harlots came to the ears of his 
son. After he had at last learnt the full 
story, the son, flaming with anger, said - 
"You silly old fool, -bayashi! How dare you 
lead my pure and spotless father into profligacy!
Very well, I, too, know a trick or two."
Thereafter the son attached himself to the nephew, 
Taka-, and it is said that he is working very 
hard for Taka- and is doing his utmost to bring 
about the failure of -bayashi. Well, well, well.
As a postscript to this tale of mistaken endeavour, it 
might be added that Takagi Masatoshi after being elected 
for the constituency in I89O, was subsequently re-elected 
no fewer than fourteen times, and had a long and distinguished 
career in the House of Representatives.
Hirabayashi was reported to have said that he was 
willing to spend ¥10,000 on his campaign. There is no 
means of telling whether he did in fact get through this 
sum. However, to give a rough idea of the amount of 
money a candidate would normally have to use on trying to 
get himself elected - the Yubin-Hochi Shimbun stated
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t h a t  t h e  minimum f i g u r e  was ¥600-700  and  t h e  maximum
f i g u r e  s e v e r a l  t h o u s a n d  y e n ,  w i t h  t h e  a v e r a g e  e x p e n se s
37p e r  c a n d i d a t e  rec k o n ed  as  ¥ 1 , 0 0 0 ,  The Tokyo N ic h i  
N ic h i  Shimbun a g r e e d  t h a t  campaign e x p e n se s  f o r  each
38
c a n d i d a t e  w e re ,  on t h e  a v e r a g e ,  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  o f  ¥ 1 , 0 0 0 .  
C o n v e r t i n g  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  i n t o  pounds s t e r l i n g ,  t h e y  
r e p r e s e n t ,  a p p r o x i m a t e l y ,  a minimum o f  £ 6 0 - 7 0 ,  a maximum 
o f  s e v e r a l  h u n d red s  o f  pounds ,  and an  a v e r a g e  o f  £100 -  
a l l  V i c t o r i a n  e r a  c u r r e n c y .  One s e l f - n o m i n a t e d  I n d e p e n d e n t  
i n  S a i ta m a  p r e f e c t u r e  was s a i d  t o  have  s o l d  a l l  h i s
e s t a t e s ,  and  d e v o te d  more t h a n  ¥ 1 0 ,0 0 0  ( £ 1 , 0 0 0 )  t o  h i s  
39cam paign  f u n d s .  Such c a n d i d a t u r e s  by w e a l th y  s e l f -
n o m in a ted  I n d e p e n d e n t s  w e re ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  f i n a n c e d  by
t h e m s e lv e s  o u t  o f  t h e i r  own p o c k e t s ,  w i t h  p e r h a p s  a few
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  from t h e i r  b a c k e r s  i f  t h e y  had  any .  On
t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  c a n d i d a t e s  who had  b e e n  a s k e d  t o  s t a n d  by
a g ro u p  o f  v o t e r s  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  o r  e l s e  had  b e e n
n o m in a ted  by a p a r t y ,  were p r o b a b l y  g i v e n  a good d e a l  o f
40
f i n a n c i a l  a i d  by t h e i r  a d h e r e n t s .
C an v as s in g  was a l s o  c a r r i e d  o u t  by means o t h e r  t h a n  
e n t e r t a i n i n g  t h e  v o t e r s  t o  d i n n e r .  I n  p l a c e s  where  t h e  
l o c a l  s u b - p r e f e c t  (Guncho) had  r e s i g n e d  t o  r u n  as  a
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c a n d i d a t e ,  he c o u ld  o f t e n  r e l y  on t h e  v i l l a g e  headmen 
and o t h e r  p e o p le  who were u n d e r  a n  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  him t o
p r e s s  h i s  c a s e .  The S i x t h  C o n s t i t u e n c y  i n  Osaka fu  was
41an a r e a  where t h e  ex-guncho was e l e c t e d  i n  t h i s  way,
B u d d h i s t  p r i e s t s ,  t o o ,  sometimes h e l p e d  c e r t a i n  c a n d i d a t e s ;  
but, i n  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  monks d i d  n o t  i n t e r f e r e  v e r y  much i n  
t h e  e l e c t i o n e e r i n g .  Then a g a i n ,  c a n d i d a t e s  would  
n a t u r a l l y  e x p e c t  t h a t  t h e i r  own f a m i l i e s ,  p e r s o n a l  f r i e n d s ,  
a d m i r e r s ,  and p o s s i b l y  t r a d e  a c q u a i n t a n c e s  t o  c a n v a s s  f o r  
them. I n  t h e  T h i r d  C o n s t i t u e n c y  (K y ö b a sh i  w a r d ) ,  Tokyo 
f u ,  f o u r  o r  f i v e  o f  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  e ach  h a d  h i s  own l i t t l e
band  o f  a c t i v e  s u p p o r t e r s .  One o f  t h e s e  M i l i t a n t s ’ was
, 42
a woman who was a  l a d y ’ s h a i r d r e s s e r  by p r o f e s s i o n .
I n  A sakusa  w ard ,  a l s o  Tokyo, a c e r t a i n  g ro u p  o f  p e o p le
were r e p o r t e d  t o  have g i v e n  t h e i r  f a v o u r  t o  one c a n d i d a t e
and  s u p p o r t e d  h i s  n o m in a t io n ,  b e c a u se  t h e y  hoped  t o
_ 43
l e n d  him money a f t e r  he was e l e c t e d .
When a c a n d i d a t e  was s p o n s o r e d  by a p a r t y  o r  a s i z e a b l e
p o l i t i c a l  c l u b ,  h i s  f e l l o w  members o f t e n  j o i n e d  i n  t h e
cam paign  and a p p e a l e d  t o  t h e  v o t e r s  t o  s u p p o r t  h im. Thus ,
a c o n t e s t  fo u g h t  on a p a r t y  b a s i s  would  t e n d  t o  g i v e  r i s e
t o  v i g o r o u s  c a n v a s s i n g  from b o th  s i d e s ,  though  t h i s  was
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a lw ays  t h e  c a s e .  I n  Yamaguchi p r e f e c t u r e ,
TNNS 2 1 - 6 - 9 0 . 43 TNNS 2 - 7 - 9 0 .
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t h e  s t r o n g l y  e n t r e n c h e d  Bocho Club seems t o  have had
44i t  a l l  i t s  own way i n  t h r e e  o f  t h e  f i v e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .
On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  i n  Chiba  p r e f e c t u r e ,  a v i c t o r y  f o r  t h e  
K a i s h i n - t ö  c a n d i d a t e  i n  th e  F o u r t h  C o n s t i t u e n c y  a p p e a r e d  
c e r t a i n  a t  one t im e ;  l a r g e l y  b e c a u se  t h e r e  was nobody 
o f  l i k e  c a l i b r e  t o  oppose him. The l o c a l  L i b e r a l s ,  
how ever ,  were n o t  p l e a s e d  w i t h  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s ,  
and  e v e n t u a l l y  found  a s u i t a b l e  opponent  f o r  t h e  K a iS h in ­
t o  champion i n  a p e r s o n  who was t h e  managing d i r e c t o r  o f  
a Tokyo soy sau ce  company -  one N ish im u ra  J inem on.
N i s h im u r a ,  accom panied  by a c o u p le  o f  a i d e s ,  c a n v a s s e d  
t h e  two s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s  (Unakami and So sa )  which  form ed 
t h e  F o u r t h  C o n s t i t u e n c y  so t h o r o u g h l y  t h a t  he won i t  
i n  t h e  t e e t h  o f  f i e r c e  K a i s h i n - t o  c o u n t e r - a t t a c k s ,  and 
d e s p i t e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  h i s  campaign  had  l a s t e d  l e s s  t h a n  
a month .
Yet  i t  was p r o b a b l y  i n  A i c h i  p r e f e c t u r e ,  where 
e l e c t i o n  f e v e r  was more s u s t a i n e d  t h a n  i n  most  o t h e r  p l a c e s ,  
t h a t  o r g a n i z e d  c a n v a s s i n g  was c a r r i e d  f u r t h e s t .  The 
pace  was s e t  by t h e  A ic h i  Koin  C lub ,  t h e  o n ly  p o l i t i c a l  
body t h a t  was a c t i v e  i n  a l l  p a r t s  o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e ;  b u t  
r i v a l  c a n d i d a t e s  were n o t  e x a c t l y  n e g l i g e n t ,  a s  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  i t e m  shows.
W
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The A ic h i  Koin Club i s  p u b l i s h i n g  t h e
p i c t u r e s  and p e r s o n a l  h i s t o r i e s  o f  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s
w i t h  whom i t  h a s  an u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i n  t h e  columns
o f  i t s  p a p e r ,  t h e  S h in  A i c h i ,  e v e r y  d a y .  I t  i s
a l s o  h o l d in g  sp e ec h  m e e t i n g s  i n  e v e ry  d i s t r i c t ,
and  i s  working h a r d  t o  i n c r e a s e  i t s  i n f l u e n c e .
M oreover  t h e  o t h e r  c a n d i d a t e s ,  t o o ,  a l l  have
t h e i r  own r i g h t  h and  men; and ,  a t  t h e i r  own
d i s c r e t i o n ,  t h e y  a sse m b le  H them_7 t o g e t h e r ,  o r
i n v i t e  t h e  e l e c t o r s  t o  s o c i a l  p a r t i e s ,  o r  send
ou t  c a n v a s s e r s  and  spokesmen i n  a l l  d i r e c t i o n s
t o  g i v e  e x p l a n a t i o n s  a t  e v e r y  d o o r  and t o  seek
45t h e  a p p r o v a l  o f  e ach  i n d i v i d u a l .
W hile  much o f  t h e  c a n v a s s i n g  t h a t  went  on i n  A ic h i  
and e l s e w h e r e  was c a r r i e d  o u t  by t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  t h e m s e lv e s  
and by u n p a i d  v o l u n t e e r  h e l p e r s ,  t h e r e  was a l s o  a c l a s s  o f  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  v o t e - p e r s u a d e r s  and  e l e c t i o n  a g e n t s .  The 
Tokyo N ic h i  N i c h i ,  i n  an  a r t i c l e  on t h e  e l e c t i o n  campaign 
i n  S a i ta m a  p r e f e c t u r e ,  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
c a n v a s s e r s  and  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  who employed them i n  t h e s e  
t e r m s : -
THUS 1 2 - 6 - 9 0 .
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In t h e  a r e a  around Kodama-machi , i n  t h e  
F i f t h  C o n s t i tu e n c y ,  i t  was a common p r a c t i c e  
l a s t  y e a r  jT a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  h a l f  
t h e  members o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  a sse m b ly _ 7  t o  
d i s t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  e l e c t o r s  p r e s e n t s  o f  c l o t h  o r  
s u g a r  b a g s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  v i s i t i n g  c a r d s  on which  
were w r i t t e n  t h e  p e r s o n a l  h i s t o r i e s  / ” o f  t h e  
c a n d i d a t e s _ 7 .  ••  .However t h e y  _/~the c a n d i d a t e s _ 7  
have  changed  t h e i r  ways s i n c e  t h e  p r o m u l g a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p e n a l  r e g u l a t i o n s  on th e  f i r s t  o f  t h i s  
month .  / ”*Now_7 t h e y  make u s e  o f  p e r s o n s  who 
have engaged  i n  p e t t i f o g g i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  t h e  
p a s t ,  s end ing  them out  ev e ry w h ere  t o  f i n d  t h e  
p e o p l e ,  g iv e  p r e s e n t s  o f  money, g o o d s ,  o r  b a n q u e t s ,  
an d  p r e v a i l  upon t h e  e l e c t o r s . ^
We may d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e s e  p e t t i f o g g e r s ,  whose c h i e f  s t o c k  
i n  t r a d e  would  have b e en  a smooth to n g u e  and a f a t  p u r s e ,  
from a n o t h e r  s o r t  o f  ! agen t*  no t  se ldom  h i r e d  by c a n d i d a t e s  
t h e  s t ro n g m a n  ( s o s h i ) ,  w i t h  a b ig  s t i c k ,  who d e a l t  i n  
blows and  i n t i m i d a t i o n .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  g e n e r a l  s t a n d a r d s  
o f  t h e  p e t t i f o g g e r s ,  w h e r e v e r  t h e y  were em ployed ,  c o u ld  
have h a r d l y  r i s e n  much above t h e  l e v e l  i n d i c a t e d  by t h e  
Tokyo N i c h i  N i c h i .
Tj£ —
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Some candidates were in the fortunate position of 
not having to bother much with canvassing, and so were 
able to do without professional agents altogether. Seki 
Naohiko, for instance, who had decided to run for the 
Third Constituency in Wakayama prefecture, was favoured 
by a seemingly irreversible tide of public opinion. He 
did virtually all his campaigning from his room in the 
Fujigen hostelry, in the centre of Wakayama city. There, 
he was visited, day in and day out, by a stream of 
relatives, friends, and political supporters, who between 
them were sufficiently strong in the constituency to 
secure his election without much trouble. Even so, Seki 
thought it prudent to set the seal on public approval 
of his candidature by arranging a special service in 
commemoration of his dead parents in one of the Buddhist 
temples in Wakayama. At the service, he gave hulled 
rice to six or seven hundred indigent citizens.
There was not one who did not weep for joy.
Each took away a bag of rice, and paid 
homage to the tombs of his ancestors. 47
Somebody who was perhaps even more popular than 
Seki was Nakajima Nobuyuki. Originally selected as the 
Liberal candidate for Yokohama where he had had a 
redoubtable opponent in Shimada Saburo, Nakajima resigned 
this candidature half way through June after having
TNNS 17-6-90.
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a c c e p t e d  a r e q u e s t  from th e  e l e c t o r s  i n  t h e  F i f t h
C o n s t i t u e n c y ,  Kanagawa p r e f e c t u r e ,  t h a t  he s h o u ld
s t a n d  t h e r e .  C l e a r l y ,  he can n o t  have had  many d o u b t s
a b o u t  t h e  wisdom o f  t h i s  t r a n s f e r .  Ke s p e n t  t h e  l a s t
week o f  t h e  campaign  on d a i l y  f i s h i n g  t r i p s  o u t  a t  s e a
o f f  t h e  p o r t  o f  Yokohama, c l a d  i n  a w h i t e  s i n g l e t  and
48accom pan ied  by a s t u d e n t - s e r v a n t .  Such s a n g - f r o i d
was u s u a l l y  shown o n ly  by t h e  v e r y  few c a n d i d a t e s  who 
had  e v e r y  r e a s o n  t o  be h o p e f u l  o f  s u c c e s s ,  o r  by t h e  
r a t h e r  more numerous band o f  t h o s e  who had  e v e r y  r e a s o n  
t o  f e a r  t h e  w o r s t .
The e f f e c t  o f  a l l  t h i s  sp e ec h  making and c a n v a s s i n g  
n a t u r a l l y  d i d  n o t  f o l lo w  any one f i x e d  p a t t e r n  o v e r  t h e  
c o u n t r y  a s  a w ho le .  I n  some p l a c e s  -  and  t h e  c o n t e s t  i n  
Fukui  p r e f e c t u r e  be tw een  Nakaj ima Matagoro and N ag a ta  
Sadaemon was a c a s e  i n  p o i n t  -  a  campaign  b a s e d  on l a v i s h  
e n t e r t a i n m e n t  o f  t h e  v o t e r s  c o u ld  rob a w e l l  known and 
u p s t a n d i n g  p o l i t i c i a n  o f  h i s  chance o f  a  s e a t  i n  t h e  D i e t .  
N a g a ta ,  t h o u g h  u n h e a r d  o f  o u t s i d e  h i s  p r e f e c t u r e ,  was a 
man o f  some s t a n d i n g  and  r e p u t e  i n s i d e  i t .  These  r e s i d e n t  
’l o c a l '  c a n d i d a t e s ,  e n jo y i n g  t h e  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  pe rm anen t  
i n f l u e n c e  and c o n n e c t i o n s  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  were o f t e n  
n u t s  to o  t o u g h  f o r  even  t h e  most g i f t e d  o f  ’o u t s i d e ’ 
c a n d i d a t e s  t o  c r a c k .
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A n o th e r  example o f  t h i s  h a p p en in g  was t h e  E i g h t h  
C o n s t i t u e n c y  i n  H iro sh im a  p r e f e c t u r e  w h e re ,  as  m e n t io n e d  
e a r l i e r ,  some o f  t h e  e l e c t o r s  t o o k  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  
t r y i n g  t o  a r r a n g e  a p u b l i c  d e b a t e  w i t h  a l l  t h r e e  c a n d i d a t e s  
t a k i n g  p a r t .  I t  w i l l  be remembered t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  
c a n d i d a t e  t h e y  a p p ro a c h e d ,  a fo rm e r  l o c a l  government  
o f f i c i a l  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  r e f u s e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  on t h e  
g r o u n d s  t h a t  he d i d  no t  have  any d e f i n i t e  i d e a s  abou t  
t h e  s u b j e c t  p ro p o s e d  f o r  d e b a t e .  Even th o u g h  the  t o p i c  
s u g g e s t e d  was t h e  v i t a l  and a l l  em brac ing  one o f  t h e  
p r o p e r  r o l e  o f  t h e  I m p e r i a l  D ie t  i n  t h e  governm ent  o f  
t h e  s t a t e ,  and  even  th o u g h  t h e  v o t e r s  d i s a p p r o v e d  o f  
t h i s  c a n d i d a t e ' s  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e i r  r e g u e s t ,  he -  t h a t  i s ,  
t h e  f o r m e r  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l  -  d i d  i n  f a c t  w in  t h e  e l e c t i o n .  
One o f  h i s  d e f e a t e d  o p p o n e n ts  who had g l a d l y  a c c e p t e d  
t h e  i n v i t a t i o n  t o  a p u b l i c  d e b a te  v/as Ino u e  Kakugoro.
Inoue  was a n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c i a n  who n o r m a l ly  s p e n t  most 
o f  h i s  t im e  i n  Tokyo; i n  1890, he was a l e a d e r  o f  t h e  
Daido  Club and n o t e d  f o r  h i s  e lo q u e n c e .  On t h e  o t h e r  
h an d ,  t h e  1 o u t s i d e 1 c a n d i d a t u r e s  o f  Suematsu  Kencho and 
N ish im u ra  J inemon -  t o  name b u t  two i n d i v i d u a l s  -  met 
w i t h  com ple te  s u c c e s s ;  and  Inoue Kakugoro h i m s e l f  was 
s u b s e q u e n t l y  e l e c t e d  f o r  a n o t h e r  c o n s t i t u e n c y  i n
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Hiroshima prefecture, at a by-election held before 
the opening of the Diet in November 1890,
Stories of voters having been prevailed upon to 
give their vote to more than one candidate, or having 
been otherwise bamboozled by the tidal wave of canvassing 
and the more hidden pressures of village politics, were 
by no means uncommon, and are not to be dismissed as 
mere fabrications. Yet the over-all impact of such 
petty dilemmas or concealed coercions was far from being 
disastrous to the election as a whole. The Tokyo Nichi 
Nichi seems to have captured the ambivalence of this 
situation in a short humorous sketch, published on the 
morning of 1 July. This showed that progress, in its 
constitutional aspects, had brought a certain amount of 
harassment for those citizens it had endowed with the 
vote; but, at the same time, its technological improvements 
afforded possible means of escape - at any rate for 
voters living not too far away from a railway station.
The scene is set in the carriages of a train about to 
leave Tokyo for Yokohama:-
While candidates are chasing round valiantly, 
the electors are making desperate efforts to 
escape. /“This state of affairs may be likened to_7 
a revolving lantern /~or 7 scissor chess. ’Goodness, 
Gembei-san, you too?T TDear me, Hachiemon-san,
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you as  w e l l ? 1 ’Ah w e l l ,  I  have j u s t  a bou t  
had  enough o f  u l t i m a t u m s  and b o a s t i n g  from 
a l l  s i d e s ,  _/” The e l e c t i o n _ 7  i s  a l l  v e r y  
w e l l ;  b u t  i f  we p o o r  m e r c h a n t s  a r e  s i l l y  
enough t o  s u p p o r t  one s i d e ,  we s h a l l  l o s e  
v a l u a b l e  c u s t o m . ’ ’N e i t h e r  t h e  D i e t  n o r  t h e  
Members can  t a k e  t h e  p l a c e  o f  t r a d e . ’ ’W e l l ,
I  am j u s t  o f f  t o  l a y  i n  s t o c k ,  and  a t  t h e  same 
t im e  t o  Yokoham a.’ 'Ha,  h a ,  h a ,  me t o o i ’ The 
d e p a r t u r e  b e l l  r i n g s ,  t h e  e n g in e  g i v e s  a h o o t . . . .  
AhJ 49
The m o ra l  o f  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  i t e m  i s  t h a t  some 
e l e c t o r s  were a b l e  t o  t a k e  c a r e  o f  t h e m s e l v e s ;  and i f  we 
a p p ly  i t  t o  t h e  e l e c t i o n  campaign  as  a w h o le ,  we s h a l l  
f i n d  t h a t  i t  s t i l l  h e l d  good f o r  many d i s t r i c t s  o u t s i d e  
t h e  c a p i t a l  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  i t .  I n  t h e  p r e c e d i n g  p a r a g r a p h s  
m e n t io n  has  been  made o f  t h e  p r e v a l e n c e  o f  b a n q u e t  
c o m p e t i t i o n s ,  and t h e  u n f a i r  i n f l u e n c e  w hich  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  
o f  l o c a l  i n t e r e s t s  o r  p o t e n t a t e s  c o u ld  and d i d  have o v e r  
t h e  minds o f  e l e c t o r s .  A l l  t h i s  i s  t r u e ,  i n  a s u b s t a n t i a l  
number o f  c a s e s ;  b u t  i n  a -  i f  a n y th i n g  -  r a t h e r  g r e a t e r  
number o f  o t h e r  c a s e s ,  t h i n g s  would seem t o  have worked 
ou t  somev/hat d i f f e r e n t l y .
Thus ,  t h e r e  was n o t h in g  t o  s t o p  an  e l e c t o r  f rom b e in g  
e n t e r t a i n e d  by more t h a n  one c a n d i d a t e ;  and i n  c o n t e s t s  
where t h i s  fo rm  o f  e l e c t i o n e e r i n g  was de r i g e u r ,  t h e  
g e n e r a l  e f f e c t  o f  t h e s e  e n t e r t a i n m e n t s  would have been  
t o  c a n c e l  e ach  o t h e r  o u t .  Even i f  a b a n q u e t  c a n d i d a t e
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triumphed in one constituency, a person who tried the 
same tactics might well be defeated in another one.
A Hakajima Matagoro went down amidst the clatter of 
plates and clinking of glasses in Pukui prefecture; 
but a Nakajima Nobuyuki could be returned without having 
b° bestlr himself unduly in-Kanagawa. Similarly, village 
end ward politics, or social considerations, did tilt 
the balance in favour of certain inferior candidates in 
some places. Yet in others, as we have seen, localism 
took the far less reprehensible form of an earnest desire 
to elect the best man available to represent the coimnunity 
as a whole. To take up a slightly different but related
point - speech meetings were well attended even when they 
W6P6 not. followed by a party.
This sort of evidence, if followed through, will lead 
us to only one conclusion, and it is the right one. Namely, 
that despite the large number of particular instances 
illustrating the contrary, the general body of electors 
in 1390 did have a mind of its own. Moreover, it was 
capable of expressing this mind. As a result, the first 
House of Representatives, in so far as it contained a 
clear majority of Liberal or Progressive opponents of the 
Government and also a substantial minority of pro-Government
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o r  In d e p e n d e n t  Members, r e p r e s e n t e d ,  c r u d e l y  maybe b u t  
n o n e t h e l e s s  e f f e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  s e t t l e d  ’p u b l i c  o p i n i o n ’ 
o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e .  Dark h o r s e s  o f  one k i n d  o r  a n o t h e r  
t h e r e  may w e l l  have b e e n ,  even  among t h e  r a n k s  o f  e l e c t e d  
Members; b u t  i n  t e r m s  o f  r e a l  p o l i t i c a l  power ,  such  
p e r s o n s  were a n e g l i g i b l e  q u a n t i t y .  The e x p e c t e d  i s  
a lw ays  l e s s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a n  t h e  u n e x p e c t e d ,  th o u g h  i t  
may be t r u e r  h i s t o r y ;  and  an a c c o u n t  o f  an  e l e c t i o n  
cam paign  i s  p e r h a p s  more p rone  t h a n  some t o p i c s  t o  
become no more t h a n  a handbook o f  b i z a r r e  h a p p e n in g s  
h e r e  and t h e r e .  T h i s  i s  a l r i g h t  so f a r  as  i t  g o e s ;  b u t  
w h i l e  m u t t e r i n g  ’ c u r i o u s e r  and c u r i o u s e r ’ w i t h  some 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  we s h o u l d  n o t  f o r g e t  t h e  t r u t h  o f  t h e  
f o r e g o i n g  s t a t e m e n t s  a b o u t  t h e  b r o a d  outcome o f  t h e  
e l e c t i o n .  They w i l l  be e l a b o r a t e d  i n  a l a t e r  c h a p t e r .
T here  r em a in s  one o t h e r  fo rm  o f  ’l e g i t i m a t e ’ 
c a n v a s s in g  t o  be n o t e d .  T h i s  t i m e ,  i t  i s  an  i n d i r e c t  one -  
t h e  ways i n  which v a r i o u s  nev/spapers  were  u s e d  o r  l e n t  
t h e m s e lv e s  as  a means o f  co m m u n ica t io n  b e tw een  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  
and  t h e  v o t e r s .  M en t ion  has  a l r e a d y  b e e n  made i n  a 
d i f f e r e n t  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p r e s s  f r e q u e n t l y  
c a r r i e d  e l e c t i o n e e r i n g  a d v e r t i s e m e n t s ,  which  s im p ly  
announced t h a t  a v o t e r  o r  a g ro u p  o f  v o t e r s  had  d e c i d e d  
t o  v o t e  f o r  a c e r t a i n  c a n d i d a t e .  Such announcements
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a p p e a r e d  o n ly  r a r e l y ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  i n  t h e  b i g  Tokyo p a p e r s ;
b u t  t h e y  were v e ry  common in d e e d  i n  t h e  p r o v i n c i a l
j o u r n a l s .  P re su m a b ly ,  t h e y  were p a i d  f o r  by t h e  v o t e r s
c o n c e r n e d ,  and  no t  by t h e  c a n d i d a t e s .  T h e r e f o r e  i t  i s
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  m o t iv e  b e h in d  t h e i r  i n s e r t i o n  was a
d e s i r e ,  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r ,  no t  so much t o  a s s i s t
t h e  c a n d i d a t e  by a c t i v e l y  c a n v a s s i n g  f o r  him i n  p r i n t ,
a s  t o  p u b l i c i z e  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  h i s  mind was made up and
so a v o id  f u r t h e r  a p p r o a c h e s  from o p p o s i t i o n  f a c t i o n s .
Yet  I  can  h a r d l y  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  was so i n  t h e  g r e a t
m a j o r i t y  o f  c a s e s ,  i n  w h ic h ,  i t  seems t o  me, t h e  n o t i c e s
were p u t  i n  t h e  p a p e r s  by v o t e r s  who were a c t u a l l y
f r i e n d l y  t o  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s .  T h i s  would have  b e e n  done
w i t h  t h e  i d e a  o f  b r i n g i n g  t h e i r  names t o  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f
t h e  p u b l i c ,  and  p e rh a p s  a l s o  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  o f  i n d i c a t i n g
t o  w a v e r e r s  which  way t h e  band wagon was l i k e l y  t o  move.
The f o l l o w i n g  i s  a t y p i c a l  spec im en o f  t h e s e  h o w - I - a m - g o in g -
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t o - v o t e  d e c l a r a t i o n s ,  t a k e n  from a Kochi  p r e f e c t u r e  p a p e r : -
We h i t h e r t o  b e lo n g e d  t o  t h e  NATIONAL PARTY
b u t  have s e e n  t h e  l i g h t  and  now f i r m l y  g i v e
o u r  s u p p o r t  t o  LIBERALISM.
Kochi  D i s t r i c t ,  Shimohayama V i l l a g e ,  Hirnenono
S e c t i o n ,  I c h ik a w a  S a n e y u k i .
D i t t o  D i s t r i c t ,  D i t t o  V i l l a g e ,  Shindokyo  S e c t i o n ,
T a k a h a s h i  T o m i j i .
K och i  Shimbun 3 0 - 6 - 9 0 .
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Advertisements like this were usually accepted 
by newspapers purely as a business proposition. This 
is proved by the fact that separate notices of support 
for different candidates sometimes came out on the same
page. There v/as at least one case, however, of a newspaper
, 51having refused to publish a voter’s announcement. The 
reason for this was that although many regional papers 
refrained from taking ’unfair sides’ in the electoral 
struggle, there were some that were violently partisan.
Partisan news-sheets, in the freedom of their own 
editorial columns, naturally played a part in canvassing 
the electorate, a part less studiously neutral than the 
one outlined above. As the campaign grew keener, some of 
them devoted much space to what was in effect undiluted 
propaganda. This, it must be realized, was a trait of 
certain relatively minor provincial papers only. Though 
the big metropolitan dailies all sided with either the 
Government or one or other of the political parties, their 
preferences stopped short of spineless eulogy and they 
were never rabid in their antagonisms. It was not always 
the same elsewhere. In the Ninth Constituency, Osaka fu, 
for instance, the backers of one candidate distributed 
free copies of the Kansai Nippo throughout the district
51TNN8 15-6-90
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b e c a u se  i t  gave him f a v o u r a b l e  p u b l i c i t y *  But once 
a g a i n ,  i t  i s  t o  A ic h i  p r e f e c t u r e  t h a t  we must  t u r n  f o r  
some o f  t h e  most s t r i k i n g  exam ples  o f  p r e s s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
i n  t h e  cam paign .  T h e r e ,  a s  s t a t e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  t h e  A ic h i  
Koin Club had  i t s  own j o u r n a l ,  a p a p e r  c a l l e d  t h e  S h in  
A ich i*  I t ,  t o o ,  was s e n t  as  a g i f t  t o  t h e  home o f  e v e r y  
e l e c t o r  i n  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e  d u r in g  t h e  campaign* There  were 
a l s o  o t h e r  l o c a l  d a i l i e s ,  t h e  K in jo  Shimbun and t h e  Fuso 
Shimbun, which  were j u s t  as  o p e n ly  p a r t i a l  t o  c a n d i d a t e s  
oppos ing  t h e  Koin  C lub .  C o n se q u e n t ly  a v e r i t a b l e  war 
o f  pens  d e v e lo p e d  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  w i t h  t h e  S h in  A i c h i  on t h e  
one s i d e  and  t h e  K i n j o ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  F u so ,  on t h e  
o t h e r  s i d e .  As a l l  t h e s e  p a p e r s  were p u b l i s h e d  i n  Nagoya,  
t h e  c o n t e s t  be tw een  Kunish im a Haku (K o in  C lu b )  and 
Horibe  K a t s u s h i r o  (Nagoya D i s c u s s i o n  S o c i e t y ,  i . e .  
I n d e p e n d e n t )  f o r  t h e  s e a t  i n  Nagoya c i t y  ( F i r s t  C o n s t i t u e n c y ,  
A ic h i  p r e f e c t u r e )  n a t u r a l l y  a t t r a c t e d  most  o f  t h e i r  
a t t e n t i o n . ^3
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  I have no t  b e e n  a b l e  t o  see  c o p i e s  
o f  e i t h e r  t h e  S h in  A ic h i  o r  t h e  Fuso Shimbun, and can  
t h e r e f o r e  g i v e  documentary  e v id e n c e  o f  t h e  m ethods  employed 
by o n ly  one o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  t o  t h e  d i s p u t e .  However t h e
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rancour and high feelings displayed in printer’s ink in 
Nagoya during the last few v/eeks of the election campaign 
were considered sufficiently remarkable to be retailed 
in due course in the news columns of the capital too. 
Therefore it is perhaps safe to assume that the standards 
adopted by the Kinjo Shimbun were identical, more or less, 
with those to be found in the Shin Aichi and Fuso newspapers 
as well. There is, moreover, a certain amount of internal 
evidence in the pages of the Kinjo Shimbun to back up 
this opinion.
Let it be said at once that the standards eventually 
adopted by the Kinjo Shimbun were deplorably low. Up 
to about 27 June, this paper, while leaving its readers 
in no doubt about where its sympathies lay, had reported 
the various campaigns in Nagoya and the other constituencies 
in a reasonably impartial and non-sensational manner. On 
27 June, all this changed, perhaps because it looked as 
if Kunishima was going to win the seat in Nagoya. On 
that day, the Kinjö published a venomous attack on him.
Its opening paragraph read as follows
DISHONEST, UNPRINCIPLED KUNISHIMA HAKU.
In olden days, men said that evil could sometimes 
look like virtue and a lie perhaps appear to be 
the truth. In Nagoya, there is a person called
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Kunishima Haku. He is evil and full of lies.
He is always talking about Liberty and Equality,
and though his heart is filthy and black, he
wears a mask of integrity and rectitude. What
is more, because his heart is filthy and black,
he wants to deceive the public and make the
people his dupes. But the sun and moon have
not yet fallen to the ground, and the gods are
still above us. Ho matter if there is an
An Lu-shan in the world, will there not ralso_7
54be a Chang Chiu Ling^ ' to prophesy rebellion?
Likewise, let there be never so many Wang An-
shihs, is it likely that men of the stamp of 
55Lu Hui Ch ing to smell out their great lies 
will be lacking? KUNISHIMA has behaved in a 
DISHONEST and UNPRINCIPLED fashion before now; 
and by exposing this to the world we shall 
disillusion those whom he has ensnared by 
other acts of trickery and evil-doing. 
/~Furthermore__"7, we shall prevail upon gentlemen 
who share our feelings to join us in reviling 
this DISHONEST AND UNPRINCIPLED KUNISHIMA. Let
517
Chinese minister in the reign of the T ’ang Emperor,Hsuan Tsung.
55
Chinese minister in the reign of the Sung Emperor, Shen- Tsung.
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him be d r i v e n  from th e  woods and f o r e s t s  o f  
s e l f - r e s p e c t i n g  c i t i z e n s i  L e t  him be b a n is h e d  
to  t h e  f u r th e r m o s t  r e g io n s  o f  o u r  c o u n try  -  
t h e r e  t o  become fo o d  f o r  w o lves  and t i g e r s i  
What f o l lo w s  now i s  a d e t a i l e d  r e c o r d  o f  
KUNISHIMA'S DISHONESTY and  LACK OP PRINCIPLE, 
and  i t  i s  on th e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  t h a t  we i n d i c t  
him. We beg th e  p u b l i c  t o  pay s t r i c t  a t t e n t i o n ,  
and  t o  t a k e  a good lo o k  a t  t h e  w orking  o f  t h i s  
DISHONEST and UNPRINCIPLED KUNISHIMA'S h e a r t . 56
A f t e r  t h i s  t h e r e  came a f u r t h e r  two and a h a l f  colum ns 
o f  n e w s p r in t .  A l l  o f  i t  s im p ly  b o i l e d  down to  th e  
a c c u s a t i o n  t h a t  K u n ish im a , a p r o f e s s i o n a l  a d v o c a te ,  had  
b een  g u i l t y  o f  m is le a d in g  some p e a s a n t s  and  i n c i t i n g  them  
t o  p u b l i c  d i s o r d e r  f o r  h i s  own p e r s o n a l  g a i n .  He had  
p ro m ised  t o  p l e a d  t h e i r  c a s e  i n  a t e n a n c y  d i s p u t e  w i th o u t  
c h a rg in g  them  e i t h e r  c o u r t  c o s t s  o r  a l a w y e r 1s f e e ,  and 
had  p r e f a c e d  t h i s  o f f e r  w i th  t h e  v /e l l  known words -
Heaven d i d  no t c r e a t e  any man above a n o th e r ,  n o r  
d id  i t  c r e a t e  any man below a n o t h e r .  57
The n e x t  a r t i c l e  on t h e  same page v/as h e a d e d ,  p o i n t e d l y  
en o u g h :-
7/HO 7/ILL HELP DISHONESTY AND BE ASSOCIATED WITH 
THE UNPRINCIPLED?
5^  ~
K in jo  Shimbun 2 7 -6 -9 0 .
Fukuzawa Y u k ic h i ,  Gakumon-no Susume, p . l .
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and ended with the threat:
If anybody on the first day of next month 
dares to vote for the DISHONEST Kunishima, 
the UNPRINCIPLED Kunishima, we will publish 
his name in the columns of our paper and make 
it known throughout the length and breadth of 
the land. Take note of this!
This anti-Kunishima campaign was continued in 
successive issues of the Kinjo Shimbun up to and including 
the day of the election. The words DISHONEST and 
UNPRINCIPLED were splashed across any page containing 
articles meant to discredit him. When the Nagoya 
result was announced, it proved to be a victory for 
Horibe Katsushiro. He polled 236 votes to Kunishima’s 
134. Both the Kinjo Shimbun and the Fuso Shimbun were 
said to have proclaimed the news in special extra 
editions under an identical headline:-
58Mr HORIBE BANZAI, CITIZENS OF NAGOYA BANZAII
To this the Shin Aichi, making the best of a bad job, 
replied:-
There is yet another Horibe Katsushiro in 
Niwa sub-prefecture at Inuyama-machi. Therefore, 
excluding 32 votes which are clearly marked 
/^as having been cast for the Horibe Katsushiro 
Tiving at_7 Funeiri-machi Nagoya city, 203 votes 
cannot be confirmed and must be rejected as 
invalid. In other words, Mr Kunishima has the 
greatest number of votes that are valid. Long 
live our party! Liberty forever!
58
Nippon Shimbun, 5-7-90
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But after announcing a ’victory’ banquet for Kunishima, 
and a further run of bickering, charges, and counter­
charges, it was at length compelled to admit defeat*
Before these final skirmishes, and before the voting 
took place, the public had been told that:- (i) Kunishima 
had gone mad (Kinjo Shimbun), (ii) Kunishima had been taken 
into custody (Fuso Shimbun), (iii) Horibe had been put
on trial (Shin Aichi), (iv) Horibe had killed himself 
59(Shin Aichi). Stories of this sort were not as a rule
spread by the newspapers; but slandering one’s opponent 
or circulating rumours that would act to his disadvantage 
was a very common ruse de guerre. Suematsu Kencho stated 
that it was used most frequently by self-nominated 
Independents and by the members of small parties which 
had little chance of victory, adding the comment that
The parties with a lot of influence wanted 
the election to take place as quietly as £q
possible, with no aftermath of unpleasantness.
This judgement would seem to be correct as a general 
summing up of the situation; though in the instance 
recorded above, one candidate (Kunishima) was a member of 
the Koin Club. Campaigning by innuendo was definitely 
illegal under the terms of the Supplementary Penal Regulations
59TNNS 5-7-90, also Kinjo Shimbun 30-6-90.
60
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ. vol.3.pp. 217-218. ' '
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b u t  i t  was an  a lm os t  im p o s s i b l e  t a s k  t o  t r a c e  a p a r t i c u l a r  
rumour back  t o  i t s  o r i g i n a l  p r o p a g a t o r  so t h a t  a c r i m i n a l  
a c t i o n  c o u ld  be b r o u g h t .  C o n s e q u e n t ly  t h i s  was a way o f  
d e f y i n g  t h e  law and h a r a s s i n g  o n e ’ s opponen t  t h a t  was 
b o t h  s im p le  and s a f e .
The sn ak es  o f  rumour c o u ld  be made t o  h i s s  f o r  one 
s i d e  o r  th e  o t h e r  i n  a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  ways,  i n g e n i o u s  
and n o t  so i n g e n i o u s .  I n  A s h i k i t a  g u n ,  Kumamoto 
p r e f e c t u r e ,  w here ,  i t  was s a i d ,  b r i b e r y  had  become o l d -  
f a s h i o n e d ,  p h y s i c a l  f o r c e  was no l o n g e r  i n t e r e s t i n g ,  and 
b o t t l e  and  candy t a c t i c s  were a l s o  ou t  o f  f a v o u r ,  
f a l s e h o o d  was u s e d  i n  a  manner  t h a t  i n c r i m i n a t e d  t h e  
h i g h e s t  i n  t h e  l a n d .  S u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  R i g h t s  
P a r t y  v i s i t e d  t h e  homes o f  e v e ry  e l e c t o r  i n  t h e  su b ­
p r e f e c t u r e ,  and c a r e f u l l y  b u t  q u i t e  m e n d a c io u s ly  e x p l a i n e d  
t h a t  t h e  M arquis  Hosokawa ( t h e  f o rm e r  Daimyo o f  t h e  
a r e a )  and  t h e  Emperor h i m s e l f  had  b o t h  o f  t h e i r  own f r e e  
w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e i r  campaign f u n d s .  T h e r e f o r e  
anyone who v o t e d  f o r  t h e  r i v a l  K a i s h i n - t o  c a n d i d a t e s  
would n o t  o n ly  be g u i l t y  o f  d i s l o y a l t y  t o  t h e  ex-Daimyo, 
b u t  w ould  a l s o  be c o m m it t in g  what amounted t o  h ig h  t r e a s o n . ^  
I n  O saka ,  one c a n d i d a t e  was everywhere  m a l ig n e d  on a cc o u n t
"3!  '
TNNS 1 4 -6 -9 0
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o f  t h e  u n p l e a s a n t  f r i e n d s  he had ;  and a n o t h e r  was
63
w ro n g ly  r e p o r t e d  t o  be n o t  e l i g i b l e  f o r  e l e c t i o n ,
Suematsu  Kencho h i m s e l f  d e s c r i b e d  a r a t h e r  more 
e l a b o r a t e  t r i c k  p l a y e d  on him i n  h i s  own c o n s t i t u e n c y  i n  
Fukuoka p r e f e c t u r e .  His  a n e c d o te  i s  b e s t  t o l d  i n  h i s  own 
w o r d s : -
M oreover ,  i n  my own c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  
p a r t y  -  i n  o r d e r  t o  c o l l e c t  an  a u d ie n c e  f o r  a 
sp e e c h  m e e t in g  t h a t  t h e y  were g o in g  t o  have -  
i n fo rm e d  i n t e r e s t e d  p e r s o n s  i n  t h e  n e ig h b o u rh o o d  
by l e t t e r  t h a t  t h e i r  c a n d i d a t e  and  I  would  h o l d  a 
p u b l i c  d e b a t e .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  copy in g  t h e  example 
o f  t h e  t r a v e l l i n g  a d v e r t i s e m e n t s  f o r  t h e  t h e a t r e  
i n  r u r a l  a r e a s ,  t h e y  went f rom v i l l a g e  t o  v i l l a g e ,  
waving f l a g s  and b e a t i n g  drums,  t o  s p r e a d  t h e  news 
a b o u t  t h e  p u b l i c  d e b a t e ,  /""By t h e s e  means,  t h e y  
managed t o _ 7  assem b le  a l a r g e  a u d i e n c e .  When th e  
t im e  came t o  open t h e  m e e t i n g ,  t h e y  announced  
1Suematsu i s  to o  f r i g h t e n e d  t o  c o m e . ’ The s l a n d e r  
was r e p e a t e d  s e v e r a l  t i m e s ,  and ,  w o r s t  o f  a l l ,  t h e y  
h a d  no s c r u p l e s  a b o u t  p u b l i s h i n g  i t  i n  t h e  n ew spapers  
e v en ,  64
The same com m en ta to r ,  when d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  g e n e r a l  p a r t  
p l a y e d  by rumour i n  th e  cam p a ig n in g ,  m e n t io n e d  t h a t  an  
a c q u a i n t a n c e  o f  h i s  who was s t a n d i n g  f o r  e l e c t i o n  s u d d e n ly  
d i s c o v e r e d  t h a t  he was t h e  v i c t i m  o f  an  ’ a r r e s t  o f  c a n d i d a t e ’ 
s t o r y ,  p u t  a b o u t  on t h e  day b e f o r e  t h e  p o l l .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,
"52
TNNS 1 4 - 6 - 9 0 .
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Suematsu Kencho, N i - j u - s a n  Nen-no So-Senkyo ,  MBZ, v o l . 3 ,
p . 218.
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a l l  t h e  i n j u r e d  p e r s o n  c o u ld  t h i n k  o f  do ing  t o  c o u n t e r a c t
t h e  damaging e f f e c t s  o f  th e  rum our was t o  h i r e  a  r ic k s h a w ,
and  d r i v e  a ro u n d  th e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  s h o u t in g  t o  a l l  and
65su n d ry  " I  am S o - a n d - s o ! ”
Suem atsu f u r t h e r  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  i n  h i s  own cam paign ,
and by i m p l i c a t i o n  i n  o t h e r  cam paigns where one c a n d id a t e
was p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t r o n g ,  s l a n d e r s  o f  t h i s  ty p e  were o f
l i t t l e  more t h a n  n u is a n c e  v a lu e ;  b u t  i n  p l a c e s  where t h e r e
were two e v e n ly  m atched  c a n d i d a t e s ,  a  rum our c o u ld  sway
66t h e  i s s u e .  Once a g a i n ,  a s  t h e r e  i s  n o t  much c l e a r  
e v id e n c e  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  we s h o u ld  a c c e p t  h i s  v e r d i c t ;  
b u t ,  a t  t h e  same t im e ,  we sh o u ld  a l lo w  f o r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  two c lo s e  r i v a l s  c o u ld  be e v e n ly  m a tched  i n  t h e i r  
p r o p e n s i t i e s  f o r  making f a l s e  a c c u s a t i o n s  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  
e v e r y th in g  e l s e .  T h i s ,  a s  we have s e e n ,  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  
what hap p en ed  i n  t h e  H oribe  v e r s u s  K un ish im a  im b r o g l io .
F i n a l l y ,  a  word a b o u t  a  more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  m ethod 
o f  g a r n e r i n g  v o t e s .  C a n d id a te s  o r  t h e i r  a g e n t s  f r e q u e n t l y  
made o u t  l i s t s  o f  t h e i r  s u p p o r t e r s  i n  c o v e n a n t  fo rm . T hus, 
M essrs  A ,B ,C ,D , e t c .  p le d g e  th e m s e lv e s  t o  v o te  f o r  Y. The 
n e x t  s t e p  was t o  g e t  t h e  v o t e r s  c o n c e rn e d  t o  v e r i f y  t h e  
a c c u ra c y  o f  th e  c o n te n t s  o f  t h e s e  l i s t s  by a f f i x i n g  t h e i r
S5 -
Suem atsu K encho, N i - j u - s a n  Nen-no S o -S enkyo , MBZ, v o l . 3 ,
p .2 1 8 .
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Suem atsu K encho , N i - j u - s a n  Nen-no S o -S enkyo , MBZ, v o l . 3 ,
p .2 1 8 .
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l e g a l  s e a l s .  T ha t  done,  t h e  l i s t  became a s o r t  o f  
c o v e n a n t .  These ’ c o n v e n a n t s ’ h a d  no l e g a l  v a l i d i t y  a t  
a l l ;  b u t  t h e y  were found t o  be e x t r e m e l y  u s e f u l ,  b e c a u se  
( i )  t h e y  e n a b l e d  a c a n d i d a t e  t o  see  e x a c t l y  how he s t o o d  
i n  t e rm s  o f  p o p u l a r  s u p p o r t ,  and  b e c a u se  ( i i )  an  e l e c t o r  
was v e r y  r e l u c t a n t  t o  w i thd raw  h i s  v o t e  a f t e r  h av in g  once 
p ro m is e d  i t  i n  t h i s  f a s h i o n .  I t  was on t h e  b a s i s  o f  
t h e s e  c o v e n a n t s  t h a t  two c a n d i d a t e s  would  sometimes d e c id e  
t o  do a p r e - e l e c t i o n  ’d e a l ’ whereby one o f  them would 
r e s i g n  h i s  c a n d i d a t u r e  and t r a n s f e r  a l l  h i s  ’ c o v e n a n t e d ’ 
v o t e s  t o  t h e  o t h e r .  The m ot ive  b e h in d  su ch  l a s t - m i n u t e  
w i t h d r a w a l s  f rom t h e  f r a y  was i n  some c a s e s  p e r s o n a l  
a d v a n t a g e ,  i n  o t h e r s  p a r t y  i n t e r e s t ,
Mr HORIBE BANZAI, CITIZENS OP NAGOYA BANZAII These 
sev en  words w i l l  p e r h a p s ,  i f  s u i t a b l y  ex p an d e d ,  g iv e  u s  
t h e  g i s t  o f  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n d e r  which  t h e  g r e a t  
m a j o r i t y  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  r a n  t h e i r  c am p a ig n s .  P u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  
i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  was nowhere c o m p l e t e ly  a b s e n t ;  and  i n  
a r e a s  where i t  was w h e t t e d  by t a l e n t e d  s p e a k e r s  o r  a c l o s e  
c o n t e s t ,  i t  c o u l d  r i s e  t o  g r e a t  h e i g h t s  o f  e n th u s i a s m .
Packed  s p e e c h - m e e t i n g s  t e s t i f y  t o  t h i s  f a c t .  To have a 
good chance  o f  w in n in g ,  however ,  a c a n d i d a t e  d i d  n o t  j u s t  
have t o  be a b l e  t o  sp e ak  w e l l .  Even more i m p o r t a n t  was 
h i s  own s t a n d i n g  i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t .  Was he  p o p u l a r  p e r s o n a l l y ?
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How many influential friends did he have? Even if he 
was both a capable politician and had strong connections 
with the people in his constituency, he was still not 
safe. Almost certainly there would be a number of self- 
nominated and scheming Independents in the field against 
him; and these men, too, would have their own links with 
the neighbourhood and maybe what was a virtually unlimited 
supply of 1money power’• Then, if he were a party man, he 
might have to contend with one of the other big party, 
organizations, or at any rate a small, but embittered 
and active, nationalist faction. Or again, his leading 
opponent might be a person as well qualified to be a 
Representative and as locally popular as himself.
All this meant that a successful, or potentially 
successful, candidate had to fight hard for his victory. 
There was only a handful of exceptions to this rule. In 
the last resort, no matter whether a contestant was a 
permanent resident in the constituency or somebody called 
in from outside, no matter whether he relied on ’mobile 
speeches’ or on ’banquet competition’, his own energies 
and the efforts of his supporters were what usually 
determined the result. Given the requisite amount of 
local backing to start with, he had to go on from there 
and gain the favour of as many electors as possible -
358
overtly or covertly, by fair means or foul* If his rivals 
used one tactic against him, he would have to use another 
and preferably even more efficacious tactic - or perhaps 
have recourse to the same one, and so pay back the opposition 
in its own coin.
Thus in conclusion, and not forgetting the all important 
fact that when all is said and done, the first House of 
Representatives did reflect with a fair degree of accuracy 
the political opinion in the Empire as a whole, we may feel 
that so far as the individual candidate was concerned, the 
success of his campaign depended on two factors of widespread 
and overriding significance - his position in the village 
politics of his constituency, and his own initiative. We 
have seen already how these two influences gave rise to the 
general body of candidates, and, in particular, shaped the 
pattern of local nominations. Therefore, in summing up all 
that part of the history of the election that does not come 
under either the provisions of the Law of Election, or the 
party entanglements and manifestos, or the subsequent behaviour 
of elected candidates in the House, we shall not be seriously 
amiss if we quote some words of Suematsu Kencho's coining.
He said of the election campaigning that:-
In Japan, however, £"as opposed to the West_7, 
candidates at present make local affinities their prime 
consideration, and it seems that in their campaigns, too, 
individual endeavour came first. 67
£7 ISuematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3, p.215.
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( i i i )  B r i b e s  and S o s h i .
As h a s  b e en  s a i d  e a r l i e r ,  w i d e s p r e a d  b r i b i n g  o f  
t h e  e l e c t o r s  was a p rom inen t  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  e l e c t i o n  
cam paign .  H ere ,  we must draw a  fo rm a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  
t h e  e n t e r t a i n i n g  o f  th e  v o t e r s  and  t h e  o u t r i g h t  p u rc h a s e  
o f  t h e i r  v o t e s .  D o u b t l e s s  t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
p r i n c i p l e ,  and o f t e n  t h e r e  must  have  b e en  none a t  a l l  i n  
p r a c t i c e ,  b e tw een  p l y in g  t h e  v o t e r s  w i th  fo o d  and d r i n k  
and a c t u a l l y  g i v i n g  them money. But i t  i s  h a r d  a f t e r  th e  
e v e n t  t o  draw t h e  l i n e  s e p a r a t i n g  l e g i t i m a t e  e n t e r t a i n m e n t  
from d e f i n i t e l y  i l l e g a l  c o r r u p t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e  we s h a l l  
be c o n c e rn e d  h e r e  o n ly  w i t h  a c t s  o f  b r i b e r y  t h a t  were 
p u n i s h a b l e  u n d e r  t h e  t e rm s  o f  t h e  Law o f  E l e c t i o n  and i t s  
S u p p le m e n ta ry  P e n a l  R e g u l a t i o n s .
Such a c t s  o f  b r i b e r y ,  c o m m it ted  by t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  o r  
t h e i r  a g e n t s ,  were a v i r t u a l l y  e v e ry d a y  o c c u r r e n c e ,  and 
r e g u l a r l y  r e p o r t e d  o r  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  t h e  p r e s s .  The 
c o n t e n t s  o f  two o f  t h e s e  r e p o r t s  have a l r e a d y  b e en  r e c o u n t e d  
e l s e w h e r e ;  and i t  would be t e d i o u s  t o  go on a dd ing  t o  th e  
l i s t  o f  what were e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same s o r t  o f  p e c c a d i l l o e s .  
A c c o r d i n g l y  t h e  g e n e r a l  s i t u a t i o n  may be most  c o n v e n i e n t l y  
i n d i c a t e d  by c i t i n g  an i r o n i c  announcement  t h a t  a p p e a r e d  
i n  t h e  Matsue Nippo ( a  Shimane p r e f e c t u r e  p a p e r )  f o r  
29 May:-
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Diet Members* Agency Ltd*
In as much as we shall:-
Firstly, for those who donate ¥10 or goods
equivalent thereto, find one vote - a 
vote that is under a signed bond not to 
go astray.
Secondly, for those who donate ¥5 or goods
equivalent thereto, vouch for one vote - 
a vote that does not have a signed bond.
Thirdly, for those who donate ¥3 or goods
equivalent thereto, procure one vote - a 
vote that has been riskily half-promised.
Fourthly, to those who favour members of our company 
by asking them to meetings free of charge 
and regaling them with banquets of meat 
and wine, make a present of a shout to 
the effect that we shall let them have 
a vote.
Fifthly, to those who donate a box of cakes, give 
a whisper that there is a possibility of 
a vote.
We are looking forward to hearing in the near future
r q
from those of you v/ho wish to do a deal.0
TENS 5-6-90
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The above was published in a spirit of jest; but,
as the Tokyo Nichi Nichi remarked v/hen it reproduced
the prospectus in its own columns, some bad jokes strike
at the evils of the day. There is no doubt that bribery
was rife in Shimane prefecture and in most other parts
69of the country - notably Saitama, and Aichi. Concerning 
the latter area, one report stated that:-
There are incessant rumours here and there 
about bribery in connection with membership 
of the House of Representatives.
The next thing to note is that although corruption of the
electorate v/as a tactic used more frequently by self-
nominated Independents than any other group of candidates,
a number of party contestants, too, were not above
greasing a palm. Thus three agents for the Kaishin-to
candidate in Wakamatsu city (Pukushima prefecture) were
arrested on 26 June and charged with bribery.^
Allegations made about Yamada Taizo, Liberal candidate
in the Second Constituency, Kanagawa prefecture, seem to
72have remained unproven;' but there is little reason to
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d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  L i b e r a l s ,  t o o ,  were  w i l l i n g  t o  h an d  ou t  
b r i b e s  i n  c e r t a i n  a r e a s *  The f a c t  t h a t  i n  A i c h i  p r e f e c t u r e  
where  t h e  Koin Club was s t r o n g ,  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  were 
r e p o r t e d  t o  be do ing  t h e i r  b e s t  t o  r e v e a l  each  o t h e r ’ s 
b r i b e s ,  ^ and t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l  campaign  i n  
Yokohama ( a b o u t  which more w i l l  be s a i d  l a t e r ) ,  a r e  
g r o u n d s  f o r  h o l d i n g  t h i s  op in io n *
A n o th e r  p o i n t  i n  t h e  t e rm s  o f f e r e d  by th e  Shimane 
p r e f e c t u r e  D ie t  Members Agency L td  t h a t  d e s e r v e s  a l i t t l e  
more a t t e n t i o n  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  sums n o m in a ted  were 
s u r p r i s i n g l y  s m a l l  -  ¥10 f o r  a  g u a r a n t e e d  v o t e ,  ¥3 f o r  
a h a l f - p r o m i s e d  v o t e .  I f  we a l lo w  f o r  t h e  m idd lem an’ s 
p r o f i t ,  t h e n  t h e  a c t u a l  p u rc h a se  p r i c e  t o  be p a i d  t o  
t h e  v o t e r  would have  b e e n  even  l e s s  t h a n  t h i s .  Of c o u r s e  
t h i s  r e c k o n in g  i s  h y p o t h e t i c a l  b e c a u se  t h e  r e p o r t  on which 
i t  i s  b a s e d  was a j o k e ;  b u t  a t  any r a t e  t h e r e  i s  an  
i n d i c a t i o n  h e r e  o f  t h e  amount t h a t  m ig h t  have  b een  e x p e c t e d  
t o  change  hands  a t  a s i n g l e  t r a n s a c t i o n .  Moreover t h e r e  
i s  a n o t h e r  s h r e d  o f  e v id e n c e  which would t e n d  t o  show t h a t  
t h i s  e s t i m a t e  was n o t  f a r  wrong.  Most o f  t h e  b r i b e r y  
c a s e s  m e n t io n e d  i n  t h e  p a p e r s  do n o t  say  e x a c t l y  how much 
money was su p p o sed  t o  have  been  g i v e n  t o  t h e  v o t e r s ;  b u t
73
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t h e  K i t a  S a i ta m a  c a s e ,  d e t a i l s  o f  which  were g i v e n  i n
74an e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r ,  i s  an  u n u s u a l l y  w e l l  documented 
o ne .  H e re ,  no more t h a n  t e n  o r  t w e n ty  s e n  was a l l e g e d  
t o  have  b e en  g i v e n  t o  e ach  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r s  i n v o l v e d .  ^
A s u b s e q u e n t  r e p o r t  m e n t io n e d  t h e  sum o f  t h i r t y  s e n ,  and 
added  t h a t  i n  some i n s t a n c e s  t h e  e l e c t i o n  a g e n t  h ad  l e f t  
t e n  s e n  and  p ro m is e d  t o  i n c r e a s e  i t  t o  f i f t y  sen  i f  h i s
76c a n d i d a t e  was e l e c t e d .  Ten s e n  would have  b een  t h e  
e q u i v a l e n t  t o  a b o u t  3d .  F i f t y  s e n  was o n ly  one and t h r e e .
The e l e c t o r s  by d e f i n i t i o n  were  n o t  p a u p e r s ;  and i t  
i s  h a r d  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  v e r y  many o f  them  would have been  
w i l l i n g  t o  ru n  th e  r i s k  o f  a  f i n e  which  would have been  
a n y t h i n g  from f i v e  t o  f i f t y  yen  f o r  such  a p a l t r y  b r i b e .  
A l l  t h i s  r a i s e s  t h e  p ro b lem  o f  t o  what  e x t e n t  g r a f t ,  
a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  i t  was w i d e s p r e a d ,  was a c t u a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  
i n  t h a t  i t  s e c u r e d  th e  r e t u r n  o f  c a n d i d a t e s  u s i n g  i t .  I n  
t r y i n g  t o  f i n d  a s o l u t i o n ,  however  t e n t a t i v e ,  t o  t h i s  
p ro b lem ,  i t  seems t o  me t h a t  we must  f i r s t  p o s t u l a t e  two 
c l a s s e s  o f  b r i b e r y : -  ( i )  sm a l l  b r i b e s  d i s t r i b u t e d  
i n d i s c r i m i n a t i n g l y  t o  a l a r g e  o r  f a i r l y  l a r g e  number o f
e l e c t o r s ,  and  ( i i )  b ig  b r i b e s  g i v e n  on a more s e l e c t i v e  
b a s i s  t o  f e w e r  v o t e r s .
75
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Sm all  b r i b e s  may be t a k e n  t o  mean sums o f  money 
o f  more t h a n  t e n  s e n  b u t  l e s s  t h a n  t h r e e  y e n ,  and  a l s o  
cheap  goods t h a t  were u s e f u l  i n  t h e i r  way b u t  o f  a 
d e f i n i t e l y  l i m i t e d  v a l u e ,  such  as  boxes  o f  c a k e ,  boxes  
o f  d r i e d  f i s h ,  h a n d - t o w e l s ,  p a c k e t s  o f  s u g a r ,  s u g a r  
p o u c h e s ,  and h a n d k e r c h i e f s .  These  b r i b e s  i n  p l a c e s  w here  
t h e y  were u s e d  seem t o  have b e en  h anded  o u t  e x t e n s i v e l y ,  
b u t  i n  such  a way t h a t  e ac h  r e c i p i e n t  was g i v e n  o n ly  one 
a r t i c l e ,  o r  a t  t h e  most  two a r t i c l e s .  I n  v iew  o f  t h i s  
m ethod  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  f e a s i b l e  t h a t  t h e y  
were g e n e r a l l y  r e g a r d e d  by th e  c a n d i d a t e s  and  v o t e r s  a l i k e  
a s  b e in g  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  a d i s c r e e t l y  t i m e d  p r e s e n t  
d e s i g n e d  t o  i n g r a t i a t e  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  w i t h  t h e  v o t e r s ,  
and  n o t  as  a  c a l c u l a t e d  and b in d in g  a t t e m p t  t o  s u b o rn  
them . I n  t h i s  c o n n e c t i o n  i t  s h o u l d  be remembered t h a t  t h e  
g i v i n g  o f  p r e s e n t s  i s  an  e s t a b l i s h e d  c o n v e n t i o n  i n  norm al  
b u s i n e s s  and  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  modern J a p a n ,  and 
one t h a t  d e r i v e s  d i r e c t l y  from f e u d a l  cu s to m .  C e r t a i n l y ,  
i n  t h e  K i t a  S a i ta m a  a f f a i r ,  t h e  Tokyo N ic h i  N i c h i  a t  one 
t im e  e x p r e s s e d  i t s  s u r p r i s e  t h a t  t h e  c a n d i d a t e  who was 
a l l e g e d  t o  have g i v e n  sm a l l  g i f t s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  u s e d  
t h e s e  m e th o d s ,  b e ca u se  he was no t  o n ly  w e a l t h y  b u t  a l s o  
p e r s o n a l l y  v e ry  p o p u l a r  i n  t h e  a r e a  and was b e l i e v e d  t o  
have  a good chance o f  b e in g  e l e c t e d  a n y w a y . ^
77
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I f  an  e l e c t o r  was t o  be v i s i t e d  i n  s u c c e s s i o n  by 
two a g e n t s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  o p p o s in g  c a n d i d a t e s  each  o f  whom 
l e f t  a  box o f  c a k e s  o r  a t o w e l ,  what  would  he do? More 
o f t e n  t h a n  n o t ,  I  im a g in e ,  he would  s im p ly  a c c e p t  and  make 
u s e  o f  b o th  p r e s e n t s ,  and t h e n  v o t e  f o r  n e i t h e r  o f  t h e  
c a n d i d a t e s ,  o r  e l s e  v o t e  f o r  t h e  one whom he r e a l l y  
p r e f e r r e d  f o r  q u i t e  e x t r a n e o u s  r e a s o n s .  T h is  m ig h t  have  
b e e n  e q u a l l y  w e l l  t h e  c a s e  even  i f  o n ly  one s i d e  was 
s e n d in g  p r e s e n t s .  The bogus p r o s p e c t u s  o f  t h e  D i e t  Members 
Agency L t d  i t s e l f  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  a  box o f  c a k e s  was n o t  
w o r th  more t h a n  a w h i s p e r  o f  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a  v o t e ;  and 
we have  a l r e a d y  s e e n  t h a t  a t  one s t a g e  i n  t h e  p r o t r a c t e d  
b a t t l e  fo u g h t  by H i r a b a y a s h i  Kyubei  and T ak a g i  M a sa to sh i  
i n  t h e  o u te r m o s t  d i s t r i c t s  o f  Tokyo f u ,  t h e  r i c e - c a k e s  
and  b o n i t o  o f  t h e  nephew q u i c k l y  f a d e d  from t h e  memories  
o f  t h e  e l e c t o r s  when t h e y  h e a r d  o f  t h e  p ro m is e d  m u n i f i c e n c e  
o f  t h e  u n c l e .
With  r e g a r d  t o  b i g g e r  b r i b e s  -  t h a t  i s ,  a n y th i n g  
from ¥3 t o  ¥10 -  t h e  c a s e  was a lm o s t  c e r t a i n l y  r a t h e r  
d i f f e r e n t ;  though  even  on t h i s  l e v e l  o f  p e c u n i a r y  in d u ce m e n t ,  
i t  i s  w o r th  n o t i n g ,  t h e  Shimane announcement  made i t  c l e a r  
t h a t  a t  l e a s t  ¥10 was n e ed e d  t o  make s u r e  t h a t  a v o t e  
p a i d  f o r  would a c t u a l l y  be g i v e n .  The c a n d i d a t e s  who 
r e s o r t e d  t o  b r i b e r y  on t h i s  s c a l e  n e a r l y  a l l  came from
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that group of self-nominated Independents who had little 
or no chance of winning by any other means. Indeed, one 
might truthfully generalize to the point of saying - the 
bigger the bribe, the less popular the candidate. The 
Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun, reviewing the general progress 
of the election campaign,- said:-
/~Most places_7 have put themselves in the 
hands of self-nominated candidates; and since 
the general body of electors is in fact being 
led astray by this, we find ourselves to-day in 
the melancholy situation that the things which
are most abhorrent in elections exist in every
, 78region.
Two weeks earlier than this, the Kokumin Shimbun in 
an editorial entitled Two Hundred Thousand Yen Will Control 
The Assembly was even more explicit, and stated: -
At present, unscrupulous good-for-nothings are 
trying to become members of the House of 
Representatives by the exercise of stealth. The 
weapons on which they rely are not f~skill in_7
_
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debate, and they are not personal ability.
Still less can they claim to have had any
experience of politics. Their one weapon is
the use of bribes. Consequently ducks that
have been long since dead have stretched their
wings and taken flight; bottles of beer have
grown feet and started walking. Electors - take
care I Remember that those who send out bribes of
ducks and beer will themselves naturally expect
to receive bigger bribes with interest added!
How can there ever be any difference between
a willingness to send bribes to the electors
and a readiness to take bribes from the Government
79once they have got into the Diet?
It is clear, then, that it was on the whole the self- 
nominated Independents with little else to commend them 
who made the most frequent and blatant use of money power. 
Once again, on the evidence available, we must conclude,
I think, that with this class of bribing, too, prevalence 
was well ahead of efficacy. The chief reason for saying 
this is that not very many of the self-nominated candidates 
of the lone-wolf type succeeded in getting themselves
79 "
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elected to the House of Representatives, Judicious 
graft might well have helped those candidates v/ho had 
had initially fairly favourable prospects at the start 
of the campaign and had since got into some sort of 
trouble; but it would seem very doubtful whether corruption 
alone ever saved the day for an absolute no-hoper.
We may adduce a number of reasons for this state of 
affairs. In the first place, the cost of bribing one's 
way into the Diet would have tended to be prohibitive in 
most constituencies. Assuming that ¥5 would have been 
enough to secure a guaranteed vote, then the average 
¥1,000 expenses would have bought only two hundred voters; 
and with the average number of voters per constituency 
being in the region of seventeen hundred, this method by 
itself would have not taken a candidate who used it very 
far towards his goal. Of even greater consequence in 
acting against the fortunes of self-nominated adventurers 
were the forces of regionalism and the personal appeal 
of rival candidates.
In this respect, the history of the election campaign
in the Fourth Constituency, Okayama prefecture, is 
80instructive. There, the person eventually elected,
THNS 15-6-90 and Kokumin Shimbun 15-6-90.
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Sakata Johei, was a much respected local resident and 
a scholar of Chinese classics. Prom the outset of the 
election campaign the favour of the electors in the area 
had been firmly fixed on him, even though he was not 
willing to canvass actively on his own behalf. Reports 
stated that from time to time self-nominated candidates 
had put in an appearance and, trying to take advantage 
of Sakata's reticence, had spread false rumours to the 
effect that he was not really willing to be elected, or 
else insinuated that a scholar was not the sort of person 
to make a suitable Representative. To these whispered 
allegations, Sakata replied simply that so far as the 
election was concerned, he would not seek it, nor would 
he compete, nor would he turn his back on popular favour.
The self-nominated candidates failed; Sakata won.
Though there is no definite statement that the self- 
nominated candidates in the above instance added corruption 
to their methods; the reports do indicate that a large 
measure of local support and strength of character were 
sufficient to defeat the more noxious sorts of Independents. 
Legal action, threatened or actually taken, and the 
consciences of individual electors must have also served 
the same end in a number of instances. The whole problem 
of determining the actual effect bribery had on the results
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of the election is an extremely difficult one to resolve 
with any degree of accuracy. However the essence of the 
matter would seem to be comprised in the following two 
statement s: -
1. Self-nominated candidates who had little or no 
popular support or local influence, and so 
relied heavily on bribing the electors, usually 
did not get elected.
2. Self-nominated candidates who did have a 
substantial measure of popular support or 
local influence and also relied on bribes were 
not seldom elected.
A brief review of the situation in Osaka, where there 
were a number of candidates who used money power, would 
seem to confirm these conclusions.
In the First Constituency, Osaka fu, the winning 
candidate was an old gunsmith, Awaya Shinazo. He was 
self-nominated Independent, and a member of both the city 
and the metropolitan (fu) assemblies. Apparently, he was 
able to take advantage of his local connections and 
previous experience in standing for the assemblies to 
make good in the contest for the House of Representatives 
against opposition of a rather inferior calibre:-
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Mr Awaya Shinazo - the whale member, or 
bean-jam bun candidate - is not at all liked 
by the public; but he is not the least concerned 
about such things. Already, the other day, he 
invited more than a thousand people - voters 
from the constituency, newspaper editors, 
acquaintances, and so on - to the Senshin inn 
in Naka-no-shima and gave a big banquet, on the 
pretext of celebrating his sixtieth birthday. 
Whereupon he became extremely popular with one 
sort of people. More especially, electoral 
contests are this old man's forte. Up till now, 
he has always fought his way through stiff 
competition and been elected by a large majority - 
both at the election of members to the city 
assembly, and at the re-election of members to the 
metropolitan assembly. Though there is still no 
definite opinion that it is he who should sit 
in the Diet, from time to time he has his 
audiences convulsed with Daughter, and at any 
rate he must be the one who is standing for the 
Diet with the highest hopes. ^
BT"
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Elsewhere in Osaka, in the Fifth Constituency, one
of the candidates who came from a wealthy local family
sent out presents of food to the electors. When his
main opponent, a lawyer, heard of this, he summoned
electors to his office and warned them of the punishments
82they would receive if found guilty of breaking the law. 
The lawyer won the seat. In the Sixth Constituency, 
another candidate used his money to try and bring about 
the defeat of a public notary, who was also standing and 
who relied on his scholastic abilities. J In the end, 
both of these candidates were eliminated by a third one - 
the former sub-prefect of one of the Districts in the 
constituency. In the Eighth Constituency, on the other 
hand, money vanquished a candidate who was an ex-official 
and an eloquent speaker.
What was happening in Osaka is symptomatic, I feel, 
of what was taking place generally throughout the country 
and corruption, though it must have had its effect on 
the campaigns in many of the constituencies, did not - 
in itself, and solely in itself - decide the issue in 
more than a very small number of them, (perhaps the 
eve-of-poll situation in the majority of constituencies
B2
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r e s e m b le d  t h a t  i n  t h e  Second C o n s t i t u e n c y ,  Tokyo,
T here  had  b e en  no s u g g e s t i o n  o f  u n f a i r  p r a c t i c e s ;  and o f  
t h e  218 v o t e r s ,  50 had  p ro m is e d  t o  s u p p o r t  one c a n d i d a t e  
and  45 t h e  o t h e r  one ,  l e a v i n g  more t h a n  a 100 s t i l l  no t
,84w i l l i n g  t o  say  p u b l i c l y  f o r  whom t h e y  would o p t , ;
I t  f o l l o w s ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  House o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i t s e l f  must have b e e n  t o  some d e g re e  
i n f l u e n c e d  by b r i b e r y ;  b u t  was by no means d e t e r m i n e d  by 
i t .  T h is  f i n d i n g  o f  c o u r s e  i s  c o n f i r m e d  by t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
a l r e a d y  g i v e n  c o n c e rn in g  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  l o w ly  f i n a n c i a l  
s t a t u s  o f  e l e c t e d  Members.
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  w h i l e  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  t r u t h  o f  t h e  
a rgum ent  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  a s  
opposed  t o  t h e  e l e c t i o n  campaign i n  g e n e r a l ,  was 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y  f r e e  from t h e  t a i n t  o f  u n f a i r  p r a c t i c e s ,  
we must a t  t h e  same t im e  admit  t h a t  i t  was n o t  w h o l ly  f r e e  
from t h i s  t a i n t .  T h is  was t h e  most  l a s t i n g  an d  r e p r e h e n s i b l e  
consequence  o f  t h e  w i d e s p r e a d  u se  o f  g r a f t  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  
o f  1890 .  I n  1892 ,  a f t e r  a p e r i o d  o f  p r o t r a c t e d  c o n t e n t i o n  
be tw een  t h e  Government and  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
on t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  Budget e s t i m a t e s ,  t h e  Government was 
a t  l e n g t h  e n a b l e d  t o  p a s s  a m o d i f i e d  f i n a n c i a l  B i l l  t h r o u g h
5TJ
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the House after it had secured the consent of a 
sufficient number of its Liberal opponents by lining 
their pockets. In this way, the forebodings of the 
Kokumin Shimbun and other organs of the press were amply 
confirmed; and an evil precedent was set to be followed 
with even graver consequences by later administrations 
and Houses of Representatives. Yet, even though corruption, 
both at the polls and within the walls of the Diet, was 
to sink to levels never reached in the opening years of 
parliamentary history, it is still doubtful if this alone 
can be regarded as having been responsible for the marked 
decline in the powers of the constitutional system that 
occurred after 1930.
To summarize, then, the rather complicated circumstances 
surrounding election bribes as a whole in 1890, we may say 
briefly that:-
1. Bribery was prevalent.
2. It was less effectual than might be 
imagined for a variety of reasons, 
among which were:-
a. The strength of regionalism and personality- 
ism.
b. The fickleness of many of the electors.
c. The legal action taken against those found 
guilty of either giving or receiving bribes.
d. The paltriness of many so-called bribes1.
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3.  N e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e  miasma o f  c o r r u p t i o n  d i d  
d r i f t  upwards from t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  1890 t o  
i n f e c t  t h e  d e a l i n g s  o f  t h e  f i r s t  House o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  w i t h  t h e  Government ,  and  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  an  a tm o sp h e re  o f  j o b b e r y .  T h i s  
grew w i t h  t h e  y e a r s  and  s e r i o u s l y  weakened,  
th o u g h  i t  d i d  n o t  o f  i t s e l f  u n d e rm in e ,  t h e  
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  sy s te m  as a  w ho le .
The main  r e a s o n s  why J a p a n e s e  p o l i t i c s  s h o u ld  have  
b e en  p a r t i c u l a r l y  p ro n e  t o  c o r r u p t i o n  may be b r i e f l y  t o u c h e d  
on.  The f e u d a l  f a m i l y  e t h i c  p e r h a p s  had  som eth ing  t o  
do v / i th  i t .  As i t  was b a s e d  on f e e l i n g s  o f  shame b e f o r e  
r e c o g n i z e d  l o c a l  g r o u p s  and no t  on a s e n s e  o f  s i n  a g a i n s t  
an a l l - s e e i n g  and a l l - p r e s e n t  God, i t  was l e s s  w e l l  s u i t e d  
t o  t h e  m o ra l  p ro b lem s  o f  e l e c t i o n e e r i n g  t h a n  t h e  more 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  d i s c i p l i n e  o f  c e r t a i n  E u ro p ea n  n a t i o n s .  
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  l a c k  -  n o t  o f  p a t r i o t i s m  i n  
e i t h e r  i t s  l o c a l  o r  n a t i o n a l  forms -  b u t  o f  t h e  s o r t  o f  
r e g u l a r  and  u n e m o t i o n a l  c i v i c  m o ra le  t h a t  would  have 
h e l p e d  t o  s a f e g u a r d  t h e  s p i r i t u a l  h e a l t h  o f  e l e c t i o n s  and 
s u c c e s s i v e  Houses o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ,  m ig h t  be c h i e f l y  
a c c o u n te d  f o r  by t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  o l d  
f e u d a l  o r d e r .  C e r t a i n l y ,  on a r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  p l a n e  
o f  v a l u e s ,  t h o s e  b r i b e s  which were no more t h a n  l i t t l e  
g i f t s  s e n t  t o  a l l  and  sundry  a r e  v i r t u a l l y  i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
i n  many i n s t a n c e s  f rom  ’ f e u d a l ’ p r e s e n t s ,  and so may have  
no t  b e e n  th o u g h t  o f  a s  b r i b e s  p r o p e r  a t  a l l .  L a s t l y  and
1
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i n d u b i t a b l y ,  one o f  t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  c a u s e s  o f  e l e c t o r a l  
c o r r u p t i o n  i n  1890 was t h e  l a r g e  number o f  s e l f - n o m i n a t e d  
c a n d i d a t e s .
I n  c o n c l u s i o n ,  we sh o u ld  t a k e  n o t e  o f  t h e  m ain  methods 
u s e d  a t  t h e  t im e  t o  combat t h e  wave o f  p e c u n i a r y  m isd em ean o u rs .  
By f a r  t h e  most s i g n i f i c a n t  o f  t h e s e  c o n t r o l s  stemmed 
from t h e  l e g a l  s a n c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  o u t r i g h t  c o r r u p t i o n ,  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  Law o f  E l e c t i o n  and t h e  S u p p lem en ta ry  
P e n a l  R e g u l a t i o n s .  These s a n c t i o n s ,  a s  we have s e e n ,  
were e n f o r c e d  f a i r l y  and f i r m l y  by t h e  p o l i c e  whenever  
p o s s i b l e .  The a u t h o r i t i e s  were o f t e n  a i d e d  i n  t h e i r  
e f f o r t s  t o  b r i n g  t h e  o f f e n d e r s  t o  book by i n f o r m a t i o n  
s u p p l i e d  by r i v a l  c a n d i d a t e s ,  o r  by v o t e r s  who had  a c c e p t e d  
b r i b e s  and  t h e n  th o u g h t  b e t t e r  o f  i t .  Newspapers  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  a l l  shades  o f  o p i n i o n  j o i n e d  t o g e t h e r  i n  
w arn in g  t h e  v o t e r s  n o t  t o  a l lo w  th e m s e lv e s  t o  be c o r r u p t e d ,  
and  i n  condemning t h o s e  c a n d i d a t e s  who t r i e d  t o  do i t .  I n  
S a i ta m a  p r e f e c t u r e ,  a number o f  p u b l i c - s p i r i t e d  p e r s o n s  
founded  a n  a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n  a s s o c i a t i o n  which  t h e y  c a l l e d  
t h e  S a i ta m a  P r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  R i g h t e o u s n e s s  S o c i e t y ;  and 
t h e r e  a r e  h i n t s  o f  s i m i l a r  moves e l s e w h e r e . ^  However t h e  
v i l l a g e  i n  Gumma p r e f e c t u r e ,  which p u t  up t h e  f o l l o w in g
TNNS 1 8 -6 -9 0  and 2 1 - 6 - 9 0 .
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n o t i c e  a t  a l l  p l a c e s  where ro a d s  e n t e r e d  i t ,  seems 
t o  have s e t  a s a d ly  i s o l a t e d  e x a m p le : -
STRICTLY NO ADMITTANCE TO ALL 
ALMS-COLLECTORS, BEGGARS, HAWKERS,
VOTE-BUYERS, e t c . 86
So much f o r  b r i b e s ;  now f o r  t h e  s o s h i .  The s t ro n g m an , 
w i th  h i s  b ig  s t i c k  and h i s  b l u s t e r i n g ,  b u l l y i n g  h a b i t s ,  
was a f i g u r e  t h a t  f r e q u e n t l y  e r u p t e d  w i th  v i o l e n c e  i n t o  
t h e  c e n t r e  o f  th e  1890 e l e c t o r a l  s c e n e ,  and  was a lw ays 
s t a n d in g  as a d a rk  shadow i n  i t s  b a ck g ro u n d . D e t a i l s  
o f  some o f  t h e i r  o u t r a g e s  have a l r e a d y  been  g iv e n ;  and
r
e a s i l y  t h e  m ost common ty p e  o f  a c t i v i t y  was p h y s i c a l  
d i s r u p t i o n  o f  a sp e ec h  m ee tin g  i n  t h e  m anner d e s c r i b e d  
on p a g es  112-114* Here i s  a n o th e r  s t a n d a r d  example o f  
h e c k l i n g *  as  c a r r i e d  on by a g ro u p  o f  s o s h i : -
S ix ty  o r  so i n f l u e n t i a l  p e o p le  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  
o f  S oka-m ach i,  S a i ta m a  p r e f e c t u r e ,  o r g a n iz e d  a 
sp e ec h  m e e tin g  i n  t h a t  town th e  day b e fo r e  y e s t e r d a y ,  
t h e  2 5 th .  The a u d ie n c e  p o u red  i n ,  one a f t e r  t h e  
o t h e r ,  from  1 p .m . onw ards; and when i t  r e a c h e d  
a t o t a l  o f  more t h a n  t h r e e  h u n d re d  s o u l s ,  a l o c a l  
e n t h u s i a s t  began  t o  g iv e  a t a l k  on s c i e n c e .
TNNS 1 4 -6 -9 0
378
Whereupon twenty or thirty persons looking 
like Liberal party soshi came in, sneered 
more than once /"at the speaker_7, and disturbed 
the meeting place with their insults and bad 
language. The political discussion began after 
this; and while Messrs Kudama Tokutaro and 
Shinoda jT?_7 were taking the platform, they 
interrupted the speeches in the same way by 
sneering and shouting abuse. However these two 
gentlemen took not the least bit of notice of 
them, and finished their speeches.
Next, Mr Noguchi Honnosuke advanced two or 
three steps towards the front of the platform, 
and was just on the point of commencing his 
speech when the band of soshi, growing still 
bolder, took to shouting in unison and tried to 
create a general uproar. Then Mr Noguchi, raising 
his voice even louder, said:- ''Gentlemen, you are 
bent on making a disturbance before I have opened 
my mouth even. No doubt because you feel that 
it would naturally be of grave disadvantage to 
you to let me finish my speech without hindrance. 
But one of my speeches is not worth it.” No 
sooner had he said this than one of the soshi
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(EbaraSenzo), who had crept up alongside of 
the platform with a bottle in his hand, 
suddenly stood up, and closing in on the speaker 
with a flying leap, spluttered out two or three 
words.
As quick as a flash, all the soshi got up 
and started a commotion in every part of the 
hall. The chairman of the meeting, Mr Udagawa Sonzo, 
rose to his feet and tried to control them, but 
the soshi seized hold of him and assaulted him.
The audience all stood up and waded in. Pour or 
five policemen pushed their way into the middle 
of the scrimmage. The band of soshi became 
increasingly destructive. The chairman was hit 
under the nose and blood trickled out. Bottles 
flew and were smashed to smithereens. Stones and 
pebbles were thrown through the air; flower-vases 
were upset. At last, the police ordered the
Q y
meeting to be closed.
The rest of the report, after repeating the allegation 
that the soshi concerned were connected with the local 
Liberal party and saying that they had travelled from
Yübin-Höchi Shimbun 27- 5- 90*87
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Tokyo f o r  t h e  e x p r e s s  p u rp o se  o f  a t t e n d i n g  t h e  Soka-m ach i
m e e t i n g ,  went on t o  d e s c r i b e  how t h e  sp o n s o r s  o f  th e
d i s r u p t e d  sp e ec h  m e e t in g  im m e d ia te ly  a r r a n g e d  t o  h o l d  a
p a r t y  i n  a n e a rb y  r e s t a u r a n t *  About e i g h t y  p e o p le
a t t e n d e d  th e  p a r t y ;  and a f t e r  t h e  m ea l  h a d  b e e n  s e r v e d ,
t h e  programme o f  s p e e c h e s  was resum ed and c o m p le te d  -  t h i s
t im e  w i t h o u t  any unseem ly  i n t e r r u p t i o n s .
A p a r t  from b e in g  employed t o  b r e a k  up p u b l i c  m e e t i n g s ,
t h e  s o s h i  were a l s o  u s e d  i n  a t t e m p t s  t o  i n t i m i d a t e
o p p o s i t i o n  c a n d i d a t e s  and t o  f r i g h t e n  e l e c t o r s .  I n  Tokyo,
a s o s h i  gang known as  t h e  Dankyo G i k a i  seems t o  have
t a k e n  a f a i r l y  a c t i v e  p a r t  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n .  On 23 J u n e ,
i t  s e n t  a l e t t e r  t o  T ak a g i  M a s a to s h i  i n  t h e  T w e l f t h
C o n s t i t u e n c y  w arn ing  him t o  y i e l d  t h e  e l e c t i o n  t o  h i s
88
u n c l e ,  H i r a b a y a s h i  K y u b e i .  S i m i l a r  l e t t e r s  were  a l s o
s e n t  t o  two o f  t h e  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  S h ib a  w ard ,  t h a t  i s  t h e
89
Second C o n s t i t u e n c y  i n  Tokyo f u .  On 30 J u n e ,  members
o f  t h e  same gang went t o  t h e  house  o f  a n  u n s p e c i f i e d  
c a n d i d a t e  i n  S h ib a  ward  and s a i d  t h a t  t h e y  had  come t o  
i n v e s t i g a t e  rumours t h a t  he had  b e e n  o f f e r i n g  b r i b e s .  The 
c a n d i d a t e  a p p a r e n t l y  had  h e a r d  o f  t h e i r  i n t e n t i o n s  and
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was not at home. The soshi, furious, conducted a 
fruitless search for him for the best part of seven 
hours.
In Yokohama, the bravado of certain soshi, who were 
indisputably connected with the Liberal faction, reached 
heights not attained elsewhere. The citizens awoke on 
the morning of 29 June to find that members of the Certain 
Death Compact Society had put up posters at every cross­
roads, threatening to kill in their capacity as 1 Heaven*s
agents1 anyone who voted for the Progressive Party 
91candidate. On the afternoon of the day of election, 
the Progressive candidate himself, Shimada Saburo, was 
visited by three of the most notorious of the Yokohama 
soshi, and after a quarrel, subjected to minor assault.
Though in two of the cases of activity by the soshi 
examined so far there are clear indications that Liberals 
were implicated, electioneering by means of rowdies was 
a practice by no means confined to the Liberal factions 
alone. Independents were, if anything, slightly more 
prone to adopt it; the Kaishin-to candidates, if anything, 
rather less. The following few details of particular 
instances should suffice to show the nature of the situation. 
_______________________90 92
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I n  t h e  T h i r d  C o n s t i t u e n c y ,  T o c h i g i  p r e f e c t u r e ,  
t h e  main  c o n t e s t a n t s  were Tanaka Shozo ( K a i s h i n - t o )  and 
Kimura Hampei ( B u s i n e s s  P a r t y ) ,  and  t h e  s t r u g g l e  was a 
keen  one .  Both  c a n d i d a t e s  c a l l e d  i n  s o s h i ,  w i t h  t h e  
r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e r e  were i n c i d e n t s  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  
campaign and  some i n j u r i e s  i n f l i c t e d .  ^ On t h e  day o f  
t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  i t  was r e p o r t e d ,  t h e y  had  s t a t i o n e d  s o s h i  
e v e ry w h e re ,  b u t  p o l i c e  v i g i l a n c e  p r e v e n t e d  any f u r t h e r
Q]|
o u t b r e a k s  o f  v i o l e n c e .  I n  Gumma p r e f e c t u r e ,  f i v e
o f  t h e  s i x  c a n d i d a t e s  were s t i l l  c am paign ing  as  h a r d  as
t h e y  c o u ld  on t h e  eve o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  and  even  though
th e  p o l i c e  s u p e r v i s i o n  was s t r i c t ,  ’ f i e r c e  q u a r r e l s ’
were o c c u r r i n g  e v e r y w h e r e . ^  I n  A i c h i  p r e f e c t u r e  (K o in
Club v .  I n d e p e n d e n t s ), s o s h i  were g e n e r a l l y  i n  s h o r t  su p p ly
b eca u se  t h e y  were b e in g  u s e d  on such  a wide s c a l e  by
96b o t h  l o t s  o f  c a n d i d a t e s .  F i n a l l y ,  i n  Osaka ,  a c e r t a i n  
In d e p e n d e n t  c a n d i d a t e ,  whom we have e n c o u n t e r e d  b e f o r e ,  
t o o k  t h e  i n i t i a t i v e  i n  e n l i s t i n g  s o s h i ,  o n ly  t o  have h i s  
l e a d  q u i c k l y  f o l lo w e d  by h i s  r i v a l s .
The r e p o r t  on t h i s  l a s t  i n c i d e n t  r e a d s : -
The e v i l  t i d e  o f  t h r e a t e n i n g  u l t i m a t u m s  has  
r e a c h e d  Osaka,  t o o .  A c e r t a i n  c a n d i d a t e  i n  t h e
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First Constituency, for example - perhaps 
finding after all that the doctrine of jam 
bun and banquet entreaties was slow in having 
effects - whistled up a gang of gambling 
ruffians, (What a MemberJ) with whom he had 
been acquainted on terms of friendship for 
some time. Having plied them with sake and 
greased their palms, he formed them into 
squads of four or five men under squad leaders, 
and by pushing his claims has brought influence 
to bear on each elector one by one. His 
competitors, on seeing this, decided that 
neither bragging nor speech meetings could 
match it, and, adopting the same policy, took 
to the idea of using main force in the form of 
intimidation and threats. Thus, the rowdies 
of one side encounter and glare at the bullies 
of the other side in front of the gate of every 
elector, and the atmosphere is tense. It is 
to be feared that, in secret, at any moment now, 
blood will be shed and flesh will fly. The 
electors for the most part find a way out by 
saying that they are not at home, and so up 
till now have done all they could to avoid
384
interference in electoral matters. The police, 
too, fearful of what may happen on the day of 
the election in these circumstances, have 
recently taken very strict precautions. Rumour 
has it that there will also be some unexpected 
arrests, and there is a general feeling of unease.
Now let us pause to consider for a moment what, if 
any, effects this widespread intervention by soshi had on 
the actual outcome of the elections. Again, it is not 
easy to give an answer with any great degree of precision; 
but, speaking in general terms, I think that the soshi - 
for all their conspicuity in the accounts of the election 
can have gained, or, alternatively, neutralized, a vote 
in only a very small number of cases. The examples of 
intervention to which reference has been made so far will 
illustrate this point.
Thus, the sponsors of the Soka-machi speech meeting 
were able to continue with the speeches elsewhere after 
the soshi disturbance had forced the premature closure of 
the meeting, though admittedly the audience had dwindled 
somewhat in the meantime. Takagi Masatoshi, Shimada 
Saburo, and one of the two threatened candidates in Shiba
97
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ward were all elected to the House of Representatives, 
despite the overt hostility of soshi. The Osaka electors 
seem to have been quite successful in withstanding the 
efforts of rival gangs to terrorize them. In short, the 
soshi were well able in many areas to exert sufficient 
force to disrupt speech meetings and impose acute, though 
generally temporary, physical discomfort on a few 
unfortunate individuals. But there is little or no 
evidence to shov/ that:- (i) anyone actually voted in 
accordance with the dictates of the soshi, and (ii) 
any candidate felt it wise to give up his candidature 
for the same reason.
All this would indicate that the hiring of soshi 
was even less effectual than the use of bribes as a 
means of prevailing upon the electors to give up their 
right to vote for the candidate they themselves liked 
best. It is not too difficult to see why. For one 
thing, the hiring of soshi was no doubt a good deal cheaper 
than the paying out of bribes. Therefore if, in a 
particular contest, one candidate resorted to soshi, the 
others could without too much expense do the same. In 
the majority of instances mentioned, this v/as indeed the 
case. As a result one lot of soshi often found themselves 
foiled by another gang of soshi, and the electors were
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left in comparative peace. Then again, it was much 
easier for the police to prevent or, failing that, 
control outbreaks of overt violence than it was for them 
to uncover secret transactions in money or goods. As 
we have seen, the police were by no means negligent in 
trying to enforce the provisions of the Law of Election, 
and on polling day itself succeeded in keeping the soshi 
ineffective throughout the country. Moreover, the violence 
displayed in so many incidents in the course of the 
campaign was of a not very serious kind. Loses might 
have been punched here, or kicks exchanged there; but 
certainly, nobody was killed. Very probably, there were 
no bones broken even.
A possible reason why this should have been so will 
be suggested in a minute; but first, there are not a 
few hints in the nev/spapers that the soshi were sometimes 
thought of as not altogether unamusing paper tigers. The 
following stanzas, from a Kanagawa prefecture Kaishin-to 
campaign song, reveal a spirit in which loathing of the 
soshi is balanced by self-confidence in face of their 
threats: -
1. Onwards, ever onwards1
Though A ’our foes_7 be massed _/”against us_7
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And the soshi blindly rage,
Advance fearing naught.
Never retreat!
For principles and country!
2. Be brave, be brave, be truly brave!
Though the soshi be such,
The law which shall protect us 
Is stronger than iron.
Never retreat!
For principles and country!
3. Think, think, 0 think!
Though hateful people threaten,
We are resolved 
Never to be threatened.
Never retreat!
98For principles and countryi
The soshi, then, though fearsome enough in appearance 
and manner, were not so very terrible in practice. For 
this and a number of other reasons, the hiring of them was 
probably the least efficacious of all - legitimate or 
illegitimate - methods of canvassing. Perhaps their most 
useful function, from the point of view of the candidates
93
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who employed them, was t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  p r o v i d e d  
a r e a s o n a b l y  r e l i a b l e  p e r s o n a l  b o d y g u a rd  i n  c a s e  o f  n e ed .  
Looking a h e a d ,  how ever ,  t h e  c a l l i n g  i n  o f  s o s h i  by 
I n d e p e n d e n t  and p a r t y  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  1890 s e t  a bad  p r e c e d e n t  
which  v/as f o l l o w e d  w i t h  f a r  more s e r i o u s  r e s u l t s  by t h e  
Government i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  1892 ,  when i t  t r i e d  t o  s e c u r e  
a p l i a b l e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  by mass i n t i m i d a t i o n  
o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e ,  F u r t h e r ,  i t  i s  a s  w e l l  t o  n o t e  t h a t  
t h e  s e t t i n g  up o f  a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  sy s te m  i n  J a p a n  d i d  
n o t h in g  t o  a b a t e  a t h o r o u g h l y  r e p r e h e n s i b l e  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  v i o l e n c e  which h a s  l a s t e d  down t o  o u r  own t i m e s .  
S p e a k in g  o f  t h e  s o s h i  t h e m s e l v e s ,  t h e r e  i s  
overwhelming e v id e n c e  t o  show t h a t  t h e  g r e a t  m a j o r i t y  o f  
them were members o f  t h e  n o rm a l ,  e v e ry d a y  gangs  o f  s e m i-  
p r o f e s s i o n a l  c r i m i n a l s  and o t h e r  c o n g e n i t a l  n e ’e r - d o - w e l l s .  
I n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  t h e y  b e lo n g e d  t o  t h a t  u n d e r w o r l d  o f  
r a c k e t e e r s ,  p imps ,  and d i s h o n e s t - p e n n y - t u r n e r s  t h a t  
e x i s t s  i n  J a p a n  o r  any o t h e r  l a r g e  c o u n t r y  -  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
o f  c o u r s e  i n  t h e  g r e a t  c i t i e s .  T h is  would  e x p l a i n  why 
s o s h i  were f o r  t h e  most  p a r t  so r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h o s e  
c a n d i d a t e s  who r e q u i r e d  them. I t  would  a l s o  h e l p  t o  e x p l a i n  
b e c a u se  as  members o f  r e g u l a r  gangs i n d i v i d u a l  s o s h i  
would  be w e l l  known t o  t h e  p o l i c e  and  members o f  t h e  
p u b l i c  a l i k e  -  why t h e y  d i d  no t  c a r r y  t h e i r  o u t r a g e s  to o
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far. Also protection rackets cease to be operable 
if one is too thorough about eliminating opposition 
racketeers. But to return to the main point - the 
following three incidents may be cited to show that most 
soshi were no more and no less than common gangsters, 
and therefore have as much claim to be regarded as a 
general social phenomenon as a specifically electoral 
one.
At a speech meeting held at Maebashi in Gumma 
prefecture on 22 June, a group of soshi started a 
disturbance, pulled one of the speakers off the rostrum, 
and eventually forced the chairman for the evening to 
declare the meeting closed. The particular speaker 
interrupted in this way was not the candidate, on whose 
behalf the meeting had been arranged, but someone who 
supported him and was also in favour of abolishing licensed 
prostitution.It may have been that in this instance 
the soshi were acting in defence of their permanent and 
apolitical interests, rather than for temporary electoral 
rewards.
The next bit of evidence does not need to have 
anything read into it, and clearly shows that the soshi 
were gangs organized on a fairly long-term basis, and were
99 TKNS 24-6-90
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willing to travel some distance in search of congenial 
employment. The Tokyo Nichi Nichi published the following 
item on 25 June, under the heading ’Departure of Soshi’•
Bribery is rife among the candidates and 
electors at Koshigaya in Saitama prefecture.
It is reported that, declaring that to leave 
things as they were would bring shame on their 
ancestor, Mr Banzuiin Chobei, twenty metropolitan 
soshi, each with a stick and wearing straw 
sandals, set off enthusiastically the morning 
before last to have high words in that area. 
Magnificent I
Koshigaya is about fifteen miles from the centre of Tokyo. 
Banzuiin Chobei was a famous chief of the Edo machi- 
yakko (a sort of chivalrous fraternity, a number of which 
were established at the beginning of the seventeenth 
century to protect the townspeople from bullying by the 
samurai attached to the Shogun or from other misfortunes 
in life) during the reign of the Shogun Iemitsu (1622-51).
It is the Yokohama campaign, however, which shows the 
soshi at their most active, and so throws the greatest 
light on who they were, how they operated, and their role 
in the election. The soshi elements in that city seem to
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have been almost all in the service of the Liberal party; 
but with the transfer of the Liberal candidate, Nakajima 
Nobuyuki, to the Fifth Constituency (Kanagawa prefecture) 
in the middle of June, the Liberal camp and its soshi 
adherents were sadly divided among themselves.100 In 
the end, a section of the Liberal party joined forces with 
some refractory members of the Kaishin-to faction; and 
on 27 June, this coalition of former opponents nominated 
Kiranuma Senzo to stand against the official Kaishin-to
^  ■  1 ............. 1 I JJJLPM M W M BH aM M r
candidate, Shimada Saburo. Before this, however, some 
of the soshi who had been working for the Liberals had 
taken the initiative, and, calling themselves the Residents 
Club, held a party for the Yokohama electors on the 22nd.101 
At this party, it was decided to sponsor the candidature 
of a certain Suzuki Inenosuke. At about the same time, 
another soshi clique, the members of which were also 
connected with the Liberals, put forward a Totsuka Sentaro 
for election to the House of Representatives. Thus in the 
last ten days of the campaign, Shimada Saburo found 
himself opposed by three Liberal candidates instead of one. 
More especially, of these three Liberal candidates, two 
at least had been championed by rival bands of soshi; and
100
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so on the Liberal side, the Yokohama election after 
the sudden withdrawal of Nakajima Nobuyuki had taken on 
many of the characteristics of a gang vendetta.
The following account of an incident which must have 
taken place just before the nominations of Suzuki and 
Totsuka makes this clear. The TheroT of the story,
Pukui Mohei, was one of the best known of all the Yokohama 
sSshi, and was the person who assaulted Shimada Saburo 
on the afternoon of the day of the election.
Those who are known to be leaders of the ??? 
in that area, Pukui, Maruyama, Umeda, Nomi,
Sakurai, and Takano all considered that the 
moment was a very propitious one for them to 
show their influence. They decided to hold a 
meeting as soon as possible, and as they favoured 
Mr Suzuki Inenosuke (a member of the Liberal Party), 
to nominate him as the candidate and tell the 
electors what they had done. For all those who 
had been opposed to them for a long time past - 
Nishimura, Ono, Kurusu, Shimada, Ishikawa, and 
Watanabe - it was a very serious state of affairs. 
Saying, ”We are local people, so why should we 
let ourselves be trampled on by those villians
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w i t h o u t  d o in g  a n y th i n g  a t  a l l  a b o u t  i t ? 1' ,  t h e y  
h u r r i e d l y  s e n t  ou t  a  r ick sh aw -m an  as  a s e c r e t  
m e s s e n g e r ,  and h e l d  a c o n f e r e n c e  o f  t h e i r  
s u p p o r t e r s  i n  a  c e r t a i n  p l a c e .
However t h e  ’ r i c k s h a w - m a n ’ -  a l l  unbeknown 
t o  them -  was a c t u a l l y  a f u l l y - f l e d g e d  L i b e r a l  
p a r t y  s o s h i ,  and  had t a k e n  on t h i s  d i s g u i s e  f o r  
r e a s o n s  o f  ? ? .  On h e a r i n g  t h e s e  / “ i n s t r u c t ions_7, 
he r a n  o f  h i s  own i n i t i a t i v e  t o  t h e  camp g a t e  
o f  t h e  L i b e r a l  p a r t y ,  w i t h  news o f  what was a f o o t .  
The c h i e f  o f  s t a f f  t h e r e ,  Mr Fu k u i  Mohei,  b o i l e d  
w i t h  r a g e ,  and s h o u te d  -  MNo m a t t e r  what s o r t  o f  
w r e tc h e s  t h e y  a r e ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  u n p a rd o n a b le  o f  
them t o  have  g i v e n  us  no w arn ing  a t  a l l  and  t o  
i g n o r e  o t h e r s ^ ” Then h a v in g  p o c k e t e d  a h a n d - k n i f e ,  
he s to rm e d  o f f  l i k e  a demon, a lo n e  on h o r s e b a c k ,  
and when he came t o  t h e  m e e t in g  p l a c e  o f  t h e  
o p p o s i t i o n  f a c t i o n ,  p r e p a r e d  t o  b u r s t  h i s  way i n .
The l a t t e r ,  f o r  i t s  p a r t ,  seems t o  have 
r e a l i z e d  t h a t  i t  had  no o r d i n a r y  foe  t o  d e a l  w i t h ;  
and men d r e s s e d  i n  d i r t y  c l o t h e s  and s o f t  s a s h e s  
were on g u a r d  a t  t h e  g a t e  w i t h  b i g  s t i c k s  i n  t h e i r  
h a n d s .  Mr F u k u i ,  a f t e r  t a k i n g  a l o o k ,  m u t t e r e d  
"Bah, mere g r e e n h o r n s j ” . H o ld in g  up h i s  k n i f e  above
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his head so that all could see it, he made a 
charge. They fell back before a countenance 
so terrible; but just then, the nearest of the 
soshi ran into the house, closed the door with 
a thud, and snapped the lock shut.
Mr Fukui, nonplussed, made a tour of inspection
here and there, and while he was doing so saw
Mr Kurusu Sohei standing in the lavatory to
relieve himself. The fearless Mr Fukui sprang
on him like a shot and gave him a sudden kick.
When he had overpowered him with kicks, he got
on top of him and hit him with his fists, shouting
in a loud voice - "You are carrying a lantern for
the Kaishin-to, but now how about supporting the
candidate whom we want to elect?" In the end,
the people inside the house ran out, and, coming
in between them, quietened them down; but for a
102while there was a great deal of confusion.
It is just possible that a soshi of Fukui Mohei’s 
undoubted energies and strength of character was genuinely 
interested in Liberalism for its own sake; but it is far 
more likely that Fukui and all the other regular soshi
102
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in Yokohama and elsewhere were interested in politics 
only for what they could get out of them, and regarded 
the general election as a Heaven-sent opportunity for 
extending their spheres of influence. The reasons why 
the Liberals seem to have relied rather more heavily than 
the Kaishin-to on soshi support are not altogether clear. 
Probably they have something to do with the facts that 
in I89O the various Liberal factions still had a populist 
taint about them, and that in the preceding decade 
militant members of the Jiyu-to had engaged in many small 
skirmishes and conspiracies directed against the Government.
What is certain about the political affiliations of the
to
soshi in general is that, in sharp contrastlthe conditions 
in later years when political violence of this or a 
much more serious type was usually the work of Right wing 
influences, the situation in 1890 was that the Left and 
Centre parties between them exercised a virtual monopoly 
over this kind of tactic.
Few, if any, of the soshi were motivated, directly or 
indirectly, by ultra-nationalism. The disturbances 
organized by the National Rights Party in the Fifth 
Constituency, Kumamoto prefecture, which have been 
described elsewhere, may have well been an exception to 
this; and it is possible, too, that the Sanyo Gikai of
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Himeji, in Hyogo prefecture, had some ultra-nationalist 
hacking. But the existence of a few exceptions or 
quasi-exceptions of one kind or another does not invalidate 
the conclusion to be drawn from the bulk of the evidence 
concerning activities of the soshi, namely that - as a 
general rule, the soshi of 1890 were not connected with 
ult ra-nationalism.
This does not mean that soshi were not on occasion 
capable of borrowing the propaganda or demeanour of the 
ultra-nationalist groups, if and when it suited them to 
do so; but in such circumstances the ultra-nationalism 
was clearly spurious. Thus at one stage, the Liberal 
soshi of Yokohama publicly accused Shimada Saburo of 
treason, but this was for their own ends. Likewise, the 
Kinjo Shimbun of Nagoya threatened that a band of two 
hundred soshi would visit the homes of all those who failed 
to vote; because ’people who disregard the rare and 
wonderful right conferred on them by tomorrow’s voting 
and do not go to the polls are guilty of extreme disloyalty 
to their country.’10  ^ Yet this particular group of soshi, 
if it existed at all outside the columns of the Kinjo 
Shimbun, was almost certainly one of the regular Nagoya 
gangs - and therefore apolitical.
103 ~
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At times, when one comes across reports of more 
serious outbreaks of violence such as arson or large- 
scale rioting, the impression arises that these were 
not so much electoral disturbances as manifestations 
of a deeper and more menacing social unrest in various 
parts of the Empire, In this connection, it should be 
remembered that the Tokugawa tradition of scattered 
but frequent peasant revolts continued well on into the 
Meiji period; and in a debate on poor relief held during 
the opening session of the Diet towards the end of 1890, 
it was alleged that upwards of 4,000 paupers were dying 
of starvation every year. Incidents involving damage to 
property were quite rare during the course of the election 
campaign; but in order to substantiate the above point, 
mention will be made of two of them.
On or about the 25 May, a street riot broke out in 
Iida-machi in the Noto region of Ishikawa prefecture,
(This was a district that had been specially noted for 
similar erneutes in the feudal era,) The Chöya Shimbun, 
reporting the incident, stated that the trouble had 
originated in the conflict between local parties, and 
that among the former Liberals there were 'wild and lawless 
fellows1 who were liable to behave badly. The rioters 
succeeded in destroying the house of the village Headman,
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and had also attacked the village-office and the police-
station, The police were compelled to draw their swords,
and ten persons were arrested and many more wounded
104before order was restored. Elsewhere, in the Third
Constituency, Tottori prefecture, the village-office and 
three adjacent houses in Yoneko-machi were burnt down 
on the morning of 30 May. Later the following notice was 
put up in every quarter of the village:-
You, Endo Haruhiko, stop forgetting your place
as a salaried official and running about on
behalf of candidates! Your ardour for the
fray will only lead in the end to the burning
down of a number of village-offices. Pour
105young soshi proclaim this.
It transpired that Endo Haruhiko, the Headman of Yoneko- 
machi, had been canvassing the area on behalf of one of 
the candidates in the parliamentary elections,
We have dealt with soshi as common gangsters, and 
with soshi as putative political militants of one kind 
or another. There were also other cases of electoral 
fracas, where the participants seem to have been indulging
loir
Choya Shimbun 26-5-90 and 27-5-90.
Kokumin Shimbun 21-6-90,
105
399
more i n  a  s p e c i e s  o f  l a r r i k i n i s m  t h a n  a n y th in g  e l s e .
The f o l l o w i n g  ( f i n a l )  s t o r y  w i l l  convey t h i s .  I t  v / i l l  
be n o t i c e d  t h a t  a t  any r a t e  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  ’ s o s h i ’ 
i n v o l v e d  were b o t h  men whose e v e ry d a y  j o b s  were r e s p e c t a b l e  
i f  somewhat humdrum; and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no s u g g e s t i o n  a t  
a l l  o f  an  u n d e r - c u r r e n t  o f  p o l i t i c a l  z e a l .
On t h e  e v en in g  o f  t h e  2 6 t h ,  t h e  Kimura 
f a c t i o n  h e l d  a speech  m e e t in g  i n  Umedo v i l l a g e ,  
In a b e  D i s t r i c t ,  Mie p r e f e c t u r e .  While  t h e  
s p e a k e r s  were  t r a v e l l i n g  back  i n  a p a r t y ,  i n  
r i c k s h a w s ,  from Umedo v i l l a g e  t o  K i t a - O y a s h i r o ,  
s i x  o r  s e v e n  s o s h i  b e lo n g i n g  t o  t h e  Amaharu 
f a c t i o n  were  go ing  a long  i n  a g r o u p .  The f i r s t  
p a r t y ,  h o w ever ,  a t t e m p t e d  t o  o v e r t a k e  w i t h o u t  
any word o f  w a r n in g .  The Amaharu f a c t i o n ’ s 
s o s h i  c r i t i c i z e d  t h i s  r u d e n e s s ,  and  s t a r t e d  
e x c h a n g in g  words w i t h  t h e  s o s h i  g u a r d s  o f  t h e  
v a r i o u s  s p e a k e r s .  A c e r t a i n  A m a sh i ro , a b a r b e r  
o f  H ach im an-S h inden  and a s o s h i  o f  t h e  Kimura 
f a c t i o n ,  s a i d  t h a t  he would c u t  down t h e  Amaharu 
p a r t y  w i t h  an  u n s h e a t h e d  sword t h a t  he was 
c a r r y i n g .  Whereupon t h e  Amaharu f a c t i o n  r e t o r t e d  -  
’ j u s t  t r y  i t ,  and see  i f  you c a n ! ’ At o n c e ,  Amashiro
4oo
s l a s h e d  H ik o ta , a s to n e -m a so n  from  M inami- 
O y a sh iro  and a s o s h i  o f  t h e  Amaharu f a c t i o n ,  
from  th e  l e f t  elbow t o  t h e  w r i s t  w i th  th e  s a i d  
sword -  a t  w h ich , th e  i r r e s i s t i b l e  H ik o ta  gave 
a  lo u d  c ry  and  f e l l  down. The Amaharu f a c t i o n ,  
s e e in g  h i s  body , s e i z e d  h o ld  o f  A m ash iro , c a l l e d  
him a v u l g a r  o a f ,  and  to o k  h i s  sword from  him.
Then th e  Kimura f a c t i o n  a l l  f l e d  t h e  s p o t ,  r a i s i n g  
a  g r e a t  c lam o u r .  H ik o ta  i s  a t  p r e s e n t  u n d e rg o in g  
m e d ic a l  t r e a t m e n t ,  and  i t  i s  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  h i s  
l i f e  i s  n o t  i n  d a n g e r .
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CHAPTER POUR
Election Results and Composition of the First House of
Representatives.
The election itself was a success. Despite a few very 
minor incidents involving soshi on the day of the election, 
the polling everywhere took place as planned and in a general 
atmosphere of quiet. This is not to say that the high 
enthusiasm which had marked the campaign in most areas 
suddenly ebbed away in the early hours of 1 July, leaving 
the voters to troop apathetically to the polls. On the 
contrary, the mood of merry-making continued right down to 
the date of the election and for a short while after. In 
the Twelfth Constituency, Tokyo fu, Takagi Masatoshi kept 
open house for all and sundry from the time of the opening 
of the polling stations at 7*0 a.m. It seems that the local 
electors and others made full use of his proferred hospitality 
for: -
When word went round that the abstemious 
and drunkards alike could freely indulge in 
tea, cakes, foreign liquor, etc. in the 
reception rooms, there was a constant stream 
of people going in and out. There were ancients 
flicking their beads and chanting innumerable 
prayers, and a party of firemen in quilted coats 
was also seen. We understand that they had not 
all left by the time the polls closed; but this 
may be an unfounded rumour. 1
THUS 2-7-90.
1
401
402
Elsewhere in Tokyo, groups of voters made arrangements
to fete successful candidates after the results of the
2elections had been announced; and in the Fourth 
Constituency, Osaka fu, the entire population of the town 
of Nishihama-machi, Nishi Nari sub-prefecture, stopped
3work on 4 July to celebrate the victory of Nakae Tokusuke.
More serious and concrete evidence of popular interest 
in the election is provided by the number of votes cast.
Of a total of 450,365 electors, only 27,636 failed to 
vote. In other words, for the country as a whole, there 
was a 95 & poll - and this when there was no legal penalty 
for not voting! The areas with the highest number of 
non-voters were Nagasaki ken (11.1$), Kyoto fu (11$),
Tokyo fu (10.9^), Yamaguchi ken (10.9$), and Yamanashi 
ken (10.9?6). 1 In Fukuoka ken, on the other hand, fewer 
than 1% of the voters did not vote. The figures for this 
extraordinarily high poll must be accepted, I think, at 
their face value as showing that the election had given 
vent to a long-cherished and widespread desire to 
participate in national politics. This same feeling, as 
we have seen, accounted in part for the large number of 
candidates who came forward to contest most of the seats;
2
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now it had been even more convincingly demonstrated by 
the numbers of people who took the trouble to vote.
Moreover, it is probable that this was no mere flash-in- 
the-pan interest in parliamentary politics. The sixteen 
year history of the Jiyü Minken Undo and crowded election 
meetings up and down the land would argue otherwise.
The press, of course, deserves a lot of credit for 
having tirelessly explained the advantages and responsibilities 
of constitutional government to the people. Yet even though 
1 last-minute * exhortations such as the following could not 
have been entirely without effect, it is likely that by 
this stage they were reflections of public opinion rather 
than moulders of it:-
The election of Members is almost upon us.
Even though there may be some who are not 
interested in the election, others who are 
bewildered by it, others who have been perplexed 
by dishonest canvassing, others who have been led 
astray by temporary inducements, others who are 
unable to distinguish the good and bad points
of the candidates, others who have been frightened
anby the threats of the orators, and sofand so forth, 
most of the electors are not in this position.
• • • • If unworthy
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They are all gentlemen
Members are returned at the coming election,
the electors will have to take all the blame
for it. On the other hand, if good men are
returned, in nine out of ten cases that will
be a tribute to the gentlemanly qualities of
the electorate. Apart from this, whether the
gentlemen concerned /~i.e., the electors_7 will
prove enthusiastic or no, whether they will take
good care or no, whether they will act with
proper rectitude or no, whether the election
will be ill-famed or of good repute - all must
depend in the end on themselves. So theirs is
indeed a great responsibility. Electors and
gentlemen, each and every one of you - we beg
5you - live up to your responsibilities;
g
2,935 of the 422,729 votes cast were invalid. This 
is not a large number by any standards. In this case, it is 
quite small when one takes into account the facts that it 
was the first general election ever held, that the method 
of voting used necessitated the writing in full of both
5 “
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the candidate’s and the elector’s names and also the 
address of the latter, and that not all the electors were 
literate. It would appear from this that the care taken 
to provide official scribes at the polling stations was of 
over-all advantage in that it reduced the number of 
spoiled votes, despite the opportunity it gave corrupt 
clerks to hoodwink those of the electors who used this 
service.
Very little bitterness was left behind by the election. 
This was so, even though the competition for seats had 
been nearly always keen and sometimes violent. Personal 
and parochial rivalries, too, had come to the fore in the 
eight weeks preceding polling day. Yet by the end of 
the first week in July, when all the results had been 
announced, the public excitement had died down, and the 
political scene, though it had obviously undergone a 
fundamental change as a result of the holding of the 
election, was tranquil. Douhtless only very few of the 
fifteen hundred or so candidates could have fully evinced 
the feelings of dispassionate amity which the editor of 
the Kokumin Shimbun wished on them when he wrote on the 
morning of 1 July:-
We rejoice that they, ever faithful to and 
utterly single-ipinded in their high ambition, have
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so gloriously undergone this great ordeal; 
and v/e shall pray that winners and losers 
will grasp each other’s hand, and, putting 
foremost the wider interests of our country, 
will continue to foster the development of 
constitutional democracy. If the clouds and 
rain of discontent have no place in their hearts, 
above their heads will only be blue sky and a 
golden sun.^
Nevertheless fthe clouds of rain and discontent’, wheresoever 
there were any, must have soon yielded to a ’blue sky 
and golden sun’; and, allowing for hyperbole, the latter 
metaphor is not a bad one to describe the mood of hopeful 
and rancour-less quiescence which succeeded the stress 
and upheaval of the election.
8Moreover, the oft-expressed fear that the personal 
animosities and regional feuds aroused in many places by 
the campaigns for the Diet would somehow have an adverse 
effect on the workings of local government proved to be 
unfounded. The various prefectural, city, town, and village 
assemblies did not really function any the worse for having
7Kokumin Shimbun 1-7-90.
8
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been involved indirectly in the election for the House of 
Representatives, The same is true, generally speaking, of 
individual officials such as village Headmen who had often 
taken a far more active part in the parliamentary contest. 
By and large, once the election was over, local affairs 
returned to being purely local affairs, and the new Diet 
was left alone to find its own place in the arena of 
national politics.
There were a number of different reasons for this happy 
state of affairs. In the first place, many of the 
candidates - possibly a majority of them - polled fewer 
than ten votes. These persons must have known from the 
outset that their chances of being elected were virtually 
non-existent, and so would have not been too disappointed 
by their failure. Secondly, interest in the forthcomijig 
Diet tended to efface memories of the polls as soon as 
the election was over. Both the party politicians and the 
press had little time for recrimination; from the beginning 
of July, they were fully occupied in making preparations 
for, or having thoughts about, what would happen in the 
following November when the House of Representatives was 
due to meet for the first time. Thirdly, the Government's 
impartial attitude towards the election meant that there 
was no up-surge of popular indignation against the Sat-Cho
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bureaucrats. Thus, post-election feeling in 1890 was 
very different from what it was in 1892, when the 
Government’s open and frequently brutal interference 
with the electors gave rise to a widespread and by no 
means transient hostility on the part of the press and 
the public. Fourthly, on the morrow of the voting, 
officials and people alike could congratulate themselves 
on a job well done. Unsavoury incidents and features of 
the campaign were not overlooked in the spate of ’over the 
wave’ editorials and press comment. But stronger than 
pricks of shame was a feeling of exhilaration and not 
unjustifiable pride in having accomplished so much.
After all, twenty-two years previously, the nation had 
barely heard of constitutional government. Finally, and 
perhaps most significant of all, the general spirit of 
good humour that prevailed after the first election was 
indicative of the fact that behind the great political 
issues of the day as well as behind the innumerable local 
rivalries, there lay a concealed but considerable and growing 
sense of national unity.
Of course, the political issues and local rivalries 
were real enough; but most of those involved were quite 
willing, when the circumstances demanded it, to subordinate 
them to the interests of the Empire as a whole. It is not 
surprising that that extreme Right wing newspaper, the
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Nippon Shimbun, s h o u ld  have  f i l l e d  i t s  e d i t o r i a l  columns 
f o r  J u l y  1890 v / i th  s t a t e m e n t s  l i k e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g
The s e t t i n g  up o f  a House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
i n  o u r  c o u n t r y  h a s  come a b o u t  as  a r e s u l t  o f  
c o l l a b o r a t i o n  be tw een  t h e  t h r o n e  and p e o p l e .
Never  can  i t  be compared w i t h  t h e  c o n f l i c t s  
be tw een  r o y a l  p r e r o g a t i v e  and  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s  
i n  E u ropean  c o u n t r i e s .  A l th o u g h  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  
c a se  t h a t  t h e r e  have been  no c o l l i s i o n s  b e tw een  
Government and  p e o p l e ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n  had  
a l r e a d y  become one o f  u n i o n  o f  S o v e r e ig n  and 
s u b j e c t s .  T h e r e f o r e  p o l i t i c a l  e v i l s  were t h e  
f a u l t  o f  t h e  g o v e rn in g  a u t h o r i t i e s  a l o n e .
Speak ing  from t h i s  s t a n d p o i n t ,  o u r  c o u n t r y  i s  
i n d e e d  s u p e r i o r  t o  any o t h e r ,  and i s  t h e  one 
t h a t  p ro d u ce d  H f i r s t _ 7  t h e  e x i s t i n g  sy s te m  o f  
making t h e  Monarch s a c r e d  an d  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  
r e s p o n s i b l e  w hich  has  r e c e n t l y  become common t o  
a l l  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o u n t r i e s .  Of c o u r s e ,  many 
o f  t h e  t r e n d s  s i n c e  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n  have  
a c c e l e r a t e d  t h i s  p r o c e s s .  Ye t  i t  must  be 
a t t r i b u t e d ,  i n  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s ,  t o  what h a s
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been made manifest in the Imperial Way and
in the character of the people from the time
9of the foundation of the Empire.
More interestingly, the Japanism of the Ultra- 
Conservatives had its echoes in the patriotism of the 
others. We have already seen that the editor of the 
Liberal Kokumin Shimbun chose the morning of the election 
to remind the candidates, and by implication the nation 
at large, of the need to 1 put foremost the wider interests 
of our country.T On the same day, the Yubin-Hochi Shimbun 
(Progressive Party) declared that the principal business 
of Government, people, and newly elected members of the
House of Representatives was to make the state a solid
10rock at home, and a shining light abroad. This common
tendency to think in terms of national problems, and a 
fairly wide measure of agreement on the question of what 
constituted the most pressing national problems of the day, 
must not be taken to mean that there was a similar unanimity 
with regard to possible solutions for these problems. 
Obviously, the Ultra-Conservative view of the relationship 
of the executive to the legislature was quite the reverse 
of that of the Liberals or Progressives. Nevertheless 
virtually all of the politicians and publicists of the
—  _
Yubin-Hochi Shimbun 1-7-90.
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age had the same general frame of reference - the 
overriding and long term interests of the Empire as a 
whole. The rural gentry Representatives, though their 
success in capturing a seat had often depended solely 
on local politics, were themselves accustomed to thinking 
in this way, too, (As yet there had been no question of 
land reform or reduction of rents.) This broad sense of 
national unity was one of the things which enabled the 
Diet to function as a genuine parliament from the first, 
and the nation to accept without any great misgivings the 
verdict of the elections.
The most important fact about the House of Representatives 
elected in 1890 was that the ’popular parties’, i.e. the 
Kaishin-to and the Liberal factions, had a clear but not 
crushing majority. The minority consisted of a mixed 
bag of Government supporters, Independents, and a handful 
of Ultra-Conservatives. It is impossible to state with 
precision the numbers of Members belonging to each of the 
various parties and factions, as the newspapers reporting 
these details doctored them in accordance with their own 
political preferences. The following table,11 published 
originally by the Tokyo Shimpo, is reproduced here because 
it contains the fullest account of the state of the parties;
Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seito Shi, vol.l, p.284.
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b u t  th e  e x a c t  n u m e r ic a l  s t r e n g t h  a c c o rd e d  t o  e a c h  o f  
them  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i t s  t r u e  o n e .  To b e g in  w i t h ,  th e  
t a b l e  l e a v e s  no fe w e r  t h a n  t h i r t y - o n e  Members u n a c c o u n te d  f o r .
« x
Kyushu D o s h i - k a i  19
Gumma K o g i - k a i  3
Kyoto K oyü-ka i  1
ö£oö■a
.
(Q
T i  Is -  
Ö 00H
IO
• p
j (K yoto  K om in-kai 5
VO •H Is — _1 (rH rC< rH 
O ( O th e rs 1 2
•H
(Kumamoto K okken-t o 5
Daido Club 55 • (
§ (H iro sh im a  S e iy u - k a i 5
A ikoku-kotÖ 32 O (o  Vt co (Hoshu C h u s e i -h a 2
J i y u - t o 16 g H (
2  ( o t h e r s 6
Godo-ha 2 b
x Same a s  Kyushu C o n f e d e r a t i o n  o f  P r o g r e s s i v e  P a r t i e s
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The above t a b l e  does a t  l e a s t  show t h a t  a l l  t h e  m ain  
s t r a n d s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  o p i n i o n  and m a j o r  p a r t y  g r o u p i n g s  
t h a t  had  a p p e a r e d  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  cam paign  
were r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  new House.  The Daido Club h ad  
done p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e l l  i n  N i i g a t a ,  Yamagata ,  and Aomori 
p r e f e c t u r e s ;  t h a t  i s ,  i n  t h e  a r e a  where t h e  d e f e n d e r s  o f  
t h e  Bakufu h ad  made one o f  t h e i r  l a s t  s t a n d s  and where 
Goto S h o j i r o  h a d  had  h i s  most s u c c e s s f u l  campaigns  a t  t h e  
t im e  o f  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  Daido D a n k e t su .  The A ikoku-  
k o to  was s t r o n g  i n  Hyogo, F u k u i ,  and Kochi  p r e f e c t u r e s ;  
w h i l e  t h e  K a i s h i n - t ö  won t h r e e  o f  t h e  f i v e  s e a t s  i n  Toyama.
On t h e  o t h e r  h an d ,  t h e  K a i s h i n - t o  f a r e d  b a d ly  a g a i n s t  t h e  
Daido Club i n  N i i g a t a ;  and  t h e  Koin  Club l o s t  a l l  b u t  two o f  
t h e  e l e v e n  s e a t s  i n  A i c h i  t o  i t s  p ro -G overnm en t  o p p o n e n t s .  
O th e r  r e g i o n s  where  pro-Government  o r  In d e p e n d e n t  c a n d i d a t e s  
s c o r e d  m a jo r  v i c t o r i e s  were M iy a g i ,  S h i g a ,  G i f u ,  Pukush im a ,  
T o t t o r i ,  and Shimane p r e f e c t u r e s .  One o f  t h e  most 
s u r p r i s i n g  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  campaign  was t h e  c o m p a r a t iv e  
s u c c e s s  o f  Inoue  K a o r u ' s  J i c h i - t o  (p ro -G o v e rn m en t  and m o d e ra te  
c o n s e r v a t i v e  g r o u p ) .  I t  had  won f i v e  o f  t h e  s i x  s e a t s  i n  
Kyoto f u ,  and had  v i r t u a l l y  swept t h e  b o a rd  i n  Yamaguchi and 
Wakayama p r e f e c t u r e s  as  w e l l .  The U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e s  had  
h e l d  t h e i r  own i n  Kumamoto and had  managed t o  make q u i t e  a 
good showing i n  H i ro sh im a ;  b u t  t h e y  ended  w i t h  an  a lm o s t
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total failure in Yamaguchi (Torio!s home province), and 
did even worse in Kochi (Tani’s home province).
The Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties was 
returned for all the seats in Saga and Kagoshima prefectures.
The result for Kagoshima is somewhat unusual, because 
Satsuma (the old name for Kagoshima) was one of the two 
’home provinces' of the Sat-Cho Government, With the sudden 
deaths of both Saigo Takamori and Gkubo Toshimichi at the 
end of the 1870s, the power of the Satsuma clan in the 
topmost ranks of the governing hierarchy seems to have 
declined slowly but surely. By 1890, the chief spokesman 
for the Satsuma interest, Matsukata Masayoshi, was known 
to be quite content to follow the lead of his Choshu 
colleagues. Therefore the ordinary people of Kagoshima had 
some reason, perhaps, to feel that they were under little 
obligation to support the existing regime on grounds of 
’clan loyalty’. As Satsuma could no longer lord it over 
the Government, it chose to enter the ranks of the opposition. 
Moreover the internal politics of the former fief had been 
complicated in the previous year (I889) by a serious quarrel 
on the subject of treaty revision. The younger inhabitants 
of the district had wished'to found a kind of Satsuma-based 
Daidö Danketsu; but the older men refused to commit 
themselves to the project which failed for lack of their support.
This timidity on the part of the 'clan elders1 weakened
12the local conservative parties.
By the time of the opening of the Diet in November 
1890, the situation in the House of Representatives had 
become far more coherent and stabilized. In August, the 
Jiyu-to, the Aikoku-koto, and the Daido Club all dissolved 
themselves in order to make way for the proposed amalgamation 
of all the Liberal groups. This was in accordance with the 
agreement reached by the three factions at the time of the 
formation of the Koin Club in May 1890. The Jiyü-to and 
Aikoku-köto went out of existence on 4 August; the Daido 
Club deferred its demise until the 17th. Meanwhile, the 
Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties, encouraged 
by news of what had happened to the Jiyu-to and Aikoku-kotö, 
dissolved itself on 7 August, and once more sent delegates 
hotfoot to Tokyo to preach the holy cause of a union of 
all true friends of the people.
Two meetings were then held, on 22 and 23 August, at 
which representatives of the three former Liberal factions, 
the former Kyushu Confederation, and the Kaishin-to discussed 
the idea of forming one single party. Agreement was virtually 
reached at the second of these two meetings on a short 
draft proposal for an entirely new party to be founded on
12
Kokumin Shimbun 9“5-90
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Liberal principles. However, the Kaishin-to delegate,
Shimada Saburo, asked that details of this decision should 
not be made public until after his party had held its 
general convention on 1 September; he also requested that 
the new organization should insert in its programme an 
explicit reference to the fact that it adhered to Progressive 
as well as Liberal principles. The others rejected his 
suggestions, and Shimada walked out of the meeting.1^
The upshot of this quarrel was that the Kaishin-to, 
when it met on 1 September, refused to dissolve itself, 
and so the prospect of a merger between the Liberal elements 
and the Progressives faded away overnight. The Liberals 
and their supporters in Kyushu went ahead with the plans 
for amalgamation, and on 15 September, the new Rikken 
Jiyu-to (Constitutional Liberty Party) was brought into 
existence at a meeting of prominent Liberal leaders in the 
Yayoi Hall, in Shiba park. The meeting was marked by 
considerable disorder - heated arguments inside the building, 
and soshi fist-fights outside it - but at length the party 
programme was approved. Thus by the end of September 1890, 
the position of the popular parties was substantially the 
same as it had been before the dissolution of the first
Hayashida Kametaro, Lihon Seito Shi, vol.l, pp.285-7.
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Jiyu-to in October 1884. There v/as now once more a large 
and somewhat precariously united Liberal Party; and the 
smaller, but better organized and powerful Progressive Party 
continued to be a separate entity.
Both these parties found that for the convenience of 
conducting their business in the Diet, it was better to have 
an intra-mural as well as an extra-mural association. 
Consequently, on 2 September 1890, the Liberal Members of the 
House of Representatives formed themselves into a society 
known as the Yayoi Club. The name of this club was taken 
from the building where it was founded - the same Yayoi 
Hall in Shiba park, mentioned above. It must be stressed 
that the Yayoi Club was not really different from the Rikken 
Jiyu-to; it was simply the parliamentary branch, so to speak 
of the latter body. Likewise, on 1 September 1890, the 
Members of the new House of Representatives attached to the 
Progressive Party were authorized by the party convention to 
set up the Giin Shükaijo (Members1 Club). In the case of both 
the Yayoi Club and the Giin Shukaijö, membership was available 
only to those adherents of the two parent parties who also 
had a seat in the Diet; and in both cases, all those 
eligible joined.
There was only one exception to this. In October, some 
Right wing 'Liberals1, belonging in the main to nationalist 
associations which had been affiliated with the former Daido
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Club, held a meeting in Saga city, Kyushu. (There was 
always an active ultra-nationalist movement in the southern 
island.) Then in the following month, they and their 
sympathizers from other regions founded in the metropolis a 
political party of their own, which they called the Kokumin 
Jiyü-to (National Liberal Party). Needless to say, the 
Kokumin Jiyü-tö was always nationalist and never Liberal.1^ 
Its sponsors hoped that it would grow into a large 
association which would be national as well as nationalist, 
and would link together all the separate Ultra-Conservative 
factions in the provinces; but this never happened. The 
Kokumin Jiyu-to had only five adherents in the House of 
Representatives; and in 1891, it was dissolved. Hov/ever, its 
history though brief is not altogether without significance. 
For one thing, it is an indication of how many different 
sorts of eggs had gone into the making of the Daido Danketsu 
and hence the Daido Club, and - to continue the metaphor - 
the unscrambling of this particular omelette had been one 
of the problems which had held up the amalgamation of the 
Liberal factions earlier in the year. Then again, the 
formation of the Kokumin Jiyu-to shows that, as always, the 
Ultra-Conservatives tried to make up for their lack of
HE
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numbers by en g ag in g  i n  a c e a s e l e s s  ro u n d  o f  h i g h - l e v e l  
a c t i v i t y  and bom bas t .  They were c h e e k y ,  th o u g h  weak.
M eanw hile ,  many o f  t h e  more m o d e ra te  C o n s e r v a t i v e s  
and s u p p o r t e r s  o f  t h e  Government i n  t h e  new house  a l s o  
came t o  f e e l  t h e  need  f o r  a s p e c i a l  i n t r a - m u r a l  a s s o c i a t i o n .  
T h i s  t h e y  fou n d ed  on 22 A u g u s t ,  and gave  i t  t h e  n e u t r a l ­
so und ing  name o f  T a i s e i - k a i  (A ccom pl ishm ent  S o c i e t y ) .
Members o f  t h e  House b e lo n g in g  t o  t h i s  g ro u p  had  a l l  been  
e l e c t e d  as  o s t e n s i b l e  I n d e p e n d e n t s  ( N o n - P a r ty  and Not B i a s s e d ) ;  
bu t  i n  r e a l i t y ,  a lm o s t  a l l  o f  them had  b e en  s t r o n g l y  p r o -  
Government  from t h e  f i r s t .  N a t u r a l l y  enough ,  i t  c o n t a i n e d  
a l a r g e  number o f  t h e  s e r v i n g  and e x - o f f i c i a l s  who had  been  
e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  House. S in c e  t h e  C a b in e t  was f o r m a l l y  
com m it ted  t o  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  n o n - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  t h e  D i e t ,  
h ow ever ,  i t  was bad  p o l i t i c s  from i t s  p o i n t  o f  v iew  t o  have 
an o p e n ly  p ro-Governm ent  p a r t y  i n  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  
Hence t h e  r a t h e r  c r y p t i c  t i t l e  o f  t h e  T a i s e i - k a i .  Hence, 
t o o ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  u n l i k e  b o t h  t h e  Yayo i  Club and t h e
G i i n  S h u k a i j o ,  t h e  T a i s e i - k a i  n e v e r  had  a p a r e n t  body o u t s i d e
15t h e  House.  Though i t  drew up i t s  own s h o r t  p o l i t i c a l  c r e d o ,  
from f i r s t  t o  l a s t ,  i t  was n e v e r  a n y t h i n g  more t h a n  an  
a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  s i t t i n g  Members o f  t h e  House o f
15
See Appx X II  below
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R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  who had a g e n e r a l  sympathy f o r  t h e  aims 
and methods o f  t h e  Government,  Members o f  t h e  House 
who were no t  e n r o l l e d  i n  e i t h e r  t h e  Yayoi  C lub ,  o r  t h e  
G i i n  S h u k a i j o ,  o r  t h e  Kokumin J i y ü - t o ,  o r  t h e  T a i s e i - k a i ,  
r em a in e d  as  I n d e p e n d e n t s .  Most ,  b u t  no t  a l l ,  o f  t h i s  
e le m e n t  a l s o  s u p p o r t e d  t h e  Government .  Among t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t s  
were t h e  M i n i s t e r  f o r  Trade  and A g r i c u l t u r e ,  Mutsu Munemitsu,  
and  o t h e r  J i c h i - t o  c a n d i d a t e s  who had  b e en  r e t u r n e d  from 
Yamaguchi and  Wakayama p r e f e c t u r e s ,  and  a l s o  most  o f  t h e  
Members b e lo n g in g  t o  t h e  u l t r a - n a t i o n a l i s t  Kumamoto R a t i o n a l  
R i g h t s  P a r t y .  On t h e  o t h e r  h an d ,  t h e  f i v e  Kyoto Komin-kai  
members, a l s o  J i c h i - t o ,  chose  t o  j o i n  t h e  T a i s e i - k a i .
When t h e  D ie t  was f o r m a l l y  opened on 29 November 1890,  
t h e n ,  t h e  s t a t e  o f  t h e  p a r t i e s  i n  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
was a s  f o l l o w s
Yayoi Club ( L i b e r a l )
G i i n  S h u k a i jo  ( P r o g r e s s i v e )  
Kokumin J i y u - t o  
T a i s e i - k a i  (P ro -G o v ern m en t )  
I n d e p e n d e n t s
130
40
45
80
5
300
S in ce  t h e  Yayoi  Club and t h e  G i i n  S h u k a i jo  were a b l e  t o  
c o - o p e r a t e  q u i t e  s u c c e s s f u l l y  i n s i d e  t h e  D i e t ,  t h e  a n t i -
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Government popular parties had a majority of forty votes.
In what seems like tacit recognition of this state of
affairs, the Emperor, acting on behalf of the Government,
appointed Nakajima Nobuyuki (Yayoi Club), who was a
veteran Liberal leader but before that had been a prefectural
governor, to be Speaker of the House, and the former
Senator, Tsuda Mamichi (Taisei-kai), tq be deputy Speaker.
Aspects of the first House of Representatives, other
than its narrov/ly political allegiances and party composition,
merit attention. To take three minor ones first:- (i) Of
the three hundred Members, 109 were shizoku and 191 were 
16commoners. The days when the former military class had 
determined the politics of the Empire were over, though 
the ratio of shizoku to commoners in the House (1:2) was 
far higher than the corresponding ratio for the population 
as a whole (1:19). (ii) The average age of Members was 
surprisingly low, even when one takes into account the 
fact that expectation of life in Japan has increased by 
at least fifteen or so years since the middle of the Meiji 
era. The following table shows that very nearly two 
thirds of the total number of Members were less than forty- 
three years of age in 1890.17
16
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Hen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3,
p.205.
17
Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Hen-no So-Senkyo, MBZ, vol.3, 
p.214.
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Y ear  P e r i o d No. o f  Meins. B orn I n
B u n s e i ,  1818-29 10
Tempo, 1830-43 59
Koka, 1844-47 40
K a e i ,  1848-53 99
A n s e i ,  1854-60 85
Manen, 1860 7
The o l d e s t  Member o f  t h e  House was s i x t y - s e v e n ,  t h e  y o u n g e s t  
j u s t  t u r n e d  t h i r t y ,  ( i i i )  The a v e ra g e  amount p a i d  i n  t a x e s  
by Members o f  t h e  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  was ¥126 p e r  annum. 
As m e n t io n e d  e a r l i e r ,  most Members were a s s e s s e d  a t  a l o w e r  
r a t e ;  t h e  a v e ra g e  f i g u r e  i s  somewhat m i s l e a d i n g l y  h ig h  
b e ca u se  one Member p a i d  o v e r  ¥ 2 ,0 0 0  and t h r e e  o t h e r s  o v e r  
¥ 1 ,0 0 0  a y e a r  i n  t a x e s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  g i v e  a  c l e a r e r  i d e a  o f  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  Members o f  t h e  House o f  
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  i n  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  h i e r a r c h y  o f  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  
i t  i s  w o r th  m e n t io n in g  t h a t  t h e  a v e ra g e  amount p a i d  i n  t a x e s  
by t h e  f o r t y - f i v e  ' m i l l i o n a i r e s 1 r e p r e s n t a t i v e s 1 s p e c i a l l y  
e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  House o f  P e e r s  was ¥ 1 ,5 3 4  p e r  annum. The 
h i g h e s t  f i g u r e  i n  t h i s  g ro u p  w as¥ IL ,282 ;  t h e  l o w e s t  ¥262 .  °
See t a b l e  i n  MBZ, v o l .3 »  p p . 1 8 8 -9 .
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Of course, only general inferences can be drawn from 
data of this sort; but allowing for exceptions, we may 
begin to sketch in the outstanding features of the 
statistically 1 typical’ Member of the House of Representatives 
by picturing him as (i) a commoner, (ii) a person who, 
though born before the fall of the Bakufu, was in terms 
of his working life of the first generation of the 
restoration, and (iii) of modest to comfortable middle 
class means. Already, the break with feudalism is obvious.
Our imaginary Member does not so far appear to have had 
many links with the Tokugawa past, when (i) the officials 
of the Shogunate and fief governments were all samurai,
(ii) age almost invariably took precedence over youth, and
(iii) those who had amassed fortunes often squandered
them on city amusements, and could never use them to acquire 
political power. With the convening of the Diet in 1890, 
there marched for the first time to the centre of the 
stage of national policy-making representatives of a ’new’ 
class, a class which had in fact been waiting in the wings 
with envy and increasing ferment for some considerable 
time. To this class we may give the generic title of Men 
of Enterprise.
All in all, the elections were a triumph for the 
middle classes, and above all for the village landlords,
who in being returned to the Diet in such numbers had 
come into their own. The following details of the
various occupations hitherto pursued by Members show
+v . 19this.
Occupation No. of Members.
Senior Officials (in 
office or recently 
retired).
18
Junior Officials (i.e. 
Kuchö and GunchS, in 
office or recently 
retired).
22
Agriculture. 125
Trade & Industry. 33
Law. 22 1
Journalism. 16
Medicine. 2
Others. 62
Included in the ’others’ are leading ’professional’ 
politicians, such as Nakajima Nobuyuki or Hayashi Yuzo, 
and also members of the recognized intelligentsia, using 
that word in its narrower sense to mean ’thinkers’ or 
'opinion formers’. Examples of this type of Member are
19
Kokumin-no Tomo, No.88, July 1890, p.93, et. seq. , 
and other sources.
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Seki Naohiko (Jichi-to) and Ueki Ernori (jiyu-to); the
latter, of course, has as much claim to be regarded as
a professional politician. These are side-issues, however.
The main point is that the ’typical Member’ would have
very probably belonged to the rural gentry class, or
failing that, to the commercial and professional middle
class of the rapidly expanding cities. Furthermore the
chances are that he either was or had been a member of a
local government assembly. The Nippon Shimbun, in one of
a series of articles analyzing the results of the election,
stated that whereas 68 of the new Members were or had been
at one time in the official service, no fewer than 158
of them were or had been at one time members of the local
20metropolitan and prefectural elected assemblies.
Both the fact that getting on for half of the total 
number of Members of the House of Representatives came 
from the country landlord class, and the fact that more 
than half of the total number of Members had at one stage 
in their career been elected to a local assembly, are of 
the utmost importance. A good deal has already been said 
here and there about these two crucial aspects of the 
election. Purely for convenience of arrangement, it is
20 ‘
Nippon Shimbun 15-7-90
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better to defer further discussion of them to the 
Conclusions that follow this chapter. Meanwhile, as 
a general comment on the result of the election of 1890, 
let it be said that the voters had secured a genuinely 
representative though not wholly effective parliament, 
and, by the same token, the Government had confronted 
itself with a formidable, if divided and as yet untried, 
opposition.
CONCLUSIONS.
Our starting point must be the hypothesis of interaction* 
For, it seems to me, Meiji constitutional history, both 
before and after 1890, is best understood in terms of 
continuous interaction between Government and opposition 
forces. Therefore this history follows an inner logic of 
its own. It is the logic of two voices raised in argument.
Now the argument is harsh and bitter with dissent; now 
it suddenly dies away and there is a reasonably amicable 
settlement of the matters under dispute; now there is fresh 
controversy as each side attempts to interpret the terms 
of the settlement to its own advantage.
The outward form of this inner logic was the process 
of constitutional evolution by stages; stages, that is, 
of rising tension, followed by partial relaxation and 
reconciliation, followed by renewed tension, and so on.
While this process was in operation, there were constant 
changes in its frame of reference. Feudal institutions 
were disposed of; the foundations of a modern industrial 
state were laid. A military caste ceased to have any 
special status as a military caste; in the countryside, 
another class, the village gentry, came into its own. 
Rebellion broke out; individuals died, not all of them in
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bed. Wars occurred, and treaties were signed. Yet though 
these Extraneous* events modified, they did not interrupt 
the essential argument in the political arena between the 
Government bureaucrats and the upholders of popular rights. 
The former wanted statism with an element of Liberalism; 
the latter favoured Liberalism with an element of statism. 
The argument persisted, and with it the process of 
achieving constitutionalism through interaction. In many 
ways, it was a mistrustful and badly geared process; but 
it worked, has gone on working, and has accomplished much.
It is in terms of, and as further evidence for, this 
hypothesis of interaction that I wish to comment on the 
broad significance of the 1890 election: firstly, as one 
stage in the process; secondly, as a symbol of the process 
as a whole; and thirdly, as an important step in giving 
this fundamental process an institutional form.
Strictly speaking, of itself, the election began 
nothing and it decided nothing - apart from the composition 
of the first House of Representatives. The holding of it 
had been made necessary by the decision to create 
representative institutions, and it has been followed by 
other general elections at regular intervals over the past 
seventy years. Thus, it was not an isolated phenomenon, 
but one link in a chain of development. It took place in
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an atmosphere of comparative calm and goodwill. But the 
cries from the hustings already contained the battle-notes 
of future challenges and conflict. The struggle for a 
representative assembly was over; the fight for party 
Cabinets was about to commence. Here, we are considering 
the position of the election in the general sequence of 
constitutional events - that is, in primarily lineal 
relationship to what had gone before and what came after.
In this respect, it occurred towards the end of a period of 
low tension, and marked the transition of the evolutionary 
process from its phase of pre-constitutional contest 
(Bureaucrats v. Jiyü Minken Undo, 1873-81) to its phase of 
post-constitutional contest (Bureaucrats v. Popular Parties, 
1890-1918).
Yet there was more to the election than this. Did it 
not also - to a remarkable degree - contain and exemplify 
in itself all the various strands woven into the pattern 
of interaction? Each side to the great political debate 
was concerned with the voting in its own characteristic 
capacity: the bureaucrats as organizers and administrators, 
self-appointed guardians of public order and the interests 
of state; the party politicians as pace-setters and the 
apostles of a brand of Liberal individualism. Both sides 
played their part within the general framework provided by
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the constitution and the Law of Election; and the whole 
business of a parliamentary election was indisputably a 
Western-type innovation. In few situations were the full 
nature and extent of the confrontation of the two great 
creative forces in Meiji politics more clearly revealed.
The official class was efficient and no doubt deeply 
interested in the results of the polling, but at the same 
time it was chary of staking the Government’s future on the 
elector’s favour since it was not yet ready to engage in 
parliamentary politics on its own account. The advocates 
of popular rights, for their part, had ample supplies 
of enthusiasm and talent, but were destined, it seems, 
to strain for ever beyond the limits of what the general 
progress of society or their own party organizations would 
allow. The attitudes of the one side had their origin in 
the attitudes of the other. The very existence, perhaps, 
of the one side depended on the existence of the other.
This sort of dualism, when made to inhabit a house of 
equitable law and institutions especially designed for 
its expression, is, of course, the spirit and structure 
of representative government as we know it. Parliament 
is first and foremost a place for discussion; and there 
can be no doubt that once basic requirements of economic 
welfare and administrative technique have been met, the
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best of all possible political worlds is the one that 
gives opportunities for useful debate. The election of 
I89O, therefore, is of interest not only as a stage in 
the process of interaction and not only as a symbol of that 
process; it is significant, too, in that it was one of the 
first acts by which the nation recognized the need to give 
itself this freedom for meaningful argument, and proceeded to 
do so in an official and durable way. With the constitution, 
the right to disagree had been embodied in the highest 
institutions of state and rule by an elected majority in 
parliament became a feasible objective. At the election, 
voters availed themselves of the right in order to draw 
closer to the objective. Henceforward both bureaucrats 
and their opponents were going to have to play the interaction 
game in accordance (more or less!) with parliamentary rules; 
and 1 July I89O was the day of the first match under the 
new dispensation. In other words, this force of interaction 
had been raised from the dust of rejection, concealment, 
and political battle, and was being turned into a properly 
constituted principle of state.
The internal dynamics of the bureaucrats and anti­
bureaucrats, at the time of the election and during the 
previous twenty-two years of constitutional experiment and 
struggle, are always worth investigating. What gave each of
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these groups its power? What drove it to seek some kind 
of understanding with its opposite number? Why did not 
the antagonism they felt for eaoh other force them so 
far apart that any sort of interaction would have been 
impossible?
As has been said earlier, a correct understanding 
of the Meiji political world depends on trying to answer 
these questions. To my way of thinking, the dynamics 
of interaction grew from a common root of individual 
ambition and the national experience of the period immediately 
before and after the collapse of the Baku-han system as a 
result of collision with the West. The legacy of feudal 
statecraft, the pressure of day to day problems, concern 
for personal success, and the appeal of the West combined 
to build up in the minds of the leading bureaucrats a 
desire to fashion some sort of constitution and some sort 
of representative institutions for their reconstructed 
state. The Jiyü Minken Undo agitators acted on a similar 
combination of motives. Their political conduct, and that 
of their followers, was animated by what persisted of the 
Tokugawa polity and its concepts, by contemporary 
dissatisfactions and ambitions, and by the example of the 
West. In what follows, I shall attempt to enlarge slightly 
on these statements by relating them to the first parliamentary
election,
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I t  s h o u ld  n o t  be th o u g h t  t h a t  th e  i n f lu e n c e  o f  t h e  
West was somehow s l i g h t  o r  s u p e r f i c i a l .  On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  
t h i s  was p r o b a b ly  th e  f a c t o r  w hich  more t h a n  any o t h e r  
s i n g l e  f a c t o r  drew t h e  re fo rm in g  b u r e a u c r a t s  and t h e i r  
L i b e r a l  o p p o n e n ts  t o g e t h e r ,  and  gave them  a common g o a l  
i n  a g e n e r a l  d e s i r e  f o r  a  W e s te rn - ty p e  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  From 
1873 t o  1889 , th e  a rgum ent was n o t  r e a l l y  a b o u t  t h e  need  
f o r  a  c o n s t i t u t i o n .  When s h o u ld  i t  be p ro m u lg a te d ?  How 
much r e a l  power sh o u ld  i t  p u t  i n  th e  hands  o f  th e  p e o p le ?  
These were t h e  i s s u e s  t o  w hich  th o s e  who s t r e s s e d  s t a t e  
r i g h t s  and  th o s e  who s t r e s s e d  i n d i v i d u a l  r i g h t s  a d d r e s s e d  
th e m s e lv e s .  Both  v iew s assum ed a good d e a l  o f  W e s t e r n i z a t i o n  
a lo n g  w i th  t h e i r  p a t r i o t i s m ;  a n d , a s  a l r e a d y  e x p la in e d ,  
b o th  t h e  m o d e ra te  b u r e a u c r a t i c  R ig h t  and th e  c o n s e r v a t iv e  
L i b e r a l  L e f t  were d e e p ly  in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  w hich  
th e y  t r e a t e d  w i th  due s e r i o u s n e s s .
M oreover, t h e  e v id e n c e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  r e s u l t s ,  th e  
cam paign ing  t h a t  p r e c e d e d  th em , and th e  n ew sp ap ers  t h a t  
r e c o r d e d  i t  a l l ,  would  t e n d  t o  show t h a t  i n  many r e s p e c t s  
W e s t e r n i z a t i o n  had  p ro c e e d e d  q u i t e  r a p i d l y  and p e n e t r a t e d  
q u i t e  d e e p ly .  Of c o u r s e ,  i t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  c la im  t h a t  
t h i s  p r o c e s s  was a n y th in g  l i k e  c o m p le te .  N e v e r th e l e s s  -  t o  
t a k e  b u t  one f a c e t  o f  t h i s  s t e a d y  i n s t r u c t i o n  i n  a h i t h e r t o  
a l i e n  c u l t u r e  -  t h e r e  e x i s t e d  by 1890 i n  a l l  p a r t s  o f  t h e
h3k
c o u n t r y  an  e l i t e  composed o f  men who th o r o u g h ly  u n d e r s to o d  
th e  m e th o d s ,  p ro b le m s ,  and o p p o r t u n i t i e s  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
g o v e rn m e n t.  These were t h e  men, c a n d i d a t e s  and p u b l i c i s t s ,  
who w ro te  th e  new spapers  and  t o u r e d  th e  c o n s t i t u t e n c i e s  
making sp e e c h e s  on W e s te rn  p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y  and i t s  
a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  J a p a n .  The v o t e r s  and  th e  g e n e r a l  p u b l i c  
re s p o n d e d  t o  t h i s  i n i t i a t i v e  from  above w i th  e n th u s ia s m  
f o r  sp e ec h  m e e t in g s ,  an  a lm o s t  100$ p o l l ,  and a  w in  f o r  
th e  a n t i -G o v e rn m e n t  p a r t i e s .  The e l e c t o r a l  w e ak n esses  
and  c o n fu s io n s  o f  t h e  xenophob ic  U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e  g ro u p s  
a r e  a n o th e r  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  same g e n e r a l  t r e n d .
T h is  f i n d i n g  would  seem t o  c o n t r a d i c t  t h e  v iew  
som etim es h e l d  t h a t  d u r in g  t h e  M e i j i  e r a ,  J a p a n  was -  i n  
a m anner n e v e r  f u l l y  e x p la in e d  -  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  t r a n s f o r m e d  
b u t  s p i r i t u a l l y  u n a f f e c t e d  by th e  W est. I  doub t i f  t h e  
Em pire w i l l  e v e r  l o s e  a l l  t r a c e s  o f  i t s  p re -m o d e rn  i d e n t i t y .  
On th e  o t h e r  h an d , th e  i d e a  t h a t  change h a s  b e e n  c o n f in e d  
t o  t e c h n o lo g y ,  o r  ough t t o  be so c o n f in e d ,  i s  s im p ly  no t 
t e n a b le  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  d e v e lo p m en ts  o f  th e  p a s t  
h u n d red  y e a r s .
However, w h i le  a l l  t h i s  i s  t o  be k e p t  i n  m ind , t h e  
e s s e n t i a l  r o l e  o f  t h e  O c c id e n t  i n  J a p a n  d u r in g  t h e  se co n d  
h a l f  o f  th e  l a s t  c e n tu r y  was t h a t  o f  a  m e n to r .  I t  gave
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new forms, a new direction, and something of its own 
spirit to forces transmitted from the native past. Quite 
definitely, one of the strongest of these forces was that 
of localism.
Not long after the Government had abolished the fiefs, 
Okubo wrote:
Although, in the autumn of 1871, a decree 
abolishing the han v/as promulgated and an order 
establishing the prefectural system was issued so 
that there would be consistency in government 
instructions, for almost one thousand years, the 
people have been accustomed to the oppressive 
feudal system and its unfortunate practices. Given 
the customs and feelings of the people, how can 
the country be adjusted to new institutions?
Democracy, of course cannot be established in Japan, 
and the old monarchy can no longer be maintained.
We must develop a political system that conforms 
to the customs, feelings, and conditions of our 
nation. We must decide on a fixed statute for 
the state, that is, a system of constitutional 
monarchy, 1
These observations show how much the senior ministers had to 
take into account the strength of an ordinary man’s attachment 
to his native district when contemplating the political 
future of the country. Likewise, an awareness of this 
mountain of localist feeling must have lain behind Kido’s 
experiment with the Conference of Prefectural Governors, and 
behind the Dajokan’s considered policy of setting up
1
Trans, Beckmann, Making, p,112. For the original, see 
Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.108.
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r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a s s e m b l i e s  i n  t h e  p r o v i n c e s  b e f o r e  i t  
a l l o w e d  a n a t i o n a l  a ssem b ly  t o  be e l e c t e d .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  
t h e  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s  movement drew many o f  i t s  e n e r g i e s  
f rom  t h i s  same f o r c e  o f  l o c a l i s m .  A s e n t e n c e  o r  two 
from t h e  A ik o k u -k o to  m a n i f e s t o  o f  1890 a d e q u a t e l y  sums 
up t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t
I n  t h e  f e u d a l  e r a ,  o u r  c o u n t r y  went  t o o  f a r  i n  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  r e g i o n a l  p a r t i c u l a r i s m  and had  
an  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  which  was s e r i o u s l y  weakened by 
d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .  The s y s te m  o f  e v e r y  l i t t l e  
c o r n e r  o f  t e r r i t o r y  m a i n t a i n i n g  i t s  own in d ep e n d en c e  
was a b o l i s h e d  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  I m p e r i a l  r e s t o r a t i o n ;  
b u t  t h e r e  was an  u n e x p e c t e d  t e n d e n c y  f o r  t h e  c e n t r a l  
Government  t o  e n l a r g e  i t s  powers and t h e  p r o v i n c e s  
g r a d u a l l y  grew w e a k e r .  Our p a r t y  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  
i n t r o d u c e  a f a i r  sy s te m  o f  l o c a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t ,  
and t o  b r i n g  a bou t  a  p r o p e r  and r e a s o n a b l e  d i v i s i o n  
o f  power.
T h e r e f o r e  we have  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which b o t h  t h e  
b u r e a u c r a t s  and t h e  L i b e r a l s  were c o n s c i o u s  o f  t h e  
r e g i o n a l i s m  l e f t  by t h e  o l d  o r d e r .  The f o r m e r ,  q u i t e  r i g h t l y ,  
f e l t  o b l i g e d  t o  p l a c a t e  i t ;  t h e  l a t t e r ,  e q u a l l y  r i g h t l y ,  
u s e d  i t  t o  t u r n  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  Government .
T h i s  r e g i o n a l i s m ,  t h e n ,  was a p o t e n t ,  th o u g h  by no means 
t h e  o n l y ,  so u rc e  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n .  As a  c o r o l l a r y  t o  t h i s ,  
i t  may be m e n t io n e d  a g a i n  t h a t  t h e  l o c a l  a s s e m b l i e s  s e t  up 
by t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  b e tw ee n  1868 and I 89O had  a t r u l y  u s e f u l  
and  v i t a l  f u n c t i o n .  I n  a l l  s o r t s  o f  way, t h e y  were a
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veritable stepping-stone from the feudalism that was 
dying to the modern parliamentary state that was coming to 
be.
If anyone should doubt the significance of localism as 
a major factor in early Meiji politics, let him consider 
its wide influence and thrusting power in the 1890 election. 
How many of the candidates of all political colours were 
members of the local assemblies or else had held posts in 
the local administrations! How many more besides these 
relied on parish pride or local connections to see them 
home! How many of the political parties of the election were 
nothing more than regional associations! Even the ’national* 
parties were really federations of like-minded regional 
associations; and the great Liberal split can be explained 
to some extent in terms of regional loyalties. This strong 
and pervasive spirit of localism was at one and the same 
time the glory and the weakness of the nascent parliamentary 
movement in Japan.
In few countries attempting representative institutions 
for the first time can Liberalism have come more easily and 
more securely to the countryside. Most nations, which though 
not in the direct tradition of West European culture have 
experimented with our type of government, have found that 
it could make some headway among the intelligentsia of the
438
cities but failed in the rural areas. In Japan, this 
was not so. The village gentry, who had been projected 
by localism into national politics, were at least the 
compeers of, and in some respects ahead of, the city 
dwellers in their radical leanings. The ready acceptance 
up and down the land of the new ideas by this important 
class of persons - who, it must be stressed, were not the 
younger sons of established landlord and village 
industrialist families, but were the heads of these families 
in their own generation - must have done much to foster 
their rapid growth and practical application from, say,
1873 to 1924. Long enough, that it, for the parliamentary 
system to become customary for the nation as a whole, and 
to that extent an established and native institution.
On the other hand, as has been made plain, the economic 
flesh of the rural proprietors and capitalists was destined 
to become in some ways the enemy of their political spirit; 
and, in the twentieth century, men of this class weakened 
representative government by using it to consolidate their 
financial hold over the less fortunate group of tenant 
farmers and village poor. This divergence between the 
economic interests of the rural capitalists and their 
Liberalism did not have any serious effects until after the 
end of the Meiji period; and before then it is the cohesiveness
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o f  t h e i r  economic power and p o l i t i c a l  b e h a v i o u r ,  and  n o t  
any p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t ,  which i s  i m p o r t a n t .  However t h e  
l a i s s e z - f a i r e  a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  L i b e r a l  m a n i f e s t o s  i n  I 89O 
c o n t a i n  more t h a n  a h i n t  o f  f u t u r e  d e v e lo p m e n t s .  A p a r t  
f rom  t h i s ,  i t  i s  o b v io u s  t h a t ,  i f  l o c a l i s m  i s  c a r r i e d  t o o  
f a r ,  i t  w i l l  d i s r u p t  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  b u s i n e s s  o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  
g o v e rn m e n t ,  d i s t o r t  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  a  n a t i o n a l  p a r l i a m e n t ,  
and  f r a g m e n t  any movement b a s e d  on an  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  p e o p l e .  
I n  t h e  J a p a n  o f  t h e  M e i j i  e r a ,  t h e r e  was a lw ays  a d a n g e r  
t h a t  t h i s  would  h ap p en .  T h i s  was p r o b a b l y  one o f  t h e  
r e a s o n s  why t h e  b u r e a u c r a t s ,  i n t e n t  above a l l  on f i r m  
n a t i o n a l  government  t o  h a n d le  a n a t i o n a l  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  
were  so  r e l u c t a n t  t o  hand o v e r  e x e c u t i v e  power i n  1890 .
I t  was c e r t a i n l y  one o f  t h e  r e a s o n s  why t h e i r  o p p o n e n ts  
were n o t  more u n i t e d .
Prom w h a t e v e r  a n g le  we l o o k  a t  i t ,  t h e  e x u b e r a n t  and 
m a n y - s id e d  l o c a l i s m  o f  t h e  f i r s t  g e n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  was,  
l i k e  i t s  f a c t i o n a l i s m ,  a m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  a s o c i e t y  i n  
t r a n s i t i o n .  I t  was t h e  mark o f  t h e  o l d  t r y i n g  t o  f a s h i o n  
i t s e l f  f o r  t h e  new; a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i t  was t h e  mark o f  t h e  
new t r y i n g  t o  a d a p t  i t s e l f  t o  t h e  o l d .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e r e  
c an  be no dou b t  w h a t s o e v e r  t h a t  t h e  l o c a l i s m  o f  1890 was 
n o th in g  o t h e r  t h a n  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  i n  d i f f e r e n t  fo rm s o f  t h e  
h a n  and v i l l a g e  autonomy o f  Tokugawa t i m e s .
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Though t h e  c o n n e c t i o n s  be tw een  t h e  v i l l a g e  c a p i t a l i s t s  
and  l o c a l i s m  a r e  i m p o r t a n t ,  t h e i r  r o l e  as  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  
i n d i v i d u a l i s m  i s  o f  ev en  g r e a t e r  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  G e n e r a l l y  
s p e a k i n g ,  p e o p le  i n  t h i s  g ro u p  were n o t  so d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
a s  i n d i v i d u a l s  a s  t h e  t o p  r a n k  o f  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s ;  b u t  
t h e y  were  t h e  e lem en t  t h a t  gave  t h e  J i y ü  Minken Undo i t s  
p o p u l a r  b a c k i n g ,  and  p r o v i d e d  t h e  new p a r l i a m e n t a r y  sy s tem  
w i t h  t h a t  backbone  o f  c o n t i n u o u s  p u b l i c  i n t e r e s t  w i t h o u t  
which  i t  c o u l d  n o t  have  f u n c t i o n e d .  They were t h e  s o l d i e r s  
whom t h e  g e n e r a l s  l e d  t o  t h e  w ar .  W i th o u t  them , t h e r e  m igh t  
have  v e ry  w e l l  b e e n  no w ar ,  o r  e l s e  i t  would have ended  
r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t l y .  They were t h e  community which  was so 
w e l l  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
What m o t i v a t e d  them? B a s i c a l l y ,  t h e i r  o b j e c t i o n  t o  
a r b i t r a r y  t a x a t i o n  c o u p le d  w i t h  t h e i r  d i s l i k e  o f  
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n .  What made them  s u f f i c i e n t l y  c o n f i d e n t  i n  
t h e m s e lv e s  t o  j o i n  I t a g a k i ' s  c ru s a d e ?  B a s i c a l l y ,  t h e  economic 
power t h e y  had  a c q u i r e d  u n d e r  t h e  o l d  o r d e r .  As a r u l e ,  
t h e  v i l l a g e  g e n t r y  who p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  were 
n o t  s h i z o k u .  T h e r e f o r e  u n d e r  t h e  Tokugawa S h o g u n a te ,  men 
o f  t h e i r  s t a t i o n  c o u l d  n o t  have  had  a n y t h i n g  more t h a n  an  
o f f - s t a g e  v o i c e  i n  n a t i o n a l  o r  f i e f  p o l i t i c s .  Yet  t h e  
v i g o u r  and  n o n - c o n f o r m i t y  w i t h  which t h e y  i n t e r e s t e d  
t h e m s e lv e s  i n  p o l i t i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  a f t e r  t h e  r e s t o r a t i o n
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show, I think, that this class must have been a reservoir 
of latent Liberal-type individualism by the end of the 
Tokugawa era. This potential for political action the 
gentry had gained from the freedom they had had before 
1868 to make good in the economic sphere. Of many a 
candidate or elected Member it was reported that his family 
had been influential farmers (i.e. rich peasants who were 
also small scale manufacturers) for several generations.
This capital, this substance, which underlay the influence
enjoyed by a particular family over the others in itsI \ L
neighbourhood, must itself have been obtained by the exercise 
of a fair degree of individualism - astute and self-interested 
and mercenary. Accordingly, given the opportunities that 
came with the restoration, it was a comparatively easy 
matter for the gentry to extend to the political field 
attitudes and methods they had inherited in the economic one.
Just as localism was present in the great cities as 
well as in the villages, so was individualism a power 
among other groups in the population besides the rural 
entrepreneurs. Indeed this individualism - sometimes 
called ’personality-ism* - was one of the dominant themes 
in national life at the time of the election and during the 
Meiji era. Inevitably, the way in which it made itself 
felt differed from group to group.
L
On the whole, what was true of the rural capitalists 
was also true of the urban capitalists - but to a noticeably 
less marked degree* The city merchants, too, espoused 
Liberal individualism, but their opposition to the bureaucrats 
was not so vehement. One reason for this was that this 
class had been more of a constituent part of the Tokugawa 
system; another reason was that it had less cause for 
complaint in the policies pursued by the Meiji Government.
The individualism of the shizoku intelligentsia, on 
the other hand, was different in kind - and not just in 
degree - from that of the rural capitalists. The training 
of the military classes had been directed towards making 
its members despise personal ambition or greed, but it 
had also sought to fill them with a strong sense of personal 
responsibility. Before the restoration, a warrior*s 
obligation had been a completely personal one to his lord 
and fief. After the restoration, many of the more idealistic 
of the Meiji shizoku were inspired by an equally personal 
and equally intense commitment to their country, a 
particular life-work, or a particular cause. It v/as this 
that gave men like Oi Kentaro, Nakae Chomin, Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, Okamoto Takeo, Torio Koyata, and Itagaki Taisuke 
their whole-hearted strength of character. Seen in this 
light, the individual achievements and endeavours of this
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group may be regarded as the last, and by no means the
least admirable, flowering of the old chivalry* Reformist
leaders from other classes, too, could show the same spirit
of endurance and initiative; the career of Sugita Teiichi
2is evidence of this.
On a rather different level of emotion and experience, 
many of the more able members of Meiji society - irrespective 
of whether they were shizoku or not - seem to have welcomed 
the chance it gave them to cultivate their own personalities. 
Feudalism had naturally tended to prevent an individual 
from developing his own nature outside certain fixed and 
rather narrow patterns of behaviour; seemingly, the higher 
the social rank, the greater the constraint. Therefore 
a great deal of the dynamism of the new era must have come 
from the breaking down of these restrictions and 
inhibitions. For the first time for several hundreds of 
years, people could begin to feel that the world really 
was their oyster; and society in general perhaps benefited 
more than it suffered from this liberation of the individual. 
The career of Okuma Shigenobu was especially notable in 
this respect. He was a man who derived all that he could 
from the opportunities presented by his age; he was also
2
See Appx. A, p.31
a vigorous personality who did much for his countrymen 
in that and later periods. But Gkuma was not alone in 
this. Coming to the election, it is impossible not to 
believe that the great majority of candidates like standing 
for the House of Representatives just as much as they 
enjoyed travelling abroad when they could and found 
satisfaction in their careers as lawyers, journalists, 
or members of the prefectural assemblies, or in sitting 
on the local school, public health, and conscription boards. 
So here, in a very real sense, was a frontier zestfully 
crossed.
The breeze of individualism, then, had entered Meiji 
politics partly as an extension of, and partly as a reaction 
to, the ethic and institutions of the Tokugawa state. It 
blew on bureaucrats and Liberals alike. Okubo, Kido, Ito, 
and the other senior Sat-Chö ministers were not just 
patriotic statesmen; they were also professional 
administrators anxious to stay in office. Itagaki, Goto, 
and Okuma were not just public-spirited denouncers of evil; 
they were also seekers of power. While all this made for 
a certain amount of opportunism, it also helped to produce 
that empiricism which was such an important element of
interaction. Moreover, as has been said, with this
\
individualism there went a prevailing mood of rejection of
445
t h e  p a s t ,  en joym en t o f  th e  p r e s e n t ,  and o p tim ism  f o r  t h e  
f u t u r e ;  and n e a r l y  a l l  t h e  i n f l u e n t i a l  men o f  a f f a i r s  i n  
t h e  M e i j i  e r a  s h a r e d  t o  some d e g re e  i n  t h i s  mood. T h is  
was a n o th e r  f a c t o r  t h a t  made i t  r e l a t i v e l y  e a sy  f o r  them 
t o  come t o  te rm s  w i th  one a n o th e r  when th e y  so  d e s i r e d .
A f t e r  a l l ,  i f  t h e r e  i s  a g e n e r a l  th o u g h  t a c i t  ag reem en t 
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o th in g  f u n d a m e n ta l ly  wrong and  th e  n a t i o n a l  
f u t u r e  lo o k s  p r o m is in g ,  why c a r r y  y o u r  d i s p u t e s  t o  th e  
p o in t  o f  s e r i o u s l y  e n d a n g e r in g  t h i s  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s ?
I n  v iew  o f  e v e r y th in g  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  s a i d  ab o u t  th e  
f e u d a l  p a s t  and t h e  way i t  sh ap ed  and  c o lo u r e d  th e  1Ö90 
e l e c t i o n ,  we m ust assum e, I  t h i n k ,  t h a t  th e  Tokugawa p o l i t y ,  
th o u g h  a l l  b u t  s t a t i c  i n  i t s  h i e r a r c h y  and t e c h n iq u e s  o f  
p o l i t i c a l  c o n t r o l  and v i r t u a l l y  c l o s e d  i n  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  
w i th  th e  o u t s i d e  w o r ld ,  was n e i t h e r  m o n o l i t h ic  n o r  a b s o l u t i s t .  
R a t h e r ,  i t  was a honeycomb e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  d i v e r s e  e le m e n ts :  
a compound o f  law  and power; o f  a  fo rm a l  d i c t a t o r s h i p  
w ork ing  th ro u g h  t h e  m ach in e ry  o f  d i s c u s s i o n  and b a s e d  on a 
d o c t r i n e  o f  m o ra l  o b l i g a t i o n ;  o f  B akufu  r i g h t s  and han  
r i g h t s ;  o f  daimyo r i g h t s  and v i l l a g e  r i g h t s ;  o f  sa m u ra i  
i n t e r e s t s  and  c a p i t a l i s t  i n t e r e s t s ;  o f  em phasis  on  p e r s o n a l  
i n i t i a t i v e  su p p o s e d ly  f o r  th e  p u b l i c  good; o f  th e  C h in ese  
l e a r n i n g  a s  opposed  t o  t h e  N a t io n a l  and D utch  L e a r n in g s ;  
o f  t o t a l  c l a s s  and r e g i o n a l  d i v i s i o n s  a s  a s e t t i n g  f o r  
p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e ,  g ro u p  autonom y, and  a s lo w ly  grow ing
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national consciousness. This was its considered, 
institutional nature. At the same time, it was also six 
or seven generations of ordinary human life - life large 
enough to include all its customers. The world of 
restaurants and big-city gangsters had preceded the Meiji 
restoration.
It was this, richly variegated and pluralist, society 
that broke under the impact of the West and its own reaction 
to that impact. But it was the fixed and outward political- 
social order, with its underlying idea of pemanence, that 
disappeared; not the diverse elements and the basic fact 
of pluralism. These elements, of course, underwent great 
modifications and changes of form after 1868 - the Bakufu 
became the new bureaucracy, the han became the new 
prefectures, the samurai became the new shizoku elite, 
the rural entrepreneurs became the backbone of the new 
Liberal movement, and so on. Nevertheless, despite these 
transformations, the inner natures and separate existences 
of these elements did not alter so much. They survived 
to determine the pattern of the Meiji history of 
constitutional conflict culminating in parliamentary 
institutions. Therefore - given always the force, timing, 
and quality of the contacts with the West - the events 
leading up to the election and the election itself were
’foretold1, so to speak, in the pluralist structure of the 
Tokugawa state and its political ethic, Meiji interaction 
was rooted in Tokugawa complexity. This must be our main 
conclusion.
Finally, a word about mid-Meiji society as observed 
through a study of the election. As in the preceding period, 
it was vigorous and many-sided, but even more so. The 
Tokugawa savants had often indulged in polemics; but their 
discussions were for a long time strictly academic and 
usually carried on in discreet seclusion. The mid-Meiji 
publicists, on the other hand, embraced controversy in the 
most fervent and open manner imaginable. Their newspapers, 
memorials, and speeches were full of it. Not even the 
throne was entirely outside the arena of public debate. The 
mass of the people ruled by the Shoguns and the various 
dairnyo doubtless maintained a fairly cheerful view of life 
and their own individual fortunes through each successive 
generation. The subjects of Meiji inherited this optimism 
from their forefathers; but they applied it not only to 
their personal destinies, but also to the common destiny of 
their nation and society as a whole. This was a big 
difference. In its two and a half centuries of existence, 
the Tokugawa polity had experienced some concealed but 
far-reaching alterations in its economic and social apparatus.
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T hese  a l t e r a t i o n s  were f r e q u e n t l y  n o t  f u l l y  r e c o g n iz e d
by t h e  r u l i n g  c l a s s ;  o r  when th e y  w e re ,  th e y  were n o t
welcomed by i t .  I n  a n e a r - c o m p le te  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h i s ,
m id - M e i j i  s o c i e t y  was v i b r a n t  w i th  c h a n g e ,  th e  knowledge
t h a t  i t  was c h a n g in g ,  and  th e  w i l l  t o  change even  f a s t e r .
T here  was some u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  t h e  u l t i m a t e  d e s t i n a t i o n ;
b u t  t h e  tw in  c o n c e p ts  o f  W e s t e r n i z a t i o n  and  n a t i o n a l
g r e a t n e s s  loomed l a r g e  i n  m ost m inds and  h e a r t s .
T h is  was t h e  s o c i e t y  f o r  which th e  e l e c t i o n  and th e
n ew spapers  t h a t  r e p o r t e d  i t  were a f a i r l y  f a i t h f u l  m i r r o r :
from t h e  p r u d e n t  and h a rd -w o rk in g  i n t e g r i t y  o f  Yamagata
and Suem atsu  Kencho, th r o u g h  th e  r e a s o n e d  e lo q u e n c e  and
h ig h -m in d e d  f u l m i n a t i o n s  o f  I t a g a k i  and th e  o t h e r  L i b e r a l
o r  P r o g r e s s i v e  l e a d e r s ,  t o  t h e  s p u r io u s  s i x t i e t h  b i r t h d a y
p a r t y  and ev en  more n e f a r i o u s  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a c e r t a i n
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Osaka g u n sm ith  w i th  p o l i t i c a l  a m b i t io n s .  Most a s s u r e d l y ,  
an  e n t i r e l y  new d e p a r t u r e  was b e in g  made i n  th e  n a t i o n a l  
l i f e  -  a  d e p a r t u r e  w h ic h ,  i n  some w ays, opened  a new phase  
o f  w o r ld  h i s t o r y .  Y et what was h ap p en in g  was as  much th e  
outcome o f  t h e  p a s t  a s  i t  was an omen f o r  t h e  f u t u r e .
See Appx. A, p p . 1 0 -1 1 .
Appendix A
Election Campaign - Regional Notes*
The following notes have been compiled largely on the 
basis of reports contained in newspapers available at the 
Meiji Newspaper and Magazine Archives in Tokyo University• 
With the exception of Kyoto fu, only those areas for which 
I could obtain at best a reasonably full and coherent 
picture of the electoral contests in the region as a whole, 
or at worst a short notice summarizing this, have been 
included. The result of this is that no more than ten 
of a total of forty-five fu and ken are mentioned; and even 
in the case of these ten, information is far more 
plentiful for some than it is for others. Despite these 
deficiencies, however, it is hoped that these notes will 
serve to confirm and in some instances to elaborate what has 
been already said about the election campaign in general.
Tokyo fu. (5>715 voters: 12 Members.)
(Kojimachi, Akasaka, & Azabu wards).
One member constituency. 233 voters; 19U- votes cast. Polling 
took place in the council room at the ward office in Kojimachi. 
Originally there were seven candidates, of whom only three 
had any chance of winning. These three were Kusumoto 
Masataka (Deputy President of the Senate, Chairman of Tokyo 
city assembly), Yajima Sakuro_(President of the Tokyo Electric 
Light Company), and Hayashi Homei (Liberal politician). 
Kojimachi ward supported Kusumoto; Akasaka & Azabu wards
1
2favoured Yajima. Hayashi, a Liberal leader, after leaving 
a constituency in Saitama ken for which he had stood as 
a candidate and waging a short but effective campaign in 
Kojimachi, suddenly resigned his candidature there, too, 
on the eve of the election and transferred all his supporters 
to Yajima. Behind this manouevre lay a Liberal party intrigue designed to prevent at all costs the election of 
Kusumoto. Kusumoto, if elected, could have easily become 
the first Speaker of the House of Representatives, and as 
he was a high official his appointment to the post of 
Speaker would have been disadvantageous to the Liberals. 
Kusumoto elected with 106 votes. Independent.
e^goncj Constituency (Shiba ward). One member constituency.
220 voters; 145 votes cast. Polling took place in the 
Shiba ward office. There were eight candidates, of whom 
only two were important. These were Tanimoto Michiyuki 
(managing director of the Tokyo Horse-Bus Company, and 
President of the Tokyo stock exchange) and Yamada Chübei. 
Tanimoto was powerful in the northern part of the ward; 
Yamada in the south. Yamada made great efforts in the last 
two days of the campaign, using Dankyo Gikai soshi to 
canvass for him and holding speech meetings. Tanimoto 
elected with 77 votes. Liberal.
^hir§.%Jonsti'fuencY (Kyobashi ward). One member constituency. 
246 voters; 216 votes cast. Polling took place in the 
Kyobashi ward office. More than seven candidates contested 
this constituency, and four of them had a good chance of 
winning it. All candidates were people with local connections, 
and had supporters in the ward. On 30 June one candidate, 
Kitada Masatada, made a soshi attack on the headquarters of 
two of his rivals - Kazama Nobukichi and Inada Masakichi.
Kazama was a lawyer, a member of the Kyobashi ward council, 
and a member of the Tokyo fu assembly. He had come top in a pre-selection ballot held in the ward to choose a candidate 
for the Diet. Inada had lived all his life in Kyobashi. 
Another candidate, Matsuo Seijiro, offended many electors at 
a speech meeting he gave because he implied that they had 
accepted bribes. Kazama elected with 56 votes. Liberal.
FPV-rtt1. ( N i h o n b a s h i  ward). One member constituency
639 voters; 469 votes cast. Polling took place in the 
Nihonbashi ward office. Seven candidates. By far the
3strongest of these was Fajita Mokichi. Fujita was a 
graduate of Keio University, ex-editor of the Hochi Shimbun, 
and author of a number of books. Later, when the Kaishin-to 
was formed, he entered that party and became one of Okurna 
Shigenobu’s chief assistants. Afterwards he worked for 
a bank, and also travelled in Europe and America, Chairman 
of the Nihonbashi ward council; member of the Public Health 
Association, Member of the standing committee of Tokyo 
fu assembly, etc, etc. The only effective challengers to 
Fujita’s candidature were a Yasuda Zenjiro (a bank 
president) and Kikuchi Choshiro. Yasuda campaigned in 
secret with the backing of the local landlord faction; 
Kikuchi had some backing from the owners of local drapery 
and dry goods stores. However Fujita, too, had a number 
of influential people on his side and they canvassed as 
hard as they could for him. On 26 June Fujita, in response 
to a request from the electors, gave a long political 
speech to the residents of the Nihonbashi ward. Fujita 
elected with 308 votes. Progressive.
Jifth^Qqns^ituency (Honjo & Fukagawa wards). One member
constituency. 282 voters; 251 votes cast. Honjo had 159 
voters; Fukagawa 123* Polling took place in Honjo ward 
office. At least seven candidates, but only three of them 
polled any votes. Honjo ward supported Ota Sane; Fukagawa 
residents insisted on nominating Shibuzawa Eiichi despite 
his refusal to stand. Ota was born in Awaji shima (Inland 
Sea region) and had studied German in his youth. Came to 
Tokyo in 1876, and then roamed about doing various jobs in 
industry. Founded the Loyalty Association in 1881 to 
promote the idea of gradualism in political affairs. Set 
up a marine products company in 1886. Former Headman of 
Honjo ward; deputy president of the Tokyo stock exchange. 
Shibuzawa was a high official in the early years of the 
Meiji era, and was a financial magnate. This election 
campaign took the form of a ’local Derby’ between_the 
electors of Honjo and the electors of Fukagawa. Ota elected 
with 156 votes. Government supporter.
^ixtl^Constituepsy^ (Asakusa ward). One member constituency. 
331 voters; 265 votes cast, polling_took place in Asakusa 
ward office. Three candidates - Sudo Tok’ichiro, Umekawa 
Chubei, and Tatsumi Kojiro. Umekawa gave up his candidature 
because of illness, and from about the middle of June his
kp l a c e  was t a k e n  by T a k a n a s h i  T e t s u s h i r o .  T a k a n a s h i  was 
a  l a w y e r  and a b r o t h e r  o f  Sudö T o k ’ i c h i r o .  T a tsu m i  was 
s a i d  t o  have had t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  p r i e s t s  and p r o s t i t u t e s  
i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  a t  t h e  b e g in n in g  o f  h i s  cam paign ,  b u t  h i s  
i n f l u e n c e  weakened as t im e  wore on .  A n o th e r  s t o r y  was 
t h a t  Sudo had been  nom in a ted  by p e o p le  i n  t h e  ward  who were 
a n x io u s  t o  l e n d  him money a f t e r  t h e  open ing  o f  t h e  D i e t .  
C e r t a i n l y  T ak a n ash i  was t h e  most a c t i v e  c am p a ig n er  i n  an 
e l e c t i o n  which seems t o  have b e en  c o n d u c te d  e n t i r e l y  on a 
b a s i s  o f  i n f o r m a l  p e r s u a s i o n .  T a k a n a s h i  had  l e a r n t  E n g l i s h  
and  had  worked f o r  a s h o r t  w h i l e  i n  t h e  T r e a s u r y ,  b e f o r e  
he t o o k  up h i s  l e g a l  s t u d i e s .  T a k a n a s h i  e l e c t e d  w i t h  
130 v o t e s .  I n d e p e n d e n t .
S ev en th  C o n s t i t u e n c y  (Kanda w a r d ) .  One member c o n s t i t u e n c y .
279 v o t e r s ;  213 v o t e s  c a s t .  P o l l i n g  t o o k  p l a c e  i n  t h e  Kanda 
ward o f f i c e .  At l e a s t  s e v e n  c a n d i d a t e s ,  b u t  o n ly  two 
c o u n te d .  These were Tsunoda Shimpei  and Oyagi B i n i c h i r o .  
Tsunoda was a l a w y e r  by p r o f e s s i o n ,  and was a member o f  
t h e  Kanda ward c o u n c i l ,  t h e  Tokyo c i t y  a s se m b ly ,  and t h e  
Tokyo f u  a s se m b ly .  His  p o l i t i c a l  s y m p a th ie s  l a y  w i t h  t h e  
K a i s h i n - t o ;  and b e in g  w e l l  known and p o p u l a r  i n  t h e  Kanda 
a r e a ,  he was r e a s o n a b l y  c o n f i d e n t  o f  e l e c t i o n .  Oyagi  was 
a l s o  a l a w y e r ,  and was a l e c t u r e r  a t  t h e  Law S c h o o l .  He 
h ad  a t  one t im e  b e lo n g e d  t o  t h e  Daido  D a n k e tsu ,  b u t  
l a t e r  became a member o f  t h e  R ig h t  wing Nippon C lu b .  Oyagi 
d i d  no t  announce h i s  c a n d i d a t u r e  u n t i l  a f t e r  t h e  b e g in n i n g  
o f  J u n e ;  b u t  once he h ad  e n t e r e d  t h e  l i s t s ,  he made a 
v i g o r o u s  a t t a c k  on h i s  o p p o n e n t .  Oyagi was h e l p e d  by t h e  
’ s c h o l a s t i c  s e t 1, and a t  v a r i o u s  t i m e s  d u r i n g  t h e  cam paign  
Tsunoda was s u b j e c t e d  t o  s o s h i - l i k e  t h r e a t s .  Oyagi w ro te  
t o  Tsunoda deny ing  p e r s o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  
i n t i m i d a t o r y  methods u s e d  by some o f  h i s  s u p p o r t e r s ,  and 
e x p r e s s i n g  h i s  r e g r e t .  Tsunoda r e p l i e d  c a r e f u l l y  a c c e p t i n g  
O y a g i Ts p r o t e s t a t i o n s  f o r  what t h e y  were w o r th ,  and  
rem in d in g  him o f  a p r e v i o u s  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  he was n o t  g o in g  
t o  s t a n d  f o r  e l e c t i o n  i n  Kanda. B ru sh e s  o f  t h i s  s o r t  a r o u s e d  
a good d e a l  o f  i n t e r e s t  i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  Tokyo and even  
so f a r  a f i e l d  as  Osaka.  T h i s  i n t e r e s t  was s u s t a i n e d  b e c a u se  
b o th  c a n d i d a t e s  were n o t a b l e  men o f  d i f f e r i n g  p o l i t i c a l  
v i e w s ,  and i n  t h e  l a s t  t e n  days o f  t h e  cam paign  i t  was 
c l e a r  t h a t  t h e y  were c l o s e l y  m a tch e d .  Oyagi r a n  a ’d o o r -  
k n o c k in g 1 cam paign ,  and d i s t r i b u t e d  f r e e  c o p i e s  o f  t h e  
Nippon Shimbun and t h e  Miyako Shimbun, b o th  R ig h t  wing 
p a p e r s .  T su n o d a ’ s t a c t i c s  were l e s s  b r a s h ;  b u t  i t  was
5s a i d  t h a t  i f  e l e c t e d ,  he would have  t o  e n t e r t a i n  t h e  
owners  o f  t h e  pawn-shops and o t h e r  im p o r t a n t  r e n t i e r s  
i n  t h e  d i s t r i c t  t o  d i n n e r .  On t h e  morning o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  
Tsunoda r e c e i v e d  a p o s t c ä r d  from  a ’p a t r i o t ’ * T h is  
announced  t h a t  h i s  w o r t h l e s s  l i r e  woulu  soon  be c u t  s h o r t  
i n  one c l a p  o f  t h u n d e r  i f  he had  t h e  good f o r t u n e  t o  
become a R e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  He s e n t  t h e  c a r d  t o  Oyagi as  
f u r t h e r  p r o o f  o f  t h e  m isdem eanours  o f  t h e  l a t t e r ’ s s y m p a t h i z e r s .  
Oyagi  answ ered  t h a t  so f a r  as he was c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e  Kanda 
e l e c t i o n  was a c o n t e s t  be tw een  g e n t l e m e n ,  and f u r t h e r  
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  t o  show t h i s  t h e y  s h o u l d  go t o  
t h e  p o l l s  t o g e t h e r .  Tsunoda a c c e p t e d  t h e  o f f e r ,  and t h e y  
w a lk ed  w i t h  each  o t h e r  t o  t h e  w ard  o f f i c e ,  where t h e y  
v o t e d  f o r  two o f  t h e  m in o r  c a n d i d a t e s .  Each f a c t i o n  had 
s u p p l i e d  i t s  s u p p o r t e r s  w i th  h i r e d  ’ r e s t - r o o m s ’ n e a r  t h e  
p o l l i n g  s t a t i o n ,  bu t  t h e r e  was a n  ag reem en t  t h a t  t h e  
e l e c t o r s  s h o u ld  v o t e  b e f o r e  ’ r e s t i n g ’ . Oyagi e l e c t e d  
w i t h  129 v o t e s .  Government s u p p o r t e r .  (T su n o d a  was 
s u b s e q u e n t l y  r e t u r n e d  t o  t h e  f i r s t  House o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
a t  a b y - e l e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  T en th  C o n s t i t u e n c y  i n  Tokyo f u . )
fJ-fcMfr.ffPPgtl-tVSPSy* (Hongo & S h i t a y a  w a r d s ) .  One member 
c o n s t i t u e n c y .  246 v o t e r s ;  202 v o t e s  c a s t .  P o l l i n g  to o k  
p l a c e  i n  t h e  S h i t a y a  ward o f f i c e .  Only t h r e e  c a n d i d a t e s  
o f  whom one,  Masuda K .o k u to k u ,  was a c t u a l l y  cam paign ing  
f o r  a s e a t  i n  t h e  p r o v i n c e s .  Remaining  two c a n d i d a t e s  
were Tsuda Mamichi ( a  S e n a t o r ,  who i n  t h e  y e a r s  b e f o r e  
t h e  R e s t o r a t i o n  had  s t u d i e d  law i n  H o l l a n d  and had  
o c c u p i e d  h ig h  governm ent  o r  j u d i c i a l  p o s t s  e v e r  s i n c e  1868) 
and S uzuk i  E o b u h i t o .  T h i s  c o n t e s t  was a n o t h e r  ’l o c a l  D e rb y ’ ; 
t h e  number o f  e l e c t o r s  i n  each  ward  was a lm o s t  t h e  same.
Both wards had had  some d i f f i c u l t y  i n  f i n d i n g  s u i t a b l e  
c a n d i d a t e s .  The two p e r s o n s  who were most  f a v o u r e d  by 
t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  wards  had t u r n e d  down i n v i t a t i o n s  t o  s t a n d .  
P o l l s  were t h e n  h e l d  o f  t h e  v o t e r s  i n  b o t h  wards  t o  t r y  
and d i s c o v e r  whom t h e y  w an ted  t o  s t a n d  as  c a n d i d a t e s ;  bu t  
none o f  t h e  p e o p le  who came t o p  i n  t h e s e  p r e - s e l e c t i o n  
b a l l o t s  were w i l l i n g  t o  be e l e c t e d  t o  t h e  D i e t .  F i n a l l y  
HongS r e s i d e n t s  a s k e d  Tsuda t o  become a c a n d i d a t e ,  and  he 
a g r e e d .  Suzuki  h ad  made a name f o r  h i m s e l f  i n  a d i s p u t e  
b e tw een  t h e  S h i t a y a  r e s i d e n t s  and t h e  J a p a n  R a i lw ay  Company 
o v e r  a  p r o p o s a l  t o  b u i l d  a  l i n e  f rom Ueno t o  A k i b a h a r a .
He was no t  v e ry  p o p u l a r  w i th  ev e ry b o d y  i n  h i s  own ward;  
b u t ,  f a u t e  de m ieux ,  he e v e n t u a l l y  emerged as  i t s  o n ly  
c a n d i d a t e  w i th  any k i n d  o f  a f o l l o w i n g .  Thus t h e  e l e c t i o n  
i n  t h i s  c o n s t i t u e n c y  r e s o l v e d  i t s e l f  i n t o  a Hongo-Tsuda v .  
S h i t a y a - S u z u k i  d u e l .  There  was no open cam paign ing  a t  a l l ;
6but the Kongo voters must have turned out virtually to 
a man in support of Tsuda. Tsuda elected with 125 votes. 
Government supporter. Deputy Speaker of the first House 
of Representatives.
Ninth Constituency (Yotsuya, Ushigome, and Koishikawa wards).
One member constituency. 182 voters; 172 votes cast.
Yotsuya had 44 electors; Ushigome had 74; and Koishikav/a 
had 64» (These figures are taken from a Tokyo Nichi Nichi 
report. The Kokumin Shimbun stated that there were 185 
electors in the constituency as a whole, giving Ushigome 76 
and Koishikawa 65.) The polling took place in the 
Ushigome ward office. Five candidates, of whom two did not 
score any votes. Yotsuya favoured Ugawa Seizaburo; Ushigome 
supported Hatoyama Kazuo (a lawyer and former Foreign Office 
official); and the Koishikawa candidate was Yoshino 
Tsugitsune (Tokyo fu official). Ugawa was in a bad position 
from the start because of the small number of voters in 
Yotsuya. Nevertheless he had enough support for the 
election in this constituency to be to all intents and 
purposes a triangular contest between the three wards. 
Hatoyama (member of the Tokyo city assembly, and also of 
the Tokyo city executive council) had been nominated as a 
candidate as a result of a formal ballot held by the 
members of the Tokyo city assembly representing Ushigome 
ward. Yoshino refused to do any campaigning, and claimed 
that he had not spent a penny on election expenses. However 
somebody else in Koishikawa did a great deal of canvassing 
on his behalf. Hatoyama sent a printed leaflet giving his political views to the home of every elector in the 
constituency, and had many people campaigning for him. 
Result: Ugawa 45 votes; Hatoyama 54 votes; Yoshino 58 votes. Yoshino elected. Government supporter.
Tenth^ Const ituency^ (Higashi Tama, Minami Toshima, and
Kita Toshima sub-prefectures). One member constituency.
799 voters; 638 votes cast. There were 27 polling stations 
in the constituency. The greatest number of electors at any 
one polling station was 36; the smallest was 5. Seven 
candidates, but only two of them campaigned openly. No noticeable traits of localist rivalries in this election. 
Foremost candidate was Mori Tokinosuke. Mori had for a 
while after the restoration worked as a minor official, but 
had given up that career for industry. In 1883, he became 
president of the 60th National Bank. He was a member of Tokyo fu assembly, and of Tokyo city assembly. Mori 
elected with 405 votes. Independent.
7Eleventh Constituency (Minarni A&achi and Minami Katsushika• ••••»••••••••«•••••Isub-prefectures). One member constituency. 1,676 voters; 
all of them voted. 33 polling stations. At least twelve 
candidates. Five of them obtained more than a hundred 
votes; the rest one vote each. Two candidates were strong 
in Minami Adachi sub-prefecture; three had supporters in 
Minami Katsushika. Hashimoto Shogo was particularly powerful 
in the area round Nishi Shomatsu-kawa village; so one of 
his opponents, Akiyama Kotaro, sent printed postcards to the 
electors in that area telling them not to be taken in by 
Hashimoto1s lies. In reply to this, other postcards were 
circulated to inform the electors that Akiyama was not 
eligible to be elected. The Akiyama faction then reported 
Hashimoto to the authorities for an alleged breach of the 
Law of Election Supplementary Penal Regulations. Strongest 
candidate was Asaka Katsutaka, a local gentleman who had 
studied economics for a long time, and had been a member 
of the Tokyo fu assembly since 1884. Asaka elected with 
332 votes. Progressive.
Twelfth Constituency (Ebara sub-prefecture and the Seven
Islands of Izu). One member constituency. 611 valid votes 
cast. 19 polling stations. Eight candidates. Chief 
among these were Takagi Masatoshi (local landowner, and 
member of the Tokyo fu assembly), and his uncle, Hirabayshi 
Kyubei (local landowner, head fisherman for Ebara sub­
prefecture, and member of the Tokyo fu assembly). Takagi had the advantage of a good education in English and Chinese 
classics; Hirabayashi was prepared to spend, or so he claimed, "£10,000 to get himself elected. The strife between 
the two was as intense as it was bitter. The election 
campaign had been marked by a succession of parties and 
speech meetings; and soshi were hired to guard Hirabayashi 
on the day of the voting. Four villages in the region 
gave undivided allegiance to Takagi; another four villages 
were equally firm in their support of Hirabayashi. This 
meant that the issue, despite all the feverish campaigning, 
would be finally decided by the remaining non-committed 
villages. In the end, Hirabayashi got 235 votes; but 
Takagi was elected with 299 votes. Progressive.
Kyoto fu, (7,515 votes: 7 Members.)
The elections in the Kyoto region aroused very little 
interest in the Tokyo press; and I have not been able to 
study a Kyoto paper. Therefore the following notes are
8somev/hat incomplete. However it is clear from the material 
which I have read that the over-all pattern of electoral 
strife in Kyoto fu was one of competition between two 
local political clubs. One of these was the conservative 
Komin-kai (Citizens Association); the other was the more 
radical Koyu-kai (Public Friends Society). The Komin-kai 
succeeded in winning five out of a total of seven seats, 
whereas the Koyu-kai managed to gain only one. Accordingly, 
it would seem that the electorate of the old capital was 
overwhelmingly pro-Government• On the other hand, there 
is reason to think that at any rate some of the KSmin-kai 
victories were attributable, in the final analysis, to 
unfair practices. Most of the candidates elected were 
typical representatives of the upper echelons of the 
Meiji bourgeoisie. Further, many of them were or had been 
members of local government assemblies, and three of them 
had travelled abroad. The rate of abstentions (lit) was 
higher here than anywhere else.
f j.rs-f.Qong^ituep^y. (Kamigyo ward). One member constituency.
Polling took place in the Sokoku-ji temple. There was 
competition for the seat, but it was probably not so fierce 
here as in other constituencies. The tv/o most popular 
candidates polled only 47 votes between them, so the electorate 
cannot have been very large. Soshi, operating on behalf 
of one of the candidates, visited the electors in some districts of the constituency early on the morning of 
polling day, and threatened to have their ’revenge’ if the 
electors voted for the ’wrong’ candidates. A number of 
electors were faint-hearted enough to be swayed by this 
intimidation and decided not to vote; but many more 
accepted the offer of police escort while on their way to 
the polls, and duly voted. Elected candidate was Hamaoka 
Kotetsu. Hamaoka had been educated in Chinese literature 
and philosophy, and had later acquired a keen interest in 
Western learning. He was a noted industrialist. Founded 
the Kyoto Trade and Industry Society, and became president 
of a commercial bank. Later set up a cloth manufacturing 
business. Visited Europe and America. Reputed to have been 
wonderfully skilful at saving money. Elected with 27 votes. 
Government supporter.
Second.Constituency (Shimogyo ward). One member constituency. 
Polling took place in the Daiun-in temple. Competition in 
this constituency was keen. Again, it would appear that the
9t o t a l  number o f  v o t e r s  was u n d u ly  s m a l l .  About a  h u n d red  
p o l ic e m e n  were on d u ty  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  th e  p o l l i n g  
s t a t i o n  on t h e  day o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  a p a r t y  
o f  d e m o n s t r a t o r s  managed t o  a p p e a r  i n  f r o n t  o f  t h e  g a t e  o f  
t h e  D a i u n - i n ,  c a r r y i n g  p l a c a r d s  i n  s u p p o r t  o f  one o f  t h e  
c a n d i d a t e s .  E l e c t e d  c a n d i d a t e  was Nakamura E is u k e  -  a 
n a t i v e  o f  Shimogyo w ard ,  and  a m e r c h a n t .  Deputy  c h a i rm an  
o f  th e  Kyoto fu  a s se m b ly ,  c h a i rm a n  o f  t h e  Kyoto c i t y  
a s se m b ly .  L a r g e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  t h e  i n s t a l l a t i o n  o f  a 
modern d r a i n a g e  sys tem  i n  th e  c i t y .  T r a v e l l e d  i n  Am erica .  
On h i s  r e t u r n  t o  J a p a n ,  he became m anager  o f  t h e  K a n sa i  
T ra d in g  Company. E l e c t e d  w i t h  47 v o t e s ;  r u n n e r - u p  p o l l e d  
43 v o t e s .  Government s u p p o r t e r .
T h i r d  C o n s t i t u e n c y  ( O t a g i ,  Kadono, O to k u n i ,  & K i i  sub ­
p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  One member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  E l e c t e d  c a n d i d a t e  
was Matsuno S h in k y ü ro .  Member o f  t h e  Kyoto fu  a s se m b ly .  
Former S u b - p r e f e c t  o f  O t a g i ,  Kadono, and  O tokun i  sub ­
p r e f e c t u r e s .  E l e c t e d  w i th  886 v o t e s ;  r u n n e r - u p  p o l l e d  
468 v o t e s .  Government s u p p o r t e r .
F o u r t h  C o n s t i t u e n c y  (U n i ,» • • • • » • » • • • « • • • • • f t * K u se , S o ra k u ,  & T su z u k i  sub
p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  One member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  R e p o r t s  o f  s t r o n g  
c o m p e t i t i o n  b e tw een  th e  N ish ikaw a  (K S m in -k a i? )  and  I t o  
( K S y u -k a i )  f a c t i o n s .  One p a r t y  was s a i d  t o  have p r e f e r r e d  
c r i m i n a l  c h a r g e s  a g a i n s t  t h e  o t h e r ;  and t h e r e  were c e r t a i n l y  
v i o l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  law i n  th e  c l o s i n g  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  campaign .  
E l e c t e d  c a n d i d a t e  was I t o  Kumao. I t o  came from a fa rm ing  
f a m i ly  r e s i d e n t  i n  T su zu k i  s u b - p r e f e c t u r e .  Member o f  t h e  
s t a n d i n g  comm ittee  o f  t h e  Kyoto fu  a s s e m b ly .  I n  1881 , he 
i n t e r e s t e d  h i m s e l f  i n  t h e  fo u n d in g  o f  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
P a r t y  new spaper ;  and i n  1889 , he fo u n d ed  a d i s c u s s i o n  
s o c i e t y .  L i b e r a l .
F i f t h s  C ons t i tuency^  (Minami Kuwata,  K i t a  Kuwata,  F u n a i ,
Amata, & Ik u r u k a  s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  Two member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  
The KSmin-kai  c a n d i d a t e s  were Tanaka G e n ta ro  and I s h i h a r a  
Hanemon; t h e  Koyu-ka i  p u t  up K a w a rab ay ash i  Yosh io  and 
A sh id a  S h ik a n o su k e .  At f i r s t ,  t h e  Kom in-kai  assumed t h a t  
t h e y  would have no t r o u b l e  i n  w in n in g  b o t h  s e a t s  i n  t h i s  
c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  b e ca u se  t h e y  had  a l r e a d y  had  a v i c t o r y  o v e r  
t h e  K oyu-ka i  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  w e a l t h i e s t  t a x - p a y e r s *
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representative to the House of Peers. However the Koyu-kai 
fought a vigorous campaign, and there were signs that 
uncommitted voters were going to favour their candidates.
It was rumoured that the Kömin-kai leaders, alarmed by this 
trend, had gone to the newly elected member of the House 
of Peers, and, reminding him that he owed his election to 
Komin-kai support, obtained ¥500 for Election expenses1. 
Kawarabayashi was said to be very popular, and it was_ 
considered that he would certainly be elected. The Komin-kai 
candidates, Tanaka and Ishihara, won both seats. Tanaka’s 
family had farmed for several generations in Minami Kuwata 
sub-prefecture. He had been chairman of the Kyoto fu 
assembly since I883, and was also chairman of the Minami 
Kuwata sub-prefectural assembly. On the committee of the 
local Public Health Association. Had connections with the 
Kyoto business world, and was president of the Kyoto stock 
exchange. Ishihara was born in Funai sub-prefecture, and 
later adopted by a samurai of the Sonobe fief. Studied 
Chinese literature at the clan school. During the War of 
the Restoration, he served with the Imperialist forces.
In I87O, he entered the Ministry of Education. 1886, 
appointed education officer for Kyoto fu. Member of the 
standing committee of the Kyoto fu assembly. Both Tanaka 
and Ishihara were Government supporters.
Sixth Constituency (Kasa, Yosa, Naka, Takano, & Kumano 
sub-prefectures)!* One member constituency. Elected candidate 
was Komuchi Tomotsune. Komuchi was a commoner and a native 
of the district. In 1873» he entered the taxation department 
of the Treasury. Visited America on official business.
1884, appointed Chief Secretary of the Treasury. 1886, 
made Deputy Director of the Tax Collection Bureau. I887, 
was dismissed from official post. Elected with 669 votes; 
runner-up polled 435 votes. Independent.
Osaka fu. (15,600 voters; 10 Members.)
First ^ Constituency^ (Nishi ward). One member constituency. 409 
voters; 340 votes cast, polling took place in one of the 
local schools. At least nine candidates, of whom five polled 
more than one vote. Three most important candidates were 
Omiwa Chobei (bank president), Mori Sakutaro (lawyer), and 
Awaya Shinazo (gunsmith and gunpowder merchant). Omiwa 
belonged to the Kaishin-to, but did not have the scholastic
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abilities usually associated with members of that party.
He was chairman of the Osaka fu assembly, and a member of the 
Osaka city assembly. In these capacities, he was frequently 
able to attract attention, but had at the same time acquired 
a bad reputation for political opportunism. Mori was a 
member of the Monday Club, a large and active Osaka Liberal 
association. Awaya sat in both the Osaka fu and the Osaka 
city assemblies. He was on the dducation committee for the 
Nishi ward, and was also one of its conscription advisers.
The competition in this constituency was stiffen than 
anywhere else in Osaka city; and intimidation was attempted, 
first of all by Awaya and then by his opponents, in the 
concluding stages of the campaign. It is probable that 
speech meetings were held by all three of the leading 
candidates. Awaya had a reputation for being coarse, but 
his rostrum buffoonery was popular - at any rate, with the 
plebeian elements in the electorate. He had done his best 
to improve his standing in more genteel circles by inviting 
over a thousand of the quality to what was ostensibly a 
birthday banquet. Awaya elected with 128 votes. Government 
supporter.
Second Constituency (Higashi and Kita wards). One member
constituency. 705 voters; 543 votes cast. Polling took 
place in the Tsurnura branch temple. At least eleven 
candidates, of whom four polled more than one vote. Oi 
Kentaro, a militant radical and president of the Liberty 
party, had originally intended to stand for this seat, but 
the law courts ruled that he was not eligible for election.
His disqualification left Toyoda Bunzaburo (electric 
light company director) the strongest candidate in the field. 
Toyoda was a member of the standing committee of the Osaka 
fu assembly, and chairman of the Osaka city assembly. He 
was also a member of the Daido Club, and belonged to the 
Monday Club. Toyoda1s closest rivals in the election were 
Taguchi Kenkichi and Akitsuki Seijuro. Each of these three 
had his own ’stronghold’ in different parts of the constituency; 
but they followed a strategy of attack as well as defence.
Thus Taguchi, whose headquarters v/as the Koshin-kai 
(Communications Club) in Uemachi had outposts in Senba 
(Toyoda1 s ’stronghold*) and Kita v/ard (Akitsuki ’s ’stronghold1). 
Toyoda had the backing of the powerful Monday Club and other 
city-wide organizations. Akitsuki was supported by the 
Toun Shimbun. In its later stages, the campaign developed 
into a two-party contest between the Toyoda and Taguchi 
factions. On 25 June, Toyoda’s supporters arranged a pre­
selection meeting, attended by fifty-seven electors. Hot
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surprisingly, the majority of these fifty-seven favoured 
Toyoda’s candidature. On the same day, Taguchi gave a 
political speech to an audience of one hundred voters,
(A Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun report states that Kikuchi 
Kanji, another member of the Monday Club and a candidate 
for the Fifth Constituency in Osaka fu, decided to run for 
the Second Constituency as well as the Fifth, and seriously 
endangered Toyoda’s chances of winning. The Osaka Mainichi 
makes no mention of such an intervention,) Toyoda elected 
with 267 votes. Liberal.
Third Constituency (Minami ward). One member constituency• 
2§3*voters; 21§ votes cast. Polling took place in the 
Mitsu temple. The voters resident in that part of the 
constituency lying north of the Dotombori canal favoured 
Karneoka Tokutaro; south of the Dotombori, the voters were 
unable to interest either of the two persons nominated in 
standing for election. The Headman of Minami ward, Ukita 
Keizö, took advantage of this situation, and put himself 
forward as a candidate. (Ukita was the owner of a long- 
established medicine store, and had at one time been a 
member of the Osaka fu assembly.) Before doing so, he 
resigned from the post of Headman. Although there were 
three or four other candidates, the contest was really 
between Karneoka and Ukita, with the latter heavily tipped 
to v/in. Ukita elected with 186 votes. Government supporter.
Fourth#Constituency (Higashi Nari, Nishi Nari, & Sumiyoshi 
sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. 1,916 voters; 
1,791 votes cast. At least five candidates. Higashi Nari 
and Sumiyoshi sub-prefectures provided three candidates - 
Kitamura Sakichi, Sasaki Masayuki, and Shinokawa Risuke - 
all of whom were of equal influence. Sasaki was a Sumiyoshi 
land-owner who had been appointed pro tempore Sub-prefect 
of that area in 1880. In addition to this, he had been a 
member of the Osaka fu assembly since 1881, and was connected 
with the Osaka Railway Company which he had helped to found. 
In Nishi Nari sub-prefecture, no candidates were nominated 
until after 20 June. By that date, it had been decided to 
choose one from among the eligible local residents, and one 
from the ranks of distinguished men living outside the sub­
prefecture. In the event, two ’outsiders1 were asked to 
stand by the voters of Nishi Nari. These two were Nakae 
Tokusuke (a^famous political theorist and journalist) and 
Murayama Ryuhei (newspaper owner). Competition in this 
constituency was probably keen, but there were no untoward incidents. Sasaki and Nakae elected. Both Liberals.
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Fifth Constituency (Shimakami, Shimashimo, Teshima, &
Nose * suft-pre£eenures). One member constituency. 2,910 
voters; 2,828 votes cast. At least five candidates, of 
whom the most important were Kikuchi Kanji (lawyer),
Takai Kozo (local gentleman), Kiji Jirobei (ex-member of 
the Osaka fu assembly), and Ori Ryokei (an ex-monk).
Kikuchi was a member of both the Osaka fu and the Osaka 
city assemblies, and was honorary Head of the Osaka School 
of Commerce. His politics were Left wing, and in 1881 he 
had been one of the founders of the Constitutional Party.
He belonged to the Daido Club, and he was a member of the 
Monday Club. There was a good deal of hidden rivalry and 
manoeuvering in this campaign. At first, Kikuchi was the 
most popular candidate in the constituency; but Takai and 
Ori purposely set out to curry favour with the large 
number of Buddhists in the area. This strategem worked, 
and Kikuchi began to lose his influence. He tried to regain 
it by making general attacks on Buddhism and its believers 
in speeches and in articles he wrote for the newspapers, but 
succeeded only in giving even greater offence to the 
electors. It was reported (in the Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun) 
that this faux pas had virtually lost him the seat, and so 
he had decided to stand for the Second Constituency as well 
as the Fifth. Takai sent out boxes of food to the electors 
as an inducement to vote for him. When Kikuchi heard of 
this, he interviewed people who had accepted Takai’s gifts, 
and threatened to start legal proceedings against them.
Ori hoped that the Buddhist monies would campaign for him, 
but they were reluctant to do so. Kikuchi elected with 
726 votes. (Takai had 673; Kiji 603.) Liberal.
Sixth Constituency (Matsuda, Katano, Sasara, Kawachi, Wakae,
& Takayasu sub-prefectures). One member constituency. At least five candidates. At the start of the campaign, three 
of the candidates - Obata Masaki (public notary), Oyama 
Hikosaburo, and Iwasaki Yasujiro - were all competing 
actively for the seat. Obata used his eloquence; Iwasaki 
relied on his money. It was not clear which of them would 
win. At this point, the village Headmen and other men of 
influence in the constituency thought that they would do the 
Sub-prefect of Matsuda, Katano, and Sasara sub-prefectures, 
Matano Kagetaka, a favour by getting him elected and asked 
him to stand. Matano, a career bureaucrat, accepted the 
nomination and resigned from his post as Sub-prefect. He 
was the probable victor from the moment he entered the ring. 
Matano elected. Government supporter.
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Seventh Constituency (ishikawa, Yakami, Furuichi, Yasukabe
Nishikibe, Tannan, Shiki, Tanhoku, Ogata, & Shibukawa sub­
prefectures), One member constituency. 2,802 voters;
2,738 votes cast. 65 polling stations. Three candidates 
with any claim to jjopular support were Higashio Heitaro 
(landowner and chairman of the Osaka fu assembly), Ema 
Chozo, and Zenda Toshitaro. From the start of the campaign, 
Higashio was the favourite with electors and non-electors 
alike, and without having to exert himself, he won a sweeping 
victory. Higashio elected with 2,144 votes. Liberal.
Eighth^Constituency^ (Sakai city, Otori & Izumi sub-prefectures)
One member constituency. Principal candidates were Hotta 
Seichu (retired official), Kitada Toyosaburo, and Yokoyama 
Katsutaro (landowner). Competition between Hotta and 
Yokoyama was particularly severe. Yokoyama was a lawyer as 
well as a landlord; but Hotta, the ex-official, seems to 
have been the one who relied most heavily on speech meetings. 
The Yokoyama faction alleged that Hotta was not a suitable 
person to have as a Representative, because he was a former 
official and therefore out of touch with the real feelings 
of the people. They also claimed that he was not eligible 
to stand as a candidate. 7/hen Hottafs supporters heard of 
this second charge, they made enquiries with the authorities 
and found that it was untrue. In retaliation, the Hotta 
faction secretly informed the police that Yokoyama had been 
sending out boxes of cakes to the electors. Yokayama was 
indeed a wealthy man, or maybe it was his supporters who 
had the money. Anyway, the Yokoyama faction deliberately 
tried to counter the effects of Hotta1s eloquence by making 
full use of its financial resources. The Hotta party then 
attempted to match this strategem by opening a 1 campaign 
fund1 of its own and asking its adherents for contributions. 
Yokoyama elected. Liberal.
£Iintk%gonsti£uency. (Minami and Hine sub-prefectures). One 
member constituency. 1,896 voters; 1,859 votes cast. There 
were approximately 835 voters in Minami sub-prefecture, and 
1,045 in Hine. 40 polling stations. The electoral strife 
in this constituency was prolonged, fierce, and complex.
The campaign had opened at the beginning of May; and though 
it outwardly had the form of a two-party (Monday Club v. 
Aikoku-kÖt5) contest, in reality it was a case of individual 
fighting individual, and Minami waging war on Hine, Thus, 
this particular battle reflects in minature many of the
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outstanding features of the election campaign as a whole. 
The Monday Club and the Aikoku-koto were both radical 
organizations, but this did not prevent them fighting each 
other. They were even ready to fight themselves. At the 
beginning of June, the five principal candidates, together 
with their occupations, their places of residence, and 
their party affiliations were:
Name Occupation or 
Qualifications
Resident in Party
Sasaki Seigai Bank executive Minami gun Monday 
Club (?)
Kara Katsuzö Mem. fu assembly Hine gun Monday
Club
Isaka Kouki Mem. fu assembly Hine gun Aikoku-
koto
Minami Genjuro Mem. fu assembly Hine gun Aikoku-
koto
Toguchi Kame­
taro
Mem. fu assembly Hine gun
In its initial stages, then, the seat was being fought for 
by a group of men all of whom were living in the 
constituency; and Sasaki Seigai was in a dominating position 
because he had the virtually undivided support of one of 
the sub-prefectures. Isaka Köuki was the strongest of the 
Hine candidates. Sasaki, having secured Minarai sub-prefecture 
in May, launched an offensive against his rivals in Hine 
from the beginning of June and began to try and win votes 
in that area too. The Hine candidates did their best to 
resist this onslaught, and Isaka in particular resisted 
as hard as he could. Their efforts were weakened, however, 
by the fact that a number of influential people in the 
southern part of Hine wanted to nominate a candidate from 
outside the constituency. Though this group was no more 
than a small minority of the voters in Hine, its suggestion 
had the enthusiastic support of Toguchi Kametaro, and its 
members eventually resolved to ask Yamashita Shigetake, an 
Osaka lawyer and a member of the Monday Club, to stand for 
the constituency. Yamashita agreed, and, travelling to 
Hine, was formally adopted as a candidate by his sponsors 
who now called themselves the Seigi-to (Justice Party), on
16
16 June, Thereafter, Yamashita, with the full support of 
the Monday Club and the Seigi-tö, opened a vigorous campaign. 
Electors were canvassed in every quarter, and free copies 
of the Kansai Nippo newspaper were distributed on a wide 
scale. As a result of these endeavours, the stock of 
Yamashita Shigetake, hitherto completely unknown in the 
constituency, began to rise very rapidly. Toguchi, Minami, 
and Hara all came to secret agreements with Yamashita and 
stopped campaigning. Consequently in its final ten or so 
days, the contest in the Ninth Constituency was a triangular 
match between Sasaki (still master of Minami gun but 
apparently not very successful in his attack on Hine), Isaka 
(still holding his own in Hine), and Yamashita (the visiting 
general who had overwhelmed the weaker candidates in Hine). 
Sasaki elected with 861 votes, (isaka polled 718 votes; 
Yamashita 241.) Though one report listed Sasaki as a member 
of the Monday Club, in the Diet he was a Government 
supporter.
Kanagawa ken. (8,521 voters; 7 Members.)
First#Constituency (Yokohama city). One member constituency. 
237 voters; 237 voted. Polling took place in the city hall.
At least nine candidates, of whom only two polled more than 
two votes. The leading contestants for this seat when the 
campaign began were Nakajima Nobuyuki (Liberal) and Shimada 
Saburo (Kaishin-to). Both of them were professional 
politicians of national eminence, and so were very evenly 
matched. Nakajima had long been associated with Itagaki; 
Shimada was_founder of the Yokohama Mainichi newspaper, 
and one of Ökuma Shigenobu’s right hand men. Nakajima had 
the support of the landlord party in the city (Kodo Club); 
Shimada was favoured by the merchant interests (Koyu-sha and 
D5k3-kai). Towards the middle of June, Nakajima decided to 
accept an invitation from the electors in the Fifth 
Constituency, Kanagawa prefecture, to stand there; and on 
18 June the secretary of the Kodo Club called an extraordinary 
general meeting to tell the members that Nakajima wished 
to resign his candidacy. The landowners had great difficulty 
in finding anyone suitable to oppose Shimada, but eventually 
joined with some dissident merchants in nominating Hiranuma 
Senzo (Non-party) on 27 June. Meanwhile different gangs 
of soshi, who had hitherto been working for the Liberals, 
chose candidates of their own. The whole campaign had been 
a vigorous one, with the various candidates opposed to 
Shimada doing their best to destroy his position of strength.
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During the last few days, canvassing went on without 
intermission. There were a number of acts of violence; 
however the actual polling was carried out without 
incident, under strong police supervision. Shimada elected 
with 146 votes. Progressive.
§e£on$L#Qonstituen£y# (Kuraki, Tachibana, & Tsuzuki sub­
prefectures).* One member constituency. Three candidates - 
Yamada Taizo (Jiyu-to) Yoshida Masaharu (Daido Club), and 
Ötsuka Nariyoshi (Non-party), Yamada had been born in 
Tachibana, and, disliking the life of a farmer, had moved 
to Tokyo at the age of sixteen or so and became a student. 
Later, he went to Yokohama where he was adopted by a rice 
merchant. Abandoning that trade in turn, he began to 
study law, and qualified as a solicitor in 1874. During the 
1880s, he was one of the defence counsel when members of 
the popular rights movement were put on trial for subversion. 
He was one of the leaders of the re-founded Jiyu-to. Ötsuka 
was also a lawyer, and he did not enter the campaign until 
about the middle of June. It was reported that after a 
slow start he was making a lot of headway. There were 
also unconfirmed reports that Yamada was about to be 
arrested at one stage, on account of a suspicion that he 
had violated the Law of Election. No arrest was in fact 
made. Yamada elected with 751 votes. Liberal.
Third Constituency (Minami Tama, Nishi Tama, & Kita Tama
sub-prefectures). Two member constituency. Apparently, 
there was hardly any competition in this constituency. Three 
Liberals contested the two seats - Ishizaka Shoko, Setooka 
Tameichiro, and Yoshino Taizo. Ishizaka had been born in 
Minami Tama, had worked as a local government official in 
Shizuoka prefecture, and had founded the Mitama Jiyu-to. 
Setooka1s family were long established farmers in Nishi 
Tama, and he himself was a member of the prefectural assembly. 
Yoshino, a former deputy chairman of the prefectural assembly, 
did not start campaigning until after the beginning of June. 
Ishizaka and Setooka elected. Both Liberals.
Fourth Constituency (Kamakura & Miura sub-prefectures). One• •••••••••••••••••• 'member constituency. Three candidates were Yamada TSji 
(Liberal), Kato Taiji (Jiyu-to), and Kozuka Tatsu (Kaishin-to)• 
Yamada had been born in Kamakura sub-prefecture, and was a 
graduate of the Meiji Law School. He lived in Tokyo, and 
earned his living by publishing magazines and doing some
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legal work on the side. Yamada elected with 504 votes; 
Kato was runner-up with 200 votes. Yamada supported the 
Liberals in the House.
Fifth Constituency (Köza, Aiko, & Tsukui sub-orefectures). 
One member constituency. Seat contested by Jiyu-to and 
Kaishin-to. The Jiyu-to candidate was Nakajima Nobuyuki, 
who had been asked by the party*s supporters in the area 
to resign his candidature in the First Constituency 
(Yokohama) so that he could take part in the election for 
the Fifth Constituency seat. The Jiyu-to was very strong 
in this conssituency, and Nakajima was one of the most 
powerful candidates in the field. He had been born in 
Tosa but lived in Kanagawa. 1874, prefect of Kanagawa 
prefecture; 1876, appointed to the Senate. Later, resigned 
from his official posts, and joined the Jiyu Minken Undo. 
Deputy president of the first Jiyu-to (1881). When the 
Public Peace Preservation Ordinance was issued in December 
1887, he withdrew to Yokohama where he organized the 
landlord party into the Kodo Club. The Kaishin-to put 
up the Sub-prefect of Koza sub-prefecture, Imafuku Genei, 
who was locally born, as an opponent to Nakajima. However 
Nakajima1s election was virtually a foregone conclusion.
He became Speaker of the first House of Representatives.
Sixth^Constituency (Osumi, Yorogi, Ashigara-kami, & 
Ashigara-shimo sub-prefectures). Three candidates, all of 
whom seem to have been connected with one or other of the 
Liberal factions. These three were Fukui Kanekichi, 
Mizushima Yasutaro (chairman of the prefectural assembly) 
and Yamaguchi Sashichiro. Electors in the area tried to 
arrange a public debate with all three candidates taking 
part, but only Mizushima agreed to speak. Yamaguchi 
elected. Liberal.
Niigata ken. (17,748 voters; 13 Members.)
The election campaign in Niigata prefecture was a two- 
party affair, with the Daido Club fighting the Kaishin-to 
for each of the thirteen seats. Jiyu-to and Conservative 
interests did not feel that it was worth their while 
putting up any candidates. The Daido Club consisted of a 
number of local political organizations the most important 
of which were the Essa Domei Kai (Echigo and Sado Alliance)
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and the Kyüyü Kai (Friendly Society), The Kaishin-to, 
too, was in reality a coalition of local groups, i.e. the 
Doko Kai (Congeniality Club) and the Seiyu Domei Kai 
(Association of Political Friends), The Daido Club 
elements often fell back on violence in the course of the 
campaigning. The Kaishin-to held a large number of speech 
meetings.
First Constituency (Niigata city and Nishi Kanbara sub­
prefecture), One member constituency. The Daido Club candidate was Yamagiwa Shichiji, and his Kaishin-to opponent 
was Tomidokoro Heisaburo. Yamagiwa was born in Nishi 
Kanbara and had joined the clan army in his youth. During 
the War of the Restoration, he had fought for the Bakufu. 
After the restoration, he studied politics. He was 
appointed mayor of Niigata, but soon resigned from that 
post and, entering the prefectural assembly, became a 
member of its standing committee. Politically, he was a 
supporter first of all of the Jiyu-to, and later of Goto’s 
Daido Danketsu. He published a newspaper called the 
Toyo Jiyu Shimbun, in the columns of which he argued the 
case for political rights. 1882, founded the Kokushin 
(Northern Dragon) Liberty Party. 1883, imprisoned for 
subversive activities. 1888, founded the Essa Dömei Kai. 
Tomidokoro was a wealthy local resident, but did not 
have Yamagiwa1s political experience. This constituency 
was from the first known to be a Daido Club stronghold. 
Nevertheless the Kaishin-to waged a vigorous campaign, and 
organized a great number of speech meetings. One of the 
most successful of these was held in the village temple 
at Yoshida mura, Nishi Kanbara sub-prefecture, on 25 June. 
The neighbourhood seems to have taken the day off for the 
occasion, and more than three thousand people packed the 
temple until nobody else could squeeze in and latecomers 
had to sit outside. There were speeches on:- The Need for 
Morality in politics; Preparing Oneself To Vote; Knowing 
Politicians By What They Say And How They Act; The Right 
To Vote And What We Expect Of The Electors; and Taking Care. 
This last was an overt attack on the Daido Club. The speech 
meeting began at 1 p.m. and ended at 5 p.m. with three cheers for the Emperor, the Empire, the Kaishin-to, and 
Tomidokoro Heisaburo, The Daido Club had sent a party of 
soshi to the meeting to disrupt it; but when the soshi 
failed to distract the speakers with their heckling, they 
fell silent and listened with everybody else. A social
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gathering was held in the same temple immediately after 
the speech meeting had closed; and later, a supper party 
was given in the village for the visiting speakers and 
local celebrities. Impromptu speeches were given both 
at the social gathering and at the supper party. The 
latter was enjoyed by all (more than a hundred) who 
attended it, and broke up about 9 p»m. with the singing 
of political songs. Despite these efforts on the part 
of the Kaishin-tS, Yamagiwa was elected for the constituency. 
National Liberal, (i.e. Ultra-Conservative).
Second Constituency (Kita Kanbara,• • • • • • • • » • • • • • • • • f t  • Higashi Kanbara, &Iwafune sub-prefectures). Tv/o member constituency. The 
Kaishin-to candidates were Ogura Koko (former Sub-prefect 
of Kita Kanbara and later mayor of Niigata city) and 
Ichishima Kenkichi (chief editor of the Niigata Shimbun). 
The Daido Club candidates were Kato Hisashi and Tango 
Naohira. Ichishima enjoyed the support of Ichishima 
Tokujiro (a relative?) who was a wealthy landowner and 
a nationally known figure. Kato and Tango were less well 
known and younger than their opponents; but there was a 
good deal of residual support for the Daido movement in 
this constituency. Ichishima attended a number of speech 
meetings organized by Kaishin-to supporters in Kita Kanbara 
on 21 and 22 June. Kato and Tango elected. Both Liberals.
Third Constituency (Naka Kanbara sub-prefecture). One• •••••••••••••••ft* ^member constituency. The Kaishin-to nominated Higuchi 
Genshü (former chairman of the prefectural assembly); 
the Daido Club put up Takaoka Chügo. This constituency was 
a Kaishin-to stronghold, and the Daido Club was not expected 
to win it in spite of its vigorous campaigning. The Kaishin- 
to held a speech meeting at the village of Okanbara on 
21 June; another speech meeting, this time followed by a 
party, was held at the same place on the following day.
Both speech meetings were intermittently interrupted by 
’vagrant rowdies’ who shouted abuse, but they were too few 
in number to be anything more than a minor nuisance.
Earlier, on 16 June, some soshi assaulted a Kaishin-to 
speaker at a meeting held in Usui village. Takaoka elected. 
Liberal.
Fourth Constituency (Minami Kanbara sub-prefecture). One 
member constituency! The Kaishin-to candidate was Kasahara
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Burgiro. The Daido Club first of all nominated Ötake 
Kanichi (former member of the prefectural assembly), but 
later replaced him with Nishigata Tamezo. Kasahara had 
gone as an emigrant to Hokkaido, but still retained property 
in Niigata and v/as a man of considerable means. Nishigata 
had been born in Minami Kanbara of farming stock. In 1868, 
he acted as the farmers representative in a conflict 
between the Nagaoka fief officials and the local peasants. 
Later, he v/as appointed Headman of his native village and 
v/as elected to the prefectural assembly. He supported the 
Jiyu-to, and actively campaigned for popular rights. His 
political activities lead to his arrest on a charge of 
having violated the Publications Regulations, He was one 
of the leaders of the Niigata prefecture Daido Club.
Kasahara returned from Hokkaido to fight as hard as he 
could for the seat; but Nishigata was elected. Liberal.
Fifth Constituency (Koshi & Mishima sub-prefectures).
Two member constituency. The Kaishin-to candidates were 
originally Kusumi Hidesaburo (member of the prefectural 
assembly) and Mishima Okujiro (president of the 69th 
National Bank, Nagaoka, and interested in the development 
of Hokkaido). Mishima, however, was not very interested 
in standing for the Diet; and sometime after 15 June his place as a Kaishin-to candidate was taken by Katano Denjiro. 
The Daido Club candidates were Kobayashi Yushichiro (editor 
of the Tohoku Nippo) and Hasegawa Yasushi. Hasegawa had 
been born in Koshi sub-prefecture, and later practised as 
a doctor. He soon left the Niigata region to continue his 
study of medicine in Chiba, and from 1869 was a university 
teacher of medicine in Tokyo. 1874, appointed Director of 
the Nagasaki Medical School. I876, appointed Head of the 
Tokyo fu hospital. 1886, resigned from his official post 
to take charge of a welfare home he had established earlier 
in Hongo (Tokyo). The campaigning in this constituency 
seems to have been fairly quiet. On 17 June, the Supreme 
Court in Tokyo quashed a sentence that had been passed 
earlier on Kobayashi for having libelled officials in the 
columns of the Tohoku Nippo. If the Court had rejected his 
appeal, he would have been unable to stand for the Diet. 
Kobayashi had v/ritten a number of political books and 
pamphlets, and was said to have been of a somev/hat haughty 
turn of mind. Hasegav/a returned home for the first time 
for over twenty years in order to fight the election. It 
was reported that he distributed large sums in campaigning 
expenses. Kusumi, too v/as a wealthy man. Kobayashi and 
Hasegawa elected. Both Liberals.
22
Sixth Constituency (Kariha sub-prefecture). One member• » • • • • • • • • « • • • a * «  •
constituency. The Kaishin-to candidate was Yamaguchi 
Gonsaburo (former chairman of the prefectural assembly); 
his Daido Club opponent was Matsumura Bunjiro (the 
serving chairman of the prefectural assembly). Both these 
candidates were locally born of wealthy families. Earlier, 
Yamaguchi had founded the Doko Kai, and he had just 
recently returned from a trip abroad. Matsumura had been 
a supporter of the Imperial cause at the time of the 
restoration. His family had made its fortune from trade, 
and just before the election, he had acted as a mediator 
between the Government and some disorderly poor. The 
Kaishin-to organized a speech campaign in the district 
on the 22 and 23 June, with a group of five speakers 
travelling from village to village and addressing 
audiences of between 150 and 700» Daido Club supporters 
in Nagatori village tried to sabotage the influence of 
these speech meetings in advance by spreading rumours 
that the Kaishin-to had brought in low rice prices and 
infectious diseases from abroad. These wild stories 
eventually came to the ears of the Kaishin-to speakers, 
themselves, and when they were talking to the people of 
Nagatori one of them carefully denied the allegations.
Daido Club hecklers in the audience attempted to shout 
down the speaker at this point, but failed to do so. The 
hecklers then rushed outside, and, after setting light to 
a nearby pile of firewood, raised the cry of * fire, firej’ 
The meeting was disrupted for a while so that speakers and 
listeners alike could go and put out the 'blaze1. Matsumura 
elected. Liberal.
Seventh.Constituency^ (Kita Uonuma, Minami Uonuma, Naka 
Uonuma, & Higashi Uonuma sub-prefectures). Two member 
constituency. Kaishin-to candidates were Sekiya Magozaemon 
( former Sub-prefect of Kita and Minami Uonuma sub­
prefectures) and Motoyama Kenji (former member of the 
prefectural assembly and founder of the Seiyü Domei Kai).
The Daido Club candidates were Shimada Shigeru and Sato 
Ryotaro. Competition in this constituency was very quiet. 
Sekiya and Motoyama elected. Both Progressive.
?^Wt.S?£stituency# (Naka Kubiki & Niahi Kubiki sub­
prefectures). Two member constituency. Kaishin-to candidates 
were Muro Takajiro (an Imperialist at the time of the
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r e s t o r a t i o n ,  l a t e r  a s u b - p r e f e c t ,  and  l e a d e r  o f  t h e  Se iy u  
Domei K a i ) and T e r a s a k i  I t a m  (member o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  
a s se m b ly )  Katö Teimei  ( f o r m e r  c h a i rm a n  o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  
a s se m b ly )  and Suzuki  S h o j i  ( a  Daido Club l e a d e r )  s t o o d  f o r  
t h e  Daido Club,  These f o u r  c a n d i d a t e s  were w e l l  m a tch ed ,  
and  t h e  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  t h i s  c o n s t i t u e n c y  was k e e n .  Muro 
and Suzuk i  e l e c t e d .  The fo rm er  was a P r o g r e s s i v e ;  th e  
l a t t e r  L i b e r a l .
N in th  C o n s t i t u e n c y  (Sawada, Kamo, & Hamo s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •  •
One member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  T h is  c o n s t i t u e n c y  c o m p r i s e d  t h e  
i s l a n d  o f  Sado,  and was one o f  t h e  s p e c i a l  ’ l a r g e  i s l a n d ’ 
c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .  The t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  i s l a n d  a t  t h e  
t im e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n  was p r o b a b l y  fe w e r  t h a n  a h u n d re d  
th o u s a n d ;  ( P a p i n o t  g i v e s  th e  1903 c e n s u s  f i g u r e  a s  115, 000) .  
The number o f  v o t e r s  t h e n  was p r o b a b l y  r a t h e r  s m a l l e r  
t h a n  t h e  a v e rag e  p e r  c o n s t i t u e n c y .  The i s l a n d e r s  d i d  no t  
t a k e  much i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  e l e c t i o n ,  and no n o m in a t io n s  a t  
a l l  h a d  b e en  made by 15 J u n e .  E v e n t u a l l y  a g ro u p  o f  
v o t e r s  a sk ed  Masuda Kokutoku, a p ro m in e n t  Tokyo i n d u s t r i a l i s t  
who had  been  b o r n  on t h e  i s l a n d ,  t o  s t a n d  as  t h e  K a i s h i n - t o  
c a n d i d a t e  -  he d i d  no t  r e t u r n  t h e r e  f o r  t h e  cam paign  u n t i l  
27 J u n e .  The Daido Club c a n d i d a t e  was Ukai I k u j i r o .
Ukai e l e c t e d .  I n d e p e n d e n t .
T o c h i g i  k en .  (15*543 v o t e r s ;  5 Members.)
. S W S t i t W W X  (Kawachi & Haga s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  One 
member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  P r i n c i p a l  c a n d i d a t e s  were Nakayama 
T a n j i r o  ( j i y u - t o )  and Yokobor i  S a n s h i  ( s u p p o r t e d  by th e  
K a i s h i n - t o ) .  Nakayama had been  t h e  f i r s t  t o  d e c l a r e  h i m s e l f  
a c a n d i d a t e ,  and i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  campaign i t  
seemed f a i r l y  c e r t a i n  t h a t  he would  w in .  However a ro u n d  
t h e  m id d le  o f  J u n e ,  t h e  S u b - p r e f e c t  o f  Haga s u b - p r e f e c t u r e ,  
Y o k o b o r i ,  su d d e n ly  r e s i g n e d  and came f o r w a r d  as a s t r o n g  
c h a l l e n g e r .  Y okobor i  had  b e en  S u b - p r e f e c t  s i n c e  1885 , and 
b e f o r e  t h a t  had  been  ch a i rm a n  o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  a s se m b ly .  
Though he had s u p p o r t e d  t h e  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s  a g i t a t i o n  and 
had  had  c o n n e c t i o n s  v / i th  t h e  K a i s h i n - t o ,  he r e f u s e d  t o  
j o i n  t h a t  p a r t y  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e  e l e c t i o n .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  
t h e  K a i s h i n - t o  e n d o r s e d  h i s  c a n d i d a t u r e  and  campaigned 
f o r  him. T h is  ’u n p r i n c i p l e d ’ d e c i s i o n  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  
K a i s h i n - t ö  l e d  t o  t h e  r e s i g n a t i o n  o f  a t  l e a s t  one 
i n f l u e n t i a l  member. Yokobor i  a l s o  had  t h e  b a c k in g  o f  t h e  
l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s  and v i l l a g e  headmen i n  Haga. Nakayama
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fought hard, and held successful speech meetings at 
places like Maoka-machi in Haga sub-prefecture; but 
at other speech meetings he organized in the same area 
labourers and firemen were hired to create disturbances. 
There were a number of very minor soshi incidents on 
election day; the police lost no time in restoring order. 
Yokobori elected. Liberal.
Second Constituency (Kami Tsuga, Shirno Tsuga, & Samukawa 
sub-prefectures;. Two member constituency. At first, the 
only two candidates who had any sort of backing were 
Arai Shogo and Iwasaki Manjiro. Both of them were members 
of the Jiyu-to. Arai had been one of the most radical 
adherents of the old Jiyu-to, and he had been in prison 
from 1886 to 1889 for attempting to stir up rebellion in 
Korea. Ke had been released from prison when political 
offenders were pardoned at the time of the promulgation 
of the constitution. He had been born in Tochigi prefecture, 
and prior to the I885 incident had sat in the prefectural 
assembly. Since they had no other competitors for the 
two seats, Arai and Iwasaki both started campaigning for 
fellow Liberals in other constituencies. While they were 
away from the Second Constituency doing this, another local 
Liberal, Tamura Junnosuke, started campaigning in Shimo 
Tsuga sub-prefecture. Two anti-Liberal candidates then 
came forward - one of them was Komine Shintaro (Head of 
the Trade & Agriculture Bureau in the prefectural government); 
the other was Anjo Junshiro (Sub-prefect of Kami Tsuga).
With these accessions to the body of candidates, the 
competition in this constituency grew more lively. Arai 
(2,536 votes) and Iwasaki (1,721 votes) elected. Both 
Liberals.
Third ConstituencyA ft A  A • f t f t » » f t * « A 4 f t * A *  V ft (Aso, Ashikaga, & Yanada sub-prefectures)
One member constituency. Principal candidates were Tanaka 
Shozo (Kaishin-to) and Kimura Hampei (Business Party).
Tanaka had been born in the prefecture and was a former 
chairman of the prefectural assembly. He was a leading 
Tochigi ken Kaishin-to politician, and had made a name for 
himself as a fearless foe of the local officials, at one 
time he spent eighty days in prison for denouncing the 
prefect too often. Throughout his career, he was known for 
his skill in oratory, and was the only public figure in the 
area to take an active interest in the treaty revision 
problem. Kimura was not such a flamboyant character, but
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he h ad  a good d e a l  o f  s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y .  
C o n s e q u e n t ly  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  s t r u g g l e  h e r e  was a h a r d  fo u g h t  
one;  b o th  s i d e s  u se d  s o s h i  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e r e  were 
a  number o f  m in o r  i n j u r i e s .  T anaka  e l e c t e d  w i t h  791 v o t e s .  
(K im ura  p o l l e d  665*) P r o g r e s s i v e .
F o u r t h  C o n s t i t u e n c y  (S h io y a  & Nasu s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  One
member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  Four  c a n d i d a t e s  -  Sakabe Norinobu  
O f f i c i a l  P a r t y ) ;  S h ioda  Okuzo ( A i k o k u - k o t o ) ; F u j i t a  
Y o s h iu k i  ( K a i s h i n - t o ) ;  and Wada Katam asa  ( i n d e p e n d e n t ) .  
S h io d a  was a p ro m in e n t  L i b e r a l  p a r t y  p o l i t i c i a n ,  and  was 
d e p u ty  c h a i rm a n  o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  a s s e m b ly .  He had 
p a r t i c i p a t e d  i n  t h e  a t t a c k s  on Mishima T su y o ’ s g o v e r n o r s h i p  
o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e .  Sh io d a  e l e c t e d .  L i b e r a l .
I t a g a k i  T a i su k e  v i s i t e d  U tsunom iya ,  t h e  c h i e f  tov/n o f  
T o c h i g i  k e n ,  from 19 -  22 J u n e .  D u r in g  t h e s e  t h r e e  days  
he d i d  what he c o u ld  t o  e n co u rag e  t h e  l o c a l  L i b e r a l  
c a n d i d a t e s .
Miyagi  k e n . ( 7 ,8 6 7  v o t e r s ;  5 Members .)
The p a t t e r n  o f  c o n t e s t  i n  Miyagi  p r e f e c t u r e  was one o f  
p ro -Governm ent  c a n d i d a t e s  v e r s u s  p o p u l a r  r i g h t s  c a n d i d a t e s .  
On t h e  Government s i d e ,  t h e r e  was a m edley  o f  I n d e p e n d e n t s ,  
U l t r a - C o n s e r v a t i v e s ,  and  Miyagi S e i k a i  (M iyag i  p o l i t i c a l  
A ssoc ia t ion)__m em bers ; t h e  p o p u l a r  p a r t i e s  were r e p r e s e n t e d  
by K a i s h i n - t o ,  A ik o k u - k ö to ,  and  Daido Club c a n d i d a t e s .  I n  
t h e  e v e n t ,  t h e  p o p u l a r  p a r t i e s  s u f f e r e d  an overwhelming 
d e f e a t ,  a s  t h e i r  pro-Government  o p p o n e n ts  c a p t u r e d  a l l  f i v e  
s e a t s  i n  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e .  On t h e  o t h e r  h an d ,  t h e  P r o g r e s s i v e  
and L i b e r a l  c a n d i d a t e s  p o l l e d  q u i t e  a r e s p e c t a b l e  number o f  
v o t e s  i n  most o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  and  i n  two o f  them had 
a m a j o r i t y  o f  v o t e s .  T here  was one m a j o r  b r i b e r y  c a se  i n  
t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  Miyagi  campaign;  and  numerous a l l e g a t i o n s  
o f  im p ro p e r  conduc t  by v i l l a g e  headmen and o t h e r  l o c a l  
o f f i c i a l s .
F i r s t #C o n s t i t u e n c y  ( S e n d a i  c i t y ,  N a t o r i  & Miyagi  sub ­
p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  One member c o n s t i t u e n c y . 1 ,7 9 4  v o t e s  c a s t .
At l e a s t  f i v e  c a n d i d a t e s .  P r i n c i p a l  ones  were Masuda 
Sh igeko  (M iyag i  S e i k a i ) ;  Suga K a tsu n ao  ( K a i s h i n - t o ) ;  
H a s h i u r a  Sadasuke  ( K a i s h i n - t 5 );  and I t a t e  Soryo ( H o s h u - t o ) .  
Masuda was c h a i rm a n  o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  a s se m b ly .  He had  
been  b o r n  i n  N a t o r i  s u b - p r e f e c t u r e ,  and  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  t h e
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restoration, he had been an ardent Imperialist. After 
1868, he had worked for the new Government, and had at 
one time been appointed prefect of a certain area, i.e. 
Iwaki prefecture (?), Suga and Hashiura were both 
permanent residents of the constituency. The contest was 
really a triangular match between these three. Masuda 
had more than half the voters in Natori on his side, and 
he also had a good deal of support in Sendai city. He was 
unable, however, to make any impression on Miyagi sub­
prefecture. Masuda was unable to campaign actively on his 
own behalf because of illness; but he had his supporters 
on the staffs of the various village offices in Natori 
gun working hard for him. Hashiura was also influential 
in Natori and Sendai city. Suga had Miyagi gun virtually 
to himself, and had many supporters in Sendai city. Both 
Hashiura and Suga fought hard and met with considerable 
success. If they had at any time joined forces, the 
Kaishin-to would have won the seat-. Masuda elected with 
723 votes. (Suga polled 683; Hashiura 234.) Government 
supporter.
Second Constituency (Shibata, Karita, Igu, & Watari sub- 
prefectures). One member constituency. 738 votes cast.
At least six candidates. The most important of them were 
Musha Denjiro (independent); Saito Nobutaro (Miyagi Seikai); 
Sakata Takahisa (Aikoku-kötö); and Kusakari Shimmei (Daido 
Club). Musha was Sub-prefect of Shida and Tamatsukuri 
sub-prefectures in an adjacent constituency. Sakata was 
a lawyer and normally lived in Tokyo. Generally speaking, 
the campaign was not marked by any untov/ard incidents, 
though each of the candidates was anxious to win. Saito 
was popular in the area around Marumori in Igu sub-prefecture, 
but did not have any backing in other parts of the 
constituency. There were a number of rumours to the effect 
that he had been reported to the authorities for bribery. 
Sakata was handicapped by his long absence from the prefecture. 
Musha had at one time thought of giving up the fight, but 
decided to stay in it and campaigned as hard as he could 
by means of agents. Kusakari was the strongest candidate 
in Karita sub-prefecture, and there were many Daido Club 
adherents in Igu. Some of these helped him by going on 
speech tours in different parts of the constituency. Musha 
elected with 286 votes. (Saito polled 158; Sakata 116;
Kusakari 111.) Though Musha had stood as an Independent, 
he sided with the Liberals in the Diet.
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(Kurokawa, Kami, S h id a ,  T a m a t s u k u r i ,
& T o ta  s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  One member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  At 
l e a s t  2 ,333  v o t e s  c a s t .  At l e a s t  f i v e  c a n d i d a t e s .  P r i n c i p a l  
f o u r  were Tomoji  Nobusuke ( i n d e p e n d e n t -); Monuki T o s h i t a d a  
( I n d e p e n d e n t ) ;  F u j i s a w a  Ikunosuke  (M iy ag i  S e i k a i ) ;  and 
Kurosawa Tözaburo  (DaidS  C lu b ) .  Tomoji  was a fo r m e r  Sub­
p r e f e c t  o f  M iyagi  gun .  E a r l i e r ,  he had  e d i t e d  a m agazine  
d e a l i n g  w i t h  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  and had  been  h e ad  o f  t h e  
I n d u s t r i a l  R e s e a r c h  Bureau i n  H i ro sh im a .  F u j i s a w a  was a 
l a w y e r  and a member o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  a s se m b ly .  These 
f o u r  s t r u g g l e d  h a r d  a g a i n s t  e ach  o t h e r ,  t h o u g h  once a g a i n  
t h e  campaign  was s u p e r f i c i a l l y  q u i e t .  Kurosawa and Tomoji  
b o th  l e f t  t h e i r  n a t i v e  gun,  T ö t a ,  t o  go c a n v a s s i n g  i n  o t h e r  
p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y .  Monuki t o o k  a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h e i r  
ab sen c e  t o  s t a r t  a campaign i n  T o ta .  F u j i s a w a  had  a t  one 
s t a g e  y i e l d e d  t o  a n o t h e r  c a n d i d a t e ,  Muramatsu,  who had  
seemed c e r t a i n  t o  w in .  E a r l y  on i n  t h e  cam paign ,  how ever ,  
Muramatsu,  had  been  p u t  i n  p r i s o n  f o r  an  u n s p e c i f i e d  
o f f e n c e .  F u j i s a w a  had  t h e n  renewed h i s  c a n d i d a c y ,  and 
was making s t r e n u o u s  e f f o r t s  t o  c a t c h  up w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  
l e a d i n g  c a n d i d a t e s .  He was p a r t i c u l a r l y  p o w e r fu l  i n  h i s  
own n a t i v e  d i s t r i c t  o f  Kami s u b - p r e f e c t u r e .  K u ro saw a 's  
s t r o n g h o l d  was T o ta  where he had  a number o f  Daido Club 
s y m p a th i z e r s  h e l p i n g  him. T h e i r  e f f o r t s  were s a i d  t o  be 
p ro d u c in g  r e s u l t s  i n  Kurokawa gun ,  and i n  t h i s  d i s t r i c t  
b a t t l e  was j o i n e d  w i t h  F u j i s a w a .  Tomoji  was re c k o n e d  t o  
have a b o u t  h a l f  t h e  v o t e s  o f  T o ta  gun.  E l s e w h e r e ,  he was 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e s p e c t e d  because  o f  h i s  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  and 
b eca u se  he h a d  had  a f a i r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  c a r e e r  i n  p u b l i c  
l i f e .  As a g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  b o th  Kurosawa and Tomoji  
c o n c e n t r a t e d  on a t t a c k i n g  F u j i s a w a  t o  t h e  e x c l u s i o n  o f  any 
o t h e r  c a n d i d a t e ,  and t h e  l a t t e r  s p e n t  n e a r l y  a l l  h i s  t im e  
d e fe n d in g  h i m s e l f  from t h e i r  o n s l a u g h t s .  I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  
Monuki was cam paign ing  as  w id e ly  and as  e n e r g e t i c a l l y  a s  
p o s s i b l e  i n  t h e  hope o f  be in g  r e t u r n e d  on t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  
v o t e s  c a s t  i n  t h o s e  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  which h i s  
r i v a l s  had  n e g l e c t e d  t o  c a n v a s s  t h o r o u g h l y .  Tomoji  e l e c t e d  
w i th  805 v o t e s .  Government s u p p o r t e r .
F o u r th  C o n s t i t u e n c y  ( K u r i b a r a  & Toyoma s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  
One member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  At l e a s t  1 ,6 8 7  v o t e s  c a s t .  At 
l e a s t  s i x  c a n d i d a t e s ;  f i v e  most i m p o r t a n t  were Azurni 
Magojuro ( I n d e p e n d e n t ) ,  Hoshi  M a tsu sab u ro  ( K a i s h i n - t o )  
Shüdo R ikuzo  ( K a i s h i n - t o ) ,  Sugawara S h in s a k u  (D aido  C l u b ) ,  
and C h ib a  Tanemasa (M iy a g i  S e i k a i ) .  Azumi had  b een  b o r n  
i n  K u r i b a r a  gun ,  and had  been  a member o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  
a s sem bly  s i n c e  1879* He had been  S u b - p r e f e c t  o f  S h id a  and
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Tamatsukuri sub-prefectures from 1883 to 1889* Shudo 
was an education official and had sat in the prefectural 
assembly since 1880. At first, the contest was dominated 
by Hoshi, Shudo, and Chiba. One newspaper^report said 
that Hoshi depended on his pocket-book, Chiba on the 
patronage he could dispense, and Shudo on his ability to 
present the voters with logical arguments. On 15 June, 
Chiba was arrested for vote-buying in Kuribara, and was 
in due course brought to trial in Sendai. He did not 
return to the campaign. Hoshi had been canvassing since 
the middle of April, but he had just gone round every 
village in the constituency announcing his name. The 
electors had not been very impressed by this procedure; 
and apart from a few in the area round his own home in the 
southern part of Toyoma gun, they were not ready to support 
him on the strength of his name alone. When he discovered 
his mistake, Hoshi started to canvass the constituency 
more thoroughly. Shudo was more reticent about advertising 
himself, but once he had decided to stand, he campaigned 
diligently. On 7 June, a party was held by his supporters 
in Toyoma-machi to introduce him to the electors in the 
district. Shudo had many influential people canvassing 
for him in Toyoma gun - they set up campaign offices in 
every part of the sub-prefecture, and won over nearly all 
its voters. Having succeeded in doing this, the Shudo 
faction started campaigning in Kuribara during the last 
tv/o weeks in June. It was said that Shudo was able to 
win a large number of votes in a short time because of 
his straightforward personality, and because many of the 
electors were Kaishin-to sympathizers. It seems that 
Azumi gained considerably from Chiba’s downfall, as the 
Miyagi Seikai supporters transferred their votes to him. 
Azumi had been a defeated candidate in the Miyagi election 
of one of the prefecture’s fifteen highest tax-payers 
to the House of Peers. It was said that the Sub-prefect 
of Kuribara gun organized his campaign for him. The 
campaign itself did not begin until after the House of 
Peers election on 10 June. Azumi elected with 736 votes. 
(Hoshi polled 428; Shudo 410.) Government supporter.
(Momofu, Oshika, & Motoyoshi sub­
member constituency. At least 641 
votes cast. At least seven candidates. Two leading 
candidates were Endo Atsushi (Miyagi Seikai), and Matsuda 
Tsunekichi (Kaishin-tS). EndÖ was deputy chairman of the 
prefectural assembly. Previously, he had been an assistant
Fifth Constituency• ••• »•»••••#•••• * *prefectures). One
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lecturer at Tokyo University but had later resigned from 
this post to work as a lawyer. Matsuda had been born in 
Oshika gun where his family were village merchants.
At the age of fifteen, he had been left in charge of the 
family business, and by dint of unremitting work had made 
it prosper. He had been a member of the prefectural assembly 
since 1878, and was later elected to its standing committee. 
He was also on the committees of the Public Health and 
Primary Schools associations for his own local district.
In 1889, when the treaty revision controversy was at its 
height, he addressed meetings in Tokyo, Sendai, and 
elsewhere. Three of the minor candidates were Isawa Sakuji 
(a lawyer and a member of the prefectural assembly, who 
stood as an Independent), Akiyama Shun, and Saito Senemon 
(a man of great wealth who had been defeated in the House 
of Peers election). Though this constituency had fewer 
voters than any other in the prefecture, it had the greatest 
number of candidates, and competition was keen. Matsudafs 
stronghold was Oshika gun, and from there he attacked 
Momofu and Motoyoshi. Endo had no trouble in holding his 
own in Momofu at any rate. The two of them had been at 
loggerheads since the promulgation of the constitution in 
February I889. The papers had reported that Endo had been 
giving out presents of piece-goods, and this tactic had 
involved him in a considerable amount of criticism.
Matsuda travelled all over the constituency, holding speech 
meetings and social parties in as many places as possible. 
Endo, too, went on canvassing tours. Akiyama was a former 
Sub-prefect of Motoyoshi gun, and was naturally favoured 
in that area. He had entered the fray rather later than the others, but he and his supporters in Motoyoshi were 
doing their utmost to win votes in Momofu. Isawa, based 
on Momofu, attacked Matsuda*s territory in Oshika, and 
busied himself there with giving dinner parties and holding negotiations. On 19 June, his faction held a speech 
meeting at Hemita village in Oshika; there were seven 
speakers. Despite his energetic campaigning, Isawa was 
not considered to be a likely winner. On 24 June, the 
Kaishin-to and the Miyagi Seikai held a joint speech 
meeting at Fukaya village in Momofu gun. Both Matsuda 
and Isawa spoke at this meeting. On the day of the election, 
the Kaishin-to informed the police that Endo had been 
bribing the electors, but the police did not act on this 
information - probably because of lack of evidence. On 
the afternoon of 1 July, some soshi stole the book containing
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the particulars of the voting in Takaki mura from a 
polling station clerk, while he was carrying it to the 
house of the village Headman after the polling had finished. 
Police were summoned, and the soshi found hiding in a 
barn within a few hours. Endo elected with 525 votes. 
Government supporter.
Fukui ken. (8,628 voters; 4 Members.)
First Constituency (Asuha & Ono sub-prefectures). One• •••»•••••••••••a •member constituency. Three candidates - Aoyama Shobei 
(member of the prefectural assembly), Takeo Shigeru 
(former member of the standing committee of the prefectural 
assembly), and Hirose Akira (a former local government 
official). At first, the contest had been between Aoyama 
and Takeo; but later, Hirose decided to resign from his 
post in the prefectural government and come forward as a 
candidate. Aoyama was influential in Asuha sub-prefecture, 
and there were more voters there than in Ono. Earlier, he 
had helped to finance a Liberal newspaper, and he had been 
sent as a delegate to Daido Danketsu conferences in Tokyo. 
His family were land-owners in Asuha, and were one of the 
richest in the whole prefecture. Takeo was away in Tokyo 
during part of the campaign, and it was reported that he 
had not prepared himself very well for it. Hirose’s 
family was well known in Ono gun, and so he was able to 
count on a sudden accession of strength in spite of the 
fact that he had delayed his candidacy. Aoyama elected 
with 9Ö2 votes. Liberal.
^ec^sL.fJpn^iti^en^y. (Yoshida & Sakai sub-prefectures).
One member constituency. 4,701 voters. In this
constituency, there took place what was virtually an 
unopposed election. The candidate so favoured was Sugita 
Teiichi (chairman of the prefectural assembly). Sugita was 
a native of Sakai gun; and though in the last week or so of 
the election campaign, some rival candidates did come forward 
in Yoshida gun, the latter had far fewer voters than Sakai. 
Therefore Sugita’s chances of winning the seat were in no 
way threatened by the opposition. At the time of the 
election, Sugita was living in the prefecture, and at 
nomination meetings held on 7 and 8 June, his candidature 
received the unanimous endorsement of those present.
The meeting on 7 June was attended by the headmen of the 
villages and tov/ns in both parts of the constituency; the
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meeting on the following day was attended by several 
hundred electors representing Yoshida as well as Sakai.
Sugita was a leading adherent of the Jiyü Minken Undo, and 
a close associate of Itagaki. His family had been working 
as farmers and land-owners in Sakai for several generations. 
At the age of twenty, he went to Tokyo and started publishing 
a ’Left wing’ magazine. In 1878, after the Aikoku-sha 
was re-established in Osaka, he worked hard for it. Earlier, 
he had made a lasting name for himself in Fukui prefecture 
by exerting himself to the utmost in a campaign for the 
reduction of taxes. His political activities had caused 
him to be imprisoned on several occasions. In 1884, he 
went abroad and visited Asia as well as Europe and America.
On his return, he was elected to the prefectural assembly. 
Sugita elected. Liberal.
Third.Const ituency# (Nan jo; Imatate, & Nifu sub-prefectures). 
One member constituency. Two (candidates were Nakajima 
Matagoro and Nagata Sadaemon. Nakajima was a Tokyo lawyer, 
and a prominent Jiyu-to politician. Nagata was a landowner 
in Okayama village, Nifu gun, and deputy chairman of the 
prefectural assembly. He had long been a supporter of the 
Liberal movement. The situation in this constituency was 
that the electors were overwhelmingly Liberal in their 
sympathies; but there was no one national or local figure 
available for the constituency who was obviously better 
qualified than anybody else to represent it in the House 
of Representatives. Therefore the electorate was divided 
into one party which wished to ask someone who was living 
outside the prefecture, and who had proved himself to be 
more than usually able, to stand; and another party which 
supported the candidature of that worthy but hardly 
distinguished stay-at-home - Nagata Sadaemon. The ’outsider’ 
group first of all approached Saito Shuichiro, who had 
returned home to visit his parents’ graves, but he was not 
willing to be nominated. Eventually, Nakajima accepted 
their suggestion that he should stand; but in the meantime, 
many of the voters who had originally wanted to bring in 
a candidate from outside the prefecture had defected to 
the Nagata camp. To make matters worse, the Nagata party 
did its best to win the election by promising to give money 
to the electors and entertaining them to lavish banquets.
The Nakajima faction did not use this kind of tactic. An 
official complaint was lodged with the authorities concerning 
Nagata’s campaigning methods; but the police did not 
prosecute him. Nakajirna’s supporters organized a number of 
speech tours, but he himself seems to have returned to Tokyo 
before the end of June. Nagata elected. Liberal.
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Fourth^Constituency (Mikata, Onifu, Oi, & Tsuruga sub- 
prefectures ) I *One member constituency. The first candidate 
to present himself v/as Tokioka Bunzaemon (member of the 
prefectural assembly). Then, the Sub-prefect of Mikata 
gun, Fujita Magohira, resigned his post and entered the 
contest. Finally, an organization calling itself The 
Shizoku of Obama Party nominated a lawyer, Tanizawa Rydkichi, 
to oppose the other two. It v/as said that Tokioka was 
personally in favour of giving way to Tanizawa, but his 
own supporters would not hear of such a move. The contest 
v/as further complicated by the fact that Tokioka and 
Fujita were friends of many years standing. However this 
friendship grew rather strained in the course of the 
campaign. Fujita elected. Liberal.
Yamaguchi ken. (5*806 voters; 7 Members.)
Yamaguchi v/as an area that had not yet been penetrated by 
the Liberal or Progressive political parties. The main 
reason for this state of affairs was the fact that 
Yamaguchi was the home province of the Chöshü clan and so 
a major Government stronghold. This also accounts for the 
presence in the competition of a number of candidates who 
v/ere senior officials attached to the central Government.
The dominant political organization in the prefecture was 
the Bocho Club under the patronage of Ito Hirobumi and 
Inoue Kaoru. Another faction in the prefecture was under 
the control of Yamagata Aritomo, but he v/as apt to find it 
difficult to keep a solid following in the area for long.
At the time of the election, Yamagata was Prime Minister 
and had just stopped being Home Minister. Therefore his 
local stock was reasonably high; but ’the temperature of 
the relations betv/een the Count and his followers changes 
so rapidly, that it appears that though he has ten thousand 
supporters now, before long he may have only one Count. ’ 1 
A third group v/as an Ultra-Conservative one, led by Torio 
Koyata and Miura Goro. This Ultra-Conservative party did 
on occasion make use of v/hat little influence it" had to 
help Yamagata’s adherents, but these alliances never lasted 
for very long. The Ultra-Conservatives were at daggers 
drawn with the Ito-Inoue faction. Thus, the local electoral
1
Choya Shirnbun 25-5-90.
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s i t u a t i o n  i n  Yamaguchi r e f l e c t e d ,  w i th  a v e r y  f a i r  
d e g re e  o f  a c c u r a c y ,  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  and r i v a l r i e s  o f  
some o f  t h e  l e a d i n g  Choshu f i g u r e s  i n  n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  
and  m i l i t a r y  c i r c l e s  ., A p a r t  f rom t h i s  s o r t  o f  h i d d e n  i n ­
f i g h t i n g  among th e  f o l l o w e r s  o f  v a r i o u s  s e n i o r  men o f  
a f f a i r s ,  t h e  Yamaguchi campaign was n o t i c e a b l y  q u i e t .  The 
v o t e r s  seem t o  have been  q u i t e  r e a d y  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  l e a d  
g i v e n  by t h e  Bocho Club o r  t h e  v i l l a g e  headmen, and  were 
no t  v e r y  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  th e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and i s s u e s  
p r e s e n t e d  by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  g o v e rn m e n t .
F i r s t  ^Const i tuency^ ( Y o s h i k i ,  Mine, Asa,  & Saba s u b -  
p r e f e e n u r e s ) ’ 'Mo* member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  S ix  c a n d i d a t e s ,  
b u t  o n ly  t h r e e  o f  them had any s t a n d i n g .  These t h r e e  were 
Y o sh i to m i  K a n ic h i  ( c h a i r m a n  o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  assembly), 
Suematsu Saburo  ( M i n i s t r y  o f  J u s t i c e  c o u n s e l l o r ) ,  and 
F uruya  S h in s a k u  (member o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r a l  a s s e m b ly ) .  
Y o sh i to m i  and F u ru y a  were s u p p o r t e d  by t h e  Bocho C lu b ,  and 
t h e  f o r m e r  was a l o c a l  p o l i t i c i a n  o f  some a b i l i t y  a s  w e l l  
a s  a d i s t a n t  r e l a t i v e  of  Inoue  K aoru .  Suematsu h ad  been  
b r o u g h t  up t o  be a B u d d h i s t  monk, b u t  had  no v o c a t i o n  
f o r  t e m p le  l i f e .  He had  s t u d i e d  law i n  F r a n c e ,  and  a f t e r  
h i s  r e t u r n  t o  J a p a n  was a p p o i n t e d  p u b l i c  p r o s e c u t o r  f o r  
t h e  Supreme C o u r t .  He had  been  one o f  Goto S h o j i r o ’ s 
l e a d i n g  s u p p o r t e r s  i n  t h e  Daido D a n k e t su .  Y o sh i to m i  and 
F uruya  were s t r o n g  i n  Y o s h ik i  and Mine s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ,  
where t h e  headmen o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  com m uni t ies  had  d e c i d e d  
t h a t  t h e y  sh o u ld  be e l e c t e d ,  and where t h e r e  were no t  a 
few Bocho Club members. Suematsu 1 n u r s e d ’ t h e  o t h e r  h a l f  
o f  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y ,  i . e .  Asa and Saba  s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s .
He had  r e t u r n e d  home t o  t h i s  p a r t  o f  t h e  p r e f e c t u r e  on 
s e v e r a l  o c c a s i o n s  d u r i n g  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  
make h i m s e l f  known t o  i t s  i n h a b i t a n t s  by means o f  sp e ec h  
m e e t i n g s  and p a r t i e s .  His  f i n a l  cam paign  t o u r  began  i n  
t h e  l a s t  week o f  J u n e ,  when he once more l e f t  Tokyo and 
t r a v e l l e d  a l l  t h e  way t o  Yamaguchi.  Y o sh i to m i  and Suematsu  
e l e c t e d .  Both  I n d e p e n d e n t s .
S e c o n d ^ C o n s t i tu e n c y  (Amu, Mishima, & Otsu  s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  
One member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  The Bocho Club and v i l l a g e  headmen 
n o m in a ted  Inoue  Masakazu ( M i n i s t r y  o f  J u s t i c e  c o u n s e l l o r ) ,  
a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  p e r s o n  whom t h e y  had  a s k e d  t o  s t a n d  had  
t u r n e d  down th e  o f f e r .  Inoue  had  s t u d i e d  law i n  F ra n c e  f o r  
s i x  y e a r s  from 1875 t o  1881 ,  and had  r e t u r n e d  home w i t h  a 
d o c t o r a t e .  He had n o t  a c t i v e l y  so u g h t  t h e  Second C o n s t i t u e n c y
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s e a t ;  b u t  h i s  b a c k e r s  seem t o  have  been  p o w e r fu l  enough 
t o  be a b l e  t o  award i t  t o  whomever t h e y  p l e a s e d .  C e r t a i n l y ,  
I n o u e ’ s ch an c es  o f  w inn ing  were s u f f i c i e n t l y  f a v o u r a b l e  
t o  s c a r e  o f f  o t h e r  w ould-be  c o n t e s t a n t s  lo n g  b e f o r e  he 
h i m s e l f  had  even  begun  t o  campaign  i n  p e r s o n .  One o f  t h e s e  
j jeop le  f r i g h t e n e d  by I n o u e ’ s p o p u l a r i t y  was a c o l l e a g u e  o f  
h i s  i n  t h e  M i n i s t r y  o f  J u s t i c e .  Inoue  e l e c t e d .  I n d e p e n d e n t .
T h i r d # Const  i t u e n c y # (Akamagaseki  & T oyoura  s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .
One’member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  U n t i l  10 June  c e r t a i n l y ,  and 
p r o b a b l y  u n t i l  a l a t e r  d a t e ,  t h e  o n ly  c a n d i d a t e  f o r  t h i s  
s e a t  was Ooka Ik u zo  ( f o r m e r l y  a member o f  t h e  K a i s h i n - t o ,  
bu t  l a t e r  j o i n e d  t h e  Bocho C l u b ) .  Ooka had  b e en  b o r n  i n  
Yamaguchi,  and i n  1873,  he e n t e r e d  t h e  N a g asak i  S choo l  o f  
M edic ine  where he s t u d i e d  German. L a t e r ,  he s t u d i e d  law 
i n  N a g asak i  and Tokyo. A f t e r  c o m p le t in g  t h e s e  s t u d i e s ,  he 
s e t t l e d  i n  Tokyo where he became famous a s  a l e a d i n g  
c r i m i n a l  l a w y e r .  He was a member o f  t h e  Tokyo fu  a s s e m b ly ,  
and i n  h i s  K a i s h i n - t o  d a y s ,  he o f t e n  spoke on t h a t  p a r t y ’ s 
p l a t f o r m s .  He had  p a i d  a number o f  v i s i t s  t o  t h e  T h i r d  
C o n s t i t u e n c y  (Yamaguchi)  s i n c e  t h e  p r o m u lg a t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and by means o f  sp e ec h  m e e t in g s  and s o c i a l  
g a t h e r i n g s  had  o b t a i n e d  a s o l i d  m easure  o f  e l e c t o r a l  s u p p o r t .
I n  t h e  en d ,  a r i v a l  c a n d i d a t e  d i d  come f o r w a r d ,  b u t  he 
p o l l e d  o n ly  75 v o t e s  t o  Ooka’ s 378 .  Ooka e l e c t e d .  I n d e p e n d e n t .
F o u r t h ^ C o n s t i t u e n c y # (T su n o ,  Kumake, & Oshima s u b - p r e f e c t u r e s ) .  
Two’member c o n s t i t u e n c y .  At l e a s t  s i x  c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  th e  
two s e a t s .  The f i r s t  t o  come f o r w a r d  was Kawamura 
H i d e t o s h i  ( a  Tokyo l a w y e r ) ,  who h a d  b e en  cam paign ing  k e e n l y  
b u t  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  s i n c e  t h e  p r e v i o u s  y e a r .  He was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t r o n g  i n  Kumake gun an d  had  made some i n r o a d s  
i n t o  Tsuno.  O th e r  c a n d i d a t e s  w i th  a l i m i t e d  amount o f  
i n f l u e n c e  i n  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n c y  were Y aj im a  Sakuro (C h a irm an  
o f  t h e  Tokyo E l e c t r i c  L ig h t  Company) and  Ono Naosuke 
( a n  a u d i t o r ) .  I n  t h e  c l o s i n g  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  cam paign ,  two 
new c a n d i d a t e s  came f o r w a r d  -  Kumano B inzö  ( M i n i s t r y  o f  
J u s t i c e  c o u n s e l l o r )  and H o r ie  Y o s h isu k e  (member o f  t h e  
S e n a t e ) .  Both  o f  them won a good f o l l o w i n g  i n  t h e  
c o n s t i t u e n c y  w i t h i n  a few weeks o f  s t a r t i n g  t h e i r  c am p a ig n s .  
Kumano had  t r a n s f e r r e d  from t h e  Second C o n s t i t u e n c y ;  H o r ie  
was a m a j o r - g e n e r a l  i n  t h e  Army, and  a member o f  T o r io  
K o y a t a ’ s Moderate  C o n s e r v a t i v e  P a r t y .  He had  b een  Commandant 
o f  t h e  M i l i t a r y  Academy; b u t  t h e  Government ,  d i s l i k i n g  h i s  
v i e w s ,  moved him t o  t h e  S e n a te  where he had  g r e a t e r  d i g n i t y  
and l e s s  i n f l u e n c e .  Yet a n o t h e r  c a n d i d a t e  was Nomura
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Tsunezo; he seems to have been a nonentity. Korie and 
Nomura elected. Both Independents.
(Kuga sub-prefecture). One member
"  "  ' . ......... A.s *of 10 June, this constituency had no
Fifth Constituency 
constituency.
candidates at all. Some of the voters had wanted to 
nominate the Director of the Foreign Office Bureau of 
Commerce, Kawakarni Kinichi, but he refused to stand.
Another possible candidate also declined. The person 
eventually elected was Yoshikawa Tsutomu, who had had no 
previous experience of political or official life. Yoshikawa 
elected. Independent.
Kochi ken. (5>542; 4 Members.)
What Yarnaguchi was for the Government, Kochi (formerly Tosa) 
was for the opposition. This was the home province of 
Itagaki’s Liberals, and their strength must have been to 
some extent due to the survival of clan loyalties and 
pride. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the prefecture 
was a Liberal stronghold, it also contained a sizeable 
number of Ultra-Conservative supporters. Tani Kanjo, too, 
was a Tosa man. Accordingly, the election contest took 
the form of a bitter struggle, particularly in the Second 
Constituency, between the Jiyu-to on the one hand and the 
Kokumin-ha (Tani's Ultra-Conservative party) on the other. 
All the Liberal candidates were politicians of the first 
rank; and the leading Liberal association, at any rate in 
and around Kochi city, was known as the Kainan Club.
First%Constituency# (Tosa and Nagaoka sub-prefectures). One 
member constituency. The Liberal candidate was Takenouchi 
Tsuna; his Ultra-Conservative opponent v/as Shinkai Takeo. 
Takenouchi came from a family which for generations had 
been minor retainers in Tosa. He took part in the V/ar of 
the Restoration, fighting for the Imperialists. After the 
war had finished, he did not enter the public service, but 
went to Osaka where he set himself up as a merchant 
interested in overseas trade. In 1870, he was appointed to 
a minor post in the Osaka fu local government. By I885, he 
was working in the Treasury Department in Tokyo, but in that 
year he resigned his post and returned to the world of 
business. In association with Goto Shojiro, he became 
interested in the Takashima coal mine, and was president of 
Gotofs Horai Sha (a business company). In 1877> Takenouchi
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was imprisoned for one year for suspected complicity in 
the Satsuma rebellion. After his release, he joined the 
Liberal movement, and he helped to found the first Liberty 
Party. He then extended the scope of his activities to 
include the press, and took a keen interest in the 
publication of the Jiyü Shimbun. Later, he was one of the 
official mediators in the negotiations leading to the 
formation of the Kdin Club. In contrast to Takenouchi, 
Shinkai was a virtually unknown figure. Takenouchi arrived 
in Kochi from Tokyo on the morning of 20 June, and was 
welcomed by members of the Kainan Club, and also by 
representatives of the staff of^the Toyo Shimbun. This 
paper (it changed its name to Kochi Shimbun later in the 
month) was a Liberal organ. Takenouchi’s campaign consisted 
of a series of speech meetings and social gatherings in 
different villages in the constituency. At one meeting, 
held at Nunoshita mura on 22 June, the audience of 250 or 
so persons was said to have broken into thunderous applause 
when he rose to speak. On that occasion, the topics he 
discussed were ( i) the responsibilities of members of the 
House of Representatives, (ii) his hopes for the coming 
Diet, and (iii) the general political situation. On 21 June, 
a group of Liberal supporters held a discussion meeting in 
a private house at Ryoseki mura, Nagaoka gun. They 
invited a leading member of the Kainan Club to attend as 
guest speaker. Since the day chosen was a traditional 
holiday, a number of women were in the audience on that 
occasion. After the speeches were finished, the organizers 
entertained the visiting speaker at a drinking party.
The Kokumin-ha, for its part, lacked the popular appeal 
and good organization of the Jiyu-to. (The voting figures 
for Kochi city were:- Takenouchi 76, Shinkai 3») It seems to have campaigned by stealth; one of its ruses was 
to circulate rumours that certain well-known and locally 
powerful voters had decided to favour it. The Toyd-Kochi 
Shimbun carried a number of advertisements put in by the 
people concerned to deny publicly the truth of these 
allegations. Takenouchi elected. Liberal.
Second Constituency (Hata, Takaoka, & Akawa sub-prefectures). 
Two member* constituency. The Jiyu-to candidates were Kataoka 
Kenkichi and Hayashi Yüzo. The Kokumin-ha nominated 
Kataoka Haoharu and Hirota Shoro. Kataoka Kenkichi was a 
Tosa samurai, who had been associated with Itagaki Taisuke 
in the anti-Bakufu movement and had taken an active part 
in the War of the Restoration. In I87O, he was sent abroad 
by the Government to study the military systems of Europe
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and America. After Itagaki's resignation in 1873,
Kataoka Kenkichi became one of the leading members of 
the Jiyu Minken Undo. Settling in Kochi, he became the 
first president of the Risshi-sha, and later was active 
in the Aikoku-sha campaign for representative institutions. 
In 1877, at the time of the Satsuma rebellion, he was 
imprisoned for a short period. In 1879, be was elected 
chairman of the prefectural assembly. Hayashi had had a 
similar sort of career. At the time of the War of the 
Restoration, he travelled to England, and on his return to 
Japan, became one of Itagakifs assistants. In 1873, be 
went as an adviser when the Foreign Minister of the day, 
Soejima Taneomi, visited China. He resigned, together 
with the rest of the !war party*, from his official post 
later that year. On returning to Kochi, he was one of 
the founder members of the Risshi-sha. Hayashi was deeply 
involved in a plot to ally the Tosa Liberals with the 
Satsuma rebels. Consequently, in 1877, he was sentenced 
to ten years’ imprisonment. In 1886, however, he was 
released under the terms of a special pardon. In 1890, he 
helped Itagaki found the Aikoku-koto. As with the First 
Constituency, the Kokumin-ha candidates were not nearly so 
well known as their Liberal opponents. However, the 
Ultra-Conservatives were strong in this constituency, and 
so the competition was keen. Kataoka Kenkichi and 
Hayashi campaigned by means of speech meetings, and in 
the course of the one month of June, spoke in a large 
number of different villages. Often, these speech 
campaigns took the form of an organized tour lasting for 
several days. For example, between 17 and 19 June, Hayashi 
attended three different meetings in three fairly widely 
separated villages. These meetings were held either in 
private houses or in public halls. Attendances were 
good, being anything from 150 to over a 1,000. The 
meeting places were sometimes decorated with flowers and 
placards or lamps, carrying slogans such as LIBERTY FOREVER. 
The speeches usually lasted from tv/o to five hours, and 
they were often followed by a party. In general, there 
were no interruptions at all at these meetings; but on 
one occasion, v/hen a speaker was criticizing the Kokumin-ha, 
two drunks appeared and started brandishing swords. They 
were over-powered by Jiyu-to soshi, however, and handed 
over to the police. When they saw this, other Kokumin-ha 
sympathizers v/ho had smuggled themselves into the audience 
left in a great hurry. This speech campaign by the Liberal 
candidates seems to have had decisive results. They 
visited villages which had previously been regarded as
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enemy strongholds, and in a number of such places the 
voters seceded en masse to the Jiyu-to. The Kokumin-ha, 
on the other hand, was very much on the defensive, and 
put up little effective resistance to the Liberal attacks. 
The skies over the Second Constituency were reported to 
be in the habit of raining down sake or money when they 
were not unleashing hailstorms of blows. In the same vein, 
the springs at öuchi-mura, a locally celebrated watering- 
place in Takaoka gun, were rumoured to have spurted 
alcohol when the Kokumin-ha held a rally of their 
supporters there. Despite these bottle and purse tactics, 
the trend of opinion was clearly against the National 
Party. This success, the Liberals owed to their own hard 
efforts. Result - Kataoka Kenkichi 1,297 votes; Hayashi 
Yuzo 1,323 votes; Kataoka Naoharu 833 votes; Hirota Shoro 
856 votes. Kataoka Kenkichi and Hayashi elected. Both 
Liberals.
Third^Constituen£y# (Kagami and Aki sub-prefectures). One 
member constituency. The Liberal candidate for this seat 
was Ueki Emori. Ueki was a Tosa man, and Itagaki’s chief 
lieutenant. His main claim to fame, however, lies in his 
works on political thought. More than any other single 
person, Ueki was the philosopher of the Liberty and 
Popular Rights Movement. He was a tireless and extremely 
able controversialist, both on the public platform and at 
the journalistfs desk. Since his early youth, he had been 
closely associated with Itagaki; in I89O, he was a leading 
member of the Aikoku-koto. I have not been able to discover any definite proof of the identity of Ueki's Kokumin-ha 
opponent. It is almost certain that there was such an 
opponent; and he may well have been Miyazaki Yoshimichi - 
a former member of the prefectural assembly and founder of 
the Tosa Koyo-kai. The competition here was not so fierce 
as in the Second Constituency. A speech meeting was held 
bY Jiyu-to supporters in None mura, Aki gun, on the evening 
of 19 June. There were three speakers, but Ueki was not 
among them. The audience of a hundred or so persons listened 
in silence; and after the meeting had ended, the speakers 
were given supper by one of the organizers. A report from 
Tateda mura, Kagami gun, stated that the Kokumin-ha, which 
had previously been very powerful in the village, had 
recently lost most of its influence. This was because: - 
(i) They had collected money from their adherents to pay 
the costs of an appeal against a sentence of several months* 
imprisonment which had been imposed on two of their members 
in the previous March. The two had been punished for 
assaulting a Liberal Party member at the time of the
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elections to the prefectural assembly, ( ±i) They had 
been involved in the illicit sale and removal of a 
building in the village, (iii) A Kokumin-ha leader 
had made over some of his land to be held jointly by eighty- 
seven of his politically loyal tenants. He had done this 
with the idea of increasing the power of his party. The 
tenants had taken advantage of their improved economic 
position to start selling eggs and toilet-paper in 
neighbouring villages. While they were hawking these 
goods, they found that they were everywhere disliked 
because of their connection with the Kokumin-ha. So, 
for the sake of securing custom, they began saying that they 
belonged to the Jiyu-to. Troubled by the fact that they 
had to tell these lies, they were seriously thinking of 
restoring the title-deed to its original owner. The 
story of their dilemma had lowered the general prestige 
of the Kokumin-ha in Tateda. Ueki elected. Liberal.
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Appendix I
Imperial Rescript of 14 April 1875.
After ascending the Imperial Throne, We called together 
the entire Court and swore the Charter Oath to the gods, 
establishing the policies of the Empire and seeking the 
welfare of all Our subjects* Happily, as a result of the 
efforts of the Spirits of Our Ancestors and as a result of 
the efforts of the whole body of Our Court, We have to-day 
achieved a semblance of peace* Yet the Restoration is not 
long since past, and there still remain not a few changes 
and reforms to be undertaken in the internal administration.
We, now, in fulfilment of the principles of Our Oath, 
hereby set up a Senate to broaden the source of legislation, 
and a Supreme Court to strengthen the powers of justice. 
Moreover, by summoning the officials from the provinces,
We shall be informed of the conditions of the people, and 
shall take counsel for the public good.
It is Our desire to introduce by degrees a system of 
constitutional government for the nation and to join with 
you, Our subjects, in looking forward to that auspicious 
event. You must not adhere too rigidly to the customs of 
former times; neither should you let your zeal for progress 
lead you into rash actions.
Mark well these Our words, and give Us your support.
(Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.186)
Appendix II
Imperial Rescript of 12 October 1881.
We, sitting on the Throne which has been occupied by 
Our dynasty for over 2,?00 years, and now exercising in Our 
name and right all authority and power transmitted to Us 
by Our Ancestors, have long had in view gradually to 
establish a constitutional form of government, to the end 
that Our Successors on the Throne may be provided with a 
rule for Their guidance*
It was with this object in view that in the 8th year 
of Meiji, We established the Senate, and in the 11th year 
of Meiji, authorized the formation of Local Assemblies, thus 
laying the foundation for the gradual reforms which We 
contemplated* These Our acts must convince you, Our subjects, 
of Our determination in this respect from the beginning.
Systems of government differ in different countries, 
but sudden and unusual changes cannot be made without great 
inconvenience.
Our Ancestors in Heaven watch Our acts, and We recognize 
Our responsibility to Them for the faithful discharge of Our 
duties, in accordance with the principles, and the perpetual 
increase of the glory, They have bequeathed to Us*
We therefore hereby declare that We shall, in the 23rd 
year of Meiji, establish a Parliament, in order to carry into 
full effect the determination We have announced, and We charge 
Our faithful subjects bearing Our commissions to make, in 
the mean time, all necessary preparations to that end.
With regard to the limitations upon the Imperial 
prerogative, and the constitution of the Parliament, We shall 
decide hereafter and make proclamation in due time.
We perceive that the tendency of Our people is to advance 
too rapidly, and without that thought and consideration which 
alone can make progress enduring, and We warn Our subjects, 
high and low, to be mindful of Our will, and that those who 
may advocate sudden and violent changes, thus disturbing the 
peace of Our realm, will fall under Our displeasure.
We expressly proclaim this to Our subjects.
(McLaren, Jap. Govt. Docs., p.86.)
Appendix III
Jivü-to Manifeste^ October 1881.
1. We shall endeavour to extend the liberties of the 
people, preserve their rights, promote their 
happiness, and improve their social condition.
2. We desire to establish a constitutional form of 
government of the best type.
3. We shall strive to realize our objects by uniting 
with those of our compatriots who approve of our 
party and its principles.
(Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.385)
Appendix IV
Rikken Kaishin-tö Manifesto, March 1882.
The Emperor has graciously given us a constitution.
The people of our Empire have been favoured with an 
unprecedented stroke of good fortune. At this juncture, 
what plan can we devise, what duty perform, in order that 
the people of the Empire will not disgrace themselves?
There is nothing for it but to join all together in a 
political party and so make manifest our strength. Gome 
brethren, let us organize a party and do our duty as 
sub J G c b s•
Happiness is something we expect of humanity. However 
we are not interested in the privileged happiness of a small 
minority. In the final analysis, this sort of happiness is 
self-interest, and is contrary to that glory of the Imperial 
House and prosperity of the people for which we stand. The 
glory of the Imperial House and the prosperity of the people 
are what we greatly desire. However we do not want the glory 
and prosperity of a brief moment. That sort of glory and 
prosperity are of limited duration, and are contrary to the 
boundless glory and eternal prosperity for which we stand. 
Therefore, should there be one or two who make our Empire 
their plaything, who despise the glory of the Imperial House and the prosper} ty of the people, and who, basking in the 
transient ease of the present time, have no thought for 
permanent injuries, we shall regard them as public enemies.
We shall try to form this party from those who hope for a 
glory that will enable the Imperial House to be maintained 
forever, and for a prosperity that the people will enjoy 
forever. Come brethren, join our party and make manifest 
these hopes!
Political reform and progress shall be our unceasing 
aspirations. If there is neither reform nor progress in 
politics, it is futile to look for a boundless glory, and a 
waste of time to plan for an everlasting prosperity. In the 
end, it would be impossible to perfect the body politic. 
Though we hope for political reform and progress, we do not 
favour violent change. To think in terms of imprudent and 
sudden transformation is simply to disorganize society and 
hamper political progress. For the same reason, we reject 
and cannot share our aspirations with those who, lost in the 
darkness of their own narrow minds, cling vainly to the past 
and, emulating the violence of the extremists, like to get
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excited. We desire to reform politics by truly proper and 
orderly methods, and to achieve progress through a policy 
of steadiness and honesty. The following are the two 
articles of our covenant
a) Our Party shall be called the Constitutional Progressive 
Party.
b) Our Party shall unite those subjects of the Empire who 
desire the following:-
(i) The preservation of the glory of the Imperial 
House, and the perfecting of the prosperity 
of the people.
(ii) Improvements in the internal administration 
before any extension of national rights.
(iii) The elimination of interference by the central 
authorities, and the setting up of the basic 
structure of local self-government.
The widening of the franchise to be in keeping 
with the general progress of society.
The reduction to an absolute minimum of 
diplomatic bargaining and the strenuous 
promotion of trade relations, in our dealings 
with foreign countries.
The maintaining of the principle of *hard 
money* in the coinage system.
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.403)
Appendix V
Rikken Teisei-tö Manifesto. March 1882.
Our Constitutional Imperial Party humbly bases 
itself on the Imperial Rescript of 12 October 1881. At home 
we shall preserve the national polity unbroken for ages 
eternal and shall strengthen the rights and happiness of 
the people; abroad, we shall extend the national rights and 
look forward to the upholding of the honour of the Empire 
in every land. We shall follow a pathr of gradual advance.
We shall not adhere too stubbornly to the past; neither 
shall we commit ourselves to frenzied change. All we desire 
is that order and progress should go together. In this way, 
we shall preserve the peace of the country. Accordingly, 
we consider it to be of the utmost importance that there 
should be a plan for progress, and have determined the 
programme of our Party as follows
(i) His Majesty has made it clear that a Parliament 
will be opened in 1890. Our Party respectfully 
accepts this, and will not countenance 
discussion of the terms or timing of the 
Imperial Rescript.
(ii) His Majesty has declared that the constitution 
will be a matter for His own august decision.
Our Party will respectfully abide by this, and 
will not fail to observe the provisions of a 
constitution sponsored by His Majesty.
(iii) It is beyond dispute that the sovereignty over 
the Empire rests in the Emperor alone, but its 
practical application will be regulated by a 
system of constitutional government.
(iv) The Diet should consist of two Chambers.
(v) In the election of Representatives, there should 
be a restricted franchise.
(vi) The Diet should be empowered to frame laws for 
the internal affairs of the Empire.
(vii) The Emperor should have the prerogative of 
approving or rejecting the legislation of the 
Diet.
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(viii) Military and naval officers should not be 
allowed to intervene in politics.
(ix) The officials in charge of the administration 
of justice should be made independent as soon 
as the legal system has been put in order.
(x) Assembly and speech, so long as they are not 
prejudicial to national safety and order, are 
public freedoms. Speeches, newspapers, and 
publications should be free within the limits 
laid down by law.
(xi) With regard to finance, the existing paper 
currency should be gradually replaced by 
convertible bank-notes.
(Miyakoshi, N.K.K.S., p.^56)
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LAW OF ELECTION 
of the
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
Chapter I.
Election Districts.
Article I.
The Members of the House of Representatives shall be 
elected in the election districts of each Fu (City) and Ken 
(Prefecture). The election districts, and the number of 
Members to be elected in each district, are set forth in the 
Appendix of the present Law.
Article II.
The Governor of a Fu or of a Ken shall superintend 
elections in the election districts in his Fu or Ken.
Elections in an election district shall be 
superintended either by the Guncho (Head of Rural District) 
or by the Shicho (Head of Municipality) in the capacity of 
Chairman of Election.
Article III.
When an election district extends over more than one 
Gun (Rural District) or Shi (Municipality), the Governor of 
the Fu or Ken shall appoint one of the Guncho or one of the 
Shicho for the Chairman of Election.
Article IV.
When there are more than one election district within 
the limits of a Shi, the Governor of the Fu or Ken shall 
appoint the Kuch5 (Head of Urban District) for the Chairman 
of Election.
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Article V.
Expenses of election shall be defrayed out of the local 
taxe s.
Chapter II.
Qualifications of Electors.
Article VI.
Every elector is required to possess the following 
qualfications:-
1 . He must be a male Japanese subject and be not less 
than full twenty-five years of age.
2. He must have fixed his permanent residence and 
actually resided in the Fu or Ken, for not less 
than one year, previous to the date of the 
drawing up of the electoral list, and must be 
still residing therein.
3« For not less than one year previous to the date of 
the making out of the electoral list, he must have 
been paying, in the Fu or Ken, direct national 
taxes to the amount of not less than fifteen yen, 
and must be still paying the same.
But in the case of income tax, he must have been 
paying it for not less than full three years 
previous to the same date, and must be still 
paying it.
Article VII.
In the case of a person that has succeeded to an estate 
by inheritance, the amount of taxes paid on the estate by 
his predecessor shall be counted in for his qualification.
Chapter III.
Qualifications of Eligible Persons.
Article VIII
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Those alone s h a l l  be e l i g i b l e ,  th a t  a re  male Japanese 
s u b je c ts  o f n o t le s s  than  f u l l  t h i r t y  y ea rs  of age , and t h a t ,  
in  the Fu o r Ken in  which they  d e s ire  to  be e le c te d ,  have 
been paying d i r e c t  n a t io n a l  ta x e s  to  an amount of n o t le s s  
than  f i f t e e n  y en , f o r  a p e r io d  o f n o t le s s  than  one y e a r , 
p rev io u s  to  th e  d a te  o f th e  making ou t o f the  e l e c to r a l  l i s t ,  
and th a t  a re  s t i l l  paying th a t  amount o f d i r e c t  n a t io n a l  
ta x e s .
As to  income ta x ,  however, i t  i s  re q u ire d  th a t  e l ig ib le  
perso n s s h a l l  have been paying i t  fo r  a p e r io d  o f n o t le s s  
than  th re e  y e a rs  p rev io u s  to  th e  d a te  o f th e  making ou t o f 
th e  e l e c to r a l  l i s t ,  and th a t  they  be s t i l l  paying i t .
A r t ic le  IX.
O f f ic ia l s  in  th e  Im p e ria l Household D epartm ent, O f f ic ia ls  
o f J u s t i c e ,  A u d ito rs , Revenue O f f ic ia l s  and P o lic e  O f f ic ia ls  
s h a l l  n o t be e l i g i b l e .
O f f ic ia ls  o th e r  th an  th o se  enum erated in  the  p reced ing  
c lau se  may. so long as t h e i r  o f f i c i a l  fu n c tio n s  a re  n o t 
th e reb y  in te r f e r e d  w ith , serve as Members, r e ta in in g  th e i r  
o f f i c i a l  p o s i t io n .
A r t ic le  X.
The O f f ic ia l s  o f a Fu, Ken or Gun s h a l l  n o t be e l i g ib l e  
w ith in  the  l im i t s  o f the  ju r i s d ic t io n  o f t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  
o f f i c e .
A r t ic le  X I.
The o f f ic e r s  o f  a S h i, Town or V il la g e , engaged in  the  
management o f an e l e c t io n ,  s h a l l  n o t be e l i g ib l e  w ith in  
t h e i r  re s p e c tiv e  e le c t io n  d i s t r i c t s .
A r t ic le  X II.
S h in to  p r i e s t s ,  and p r i e s t s  and te a c h e rs  o f r e l ig io n  
o f a l l  k in d s s h a l l  be i n e l i g i b l e .
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Article XIII.
When a member of a Fu or Ken Assembly has been 
elected Member of the House of Representatives, and has 
accepted the election, he shall resign his former seat.
Chapter IV.
Rules Applicable in Common to Electors And to 
Eligible Persons.
Article XIV.
Any person, falling within any of the following 
categories, shall be disqualified as electors or as eligible 
persons:-
1o Lunatics and idiots.
2. Undischarged bankrupts.
3* Persons who have been deprived of public rights 
or whose public rights are suspended.
4. Those who have been sentenced to confinement,
when full three years have not yet elapsed since 
the completion or pardon of their sentences.
5* Persons who have been sentenced by the old 
Criminal Law to penal servitude for not less 
than one year, or to imprisonment for a political 
offence for not less than one year, when full 
three years have not yet elapsed since the 
completion or pardon of their sentences.
6. Persons who have been punished for gambling, 
when full three years have not yet elapsed since 
the completion or pardon of their sentences.
7. Persons whose right to elect and to be elected 
is suspended on account of an offence connected 
with an election.
Article XV.
Men in the Army or in the Navy can not exercise the
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right to elect or to be elected, while they are in actual 
service. The same rule applies to those, who have 
temporarily retired from actual service, or who have been 
suspended therefrom.
Article XVI.
The t5shu (pater-familias) of families of nobility 
shall be incapable of electing or of being elected Members 
of the House of Representatives.
Article XVII.
Any person, against whom a criminal prosecution has been 
brought, and who is in detention or is under bail, shall be 
incapable of exercising the right to elect or to be elected, 
until the completion of the proceedings.
Chapter V.
Electoral List.
Article XVIII.
The Chairman of Election shall cause the Chocho (Head 
of Town) and the Sonchö (Head of Village) of an election 
district, to make a list of all the persons in the district 
having qualifications to elect, and make out two copies 
thereof by the 1st of April in each year: one of the copies
shall be forwarded to the Chairman of Election before the 
20th of the same month.
In this electoral list shall be entered the name, 
official rank, profession, class, residence and date of birth 
of each elector, and the total amount of direct national 
taxes paid by him, and the place in which such taxes are paid.
Article XIX.
In a Shi, the electoral list shall be made out in the 
following manner
1 • When the whole Shi or a Ku (Urban District) thereof
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constitutes an election district, the Chairman 
of Election shall compile the electoral list.
2. When several Ku of a Shi are united into one 
election district, the Kucho of each Ku shall 
compile the electoral list for his respective 
district, and forward it to the Chairman of 
Election.
3. When, in case Gun and Shi are united into one 
election district, the Guncho assumes the functions 
of Chairman of Election, the Shicho shall compile 
the electoral list and forward it to the Chairman 
of Election.
4. In the case mentioned in the last clause, when
the Shicho serves as Chairman of Election, he shall 
compile the electoral list of the Shi.
Article XX.
When an elector is paying direct national taxes without 
the limits of the election district in which he is residing, 
he shall obtain, to that effect, the certificate of the 
Chocho, Soncho, Shicho or Kucho, of the place in which he is 
paying such taxes, and forward it, before the date for the 
compilation of the electoral list, to the Chochö, Soncho, 
Shicho or Kucho, entrusted with the management of the voting.
Article XXI.
The Chairman of Election shall amalgamate into one, all 
the electoral lists forwarded by the respective Chochö» 
Soncho, Shicho or Kuchö, making one list for each election 
district. He shall keep it in the Gun, Shi or Ku Office, 
concerned in the management of the election, and send a 
duplicate of it to the Governor of the Fu or Ken.
Article XXII.
The Chairman of Election shall, during fifteen days 
commencing from the 5th of May in each year, exhibit for 
public inspection a copy of the electoral list of each 
election district in the Gun, Shi or Ku Office, concerned in
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the management of the election*
Article XXIII.
When any one possessing the qualifications to elect, 
discovers an omission or the wrong registration of a name in 
an electoral list, he may claim that correction be made, by 
giving to the Chairman of Election, during the period of 
public inspection, written notice and his reasons therefor, 
together with corroborative evidence.
After the expiration of the period for public inspection, 
no notice mentioned in the foregoing clause shall be 
entertained.
Article XXIV.
Upon the receipt of a notice about omission, the Chairman 
of Election shall examine the reasons alleged and the 
evidence adduced, and shall give his decision within twenty 
days from the receipt of such notice. When he decides the 
notice to be relevant, he shall immediately register the 
name omitted, and communicate the circumstances to the Chocho, 
Soncho, Shichö or Kucho of the place, in which the person 
in question is residing, at the same time publishing the fact 
in the election district.
Article XXV.
Upon the receipt of a notice of wrong registration, the 
Chairman of Election shall examine the reasons alleged and 
evidence adduced, and in case of necessity shall summon and 
examine the person, who has given the said notice, and the 
one, concerning whom the notice has been given. The matter 
shall be decided within twenty days from the receipt of the 
notice, and when it is decided to have been a wrong 
registration, it shall_be at once erased, and the circumstances 
communicated to the Chocho, Soncho, Shichö or Kucho of the 
place, in which the person in question is residing, at the 
same time publishing the fact in the election district.
Article XXVI.
When either the person, who has given the notice, or the
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person, about whom it has been given, is not satisfied with 
the decision of the Chairman of Election, he may, within 
seven days from the day, on which the said decision was 
given, institute against the Chairman of Election a suit in 
a Court of First Instance*
Article XXVII.
Upon the receipt of the suit mentioned in the proceeding 
Article, the Court shall promptly proceed to the trial of the 
case, irrespective of its calender.
Article XXVIII.
No appeal is allowed against the judgement of the Court 
of First Instance mentioned in the preceding Article, but 
it is permissible to bring an appeal to the Court of 
Cassation for revision.
Article XXIX.
The 15th of June shall be the date, on which the 
electoral list shall be finally settled, and it shall be 
maintained as it then may be, until the day of compilation 
the following year. When, however, any correction is to be 
made in pursuance of the judgement of a Court of Law, the 
Chairman of Election shall make the said correction within 
twenty-four hours from the receipt of such judgement, and 
shall j^omrnunicate the circumstance to the Choc ho, Soncho, 
Shicho or Kucho of the place, in which the person, who has 
given the notice, or the one about whom the notice has been 
given, is residing, at the same time publishing the facts 
within the election district.
Chapter VI.
Date of Election and Voting Place.
Article XXX.
Voting shall take place ordinarily on the 1 st day of 
July. In the case, however, of the dissolution of the House 
of Representatives, the date of an extraordinary election
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shall be fixed and proclaimed by Imperial Ordinance, at least 
thirty days beforehand.
Article XXXI.
The voting place shall be opened in the Town or Village 
Office or in some other place named by the Ghocho or the 
Soncho, and shall be put under the management of the Ghocho 
or Soncho.
Article XXXII.
When the number of electors in a Town or a Village is 
not numerous enough to require the opening of a voting place, 
several Towns or several Villages or both may be united for 
the purpose.
In this case, the Guncho shall, subject to the approval 
of the Governor of the Fu or Ken, determine the Towns or 
Villages to be thus united, the voting place, and the Ghocho 
or Soncho, under whose management the voting place is to be 
put.
Article XXXIII.
The Chocho or the Soncho shall nominate not less than 
two and not more than five witnesses from among the electors 
of the election district under his management, and the notice 
of the nomination shall be sent to the persons nominated at 
least three days previous to the day of election, requesting 
them to attend the voting place on that day.
The witnesses cannot decline their nomination without 
proper reasons.
Chapter VII.
Voting.
Article XXXIV.
The voting shall commence at 7 o !clock A.M. and be closed at 6 o*clock P.M.
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A r t i c l e  XXXV.
The b a l l o t  box s h a l l  have a  d o u b le  l i d ,  e ac h  f i t t e d  
w ith  a d i f f e r e n t  k e y . One o f  th e  two k ey s  s h a l l  be p u t  i n  
th e  c u s to d y  o f th e  Chocho o r  S oncho , and th e  o th e r  i n  t h a t  
o f  th e  w i tn e s s e s .
A r t i c l e  XXXVI.
B efo re  th e  commencement o f  th e  v o t in g ,  th e  Chocho o r  
th e  Soncho s h a l l ,  to g e th e r  w ith  th e  w i t n e s s e s ,  open th e  
b a l l o t  box i n  th e  p re s e n c e  o f  th e  e l e c t o r s  on th e  s p o t ,  and 
show them t h a t  i t  i s  em pty .
A r t i c l e  XXXVII.
On th e  day o f  e l e c t i o n ,  e l e c t o r s  s h a l l  come i n  p e rs o n  
t o  th e  v o t in g  p la c e  and v o te  a f t e r  i d e n t i f y i n g  th e m se lv e s  
w i th  t h e i r  names in  th e  e l e c t o r a l  l i s t .
A r t i c l e  XXXVIII.
The v o t in g  p a p e rs  s h a l l  be o f  a  u n ifo rm  s t y l e  i n  e ac h  
Fu and K en, and s h a l l  be g iv e n  to  e a c h  e l e c t o r  by th e  Chocho 
o r  th e  Soncho, a t  th e  v o t in g  p la c e  on th e  day  o f  e l e c t i o n .
E very v o te r  s h a l l ,  a t  th e  v o t in g  p l a c e ,  i n s c r i b e  upon 
th e  v o t in g  p a p e r  th e  name o f  th e  p e rs o n  he v o te s  f o r ,  th e n  
h i s  own name and r e s id e n c e ,  and s h a l l  p u t  h i s  stam p upon i t .
A r t i c l e  XXXIX.
When a v o te r  d e c la r e s  h im s e lf  in c a p a b le  o f  fo rm in g  th e  
c h a r a c t e r s  r e q u i r e d ,  th e  Chocho o r  th e  Soncho s h a l l  d i r e c t  
an  o f f i c e r  to  do so f o r  h im . The p a p e r  s h a l l  n e x t  be re a d  
to  th e  v o t e r ,  who s h a l l  p u t  h i s  stam p th e r e o n  and th e n  c a s t  
h i s  v o t e .  These d e t a i l s  s h a l l  be e n te r e d  i n  th e  m in u te s  o f  
th e  v o t in g .
A r t i c l e  XL.
In  an  e l e c t i o n  d i s t r i c t  w here two o r  more th a n  two
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Members are to be elected, the method of Mscrutin de liste” 
shall be employed•
Article XLI.
No person, other than those entered in the electoral 
list, shall be capable of voting. Should, however, any one 
come to the voting place on the day of election, bringing 
with him a judgement of a Court of Law entitling him to have 
his name entered in the electoral list, the Chocho or the 
Soncho shall give him a voting paper and allow him to vote.
The circumstances shall be entered in the minutes of the voting.
Article XLII.
When the time for closing the polling arrives, the 
ChochS or the Soncho shall declare the fact and shut the 
ballot box. After the shutting of the ballot box, no voting 
shall be allowed.
Article XLIII.
The Chocho or the Soncho shall keep minutes of the 
voting, in which are to be entered all matters relating to 
the voting, and to which he shall put his signature as shall 
also the witnesses theirs.
Article XLIV.
On the day following that of election the Chocho or 
Soncho shall send, in company with one or more witnesses, the 
ballot box and the minutes of the voting, to the Gun, Shi 
or Ku Office concerned in the management of the election.
Article XLV.
In the case of an island situated in an election 
district, whence there are circumstances to make it impossible 
to send the ballot box within the time mentioned in the 
preceding Article, the Governor of the Fu or Ken may fix a 
convenient date for voting, between the day of the 
settlement of the electoral list and the date of the election, 
and cause the ballot box to be sent by the date of the 
election.
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Chapter VIII.
Election Meeting.
Article XLVI.
The election meeting shall be held in the Gun, Shi or 
Ku Office,entrusted with the management of the election.
Article XLVII.
The Chairman of Election shall nominate by lot an 
Election Committee of not less than three and of not more 
than seven persons, from among the witnesses assembling 
from the different voting places.
Article XLVIII.
On the day following that of the transmission of the 
ballot boxes, the Chairman of Election shall open each ballot 
box in the presence of the Election Committee, and shall 
count the total number of ballots and that of the voters.
When there is any difference between the total number of 
ballots and that of the voters, the fact shall be entered 
in the minutes of the election.
Article XLIX.
When the counting has been finished, the Chairman of 
Election shall inspect the ballots in company with the 
Election Committee.
Article L.
The electors may request admission to the election 
meeting of their respective election districts.
Article LI.
The following ballots shall be void:-
1• Those of persons whose names are not recorded in 
the electoral list. It is, however, otherwise in
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the case of a person, who has voted in virtue of a 
judgement of a Court of Law, which he had brought 
with him.
2, Ballots, for which a regular voting paper has not 
been used.
3* Ballots, on which the voter*s name is not stated.
4. Those, on which the name of a person, who has no 
qualifications for election, is inscribed. But 
in the case of a "scrutin de liste”, such a 
ballot shall have effect with respect to such of 
the persons named therein as do possess those 
qualifications•
5. Those, on which either the name of the voter or 
that of the person voted for cannot be deciphered 
on account of erroneous characters used, stains, 
erasures or injuries. It is otherwise, when the 
ordinary kana characters are used, or when the 
name, though formed of wrong characters, may be 
clearly recognized.
6. Those, in which words other than those specified
in the second clause of Article XXXVIII are written. 
But it is not the same, when the official nnk, 
profession, class and residence of the person 
voted for, have been added, so that there might not 
be mistake of identification, or when titles of respect have been used.
Article LII.
When any doubt arises as to the validity of a ballot, 
the Chairman of Election shall decide, after having heard 
the opinion of the Election Committee. Against this decision 
no objection can be raised at the election meeting.
Article LIII.
Those ballots, that are void, shall be crossed across, 
and the circumstances shall be recorded in the minutes of 
election. Such ballots shall be preserved for a year, and 
at the expiration of that time, shall be destroyed by fire.
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Article LIV.
When a ballot contains more than the fixed number of 
names of persons to be voted for, the names in excess of the 
fixed number shall be struck off commencing with the last*
When a "scrutin de liste" contains less than the fixed 
number of names, only those actually put down upon it shall 
be counted. In case the name of one person is written 
twice, it shall be counted as one vote.
Article LV.
Ballots shall be preserved for sixty days in the Gun, 
Shi or Ku Office, but shall be destroyed by fire at the 
expiration of the said period.
Article LVI.
When, concerning an election suit, either a criminal 
accusation or indictment has been brought, the ballots shall 
be preserved until the settlement of the case, without any 
regard to the expiration of the periods mentioned in Article 
LIII and in Article LV.
Article LVII.
The Chairman of Election shall make minutes of the 
election, in which shall be recorded all matters relating to 
the inspection of the election, and shall preserve them, after 
putting his signature and obtaining those of the members of 
the Election Committee to them also.
Chapter IX.
Elected Persons.
Article LVIII.
The individual, who has obtained a relative majority of 
the total number of ballots, shall be declared the elected 
person.
When the number of ballots is equal, the individual,
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the senior in point of birth, shall be declared the elected 
person, and when the dates or birth are the same, it shall 
be decided by drawing lots.
Article LIX.
When the elected person or persons have been settled, 
the Chairman of Election shall at once communicate his or 
their names and the number of his or their ballots to the 
Governor of the Fu or Ken.
Article LX.
Upon the receipt of the communication mentioned in the 
preceding Article, the Governor of the Fu or Ken shall give 
notice to each of the elected persons, and shall notify 
their names throughout the district under his jurisdiction.
Article LXI.
Upon the receipt of notice of election, every elected 
person shall communicate to the Governor of the Fu or Ken, 
as to whether he accepts it or not.
Article LXII.
Any individual, who has been declared elected in 
several election districts, shall, upon the receipt of the 
notice of election, communicate to the Governor of the Fu 
or Ken which election he accepts.
Article LXIII.
Those elected persons shall be considered to have 
declined their election, who, being then within the 
respective Fu or Ken, have not made the communication of 
acceptance within ten days, or who, being then out of the 
respective Fu or Ken, have not made such communication 
within twenty days.
Article LXIV.
When an elected person either declines the election or
Appendix VI 16
does not send in the communication of acceptance of election 
within the fixed period, the Governor of the Fu or Ken shall 
fix the date of election, and cause the respective Chairman 
of Election to hold a new election. But in the case 
mentioned in the second clause of Article LVIII, should any 
individual, who has been declared an elected person by the 
drawing of lots, either decline or fail to send in the 
communication of acceptance, the other person, who has lost 
the election by the said drawing of lots, shall be declared 
the elected person.
Article LXV.
When it has been settled who are the elected persons 
in every election district, the Governor of the Fu or Ken 
shall give them certificates of election, and notify their 
names throughout the extent of his jurisdiction. He shall 
then report thereon to the Minister of State for Home Affairs 
with the statements of the qualifications of the elected 
persons•
Chapter X.
Term of Membership and Substitutional Elections.
Article LXVI.
The term of membership shall be four years. After the 
expiration of their term, Members may again accept election.
Article LXVII.
When, upon the occurrence of a vacancy among Members, 
the Minister of State for Home Affairs orders the Governor 
of the respective Fu or Ken to hold a substitutional 
election, the latter shall cause an extraordinary election 
to be held in the respective election district for the 
election of a substitutional Member, within twenty days from 
the day, on which he received the order of the said Minister 
of State.
Article LXVIII.
The term of substitutional membership shall correspond 
to that of the predecessor.
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Chapter XI.
Regulation of Voting Places.
Article LXIX.
The Chocho or Sonchö charged with the management of 
voting shall maintain order at the voting place, and, in a 
case of necessity, may deliver an offender to the police 
authorities to be dealt with by them.
Article LXX.
No person carrying weapons or arms is permitted to 
enter a voting place.
Article LXXI.
No person, who is not an elector, is permitted to enter 
a voting place.
Article LXXII.
At a voting place it is forbidden to make speeches, 
to engage in discussions, to cause an uproar, or to use 
persuasion for the votes of other people.
Article LXXIII.
When^any person disturbs the order of a voting place, 
the Chocho or Soncho shall give him warning, and, when the 
warning is disregarded, shall cause him to leave the voting 
place.
Article LXXIV.
A person, who has been compelled to leave a voting 
place, may, unless he has become an offender against law, 
again be called therein for the purpose of voting.
Article LXXV.
When any of the electors assembled at a voting place
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transgresses either the provisions of the Criminal Law or 
the punitive rules of the present Law, he shall be forbidden 
to vote, and his name and the circumstances shall be 
recorded in the minutes of the election.
Article LXXVI.
As to the decision of the Chocho or Soncho on a 
dispute relating to an election, no objection against it 
can be raised at the voting place.
Article LXXVII.
Any person, who requests admission to an election 
meeting held at the Gun, Shi or Ku Office charged with 
management of election, shall be treated by the Chairman of 
Election according to the provisions set forth in the five 
Articles from Article LXIX to Article LXXIII.
Chapter XII.
Law Suits About Election.
Article LXXVIII.
When a person, who has lost an election, considers 
that there is sufficient reason to make void the election of 
the elected person in the respective election district, he 
may institute a suit in a Court of Appeal against the 
elected person, within thirty days from the day of the 
notification of the name of the elected person as mentioned 
in Article LXV.
No suit brought after the expiration of the above 
mentioned period shall be entertained.
Article LXXIX.
The plaintiff shall, simultaneously with the filing of 
his petition, deposit as security in the Clerk*s Bureau 
of the Court of Appeal three hundred yen in cash or Public 
Bonds of equal value.
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Article LXXX.
In case the judgement has been given against the 
plaintiff, should he fail to pay the whole amount of the 
legal costs within seven days from the day on which the 
judgement was delivered, the security money shall be 
appropriated for the purpose, and should there still remain 
any deficiency, the required amount shall be charged to 
the plaintiff.
Article LXXXI.
In case two or more than two plaintiffs have brought 
a suit against one and the same elected person, the Court of 
Appeal may deliver judgement to all the plaintiffs by one 
and the same document.
Article LXXXII.
Should the House of Representatives be ordered to 
dissolve while the trial is going on, the Court of Appeal 
shall dismiss the suit.
Article LXXXIII.
When the plaintiff withdraws his suit, he shall give 
public notice of the fact through the medium of a newspaper 
or by some other method.
Article LXXXIV.
In trying a suit about an election, a Court of Appeal 
may directly deliver judgement on those offenders against 
the Criminal Law or the present Law, who are connected with 
the suit at issue. In this case, however, the Public 
Prosecutors must be present.
In case he is not connected with a suit about an 
election, an offender against the present Law shall be tried 
in the Criminal Court having jurisdiction over him.
Article LXXXV.
When a suit about an election is decided in a Court of
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Appeal, a copy of the judgement shall be sent to the 
Minister of State for Home Affairs; and on the opening of 
the House of Representatives, another copy shall be sent 
to the President thereof.
Article LXXXVI.
Against the judgement of a Court of Appeal on a suit 
about an election, an appeal may be made for revision to 
the Court of Cassation.
Article LXXXVII.
An elected person, who is the object of a suit, shall 
not lose the right of a seat in the House of Representatives, 
pending the final decision of the Court of Law.
Article LXXXVIII.
In connection with a suit about an election, in all 
matters not provided for in the present Chapter, the process 
of ordinary legal proceedings shall be followed..
Chapter XIII.
Punitive Rules.
Article LXXXIX.
Any person, who has effected the insertion of his name 
in the electoral list by fraudulently falsifying the amount 
of his tax paid, his age, residence, or any other facts 
necessary for the qualifications of an elector, shall be 
liable to a fine of not less than four yen and of not more 
than forty yen.
Article XC.
Any person, who either directly or indirectly has 
given or has promised to give an elector money, goods, notes, 
or public or private employment, with the object of 
obtaining a vote for himself, of enabling another person to 
obtain the same, or of preventing the elector from voting
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for another person, shall be liable to a fine of not less 
than five yen and of not more than fifty yen«
The same rule applies to the person who has received 
such gift or promise.
Article XGI.
Any person who has either obtained a vote for himself, 
or has enabled another person to obtain the same, or has 
prevented an elector from voting for another person, by 
either directly or indirectly giving or promising to give 
the elector money, goods, notes, or public or private 
employment, shall be dealt with, according to the provision 
of Art.23*+ of the Criminal Law.
Any person, who has voted or who has refrained from 
voting in consideration of such gift or promise, shall be 
dealt with in a like manner.
Article XCII.
Any person, who has done violence to an elector, with 
the object of obtaining a vote for himself, of enabling 
another person to obtain the same, or of preventing an 
elector from voting for another person, shall be sentenced 
to a minor confinement without hard labour of not less 
than one month and of not more than six months, with a fine 
of not less than five yen and of not more than fifty yen.
Article XCIII.
Any person, who, by doing violence to an elector, has 
obtained a vote for himself, or enabled another person to 
obtain the same, or has prevented the elector from voting 
for another person, shall be liable to be sentenced to a 
minor confinement without hard labour of not less than 
three months and of not more than two years, with a fine of 
not less than ten yen and of not more than a hundred yen.
Article XGIV.
Whoever assembles a crowd of people, for the purpose of
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either intimidating electors, of causing disturbance at a 
voting place or at an election meeting, or of detaining, 
damaging, or plundering a ballot box, shall be liable to be 
sentenced to a minor confinement without hard labour of not 
less than six months and of not more than two years, with a 
fine of not less than ten yen and of not more than a hundred 
yen.
Whoever knowingly joins such a crowd and adds to its 
influence, shall be liable to a minor confinement without 
hard labour of not less than fifteen days and of not more 
than two months, with a fine of not less than three yen and 
of not more than thirty yen.
Should the offender be carrying weapons or arms, one 
degree shall be added to the principal punishment.
Article XCV.
Whoever at the time of election, by force, or by doing 
violence to the election officers or witnesses, either 
disturbs a voting place or a place of election meeting, or 
detains, damages, or plunders a ballot box, shall be liable 
to a minor confinement without hard labour of not less 
than four months and of not more than four years, with a 
fine of not less than twenty yen and of not more than two 
hundred yen.
Should the offender be carrying weapons or arms, one 
degree shall be added to the principal punishment.
Article XCVI.
Whoever commits either one of the offences mentioned 
in the preceding Article, by assembling a crowd of people, 
shall be liable to a major imprisonment without hard labour.
Whoever knowingly joins such a crowd and adds to its 
influence, shall be liable to a minor confinement without 
hard labour of not less than two years and of not more 
than five years.
Should the offender be carrying weapons or arms, one 
degree shall be added to the principal punishment.
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Article XCVII.
Whoever instigates a person or persons, by means of 
speeches, newspapers or writings of any kind, to commit any 
of the offences mentioned in the preceding three Articles, 
shall be liable to be dealt with, according to the 
provision of Art.105 of the Criminal Law. In case the 
instigation has not produced any effect, the principal 
punishment shall be commuted by two or three degrees.
Article XCVIII.
Whoever enters a voting place or a place of election 
meeting, carrying weapons or arms, shall be punished with a 
fine of not less than three yen and of not more than thirtyZeno
Article XCIX.
Should an elected person have been sentenced to any 
of the punishments mentioned in the ten Articles from 
Article LXXXIX to Article XCVIII, the election shall be 
void.
Article C.
Any person who has voted by fraudulently assuming 
another person's name, or has voted in spite of his 
disqualifications according to Article XIV, shall be 
punished with a fine of not less than four yen and of not 
more than forty yen.
Article Cl.
Whoever has, for the commission of any of the offences 
mentioned in the foregoing Articles, been sentenced to a 
punishment severer than confinement, or has been twice 
sentenced to fines, shall be suspended from the exercise of 
the right to elect and to be elected for a period of time 
not less than three years and of not more than seven years.
Article CII.
Should a witness fail to discharge any of the duties
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mentioned in the provisions of the present Law? without any 
justifiable reason, shall be punished with a fine of not less 
than four yen and of not more than forty yen.
Article CIII.
As to offences, other than those for which provisions 
are made in the present Chapter, they shall be dealt with 
in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Law, when 
such provisions are expressed therein, and the severer 
punishment shall be applied.
Article CIV.
In all offences relating to elections, six months shall 
be considered as the term of prescription of penalties.
Article CV.
The present punitive rules, as well as the Articles of 
Chapter XI, shall be pasted up at every voting place and 
every place of election meeting.
Chapter XIV.
Supplementary Rules.
Article CVI.
In every Shi, there shall be established one voting 
place, and the management of all votings and elections as 
specified in the present Law shall be taken charge of by 
the Shicho.
In the case mentioned in Article IV, one voting place 
shall be established in each election district, and the 
management of all votings and elections as specified in the 
present Law shall be taken charge of by the Kucho.
Article CVII.
In the case mentioned in the preceding Article, the
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Shichö or the Kuchö shall nominate not less than three and 
not more than seven witnesses from among the electors in 
the election district under his management, and shall give 
notice of nomination to them, at least three days previous 
to the date of election, at the same time requesting them 
to be present on the day of election at the Shi or Ku Office 
concerned in the management of the election.
The witnesses shall be present at the voting, and shall 
also inspect the ballots.
In this case, matters relating to voting shall also be 
recorded in the minutes of election.
Article CVIII.
In localities where the Toshi (Governor of Island) is 
appointed, the functions of Chairman of Election mentioned 
in the present Law shall be discharged by the Toshi.
Article CIX.
In Towns and Villages where the Law for the Organization 
of Towns and Villages is not in force, the functions of the 
Chocho or Sonchö mentioned in the present Law shall be 
taken charge of by the Kocho (Headman).
Article CX.
In the first year of the compilation of the electoral 
list, those persons who have continuously been paying in 
full amount, since the coming into force of the Law of 
Income Tax, an amount of income tax equal to that specified 
in Article VI and Article VIII, shall be considered to 
have fulfilled the condition as to the period of tax payment 
required in tax qualification.
Article CXI.
In the Hokkaido, in the Okinawa Ken, and in the Ogasa- 
warajima, the present Law shall not be carried out, pending 
the carrying out therein of general laws for the organization 
of local governments.
(Official translation.)
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SUPPLEMENTARY PENAL REGULATIONS FOR THE IAW OF ELECTION
of the
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
29.5.1890
COUNT YAMAGATA ARITOMO PRIME MINISTER.
COUNT SAIGÖ TSUGUMICHI MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS.
COUNT YAMADA AKIYOSHI MINISTER OF JUSTICE.
1 • Persons who provide electors with food or drink while they 
are on their way to or in the neighbourhood of election 
meeting places or polling stations, and also those who 
supply any type of transport by kuruma or horse to or 
from election meeting places or polling stations with the 
object of obtaining votes, or obtaining votes for other 
people, or of preventing votes being cast for other 
people, and also those who accept such provisions or 
supplies, and also those who act as agents for or promise 
to act as agents for electors with regard to the cost of 
rest, lodging, or food, or travelling expenses, or 
transport by kuruma or horses to or from the election 
meeting places or polling stations, and also those who 
accept such representation or promise shall be dealt 
with in accordance with the precedent afforded by Article 
90 of the House of Representatives Election Law.
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2, Persons who obstruct the exercise of the right to vote by 
intimidating or abducting electors, or by hindering their 
movements, or by using deceit with the objects 
described in section one shall be dealt with in accordance 
with the precedent afforded by Article 92 of the House 
of Representatives Election Law.
Those persons who behave in the way described in this 
section and /als£7 do what is described in section one 
shall be dealt with in accordance with the precedent 
afforded by Article 95 of the House of Representatives 
Election Law.
3o Persons who spread false reports to the effect that 
/certain people7 are eligible for election or are not 
eligible for election or are unwilling to agree to 
be elected shall be fined not less than five yen and 
not more than fifty yen.
b0 Persons who assemble in large numbers or go about in
bands, or light bonfires or pine torches, or make a noise 
with bells, drums, conch shells, or horns, or make use of 
flags or other emblems in the Districts or cities where 
there are election meetings or polling stations in order 
to stimulate election fever, and do not obey police orders 
to desist shall be sentenced to not less than fifteen days*
Appendix VII 3
and not more than three months* imprisonment with light 
labour and shall be fined not less than five yen and not 
more than fifty yen.
5o Persons who display public posters for the purposes
described in section one shall be fined not less than two 
yen and not more than twenty yen.
6. If persons elected are sentenced under sections one to 
four inclusive, it shall be subject to the precedent 
afforded by Article 99 of the House of Representatives 
election Law.
7« Offences under this law are subject to the precedent 
afforded by Article 1o4 of the House of Representatives 
Election Law.
(KampS, No.2,073* 30.5.1890)
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Jivu-to Manifesto. 21-23 February 1890.
PRINCIPLES.
Our Party is based on Liberalism.
MAIN OBJECTIVES.
Our Party will seek only to enhance the perpetual 
union of Emperor and people by extending liberty, by 
protecting rights, by esteeming virtue, and by 
fostering the common weal.
PARTY PLATFORM.
1. We shall bring in party Cabinets.
2o If the officials of the Court of Administrative 
Litigation, either deliberately or else by 
accident, harm the rights of the people, we shall 
see to it that they are indemnified.
3. We shall make equal treaties with foreign countries.
4. We shall introduce the jury system.
5* We shall improve the education system and encourage 
the spread of learning.
6. We shall improve the military system and shorten 
the period of reserve service.
7. We shall abolish the system for retiring public 
officials.
8. We shall cut the costs of administration and 
reduce the number of officials.
9. In general, when fixing the rates for taxes, we 
shall pay attention to profits.
10. We shall reduce the land-tax.
11. We shall increase the number of income-tax grades
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12. We shall overhaul the arrangements for the upkeep 
of Government property, and shall pay great 
attention to the management of this.
13« We shall abolish the tax qualification for election 
candidates.
1V. We shall give the vote to those who pay ¥5 or 
more in direct national taxes.
1J. We shall make the age qualification for election 
candidates 25 years, and that for electors 20 
years.
16. We shall make the election constituencies bigger.
17* We shall do away with special protection for home 
industries.
18. We shall strengthen the organs of local self- 
government, and we shall reform the prefectural system.
19« We shall reform the Registration Law.
20. We shall use the property belonging to the
Government as the basis for local self-government.
21 . We shall enlarge the freedoms of publication and 
assembly.
22. We shall abolish the Peace Preservation Ordinance.
23. We shall reform the time limit for paying taxes 
on fields.
(Hayashida, Nihon Seito Shi, vol.1, p,264)
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Daidö Club Manifesto, 4 May 1890»
PARTY PLATFORM«
1. We shall uphold independent sovereignty.
(i) We pledge ourselves to consult the Imperial 
Diet in advance on matters of diplomacy
or treaty making that affect the 
liabilities of the nation.
(ii) It is necessary to carry out treaty revision 
by signing completely equal treaties.
(iii) We pledge ourselves to improve the 
organization of the Army and Navy, and to 
enlarge them gradually as the nation grows 
stronger.
(iv) We pledge ourselves to curtail the period 
of military conscription, and to increase 
the number of soldiers available in times 
of war.
2. We shall introduce responsible Cabinets.
(i) We pledge ourselves to make the Ministers 
of State fully responsible to the Imperial 
Diet as well as to His Majesty the Emperor.
(ii) We pledge ourselves to make clear the 
distinction between policy-making officials 
and executive officials, and not to cause 
them needlessly to rotate at every change 
of Cabinet.
(iii) We pledge ourselves to use the Privy Council 
purely as an advisory body.
(iv) We pledge ourselves to establish the system 
of administrative litigation on a perfect 
and enduring basis.
(v) It is necessary to amend the regulations 
governing appointments to the Civil Service,
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and to devise ways of appointing men of 
talent.
3. We intend to put the financial administration in
order, and to foster the strength of the people.
(i) We pledge ourselves to simplify the 
structure of government by reforming the 
Civil Service, by re-arranging the 
government departments, and by reducing the 
number of public officials*
(ii) We pledge ourselves to make differences of 
salary correspond to the type of work done, 
to enact a definitive Civil Service 
Pensions Scheme, and to abolish the 
existing retirement regulations.
(iii) We pledge ourselves to present a statement 
of the previous year*s accounts to the 
Diet at the same time as we shall submit 
the annual Budget estimates.
(iv) We pledge ourselves to maintain the 
independence of the Board of Audit.
(v) We pledge ourselves to rescind as far as 
possible policies that obstruct the 
enterprise of the people.
(vi) We pledge ourselves to reform the tax laws, 
and to simplify their procedure.
V. We shall make perfect the system of local 
se If -gove rnraen t.
(i) We pledge ourselves to reduce to the 
minimum the interference of the central 
Government with the local officials and 
assemblies.
(ii) We pledge ourselves to entrust, as far as 
possible, the management of police affairs, 
public works, hygiene, education, and other 
matters to the organs of local
SeIf-government.
Appendix IX Page 3
Daido Club Manifesto % 4 May 1890*
(iii) We pledge ourselves to make local custom 
the foundation of the Municipal and the 
Town and Village Codes,
5* We shall make complete the freedoms of speech, 
assembly, and association.
(i) We pledge ourselves to reform the Speech,
Assembly, and Publications Regulations, and 
to abolish the Peace Preservation Ordinance.
Addenda•
(i) We pledge ourselves to have election 
constituencies consisting of one fu or 
one ken.
(ii) We pledge ourselves to lower the tax 
qualifications for candidates and voters.
(iii) We pledge ourselves to make the age 
qualification for candidates 25 years, and 
to let the tax qualification for them be 
valid irrespective of locality.
(iv) We pledge ourselves to alter the date of 
election.
(v) We pledge ourselves to allow Hokkaido. 
Okinawa ken, and other places to elect 
Representatives in proportion to their 
population.
(vi) We pledge ourselves to refrain from
allowing the Courts and police to make 
discriminations in their handling of affairs 
on the basis of social position, Court rank, 
or official rank.
(vii) We pledge ourselves to reform the 
Registration Law.
(Hayashida, Nihon Seito Shi, vol,1, p.267)
Appendix X
Aikoku-koto Manifestot 5 May 1890»
On this 5th day of May 1890, having met in Tokyo and 
formally established the Aikoku-koto, we make the following 
declaration:-
Our party made its first appearance in 1873. At that 
time, we solemnly swore that we would protect the rights 
which Heaven has given to all men, and would make the nation 
free and absolutely independent. Our party was the first to 
speak the name of Liberty to the Empire, and the idea of 
making this a principle of national policy was born in those 
days. Even though many changes have taken place since then 
and circumstances are different, we have always remained 
true to our belief in Liberty. So we have now given this 
party the old name. Its principles continue to be the same.
Liberalism is a fundamental principle of government.
There is nothing under Heaven that does not have a 
fundamental principle. How can it be that government alone 
lacks a fundamental principle? We desire to inaugurate the best possible type of rule by seeking for fundamental 
principles and making clear our primary allegiances.
Government must be suited to the times, and it is not 
possible to put all one*s fundamental principles into 
operation at once. Nevertheless, we consider that a political 
party which, neglecting fundamental principles and subverting 
its primary allegiances, wants only to govern in accordance 
with the exigencies of the existing situation, will usually 
be mistaken in its policies. This is why a political party has need of principles.
A country is made up of its people. As each is dear to 
himself, it must be that everyone loves our country; and to 
love that is to have a wide and generous love of humanity. 
Ah, if all the gentlemen in our party understand that to 
sacrifice themselves eagerly for their country, with the 
principles of Liberalism on their lips, is more important 
than any one individual in the country, then, by extending 
self-love to the entire country, we shall secure the 
happiness of the people as a whole. This is what Liberalism 
really is.
Liberty is bestowed upon us all by Heaven. Our party
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will never suppress this truth, and will never follow the 
precedent of governing by half-measures. The security of 
the state really lies in making the people free. To pretend 
that Liberty is dangerous and to deprive the people of their 
rights is to transgress the universal law of Heaven. Our 
party's assiduous demand for party Cabinets means that we 
wish to invest the Prime Minister with the responsibility 
for the general policies of state, and that we wish to raise 
the Imperial Household to th
upon the monarch. Looking carefully at the state of affairs 
in the outside world, what really happens to monarchs who 
have both absolutist parties and Liberal parties?
Liberalism is the true support of reigning dynasties. Not 
only will it enhance the dignity of the Imperial Household 
above, and improve the welfare of the people below; but also, 
look where you will, you shall not find outside the Liberal 
principles of our party the means of protecting the 
independence of our country and of securing the public peace.
Our party, on this the occasion of its founding, is 
anxious to attain to these objectives by relying on these its 
principles. Generally speaking, what a political party 
needs to do is:- firstly, to establish fixed principles; 
secondly, to work for the general welfare of the country; 
and thirdly, to accept the restraints of public opinion.
If it fails in any of these respects, it is therefore 
crippled as a political party. A political party takes its 
stand on the principles of Liberalism and wishes to join 
forces with others and so grow into a very large organization* 
The reason why England has so much success with party 
Cabinets is that her parties are very large. The reason why 
Germany still does not have party Cabinets is her great 
number of small parties. If a Cabinet does not have the 
support of a large party behind it, it cannot take up a firm 
position and it cannot carry out its own policies.
As our party is one of established principle, it has to 
have fixed policies based on those principles. Nevertheless, 
the actual execution of these policies will be based upon 
consideration of the circumstances, and our plan provides for 
this throughout. Moreover, we have no wish to settle with 
a stroke of the pen weighty matters, the consequences of 
which will affect the state for a hundred years. Nor do we 
wish to issue documents of no real worth. However, looking
as a result of not allowing
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back over a good many years of experience both in speech 
and in action, we have found it possible to summarize the 
fruits of this experience in the form of a public statement 
consisting of a number of separate clauses and articles. 
This is:-
1 o We shall reduce Government intervention to the 
minimum.
The business of Government is to further the 
people’s rights and to compel them to discharge 
their obligations. Moreover, for the good of 
the general public, the Government must also 
play some part in the management of education, 
communications, agriculture, trade and so on. 
Nevertheless, desiring as we do to govern in 
accordance with the principles of Liberalism, 
our party will reduce intervention to the 
minimum•
2. In internal affairs, we shall avoid the
centralization of power and shall emphasize the 
separate rights of the provinces.
The institutions of the various countries differ 
in accordance with their general conditions.
In the feudal era, our country went too far in 
the direction of regional particularism and had 
an administration which was seriously weakened 
by decentralization. The system of every little 
corner of territory maintaining its own 
independence was abolished at the time of the 
Imperial restoration; but there was an 
unexpected tendency for the central Government 
to enlarge its powers and the provinces 
gradually grew weaker. Our party is determined 
to introduce a fair system of local self- 
government, and to bring about a proper and 
reasonable division of power.
3o In external affairs, we shall maintain relations of 
equality with every country.
Diplomacy should concern itself with nothing else 
but the freedom and independence of our country.
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Our party will never take it upon itself to 
flatter the powerful nations while despising the 
weak, to be of service to the great while 
oppressing the small, to incur the dislike of 
one country in the hope of currying favour with 
another, to break faith, to show partiality, and 
to indulge in actions that do not of themselves 
provide their own clear justification. In such 
matters as those of the treaties and trade, so 
long as the other parties involved fully and 
fairly discharge their obligations towards us, we 
for our part will acknowledge their rights. In 
this way, we shall mutually protect each other*s 
equal rights. This, indeed, is a basic objective 
of our party.
b 0 In military preparations, we shall lay stress on 
defence.
Since our main purpose in undertaking military 
preparations will be the defence of our 
independence against foreign Powers, we must make 
sure that we shall meet this commitment in full. 
Yet our party has no intention of defraying 
enormous sums regardless of the resources of the 
state, or of adopting a policy of aggression to 
the detriment of the state. If our country is 
put to shame and there is no help for it, we shall 
have to try and avenge this so far as our 
military strength will allow. But our basic 
objective shall be the legitimate defence of our 
national rights.
5« In financial administration, we shall make
retrenchment our objective and shall make expenditure 
correspond to the resources of the people.
Administration of the finances is the thing which 
most closely touches the life and welfare of the 
people, or so we think, and it is necessary when 
managing this to reform all sorts of tax laws, to 
make the people*s burden as light as possible, and 
to treat all tax-payers with strict impartiality. 
Moreover, though we shall, of course, meet all 
essential expenditures of the state, our party will
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n o t n e e d le s s ly  expand th e  s t r u c tu r e  of 
government w ith o u t reg a rd  fo r  the  re so u rce s  o f 
the  p e o p le . Our p a r ty  in te n d s  to  make la rg e  
re d u c tio n s  in  e x p e n d itu re , and to  n o u rish  the  
s t r e n g th  of th e  n a t io n .
Our p a r ty  i s  anxious to  l e g i s l a t e  on th e  b a s is  o f th e  
above p r in c ip le s  and to  b r in g  abou t a reform  of governm ent.
The refo rm s fo r  which our p a r ty  w i l l  su re ly  s t r iv e  a re  so 
numerous th a t  i t  i s  s c a rc e ly  p o s s ib le  to  l i s t  them a l l  a t  
th i s  s ta g e .  But th e  o f f i c i a l s  and people o f our coun try  
a re  s t i l l  unaccustom ed to  p a rlia m en ta ry  governm ent; and 
b e s id e s  t h i s ,  the  people have n o t y e t  com pleted th e i r  
e x p lo ra tio n  o f th e  a c tu a l  w orkings o f governm ent. In  d ea lin g  
w ith  m a tte rs  o f  v i t a l  im portance to  th e  s t a t e ,  th e n , the  
utm ost ca re  and accu racy  i s  re q u ire d  bo th  in  fram ing a s in g le  
p a r lia m e n ta ry  b i l l  and in  su b je c tin g  i t  to  s e v e ra l months o f 
p a in s ta k in g  ex am in a tio n . I f  we t r y  to  reform  ev e ry th in g  a t  
once, th e re  i s  a danger th a t  our la b o u rs  w i l l  m isc a rry . Even 
though we hope to  c a rry  ou t a l l  s o r ts  of re fo rm s, i t  i s  n o t 
p o s s ib le  to  ru sh  our in v e s t ig a t io n s .  C onsequently , i f  we a re  
to  make thorough in v e s t ig a t io n s ,  a long tim e w i l l  have 
e lap se d  b efo re  they  a re  com pleted and we can ta b le  
l e g i s l a t i o n .  Only in  the  case  o f  the  most u rg en t m a tte rs  
s h a l l  we ta b le  b i l l s ;  and what i s  m ore, as soon as the  
e le c t io n s  to  the  D ie t a re  o v e r, we s h a l l  announce the  r e s u l t s  
o f our in v e s t ig a t io n s ,  and s h a l l  subm it them fo r  c o n s id e ra tio n  
and d e b a te . Though th e re  w i l l  d o u b tle ss  be a d d i t io n s  or 
e l im in a tio n s  made to  /£ h i s  l i s t 7 ,  the  item s fo r  d is c u s s io n  
th a t  our p a r ty  w ishes to  have adopted  f i r s t  a r e ,  in  g e n e ra l , 
as fo llo w s
1• R eduction in  the  la n d - ta x .
2 . R eduction in  government e x p e n d itu re .
3* Reform o f th e  ta x  law s.
4 . Amendment o f the  Newspaper, Assembly, and 
P u b lic a tio n s  R e g u la tio n s .
5. A b o litio n  o f th e  Peace P re se rv a tio n  
O rd inance•
6 . Improvement o f the  p o lic e  system .
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7. Improvement of the prison system.
8. Discontinuation of special protection for 
private industry.
In the above legislative programme, the reform of the 
tax laws and related matters are the most urgent pieces of 
business. Speaking of the existing system, though it is not 
hard to see what is wrong with it, as we still have not 
completed all our investigations, we shall decide about this 
at a later date. The prison regulations are drawn up in the 
form of an Imperial ordinance; but we shall try to make them 
matters of law and so be in a position of being able to 
amend them. The three sets of Regulations /i.e., Newspaper, 
Assembly, and Publications? are the things we consider to be 
the most inconvenient when it comes to putting representative 
institutions into practice and elevating public opinion. 
Again, the excessive secrecy of the police system has its 
abuses, and we shall reform it. By making easiness and 
simplicity our standards, it should be possible to reduce 
administrative costs.
Furthermore, reduction of the land-tax is an objective 
long entertained by our party, and is nothing more than what 
was discussed by its members in every region, when the 
Petition On Three Serious Matters was published some time ago. 
Although we do not claim that there are no other taxes which 
can be reduced, the land-tax amounts to almost one half of 
the total revenues of the Government. The land-tax for the most part is a tax on agriculture, and the taxes on 
agriculture are disproportionately heavy when compared with 
those levied on other activities. As for the great dependence 
on agricultural taxes, in feudal days, it was easy to use 
them as the basis of finance and so this sort of unfairness 
came to be perpetrated. Now, it is not the same as it was in 
days gone by; similarly, it is impossible to hold that tax 
laws which place unequal burdens on the citizens of a 
constitutional state are just. Though a cut in the land-tax 
will reduce the amount of money coming into the national 
treasury, one way of making up for this is to curtail 
administrative expenditures. As for curtailing administrative 
expenditures, we shall secure a severe retrenchment either 
by reducing the number of officials or else by re-organizing 
the government departments.
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Moreover, there are other ways of making up for the 
deficit. Things like giving special protection to private 
trade and industry account for a great deal of the public 
expenditures; moreover, they are wrong in principle. In the 
case of such things as sea traffic or railways which concern 
the public interest, the grant of subsidies by the Government 
is wholly for the public good. The giving of special 
subsidies to private trade and industry is nothing more nor 
less than a misuse of public funds. As a result of this, 
industry is turned into the exclusive monopoly of a few, 
with whom it is impossible for the majority of industrialists 
to compete. Thus, the development of independent businesses 
is gravely hampered.
The thingswhich our party, basing itself on the doctrines 
of Liberalism, would seek to reform when in power are by 
no means limited to these. The above are really the most 
urgent of urgent matters. We have decided to table bills 
on them in this year’s House, and hope that they will win a 
wide measure of support.
Nevertheless, when one looks carefully at these /Ttems7, 
/one can see thai/ our party, with a truly heroic restraint 
and after checking the aspirations of many years, has taken 
up only these urgent problems. Though we wish for reforms 
in these matters, we fully realize how very difficult it will 
be. Why? It is a question of interpreting the constitution. 
Now, in all constitutional countries, parliament has the 
right to discuss financial policies. If a parliament does 
not have this right, it is without any real authority.
Moreover, the right of discussing financial policies belongs 
first and foremost to the popular Chamber. Accordingly, by 
the terms of our country’s constitution, the budget has to 
be introduced first into the lower House. Further, it is 
laid down that the revenues and expenditures of the state 
must receive every year the approval of the Imperial Diet in 
the form of a budget. Our party, as a matter of constitutional 
government and as a matter of interpretation of the 
constitution, believes that the House of Representatives 
possesses the right to discuss financial policies. However, 
if some explanations of the words ’previously fixed 
expenditures1 etc. are to prevail, the Diet will scarcely 
have any right to deliberate on financial policies.
On the eve of standing for the Diet, we desire to affirm
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that we shall strive to attain to these objectives by fair 
and lawful means. The principles, objectives, and programme 
of our party are of this nature. Our party will defend 
itself by means of these. It shall move forward by means 
of these. Expecting those hardships, it hopes to carry out 
these things. Our party has firm faith in itself. The day 
when we achieve these objectives shall be the day when the 
people are truly secured in their Heaven-given universal 
rights, and the day when they will be made free and 
completely independent. We assert the rights of the people 
and their Representatives; we stand for party Cabinets.
To use the common phrase - we shall enhance the glory of the 
Imperial Household on high, and shall foster the prosperity 
of the nation below. We shall uphold the majesty of our 
Sovereign, and we shall establish the happiness of our 
country. If we succeed in putting into general effect the 
Liberal principles of our party, we shall for the first time 
stand inviolable on the same lofty peaks as the Western 
countries and shall be on terms of complete equality with 
them.
The great spirit of Liberty is a harmonious and 
auspicious one. Blowing like the soft winds of a vernal day 
it shall make the officials and people as one, and. changing 
the absolutism of former times into a new rule of the 
constitution, it shall build a great and independent nation 
in the Orient. Ah, our land of the dragon-fly is an orphan 
isle! If we are ardent in our devotion to true Liberty, 
shall we not make our country’s glory shine through the five 
continents?
Our party is steadfastly resolved on this, and will not 
fail to observe this declaration.
(Hayashida, Nihon Seitö Shi, vol.1, p.270)
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Kokumin Jiyü~to Manifesto, November 1890»
Hov/ can we preserve the independence of Japan and 
extend her influence, in this present age of intense rivalry 
among the different Powers? Of all political questions, 
there is none more important than this. Needless to say, 
we stand for progress. Needless to say, we esteem liberty. 
Yet, we believe in true progress and true liberty.
When establishing a nation in this world, one must 
foster its own special qualities abroad and perfect its 
unity at home. Progress which preserves special qualities 
is true progress. Liberty which goes with unity is true 
liberty. Not a day passes but we wish to accomplish this 
sort of liberty and plan for that progress. Men call the 
copying of foreign things progress, and the advocacy of 
personal rights liberty. This will destroy the special 
qualities of our nation, injure its unity, disrupt and 
endanger the true spirit of the people, and will 
eventually bring us to enslavement by other countries.
How can that be progress and liberty?
Those v/ho try to protect their political power by 
making selfish use of military force are public enemies of 
liberty. Those who want to capture political power by 
encouraging parties and factions are public enemies of 
liberty. We shall regard it as our duty under a 
constitutional system to check these public enemies. The 
union of Throne and people, and the thing that makes 
development possible, is what we call the nation. Political 
power should always be fully and firmly in the hands of 
the nation as a whole.
Anyone agreeing with these principles is one of us.
We believe that all upright gentlemen in the Empire must 
agree with these principles. The competition of the Powers 
is indeed a danger to the Orient. Is not a danger to the 
Orient a danger to the Japanese nation? Those v/ho do not 
really care for their country vainly bustle round inside 
its boundaries, boasting of its small reputation; they dare 
to make a plaything of the constitutional system even. We, 
for the sake of the future of the Japanese people, wish to 
pledge ourselves to the duty of stopping this. Our intentions 
are as herein stated.
(5tsu Junichiro, Dai Nihon Kensei Shi, vol.III,
pp.*+56-8)
Appendix XII
Taisei-kai Declaration« 22 August 1890«
Briefly, our objectives are the prosperity of the 
state and the happiness of its people; and we hope to 
attain to these objectives by upholding righteousness and 
paying attention to public morality. We are not a 
Government party; neither are we an opposition party. 
Though we welcome progress, we shall not push forward too 
quickly. Though we value lav; and order, we shall not be 
blindly conservative. Thinking only of the good of the 
country and the welfare of the people, we shall confine 
ourselves to adopting policies that are both sound and 
honest and shall tread the great road of fairness and 
impartiality. At the present time, the reduction of the 
fiscal burden borne by the people is an important task; 
yet from the point of view of enlarging national rights, 
we cannot be parsimonious about national expenditures. We 
look forward to making the legal system as complete and as 
perfect as possible; but we have to take into account the 
condition of the country and the state of the people. 
Naturally, the introduction of responsible cabinets is an 
urgent matter; but v/e must see to it that the transfer of 
governmental power does not lead to bad feeling because 
of personal greed and ambition. The need for treaty 
revision is indisputable; yet it must be achieved in a 
manner creditable to ourselves, and we are against 
damaging the national interest through rash actions.
In short, statements of general principles are 
dependent on reality. What is that reality but practical 
problems? Therefore we have dispensed with a statement 
of general principles, and hope to bring about 
parliamentary government by making up our minds about 
practical problems one by one. This is why we have held this meeting.
(Hayashida Kämetaro, Nihon Seito Shi, vol.I,
pp.298-9)
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L i s t  o f  U n v e r i f i e d  P e r s o n a l  Names A p p e a r in g  i n  Main 
Body o f  th e  T e x t .  O th e r  Than Names o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
E l e c t e d  i n  J u l y  1890 .
A m ash i ro .........................
E b a ro  S e n z o .................
Endo H a r u h ik o . . . . . .
F u k u i  Mohei.................
Hatoyama. Kazuo..........
H i k o t a ......................
H i r a b a y a s h i  K yube i ,
Hiranuma S e n zö ..........
H i r o s e .............................
K iraura .............................
Kiraura Hampei.............
K obay ash i  K a n i c h i r o
K o im a i .............................
Kudama T o k u t a r o . . . .
K urusu  S o h e i . . ..........
Matsuo S e i j i r o ..........
Mizushima Y a s u t a r o .  
No guc h i  Honno s u k e . .
S a to  Kiemon.................
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Suzuki Inenosuke 
Takada Kiyonobu. 
Tanaka Tokitaro, 
Totsuka Sentaro, 
Tsugawa Migiyumi 
Udagawa Sonzo...
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1A ppendix XV.
S e le c t iv e  B ib l io g r a p h y .
A. PRIMARY SOURCES.
1 . N ew spapers: The g r e a t e r  p a r t  o f  th e  m a t e r i a l
u se d  i n  t h i s  t h e s i s  h a s  b e en  ta k e n  from  
n ew sp ap ers  and m ag az in es  made a v a i l a b l e  to  
me a t  th e  M e iji  N ew spaper and  M agazine A rc h iv e s  
( M e ij i  Shimbun Z a s s h i  Bunko) i n  Tokyo U n iv e r s i ty .  
T hese f i l e s  were a s  f o l lo w s : -
a .  M e tro p o li ta n  P r e s s :  Kampo ( O f f i c i a l
G a z e t te ) ;  Kokum in-no Tomo (m a g a z in e ) ;  
Kokumin Shim bun; N ippon Shim bun; Tokyo 
N ic h i N ic h i Shim bun; Y ü b in -H o ch i 
Shimbun.
b . P r o v in c ia l  P a p e r s : K in  jo  Shim bun;
KSchi Shimbun ( a l i a s  Toyo Shim bun); 
N i ig a ta  Shim bun; O saka M a in ic h i;
Sanyo Shim bun: Tohoku M a in ic h i;
Toyo Shimbun ( a l i a s  K ochi Sh im bun).
N ote: The u s e f u ln e s s  a s  w e l l  a s  th e  p o l i t i c a l
o u tlo o k  o f  th e  above v a r i e d  t o  q u i t e  a  m arked  
e x t e n t .  F o r  exam p le , th e  O saka M a in ic h i was 
d i s a p p o in t in g ly  d e f i c i e n t  i n  e l e c t o r a l  news 
and comment. On th e  o t h e r  h a n d , t h e  Tokyo 
N ic h i N ic h i p ro v ed  a v e r i t a b l e  m ine o f  
in f o r m a t io n ,  and gave  by f a r  th e  b e s t  o v e r a l l  
r e p o r t in g  on th e  e l e c t i o n .  S in c e  i t  o f t e n  
happened  t h a t  th e  same i te m  w ould  be r e p o r te d  
i n  th e  same words i n  a l l  t h r e e  m a jo r  Tokyo 
p a p e rs  (Kokum in, Tokyo N ic h i N ic h i ,  and  Y u b in - 
H o c h i); I  h a v e , f o r  th e  sa k e  o f  c o n s i s t e n c y ,  
r e f e r r e d  to  th e  Tokyo N ic h i N ic h i  w henever 
p o s s ib l e .  Some o f  th e  a r t i c l e s  on th e  e l e c t i o n  
w i l l  be found  i n  volum e 7 o f  Nakayama Y asu m asa 's  
Shim bun S h u se i M e ij i  Hennen S h i (A C h ro n o lo g ic a l  
M e ij i  H is to ry  C om piled From N e w sp a p e rs ) , T okyo, 
1935.
. i .
22. Suematsu Kencho, Ni-ju-san Nen-no So-Senkyo,
in volume 3 of Meiji Bunka Zenshü, pp. 200-221. 
(Comment authoritative; statistics invaluable.)
3. Kayashida Kametaro, Nihon Seito Shi, vol. 1, published by Dai Nihon Yuben Kai, Tokyo, 1927» 
(Furigana readings for all personal names are 
very helpful.)
4* Ito Hirobumi, Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the Empire of Japan, trans. by Ito Myoji, 
Tokyo, 1906.
5* McLaren, W.W., Japanese Government Documents, 
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 
vol. 42, May 1914, Tokyo.
6. Okubo Kagao, Shugi-in Giin Kohosha Retsuden 
(Biographies of Candidates for the House of 
Representatives), Tokyo, 1890.
7* Otsu Junichiro, Dai Nihon Kensei Shi, vol.3, 
Tokyo, 1927.
B. SECONDARY SOURCES.
Beckmann, G.M., The Making of the Meiji 
Constitution, Lawrence, 1957*
Dai Nihon Teikoku Gikai Shi (Record of the Imperial Japanese Diet) 1890-92.
Genro-in Kaigi Hikki (Senate Record) 1889.
Hayashida Kametaro, Meiji-Taisho Seikai 
Sokuraen Shi (inner History of the Political 
World in the Meiji and Taisho Eras), Tokyo, 1926.
Ike Nobutaka, The Beginnings of Political 
Democracy in Japan, Baltimore, 1950.
Ike Nobutaka, Landownership and Taxation in 
the Westernization of Japan, The Journal of 
Economic History, vol. 7, Nov. 1947*
Itagaki Taisuke, Jiyu-to Shi (History of the 
Liberty Party), 2 volumes, Tokyo, 1910.
3Jones, F.C., Extraterritoriality in Japan and 
the Diplomatic Relations Resulting in Its Abolition 
1853-09» New Haven, 1931*
Lay, A.H., History of the Rise of Political 
Parties in Japan, Transactions of the Asiatic 
Society of Japan, vol. 30 Pt. iii, 1902.
Miyakoshi Shinichiro, Nihon Kensei Kiso Shiryö (Materials on the Setting Up of the Japanese 
Constitutional System), Tokyo, 1939»
Norman, E.H., Japan*s Emergence as a Modern 
State, New York, 1940.
Norman, E.H., Feudal Background of Japanese 
Politics, Secretariat Paper No. 9 for the Ninth 
Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1945.
Norman, E.H., Soldier and Peasant in Japan:
The Origins of Conscription, New York, 1943.
Ökuma Shigenobu (editor), Fifty Years of New Japan, 2 volumes, London, 1910.
Scalapino, R.A., Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First 
Attempt, University of California Press, 1953.
Scalapino, R.A., Japan: Between Traditionalism and Democracy, in Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics, edited by Sigmund Neumann, Chicago, 1956.
Simmons, D.B. and Wigmore, J.H., Notes on Land 
Tenure and Local Institutions in Old Japan, 
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. 19, 1891.
Smith, N. Skene, Materials on Japanese Social 
and Economic History: Tokugawa Japan,
Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan,Second Series, vol. 14, 1937.
State Papers presented to both Houses of Parliament, 1868-70*
4Tani Kargo Iko (Posthumous Papers of Tani 
Kanjo), 2 volumes, Tokyo, 1912.
Tsunoda, R., de Bary, W.T., and Keene, D., 
Sources of Japanese Tradition, New York,
1958.
Uyehara, G.E., The Political Development of 
Japan 1867-1909, London, 1910.
Wigmore, J.H., Materials for the Study of 
Private Law in Old Japan, Transactions of 
the Asiatic Society of Japan, vol. 20, 
Supplement, December 1892.
Wilson, R.A., The Seitaisho: A Constitutional
Experiment, Par Eastern Quarterly, vol. 11, 
1952.
C. OTHER WORKS.
Allen, G.C. , A Short Economic History of 
Modern Japan 1867-1937, London, 1946.
Asakawa, K., Some of the Contributions of 
Feudal Japan to the New Japan, Reprinted from 
The Journal of Race Development, vol. 3 No. I, 
July 1912.
Asakawa, K., Notes on Village Government in 
Japan after 1600, Journal of the American 
Oriental Society, June 1910.
De Bary, W.T. , Five Women Who Loved Love (a 
translation of Ihara Saikakufs Koshoku Gonin 
Onna), Tokyo, 1956.
Bellah, R.N., Tokugawa Religion: the values 
of pre-industrial Japan, Glencoe, 1937.
Benedict, R., The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, 
Tokyo, 1954.
Black, J.R., Young Japan, 2 volumes, London, 1880.
5Borton, H., Peasant Uprisings in Japan 
of the Tokugawa Period, Transactions of 
the Asiatic Society of Japan, Second Series, 
vol. 16, May 1938.
Chamberlain, B.H., Things Japanese, London,
1905.
Craig, A.M., Choshu in the Meiji Restoration, 
Harvard, 1961.
Embree, J.P., A Japanese village: Suye Mura, 
London, 1946.
Fisher, G.M., Kumazawa Banzan: His Life and 
Ideas, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of 
Japan, Second Series, vol. 16, May 1938*
Fukuzawa Yukichi, Autobiography, translated 
by Kiyooka Eiichi, Tokyo, 1934#
Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshu (Collected Works of 
Fukuzawa Yukichi), Tokyo, 1925*
Gubbins, J.H., The Making of Modern Japan,
London, 1922.
Harrison, J.A., The Ainu of Northern Japan 
(an annotated translation of Takakura Shinichiro's Ainu Seisaku Shi), Transactions 
of the American Philosophical Society, New 
Series, vol. 50 Pi* iv, April i960.
Hearn, L., Japan An Attempt At Interpretation, 
London, 1913*
Hearn, L., Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan, 2 
volumes, London, 1894.
Honjo Eijiro, The Decay of the Samurai Class, 
Kyoto University Economic Review, vol. 2 No. i, 
1927.
Honjo Eijiro, Changes of Social Classes During 
the Tokugawa Period, Kyoto University Economic 
Review, vol. 3 No. i, 1928.
Honjo Eijiro, A Short History of Social Problems 
in Japan Before the Restoration, Kyoto University 
Economic Review, vol. 3 No. ii, 1928.
6Honjo Eijiro, The Social and Economic History 
of Japan, Kyoto, 1935*
Horie Yasuzo, The Economic Significance of the 
Meiji Restoration, Kyoto University Economic 
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Iddittie Junesay (Ichichi Junsei), Marquis 
5kuma: A Biographical Study in the Rise of 
Democratic Japan, Tokyo, 1940.
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INTRODUCTION;
CHAPTER ONE;
CHAPTER TWO;
Meiji Constitution - process leading to promulgation of 
constitution was one of interaction between bureaucrats and 
their opponents - rise of the Liberty and Popular Rights 
Movement - early political parties - Government's policy 
of gradualism - Western influence - traditional background.
Organization and Administration.
Distribution of seats - franchise qualifications - size of 
electorate in each constituency - qualifications for 
candidates - election officers - electoral rolls - polling 
stations and supervision of voting - ballot boxes - voting 
procedure - counting of votes and declaration of poll 
meetings - criticisms of Law of Election - police activities 
in checking breaches of the law and safeguarding the voting - 
general success of administrative arrangements.
Parties, Principles, and Issues.
Daidö Danketsu - development of three Liberal factions - 
collapse of Daido Danketsu symptomatic of basic weaknesses 
of Liberal movement - Liberal election manifestos - Itagaki's 
campaign speeches in Ibaraki Prefecture - Okamoto Takeo's 
speech in Mie Prefecture - Matsuo Seijiro's speech in Tokyo 
fu - Kyushu Confederation of Progressive Parties - Köin 
Club - union of anti-Government forces desirable but 
difficult - policies of the Liberals better than their 
organization - Kaishin-to comparatively stable because 
of the nature of its membership - careers of Shimada Saburo 
and Ozaki Yukio - differences between the Liberals and 
Progressives not very serious - Kaishin-to policies as 
revealed in the editorials of the Yübin-Hochi Shimbun - 
Conservative forces badly divided and generally weak - 
distinction between conservativism and reaction - Inoue 
Kaoru's attempt to found a moderate conservative group - 
career of Tani Kanjö and his attitude towards the election - 
career and outlook of Torio Koyata - Torio's attempt to 
intervene in the election by starting a political party - 
nature of the Ultra-Conservativism of 1890 - Independent 
candidates very numerous - reasons for this state of 
affairs - Liberal and Ultra-Conservative groups of 1890 
descended from the Imperialist and anti-foreign agitation 
of Bakumatsu period - growing power of the socially conserv­
ative landlord bloc in the Liberal movement - latent strength 
of Ultra-Conservative attitudes - medial role of bureaucracy - 
industrialization - importance of the Progressive Party in 
the future development of the representative system.
CHAPTER THREE: The Election Campaign - General Survey,
CHAPTER FOUR:
CONCLUSIONS:
Ratio of candidates to seats - types of candidates - methods 
of nomination - importance of localism and personality in 
places where groups of voters selected candidates - speech 
meetings and parties - entertainment of voters as major 
feature of some campaigns - legitimate canvassing - rumours 
and tricks - newspapers and the soliciting of votes - 
majority of campaigns run on a basis of local affinities and 
personal endeavour - corruption widespread but not very 
efficacious - use of violence and links between politics 
and the underworld - intimidation not often successful.
Election Results and Composition of the First House of 
Representatives.
Election itself was orderly - results of voting - amalgamation 
of Liberal factions - breakdown of negotiations for a union of 
Liberals and Progressives - party strengths on the eve of the 
opening of the Diet - social background, age, and financial 
status of average Member - occupations of Members - rural 
landlord-entrepreneur interest well represented in the new 
House - many Members had previously sat in the local 
assemblies.
Meiji constitutional process seen as one of interaction - 
first general election discussed in terms of this theory of 
interaction - dynamics of interaction - strength of localism 
and individualism apparent from history of first general 
election - Meiji interaction stemmed from Tokugawa pluralism - 
mid-meiji society as shown in newspaper accounts of the 
election.
